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Abstract  
This study aims to investigate empirically the extent of mandatory disclosure with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the level of voluntary disclosure 
by firms in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) member states — namely, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — over the 
period 2010 to 2013, and to explain why some firms disclose more than others. It aims to 
investigate the determinants of mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of GCC listed firms. It seeks to assess the relationship between a number of firm-
specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, 
corporate governance factors and cultural factors (manager’s personal characteristics) and 
the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures. In addition, this study captures the 
impact of voluntary disclosure level on mandatory disclosure level, and the impact of 
mandatory disclosure level on voluntary disclosure level in sub-sample country groups. 
This study does not focus on the value relevance of the accounting information to the 
market participants, but instead it focuses on an investigation of compliance with 
accounting standards and differences in voluntary disclosure levels across GCC member 
states.    
 
The relevant regulators and enforcement bodies are discussed to explain their monitoring 
and enforcement activities. The study shows that the surveillance departments of the 
ministry of commerce and the external auditors are the most important regulators which 
affect the level and nature of disclosure in GCC countries. The enforcement bodies, as 
governmental non-profitable organizations, manage the relationship between investors, the 
stock exchange, brokers and the company. The existence of regulators and enforcement 
bodies is the major reason for improvement in the disclosure level in GCC countries.   
 
The extent of mandatory disclosure and the level of voluntary disclosure are examined 
using two different disclosure indices. The disclosure index for the former contains 325 
mandatory disclosure items and the disclosure index for the latter comprises 129 voluntary 
disclosure items. The empirical approach is applied to the financial statements of 120 listed 
firms. Multivariate regression analysis is employed to explore the relationships between the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures and firm-specific characteristics and year 
dummy variables.  
 
xv 
 
The level of mandatory items disclosed by the sample GCC country listed firms compared 
to what is required in the 24 applicable IFRSs/IASs (325 mandatory disclosure items) is 
found to vary across the GCC countries. This reflects differences in each state’s position 
over time in relation to the adoption of IFRSs, differences in the effectiveness of 
enforcement bodies, and differences in the nature of the audit. The average level of 
mandatory disclosure requirements with the 24 IFRSs investigated across firms and years 
was 0.73, with a range from 61% to 87%. The level of mandatory disclosure increased from 
0.72 in 2010 to 0.74 in 2013, indicating that the level of mandatory disclosure improved in 
the region over the study period. However, no firm within the study period fully matched 
the benchmark index created. The level of mandatory disclosure varies across the GCC 
listed firms. The highest average mandatory disclosure level for all years was in the UAE 
(0.77) followed by Qatar (0.76) Kuwait (0.74) Oman (0.72), Saudi Arabia (0.71) and 
Bahrain (0.71). 
 
 Several firm characteristics help to explain the level of mandatory disclosure. The extent 
of mandatory disclosure increases with firm size, international presence (international 
listing and international sales), group firms, firm age, the proportion of state share 
ownership, the degree of board independence, and the education level of the board of 
directors and company financial controllers. In addition, the level of mandatory disclosure 
also varies by industry type. In contrast, the level of mandatory disclosure decreases with 
firm profitability, the proportion of institutional share ownership, board size, CEO role 
duality, and the level of voluntary disclosure. In addition, there were significant differences 
in the level of mandatory disclosure through time and across country groups. The level of 
mandatory disclosure is higher in the sub-sample country group ( higher level of exports 
countries). However, liquidity is found not to be a significant factor in explaining variations 
in mandatory disclosure levels.  
 
The average level of voluntary disclosure for the GCC listed firms as a whole, across the 
13 groups of information categories (129 voluntary disclosure items), and examined for all 
years was 0.31; that is, on average firms disclosed 31% of the voluntary disclosure items, 
with a range from 9% to 68%. The voluntary disclosure mean levels for all years were as 
follows: Saudi Arabia: 0.45, Oman: 0.38, Bahrain: 0.32, Qatar: 0.32, the UAE: 0.23 and 
Kuwait: 0.21. The level of voluntary disclosure increased by 1% over the sample period, 
from 0.31 in 2010 to 0.32 in 2013, indicating that the extent of voluntary disclosure has 
xvi 
 
improved slightly in the GCC listed firms. However, no sample firm fully disclosed the full 
list of benchmark voluntary information items. 
 
The level of voluntary disclosure varies by the type of information, consistent with existing 
studies. The highest group scores were for general information (0.66), information about 
directors (0.57),  foreign currency information (0.48) and market-based information (0.42), 
whereas the lowest group scores were for future prospects (0.08), research and 
development (0.11), employee information (0.18) and social policy and value added 
information (0.26). The findings show that GCC listed firms disclose significantly 
more general information, directors’ information, foreign currency information and market 
information than future prospect information, research and development information, 
employee and social information. 
 
The level of voluntary disclosure increases with firm size, leverage, profitability, the 
proportion of assets in place, multiple exchange listing status, firm age, the proportion of 
state share ownership, board size and CEO role duality. In addition, the level of voluntary 
disclosure also varied by industry type. In contrast, the level of voluntary disclosure was 
lower for service sector firms, and in relation to the proportion of director ownership, the 
proportion of family members on the board and the extent of mandatory disclosure. In 
addition, the level of voluntary disclosure is higher in the sub-sample country group (firms 
with developed stock markets). The results show no significant differences in the level of 
voluntary disclosure through time. However, liquidity, the proportion of institutional share 
ownership, and the degree of board independence do not evidence a significant association 
with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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 Introduction 
 
 Background to the study 
It is apparent that it is important for modern firms to be part of the global market. As global 
firms wish to attract wider investors, they disclose information on both a mandatory and 
voluntary basis for the purposes of satisfying the investors’ interests (Schuster and 
O’Connell, 2006). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has become 
increasingly influential in the world of commerce. Its principal objective is to issue 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) in order to increase the comparability of the 
financial reports produced by companies, regardless of their country of origin (Choi et al., 
2002). The IASB, which has no power to enforce its standards, issued 41 IASs by 
December 2002 and achieved much since its foundation in 1973 (Choi et al., 2002; 
Radebaugh and Gray, 2006). In 2000, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) approved a resolution supporting its members’ use of IASs. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) first began as an attempt to harmonize 
accounting systems across the European Union (EU) but the value of harmonization 
quickly made the concept attractive around the world. They are sometimes still called by 
the original name of IASs. IASs are issued between 1973 and 2001 by the Board of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). On 1 April 2001, the new IASB 
took over from the IASC the responsibility for setting IASs (Hossain et al, 2015). During 
its first meeting the new Board adopted existing IASs and Standing Interpretations 
Committee standards (SICs). The IASB has continued to develop standards calling the new 
standards IFRSs.  
 
Since then the European Commission (EC) has passed legislation requiring all European 
listed firms preparing consolidated financial statements to comply with IASs/IFRSs from 
1 January 2005 (EC, 2016). From mid-2005, over 90 countries have claimed to have 
adopted, or plan to adopt in future, IASs (IASB, 2005). However, recent research provides 
significant evidence of non-compliance with IASs/IFRSs by firms claiming to have 
adopted them (Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). Similarly, the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has observed that auditors at times assert that financial 
statements comply with IASs/IFRSs when firms’ accounting policies and notes indicate 
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otherwise (Cairns, 1997). Given these findings, the activity and effectiveness of 
enforcement bodies that are responsible for promoting compliance with IASs/IFRSs has 
been questioned (Glaum and Street, 2003). The existing academic research focuses mainly 
on firms domiciled in developed countries, whereas developing country firms have been 
somewhat neglected.  
A number of authors such as Ettredge et al., (2002), Brennan and Hourigan (2000), and 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) investigate the relationship between the extent of corporate 
financial disclosures and corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate 
governance, and cultural factors. Such studies are orientated largely towards developed 
nations, limiting the potential generalisation of results to emerging economies. In spite of 
the existence of numerous studies on the topic of corporate financial reporting, there is a 
dearth of knowledge, for example, about corporate information disclosure in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) member country firms (Ismail, 2002). Thus, there is a need to 
assess the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure for firms situated in GCC nations, 
as well as understanding the drivers of such disclosure. 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council, established in 1981, aims to enhance economic 
development and collaboration in the area (Al-Shammari, 2005). The member states; 
namely, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
have a strong religious dimension as well as strong economic interdependence. All of the 
GCC countries have exhibited increasing market capitalisation and significant growth in 
the region over the decades has led the member states to adopt International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) in order to satisfy the needs of both local and foreign investors (Al-
Shammari et al., 2008). 
 
This study focuses on the GCC member states, as emerging markets, as they provide a 
useful setting for examining the extent of mandatory disclosure as these states have made 
IASs/IFRSs mandatory since 2001. The GCC was established in May 1981 from six Arab 
Gulf states, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). The purpose of the GCC is to encourage integration between members in 
matters of national security, foreign policy, and economic and financial affairs. In 
November 1981, the GCC member states signed the Unified Economic Agreement which 
aimed to establish a common market and to encourage capital inflows from foreign 
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investors. In 1998, the GCC created the Gulf Co-Operation Council Accounting and 
Auditing Organization (GCCAAO) in order to promote the harmonisation of accounting 
and auditing standards. 
As there is a lack of knowledge about corporate information disclosure in GCC member 
country firms, as well as understanding the drivers of corporate disclosures for firms 
situated in GCC nations. This thesis is aim to examine the impact of firm-specific 
characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate 
governance factors and cultural factors (managers’ personal characteristics) on the extent 
of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
 
 Aim and objectives of the study 
Most firms wish to attract investors from global markets in order to raise funds to support 
investment. A firm can choose whether to add more information to its annual report that is 
used by investors in decision making (Meek et al., 1995). Increasing financial disclosure 
among firms has created some doubt regarding the quality and quantity of the information 
released (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006). However, a contrasting view is that complying 
with mandatory disclosure requirements and/or releasing additional information on a 
voluntary basis can be beneficial to the firm in many ways.  
 
Listed firms may enjoy many benefits by adapting to mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Firms clearly do not operate in isolation and in the present global environment, compliance 
with foreign reporting requirements will help to streamline their financial reporting. This 
will help to minimize reporting costs as a result of common reporting systems and 
consistency across firms in statutory reporting. Secondly, it will enable 
comparison/benchmarking with foreign competitors. Thirdly, since the adoption of 
IASs/IFRSs transcends national boundaries, cross-border acquisitions and joint ventures 
will be made possible, and it should facilitate easy access to foreign capital. Fourthly, firms 
are able to trade their shares and securities on stock exchanges worldwide. For instance, 
both developed and developing stock exchanges require financial statements to be prepared 
under IASs/IFRSs as investors are then able to make rational and informed decisions. 
Fifthly, the convergence of financial statements should provide a platform for management 
to view all firms in a group within a common platform. Thus, time and effort to adjust the 
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accounts in order to comply with the requirements of national GAAP is reduced. Business 
acquisitions can then be reflected at fair value rather than at the carrying values. There 
should be more objectivity and transparency in financial statements. For firms to enjoy 
these benefits, a single set of accounting standards worldwide should ensure that auditing 
firms standardize their training and maintain the quality of their work globally. 
 
Managers adopt voluntary disclosure in order to send signals to the capital market with the 
hope of obtaining positive feedback. Further benefits of such disclosure include the 
following: an increase in the firm’s credibility; an increase in share value; an increase in 
the potential number of investors; an improvement in access to capital; a diminution in a 
share’s volatility; an increase in share liquidity; an improvement in relations with suppliers; 
and a diminution in political intervention to regulate the market. However, a contrasting 
view is offered by some authors which emphasises the greater cost of preparation in 
providing such additional disclosure information (Schuster and O’Connell, 2006; McNeil, 
2007). 
 
A study by Al-Shammari et al. (2008) examines the extent to which firms that operate in 
the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states comply with International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). They show that significant compliance variations exist across 
GCC-based firms that utilise IASs. Non-compliance in GCC firms is also greater than that 
observed for developed countries, reflecting limited compliance monitoring and 
enforcement by the bodies in these countries that oversee financial reporting. Thus, 
variations may exist in the way firms listed on the GCC country stock markets actually 
implement of accounting standards. 
 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures in the annual reports of GCC country listed firms, as well as the determinants 
of such disclosure. In relation to the latter, it seeks to examine the relationship between the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure and factors such as corporate characteristics, 
ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors and cultural factors.  
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 Overview of the study 
Corporate financial disclosures play an important role in both investor and corporate 
decision-making. In particular, the fundamental purpose of financial information is to help 
investors to take effective decisions concerning their stock investment portfolios. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) argue that corporate disclosure practice does not develop in а vacuum, 
but rather reflects the underlying environmental influences that affect firm accounting 
practices in different countries (Choi and Levich, 1990; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). A 
variety of environmental factors affect corporate disclosure practices, including the 
following: the economy, the capital market, accounting and regulatory frameworks, 
enforcement mechanisms, and culture. Further, many existing studies consider various 
firm-specific characteristics that may affect the corporate financial disclosures in annual 
reports such as corporate characteristics and ownership structure factors (Cerf, 1961; Firth, 
1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991, 1992; Malone et al., 1993; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Street and Gray, 2002; Glaum 
and Street, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Popova et al., 2013). 
Recent research has examined the impact of corporate governance and cultural factors on 
accounting disclosure (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Adams and Hossain, 1998; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Chau and Gray, 2002; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; 
Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Similarly, other studies (Wallace and Gernon, 
1991; Cooke, 1992; Ali and Hwang, 2000) explain why accounting systems and corporate 
disclosure practices differ from one country to another.  
 
The aim of corporate disclosure, including mandatory and voluntary disclosures, is to 
inform the users of financial information in order to help them make informed investment 
decisions. Although financial regulation requires a significant and growing amount of 
mandatory reporting via different regulated financial reports, firms appear also to disclose 
voluntary information through capital markets with additional relevant disclosures through 
the press to investors. Firms' motivations for voluntarily disclosing information to investors 
have been studied widely.  
 
Regulators often require public disclosure to be equally provided to everyone by providing 
equal access to information across investors (Hakansson, 1977). Existing studies, such as 
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Bushman (1991) and Lundholm (1991) assume that investors observe public disclosure and 
their private information at the same time. In the economy we consider, traders are allowed 
to acquire and trade on private information prior to the public signal’s disclosure. 
Therefore, a forthcoming public disclosure can stimulate private information collection in 
the pre-announcement period. This leads to information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry occurs when one or more investors have private information about the firm’s 
value while other investors only have access to public information (Brown and Hillegeist, 
2007). Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2005) find that there is a negative relationship between 
disclosure quality and information asymmetry. Empirical evidence from regulators 
suggests that disclosing high-quality information makes capital markets more attractive to 
“common”, uninformed investors (FASB, 2001; FASC, 1998; Levitt, 1998). According to 
Botosan (1997), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003), we can reduce 
information asymmetry by improvements in firm transparency through quality disclosure 
in the annual report.  
 
Despite the fact that GCC countries have relatively strong economies, their stock markets 
remain dominated by GCC nationals (Evans, 2010). Some GCC governments such as that 
of Saudi Arabia are confronted by conflicting objectives: they want to have a more 
transparent and mature stock market, and the only way to obtain this is to have long-term 
foreign investors. However, the government is anxious about ‘opening the door’ of 
investment to foreign investors. For instance, the ‘Tadawul (SSE) was opened to Saudi 
nationals, although their participation remains limited as they have tended to focus on their 
domestic markets’ (Savard et al., 2009, p.4). The Capital Market Authority (CMA) issued 
Circular No. 2-28-2008 (‘the swap agreement’) which allows foreign investors to 
participate in the trading of Saudi shares (Al Tamimi and Company, 2008). GCC countries 
have evidenced growth in their economies in recent years, thereby attracting investment 
from across the world, and especially from Western nations. As such, there has been a lot 
of pressure on GCC member nations to adopt globally accepted accounting principles. This 
has led to the adoption of the IASs/IFRSs so that the accounting principles of the member 
nations may be harmonized, and so that governments can deal effectively with foreign firms 
in the region. Indeed, the new agreement has been a portal for overseas investors who want 
access to GCC member state stock markets. Foreign investors who want to take part in 
GCC stock markets require more information about the operating and financial conditions 
of component firms as found in their annual reports.   
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Corporate disclosure in the annual reporting of GCC listed firms has become a popular 
research topic as this avenue is the most widely disseminated source of information on 
publicly held firms (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Once the determinants of corporate 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are identified from theory, the determinant variables 
may be modelled in order to test hypotheses concerning such determinants. This thesis 
studies the relationship between the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures and 
factors such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance 
factors and cultural factors in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
 
 Motivation of the study 
The primary motivation of this thesis is to determine the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures in GCC country listed firms after IASs/IFRSs’ adoption. Further, it aims to 
investigate the key factors which determine mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices 
in GCC listed firms. Importantly, this study covers area field in which there are relatively 
few studies on emerging financial markets in general, and GCC in particular.  
 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) investigate the extent of compliance with international 
accounting standards (IAS) by companies in GCC member states (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). They find that compliance increases 
over time, from 68% in 1996 to 82% in 2002. Irvine and Lucas (2006) examine the impact 
of IFRS adoption on a developing country, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They 
conclude that the UAE will face challenges such as the development of a legal and 
regulatory structure to overcome a culture of secrecy and fraud when implementing IFRS. 
Furthermore, Mutawaa and Hewaidy (2010) investigate the extent of the compliance level 
of Kuwaiti listed firms with IFRS disclosure and find that the overall compliance level for 
48 non-financial companies averages 69% of the disclosures required in relation to the 
selected standards tested. 
  
This thesis aims to extend the existing literature work in order to expand our understanding 
of the mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices across GCC country listed firms, and 
in particular explores the factors which determine the corporate disclosure practices.  The 
study is important as it investigates the reasons for the variations in mandatory and 
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voluntary disclosures across GCC listed firms in much greater depth. Al-Mulhem (1997) 
argues that existing studies for different countries reveal that the level of disclosure varies 
significantly across firms according to variables such as firm size, industry type, leverage 
and profitability. This study will attempt to determine the factors in depth which affect the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures for GCC country listed firms.  
 
 Research questions 
This study intends to address the following three research questions: 
Question 1: To what extent do GCC country listed firms disclose mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure information? 
Question 2: What are the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in GCC 
country listed firms? 
Question 3: How and why do the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
differ across GCC country listed firms? 
Finding answers to these research questions is important for understanding whether 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures have improved and for identifying factors that help 
explain the differences in the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures across GCC 
listed firms. The enforcement body in each GCC member state is likely to be interested in 
any low level of disclosures by firms. The findings will interest the GCCAAO in their 
efforts to harmonise accounting standards in the region. The findings may provide the 
GCCAAO with useful information about the spread of IASs/IFRSs among firms in the 
member states and the attributes that lead to greater disclosures. The findings offer current 
and prospective local and foreign investors an objective assessment of the level of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the GCC listed firms. This study also provides the 
IASB with potentially useful information about the level of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures in a particular region and the factors associated with it. 
 
Disclosure for an item is mandatory if the item, when applicable, must be reported in the 
financial statements of firms in accordance with legal or financial reporting requirements. 
Voluntary disclosure refers to disclosure of any item that is not so required. In this study, 
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mandatory and voluntary disclosures is examined to assess the level of both disclosures in 
the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
 
The focus of most mandatory and voluntary disclosures research has been on developed 
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and continental European 
countries (Nobes, 1990; Street, Gray and Bryant, 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and 
Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). This study extends this literature in developing 
countries in general and to the GCC member states in particular. 
 
 Research method  
Due to the large number of listed firms in the GCC countries, the sample for testing the 
hypotheses in this thesis consists of the top 20 non-financial listed firms, selected on the 
basis of the highest market weight index for each GCC stock market over the period 2010 
to 2013. The primary data source used to examine the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure is the annual reports of GCC-listed firms. As the data must be hand collected 
and obtaining annual reports for earlier years is difficult, the study period is from 2010 to 
2013, which is the most recent data available for GCC-listed firms at the time of data 
collection. 24 IASs/IFRSs mandatory disclosure standards, 325 mandatory disclosure 
items, and 129 voluntary disclosures items are selected to measure the level of disclosure, 
based on their applicability and relevance to the business environment in the GCC member 
states over this period. 
 
To investigate the relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the attributes that explain disclosure differences, the mandatory 
disclosure index and the voluntary disclosure index are computed as the dependent 
variable. Corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance 
factors, and cultural factors (manager’s personal characteristics) are examined as 
independent variables. 
 
In corporate disclosure research, researchers use a range of methodologies depending on 
the precise focus of their studies. Since it is very difficult to capture the complete range of 
corporate disclosures in the annual reports, it is essential to compute a disclosure index 
(Barako, 2007) in order to operationalise the research. Consistent with existing mandatory 
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disclosure research (Cooke, 1989, 1991, 1992; Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; 
Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-Shammari et al., 2008) and voluntary 
disclosure studies (Buzby, 1975; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989b, 1991; 
Hossain, 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1997; Abd-
elsalam, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Xiao, Yang and 
Chow, 2004; Tsamenyi M, Enninful-Adu E, 2006; Hossain, 2008) in this thesis, disclosure 
indices are used to measure the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of  GCC country listed firms. A score of 1 is awarded if an item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. The mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices are used as the dependent 
variables in the empirical models and are prepared on the basis of the selected disclosure 
items. To test the study hypotheses, a simple multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
analysis is used to model the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures against the 
independent variables in GCC country listed firms.  
 
 A summary of the research findings  
1.7.1 The extent of mandatory disclosure 
In this thesis, for all GCC countries firms, the average level of mandatory disclosure with 
the items in 24 IASs/IFRSs investigated across all years is 0.73 out of the required level of 
1. Thus, on average firms disclosed 73% of the disclosure and measurement items required 
in 24 IASs/IFRSs, with a range of 61% to 87%. In GCC country firms, the extent of 
mandatory disclosure increased over time, rising from 0.71 in 2010 to 0.74 in 2013, 
indicating that the level of mandatory disclosure has been improving in the region over that 
period. However, no firm in the sample and study period fully disclosed all required 
disclosures in 24 standards. 
 
The level of mandatory disclosure among GCC country listed firms is found to be not only 
lower than the level of mandatory disclosure in developed countries, but also lower than in 
some developing countries. In this thesis, the level of mandatory disclosure is found to be 
lower than that found by Al-Shammari et al. (2008) among GCC member states, where the 
level of disclosure in their study of 14 IASs for all years for the entire region is 75%. The 
explanation for this may lie in the number of applicable IFRSs used in this study (24 
IASs/IFRSs) compared with only 14 IASs in the study of Al-Shammari et al. (2008). In 
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addition, the adoption of recent accounting standards such as: IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12 
and IFRS 13, which firms are not familiar with, has a negative impact on the overall 
mandatory disclosure level. Thus, a low level of mandatory disclosure may be associated 
with proprietary costs, difficulty in adherence, the sensitive nature of certain standards, and 
lack of firm experience in interpreting the requirements. 
 
The level of mandatory items disclosed by the sample GCC-listed firms compared to what 
is required in the 24 applicable IFRSs/IASs is found to vary across the GCC countries. This 
reflects differences in each state’s position over time in relation to the adoption of IFRSs, 
differences in the effectiveness of enforcement bodies, and differences in the nature of the 
audit. The highest average mandatory disclosure level across the study years is in the UAE 
(0.77), followed by Qatar (0.76) Kuwait (0.74) Oman (0.72), Saudi Arabia (0.71) and 
Bahrain (0.71). Further, the level of mandatory disclosure increases over time for each GCC 
member state, indicating that accounting practices in these states have been moving 
towards greater consistency with IFRSs. 
 
The results show wide variation in the level of mandatory disclosure across the 24 
applicable IAS/IFRS. Higher levels of mandatory disclosure for some standards may be 
attributed to those standards having requirements that are relatively easy to meet. So, firms 
and auditors are more familiar with some standards and have the experience to meet the 
requirements of those standards. Further, the medium level of mandatory disclosure for 
some standards appears to be determined by firm-specific characteristics. So, the variations 
in corporate characteristics among GCC listed firms such as firm size, industry type, 
profitability, internationality and firm age contributed to differences in the level of 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
Where standards evidence lower levels of disclosure, contributing factors appear to be 
proprietary costs. Firms limit the level of disclosure because of the existence of disclosure 
related costs (proprietary costs). These costs include not only the costs of preparing and 
disseminating information but also the cost deriving from disclosing information which 
may be used by competitors and other parties in a way which is harmful for the reporting 
company, this potential threat associated with disclosure may cause firms to limit their 
disclosure levels when proprietary costs arise. In addition, difficulty in adherence, the 
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sensitive nature of the disclosure requirements, and preparer inexperience in implementing 
the standard also may cause firms to limit their disclosure levels.  
 
The results evidence a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and 
firm size, international presence (international market listing and international sales), firms 
with group accounting standards or consolidated financial statements, firm age, the 
percentage of state share ownership, the degree of board independence, education level of 
board directors and financial controllers. Further, the levels of mandatory disclosure among 
GCC country listed firms are negatively related to firm profitability, the degree of 
institutional share ownership, board size, the presence of CEO role duality, and level of 
voluntary disclosure. The results also evidence of significant differences in mandatory 
disclosure levels across the three industry categories (manufacturing, services and energy) 
in GCC country listed firms. In addition, there are significant differences in the level of 
mandatory disclosure through time and across country groups (grouped by high level of 
exports). However, liquidity is not a significant factor when explaining variations in the 
level of mandatory disclosure.  
 
1.7.2 The extent of voluntary disclosure  
The average level of voluntary disclosure, for the GCC countries as a whole is 0.31, on the 
basis of 13 information categories across all sample years. Thus, on average the sample 
firms disclose 31% of voluntary disclosure items, with scores ranging from 9% to 68%. 
The mean voluntary disclosure levels across all years is as follows: Saudi Arabia (0.45), 
Oman (0.38), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE (0.23), and Kuwait (0.21). The average 
level of voluntary disclosure across GCC country listed firms is found to be higher than 
that reported by Al-Shammari (2008) for Kuwait (15%), Ferguson et al. (2002) for Hong 
Kong (13%), Meek et al. (1995) for the US, UK and Continental Europe (18%), Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) for Kuwait (19%), Alfaraih and Alanezi (2011) for Kuwait 
(22%), is similar to that found by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) for Malaysia (31%), but is 
lower than that found by Hossain and Hammami (2009) for Qatar (37%), Leventis and 
Weetman (2004) for Greece (37%) and  Al-Janadi et al. (2012) for the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia (36%). The level of voluntary disclosure improved by 1% over the period from 0.31 
in 2010 to 0.32 in 2013. However, no firm in the sample fully disclosed all voluntary 
information items.   
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The results show that the level of voluntary disclosure varies by the type of information (13 
groups of information), consistent with existing studies. The disclosure group scores in 
descending order are as follows: group 1 general information (0.66), group 9 information 
about directors (0.57), group 13 foreign currency information (0.48) and group 5 market-
based information (0.42), whereas the lowest groups were for group 6 future prospect 
(0.08), group 8 research and development (0.11), group 10 employee information (0.18), 
and group 11 social policy and value added information (0.26). The results show that GCC 
listed firms disclose significantly more general information, directors’ information, foreign 
currency information and market information than they do in relation to future prospects 
information, research and development information, and employee and social information. 
The results from the modelling of voluntary disclosures support a positive relationship 
between voluntary disclosure levels and firm size, industry type (energy), leverage, 
profitability, assets in place, multiple listing status, firm age, the degree of state share 
ownership, board size and the presence of role duality. Further, the results show that the 
level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the degree of director share ownership, 
the proportion of family members on the board, and with the extent of mandatory 
disclosure. The results show that the level of voluntary disclosure for industry type (service) 
is negatively significantly different from other industries. The results show no significant 
difference in the level of voluntary disclosure through time but it is significantly positively 
related to the country groups (length of stock market establishment). Liquidity, institutional 
share ownership and board independence are not significantly related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
 Contribution of this study  
This thesis makes the following contribution to the knowledge: 
First, the disclosure indices used in this study consist of two different disclosure indices, a 
mandatory disclosure index which contains 325 mandatory disclosure items and a 
voluntary disclosure index which comprises 129 voluntary discourse items. Thus, the thesis 
explores mandatory and voluntary disclosure in much greater depth than the existing 
literature (Cooke, 1992; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Glaum and Street, 2003; Omar, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Hassaan, 2012; 
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Popova et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). The resulting indices may be used by different 
stakeholders (e.g. investors, financial analysts, practitioners and academics) in order to 
assess the extent of corporate disclosures in GCC country listed firms. For future 
researcher, the indices may be updated by adding new mandatory disclosure items and other 
voluntary items, as appropriate for GCC listed firms. Therefore, the indices could act as a 
benchmark for regulators as well as users and researchers for the purposes of future analysis 
and evaluation. 
 
Second, the thesis investigates the factors which determine the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure across GCC country listed firms. This study is comprehensive in that 
it covers both mandatory disclosures (IAS and IFRS) and voluntary disclosures. It 
contributes to the corporate financial disclosure literature by providing new empirical 
evidence on the relationship between the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in 
firm annual reports and corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate 
governance factors, and cultural factors for GCC country listed firms. It represents first 
empirical study for GCC country listed firms concerning both the level of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures and their drivers. It provides a useful guide for understanding the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC country listed 
firms. Thus, this study makes an important additional contribution to the body of 
knowledge. 
 
Third, the study uses theoretical foundation of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
practices in the developed and mature markets, and seeking to determine whether they 
apply to an emerging economy setting in explaining the influence of firm-specific 
characteristics on the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of 
GCC country listed firms.  
 
Fourth, the results of this thesis provide a better understanding not only of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure practices in the GCC context but also of the factors that affect it. So, 
the results are interesting for investors, financial analysts, practitioners and academics and 
it gives an opportunity for more financial reporting comparable on a global scale.  
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 Structure of the thesis 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
regulations with which firms should comply and the role of external auditors in promoting 
compliance in GCC countries. It also discusses the role of the enforcement bodies charged 
with monitoring firm disclosure and enforcing compliance. Chapter 3 describes the 
theoretical framework and the individual theories that are employed in the literature to 
explain the measurement and extent of firm mandatory disclosure and its drivers. The 
chapter reviews the current literature concerning the mandatory disclosure in both 
developed and developing countries that is relevant to this study. The discussion of the 
theoretical framework assists in the formulation of testable hypotheses related to mandatory 
disclosure. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical frameworks relating to the voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants, along with the common sources of voluntary disclosure 
information. This chapter also makes the distinction between developed and developing 
countries. The discussion of the theory helps in the construction of testable hypotheses 
relating to the determinants of voluntary disclosure. Chapter 5 discusses the data sample 
collected and the research methods used to measure the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in this study. It discusses the measurement, selection of items and the calculation 
of the mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices. The statistical and econometric 
modelling methods used are also discussed. The results of the mandatory disclosure models 
are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents and discusses the results of 
the voluntary disclosure models. Finally, the summary, conclusions, limitations and 
suggestions future research are set out in Chapter 8. 
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 The Financial Reporting Environment and 
Compliance with IASs/IFRSs in GCC Countries  
 
 Introduction 
A country’s legal and institutional framework is likely to affect the extent to which 
domestic listed firms in that country comply with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). The purpose of this chapter is to describe the framework of financial 
reporting in each of the GCC countries member states, which taken together constitute the 
area of interest of this thesis. This section discusses the regulations that firms must comply 
with, and the formal mechanisms used by firms to promote their compliance. This chapter 
discusses each state’s legislation relating to financial reporting and any mandatory 
requirements relating to accounting standards that must be adhered to. It discusses the role 
of auditors in promoting compliance with accounting standards, and the roles and tasks of 
the governmental body responsible for monitoring compliance and for enforcement. It also 
explains the harmonisation efforts among the GCC countries to promote compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and other relevant regulations. 
 
Section 2.2 outlines the legislation governing financial reporting in the GCC countries. 
Section 2.3 discusses any mandatory accounting standards for each GCC country. One of 
the enforcement mechanisms used to promote compliance with relevant accounting 
regulations is the independent audit, which is discussed in Section 2.4. The enforcement 
processes in place are discussed in Section 2.5. Accounting harmonisation efforts among 
member states are discussed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 discusses the macroeconomic 
indicators of the GCC countries. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.8. 
 
 Legislation 
Company law and security market law regulate corporate financial reporting in listed firms 
within each GCC country. Financial reporting legislation is concerned with protecting the 
users of financial reports in GCC countries. Table 2.1 illustrates the company laws and 
security market laws in place across the GCC countries. Company laws regulate the 
formation, operation and dissolution of firms (Al-Shammari, 2005). These laws contain 
provisions on various aspects of corporate activities, including: the incorporation of firms; 
17 
 
corporate governance structures (e.g. the corporate contract, by-laws, and provisions 
regarding directors and employees); the obligations and rights of shareholders; the methods 
of raising capital; financial accounts and audits; supervision and inspection; and corporate 
dissolution and liquidation. In terms of financial reporting requirements, the company law 
in each GCC member state contains general principles for corporate financial reporting. 
The laws do not specify the format or content of the financial statements, except for 
requiring at least an annual balance sheet and a profit and loss statement (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1. Financial reporting legislation in the GCC member states 
Country Company law Securities 
and 
exchange 
law 
Company 
registrar 
Financial 
statements 
to be 
prepared 
To whom 
should 
financial 
statements 
be submitted 
Guidelines 
for 
preparing 
financial 
statements 
Bahrain Company Law 
No. 28 of 1975, 
replaced by 
Law No. 21 of 
2001 
Bahrain 
Securities 
and Stock 
Exchange 
Law No. 4 of 
1987 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
and Industry 
Balance 
sheet and 
profit and 
loss 
statement 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
a true and 
fair view 
Kuwait Company Law 
No. 15 of 1960 
Kuwait Stock 
Exchange 
Law of 
13/8/1983 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
and Industry 
Balance 
sheet and 
profit and 
loss 
statement 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
a true and 
fair view 
Oman Company Law 
No. 4 of 1974  
Muscat 
Securities 
Market Law 
No. 53 of 
1988 
replaced by 
Capital 
Market Law 
No. 80 of 
1998 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Balance 
sheet and 
profit and 
loss 
statement 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
an honest 
and fair view 
Qatar Company Law 
No. 11 of 1981 
Doha 
Securities 
Market Law 
No. 14 of 
1995 
Ministry of 
Economy 
and 
Commerce 
Balance 
sheet and 
profit and 
loss 
statement 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
a true and 
fair view 
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Country Company law Securities 
and 
exchange 
law 
Company 
registrar 
Financial 
statements 
to be 
prepared 
To whom 
should 
financial 
statements 
be submitted 
Guidelines 
for 
preparing 
financial 
statements 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Company Law 
No. 6 of 1965  
Saudi Share 
Registration 
Company 
(SSRC) Law 
No. 8/1230 
of 1984 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Balance 
sheet, profit 
and loss 
statement, 
report on the 
company’s 
activities 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
a true and 
fair view 
UAE Company Law 
No. 8 of 1984  
UAE 
Securities 
Market Law 
No. 4 of 
2000 
Ministry of 
Economy 
and 
Commerce 
Balance 
sheet and 
profit and 
loss 
statement 
All 
shareholders 
Registrar of 
companies 
Must provide 
a true and 
fair view 
Source: (Al-Shammari, 2005; Al-Hussaini et al., 2008). 
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In Saudi Arabia, the due date for submission of financial statements is within two months 
following the financial year end date, and at least 25 days before the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). In Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it is within 
three months following the financial year end date and at least two weeks before the AGM. 
In Oman, it is within four months following the financial year end date and at least 21 days 
before the company’s AGM. In Qatar, it is within six months following the financial year 
end date (Al-Shammari, 2005, Al-Hussaini et al., 2008). 
 
The laws require firms to maintain proper books of account and to prepare and submit 
audited annual financial statements to their stockholders in order to reflect a “true and fair 
view” of the firm’s state of affairs. The financial statements must be submitted to the 
Companies Registrar of the Ministry of Commerce within a specified time after the 
financial year end date. All GCC countries have set security market laws that recognise a 
stock exchange as an independent government entity. The laws are designed to protect users 
(e.g. investors), to establish directors’ rights and responsibilities, to set up mechanisms for 
monitoring the issuing of securities, and to promote and develop the capital market. Each 
GCC stock exchange is governed by a board of directors chaired by the Minister of 
Commerce. The board of directors is responsible for formulating the general policies and 
strategy of the exchange, regulating the issuing and trading of securities, and approving 
applications from brokers and market makers to trade (Al-Shammari, 2005). Only the 
Muscat Securities Market (MSM) of Oman and the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) play a 
role in monitoring listed firms’ compliance with accounting standards and other 
regulations. They require all listed firms to comply with accounting regulations issued by 
the Ministry of Commerce, and furthermore to meet the disclosure requirements contained 
in securities regulations. These include the stipulation that the board of directors of each 
listed firm must submit audited annual financial statements to the stock exchange within a 
specified time after the financial year end date (Al-Shammari, 2005). 
 
 Accounting standards in GCC countries 
2.3.1 Professional accounting bodies in GCC countries 
In GCC countries, the government controls the accounting and auditing profession and 
regulates financial reporting regulations. Professional accounting bodies exist in four 
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states: Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The Bahrain Society of Accountants 
and Auditors (BSAA), the Kuwait Accounting and Auditing Association (KAAA), and the 
UAE Accountants and Auditors Association (UAEAAA) they do not regulate or license 
accountants and auditors or to establish accounting and auditing standards. Further, they 
do not have the authority to regulate their members’ behaviour or supervise or encourage 
audit firms to act on non-compliance issues (Shuaib, 1998; Joshi and Al-Basteki, 2000; 
Shuaib, 1999; Al-Basteki, 2000). However, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA), established in 1991, is authorised by the Saudi Ministry of 
Commerce to issue accounting and auditing standards and has the authority to certify public 
accountants (SOCPA, 2004a). 
 
Among the GCC countries, only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have made an effort to set local 
accounting standards. In Kuwait, the Permanent Technical Committee (PTC) of the 
Ministry of Commerce issued three accounting standards in 1986 to be applied by all listed 
firms effective from 1 January 1987. The three accounting standards refer to financial 
statements, investment accounting and property accounting (Shuaib, 1998). These 
standards have been criticised by several parties, including accountants, auditors, 
academics, investors, creditors and other users of financial information, for their 
insufficiency, ambiguity and overall weakness (Al-Mudhaf, 1990; Shuaib, 1998). 
 
2.3.2 The adoption of IASs and IFRSs in GCC countries 
The rapid growth and opening up of capital markets in the GCC countries, and pressure 
from international firms, have led the governments to adopt IASs and IFRSs, in the 
expectation that their adoption will meet the demands of shareholders and of local and 
international investors for more detailed information and for greater comparability in 
financial reporting (Azzam, 1998; Hassan, 1998; Shuaib, 1999; Al-Basteki, 2000; Hussain, 
Islam, Gunasekaran and Maskooki, 2002; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003b). All GCC countries 
adopted IASs at some stage during the period 1986-1999, and transit to IFRSs during the 
period 2001-2008. Table 2.2 shows the regulatory body and the law requiring the adoption 
of IASs/IFRSs in each state. 
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Table 2.2. The adoption of IASs and IFRSs in GCC countries 
Country 
Law and its 
date of issue 
Authorised 
body 
requiring 
adoption of 
IASs 
Effective 
Date 
Application 
Transition 
year to IFRS 
Application 
Bahrain 
External 
Auditing Law 
No. 26 of 1996 
issued on 24 
February 1996 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
1996 
All listed 
firms 
 
2001 
 
All listed 
firms 
Kuwait 
Ministerial 
Resolution No. 
18 of 1990 
issued on 17 
April 1990 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
1991 
All listed 
firms 
 
2005 
 
All listed 
firms 
Oman 
Professional 
Accounting 
and Auditing 
Law No. 77 of 
1986 issued on 
18 October 
1986 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
1986 
All listed 
firms 
 
1986 
 
All listed 
firms 
Qatar 
The Central 
Bank of Qatar 
Circular No. 27 
of 1999 issued 
on 19 February 
1999 
Qatar Central 
bank 
1999 
Banks, 
finance and 
investment 
firms 
2002 
 
All listed 
firms 
Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi 
Arabia 
Monetary 
Agency 
Saudi Arabia 
Monetary 
Agency 
(SAMA) 
1992 
Banks, 
finance and 
investment 
firms 
 
2008 
 
 
Banks, 
finance and 
investment 
firms 
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Country 
Law and its 
date of issue 
Authorised 
body 
requiring 
adoption of 
IASs 
Effective 
Date 
Application 
Transition 
year to IFRS 
Application 
Circular No. 
11/2 of 1992 
issued on 23 
July 1992 
UAE 
The Central 
Bank of UAE 
Circular No. 20 
of 1999 issued 
on 25 January 
1999 
UAE Central 
bank 
1999 
Banks, 
finance and 
investment 
firms 
2003 
All listed 
firms 
Source: (Al-Shammari, 2005; Al-Hussaini et al., 2008; IASPlus, 2016; Adoptifrs, 2016). 
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All listed firms in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman were required, by Ministry of Commerce, 
to comply with IASs from 1996, 1991 and 1986, respectively. In Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
UAE, the respective central banks required banks, finance, and investment firms to comply 
with IASs from 1999, 1992 and 1999, respectively. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the introduction of foreign ownership in banks led the Saudi Arabia 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), which is responsible for the registration, monitoring and 
supervision of financial organisations’ reporting and activities, to require banks to adopt 
IASs to provide understandable, reliable and comparable financial statements to local and 
foreign investors (Abdallah, 2001). In the UAE, the widespread use of IASs in the financial 
statements of banks and other financial organisations across the world led the UAE Central 
Bank to adopt IASs, with the aim of increasing the understanding and comparability of 
banks’ financial reports in the UAE, and thus boosting their relative position (UAECB, 
1999). In Qatar, similarly, the increasing number of foreign banks using IASs voluntarily 
led the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) to require all banks (foreign and local) to adopt IASs in 
order to unify the accounting standards used by banks, to better observe their performance 
and to increase the level of comparability of financial reports, thereby meeting the demand 
for information from shareholders and the public (QCB, 2013). 
 
2.3.3 Transition to International Financial Accounting Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) in GCC countries 
Much effort has been made to harmonise accounting standards around the world. Most 
countries across the world have now adopted IFRSs in order to enhance the transparency 
and comparability of the financial information that they produce. IFRS adoption is thus 
mandatory for listed companies in most of these countries. IFRSs have been developed by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and they should be implemented 
without regard for differences in socio-economic and political environments between 
different countries. The IASB has no power of enforcement in any country, and thus the 
adoption of IFRSs depends upon national regulatory bodies (Alali and Cao, 2010). As 
discussed above, only Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have professional 
accounting bodies. Such bodies enforce and monitor IFRS adoption practice to ensure and 
maintain full adoption. 
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In GCC countries, all listed firms in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE adopted IFRSs from 
2001, 2005, 2002 and 2003, respectively (IASPlus, 2016). In Oman, there is no 
endorsement or adoption process, and accordingly, IFRSs, as broadcasted by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and are applied without amendment 
(IASPlus, 2016). In Saudi Arabia to date, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) has issued 21 Saudi Accounting Standards (SAAs) to which all 
listed firms must comply, except for banks and finance and investment firms, which 
adopted IFRSs in 2008 (Deloitte, 2016). The SOCPA approved an IFRS transition plan that 
requires listed firms to report using “national standards that are closely converged with full 
IFRSs”.  According to a press release by the SOCPA published on the SOCPA website 
in August 2013, the earliest date for IFRS application will be for the financial statements 
of listed entities prepared for financial periods starting 1st January 2017 (IASPlus, 2016). 
 
 Independent audit in GCC countries 
The quality of financial reporting is not only determined by the quality of the accounting 
standards, such as IASs/IFRSs, but also by the efficiency of the enforcement of these 
accounting standards (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2003; 
Saudagaran, 2004). One mechanism designed to enforce compliance of listed firms with 
IASs/IFRSs and other relevant accounting regulations is the independent audit (Glaum and 
Street, 2003). The important role of an external auditor in each member state is to promote 
compliance with the relevant regulations. 
 
In each GCC country, company law requires the annual financial statements of a listed firm 
to be audited by at least one external auditor, who must be recognised by with the Ministry 
of Commerce. Company law also requires the external auditor to be chosen at the AGM of 
the shareholders. In addition, the auditor’s remuneration must be determined by the 
shareholders at such a meeting. Company law in the GCC countries comprises common 
provisions concerning the responsibility of the external auditor (Al-Shammari, 2005). The 
external auditor has a specific responsibility to report non-compliance with accounting 
standards and other regulations in their report to the respective Ministries of Commerce. 
The external auditor must not be a board member, founder, or hold a management or 
administrative position in the audited firm. The external auditor must give an opinion on 
whether the firm maintains proper accounts, whether the balance sheet and the profit and 
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loss statement are produced in accordance with the “real state of a firm’s affairs”, whether 
the firm complies with the requirements of the provisions of company law, and whether the 
firm reflects “honestly and clearly” the financial position of the firm. 
 
It is argued that the qualifications of the auditor play an important role in the efficiency of 
the audit function (Arnett and Danos, 1979; Shuaib, 1999; Al-Basteki, 2000). Table 2.3 
summarises the requirements of the GCC countries regarding the qualification of auditors 
and their role in promoting compliance, the work experience requirements for all auditors, 
and the imposition of penalties on auditors for the contravention of legislation or auditing 
standards. 
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Table 2.3. Legal requirements for GCC external auditors 
Country Law regulating 
auditors 
Audits only by 
government 
certified and 
licensed 
auditors 
Use of 
International 
Standards of 
Auditing (ISAs) 
Examination for 
admission 
Professional 
training 
requirements 
Work 
experience 
required for 
auditors 
Penalties 
apply where 
external 
auditors 
breach a 
regulation 
Bahrain External Auditing 
Law No. 26 of 
1996 
Yes Yes No  No  Yes Yes 
Kuwait  External Auditing 
Law No. 6 of 1962 
Yes Yes Yes No  Yes Yes 
Oman Professional 
Accounting and 
Auditing Law No. 
77 of 1986 and 
replaced by Law 
No. 58 of 1996 
Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar Auditing Law No. 
7 of 1974 
Yes No  No  No  Yes Yes 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Chartered 
Accountants Law 
No. M/43 of 1974, 
amended by Law 
No. 12 of 1992 
Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UAE Professional 
Accounting and 
Auditing Law No. 
9 of 1975 replaced 
by Law No. 22 of 
1995 
Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes 
Source: (Al-Shammari, 2005; Al-Hussaini et al., 2008). 
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There are differences in the examinations required for admission to the profession, the 
professional training of auditors, and the adoption of International Standards of Auditing 
(ISAs) issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). In Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, an examination is mandatory for admission to the profession. In Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, and UAE, professional training for auditors is required. In Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman 
and UAE, the auditor must conduct the audit using ISAs issued by the IFAC, while in Qatar 
the auditor must audit the accounts of firms in light of the Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS). In Saudi Arabia, an external auditor must follow the Saudi Standards 
of Auditing (SSA) issued by SOCPA. Such differences might affect the extent to which 
auditors promote compliance with IFRSs. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that variations in 
auditors’ professional training and qualifications requirements impact upon the credibility 
of financial statements and audit reports. As a result, countries where admission to the 
profession requires professional training and examination, such as Kuwait, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE, are expected to have a stronger audit function and to be more likely to 
detect and query and non-compliance with mandatory accounting standards. 
 
In each GCC country, an external auditor may be subject to disciplinary proceedings by the 
Disciplinary Committee of the Ministry of Commerce (Al-Shammari, 2005). The Minister 
of Commerce has the power to refer an auditor to the Disciplinary Committee if they are 
accused of violation of a regulation relating to financial reporting or the moral principles 
of the audit profession, or if they are believed to have committed a shameful act or a serious 
act of neglect. The Disciplinary Committee makes a decision after discussing an accusation 
with the auditor. If it became evident that the auditor had violated regulations, the 
Disciplinary Committee would issue a disciplinary order. In all GCC countries, penalties 
range from a caution to a warning of suspension for a period of no longer than three years 
or, eventually, to removal from the Register of Auditors maintained by the Ministry of 
Commerce. In addition, company law in each state contains laws for prosecuting auditors 
for a failure to report non-compliance with a regulation or law. 
 
 Enforcement 
Company law across GCC countries has established government enforcement bodies. The 
law provides for proactive and reactive monitoring of firms’ accounts by the enforcement 
body. Proactive monitoring refers to the process of monitoring firms’ compliance with 
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IASs/IFRSs and other accounting regulations with a view to detecting non-compliance 
(Financial Reporting Review Panel, 2012). Reactive monitoring refers to the process of 
examining a firm’s compliance with IASs and other relevant accounting regulations after 
the enforcement body receives a complaint from shareholders or other parties that the firm 
may have failed to comply with IASs (FRRP, 2012). When there is a proof of a violation, 
penalties may be imposed on members of the board of directors, the firm’s managers or 
staff, or the external auditor as provided by the law. 
 
The enforcement process typically involves the following steps: (i) lodgement of audited 
annual financial statements with the firm’s registrar, which applies to all listed firm in 
Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, or with the Central Bank, which applies to all listed firms in 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; (ii) the enforcement body checks that the required 
financial statements have been lodged with the appropriate authorities; (iii) the enforcement 
body checks the financial statements for compliance with IFRSs. 
 
2.5.1 The enforcement process in Bahrain 
In Bahrain, the Surveillance Departments of the respective Ministry of Commerce are 
responsible for monitoring listed firms’ compliance. The Kingdom of Bahrain does not 
have its own national accounting standards. However, the Bahrain Commercial Companies 
Law 2001 (earlier Law of 1975 substantially amended) requires all firms to prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with the IFRSs (Marat and Shoult, 2005). Similarly, 
firms listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange and all banks and financial institutions licensed 
by the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) and the Central Bank for Bahrain, are required 
to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRSs. The Bahrain Commercial 
Companies Law (BCCL) 2001 requires each registered entity to produce its balance sheet, 
profit and loss account, and managers’ (directors’) report for every financial year in 
compliance with IFRSs within three months following the end of the financial year. It also 
requires the entities (firms) to appoint auditors to audit their financial statements, in 
accordance with the Bahrain Audit Law, Decree 26/1996. All auditors must comply with 
the International Standards on Auditing (IASs) while performing their audits (Marat and 
Shoult, 2005). 
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In Bahrain, the Surveillance Department of the Ministry of Commerce primarily relies on 
the external auditor’s report for monitoring a firm’s compliance with IFRSs. If the Ministry 
notes that the audit report displays non-compliance, it communicates with the external 
auditor concerned and with the firm’s management. The non-compliance issue is then 
discussed, and management advised of any action that needs to be taken to correct the 
situation. If the management refuses to take any action deemed necessary, then the 
Ministry’s staff can raise the matter with the firm’s shareholders at the AGM. They can 
then take any action available to them, such as dismissing the management, members of 
the board of directors, or the external auditor. 
 
The Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) relies entirely on the external auditor’s report for 
monitoring a firm’s compliance with IASs/IFRSs. Similarly, the Bahrain Monetary 
Agency, which is responsible for supervising banks and finance and investment firms, also 
relies on the audit report (Marat and Shoult, 2005). 
 
2.5.2 The enforcement process in Kuwait 
The Surveillance Department of the respective Ministries of Commerce is also responsible 
for monitoring listed firms’ compliance in Kuwait. Further, the stock market in Kuwait is 
also involved in the monitoring process. In Kuwait, the Law of Commercial Companies 
No. 15/1960 is one of the most significant laws governing accounting. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) issued the law on 19 October 1960 to organise the formation 
of new firms and regulate the administration of existing firms (Alfaraih, 2009). This law 
has been amended numerous times over the last 40 years. Although several laws now 
regulate Kuwait’s accounting and auditing profession to various degrees, the Law of 
Commercial Companies is still considered the primary law governing the accounting and 
auditing functions of listed firms in Kuwait (Al-Qahtani, 2005). The MCI law requires 
firms to provide annual, audited balance sheets, and profit and loss statements, to the MCI 
and to all shareholders. 
 
Since 2005, The Law of Commercial Companies requires financial statements in Kuwait 
to be prepared in accordance with IFRSs (Alfaraih, 2009). They must submit their annual, 
audited financial statements to the MCI within 90 days of the close of the financial year, 
and at least two weeks before their annual shareholder meeting. In addition, the 
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Commercial Companies Law states that all annual financial statements must be fully 
audited and all quarterly financial statements must be reviewed. At least two external 
auditors from separate firms must audit and review the financial statements. 
 
In Kuwait, there is no coordination between the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) and the 
Surveillance Department of the Ministry of Commerce. Each body conducts its own 
monitoring. This has led to mixed results and conflicting opinions regarding compliance 
with IASs/IFRSs. The Surveillance Department of the Ministry of Commerce checks 
whether firms comply with company law requirements including the audited annual 
financial statements. A checklist based on IAS 1, prepared by the department’s staff, is 
used to check each firm’s annual report for compliance before it is distributed to the 
shareholders. The department relies primarily on the external auditor’s report for indicating 
compliance with IASs other than IAS 1. 
 
The KSE, through its Surveillance Department, is responsible for monitoring in greater 
detail listed firms’ compliance with company law requirements, in contrast to the 
Ministry’s limited monitoring mechanism. In 1999, just before foreign investors were first 
permitted to trade on the KSE, the Surveillance Department also became legally 
responsible for monitoring listed firms’ compliance with IASs/IFRSs. The Department 
monitors firms’ compliance through a checklist for every IAS/IFRS. The checklist is 
prepared by technically qualified staff and checked against each firm’s annual report. If a 
departmental review detects a possible case of non-compliance with an IAS requirement, 
and the external auditor did not report the violation, the Department can communicate with 
the firm’s manager and the external auditor to investigate the matter further. If it is evident 
that the firm has violated a requirement of an IAS/IFRS, the Department can report the case 
to the Minister of Commerce, for assessment and a decision, through the Market Director 
of KSE (Al-Shammari, 2005). The Minister of Commerce may take any necessary steps to 
convene a meeting of shareholders, who have the right to take further action. The Market 
Director also has the authority to refer cases to the KSE’s Disciplinary Committee which 
may impose a penalty for the violation of such as a warning, a suspension of dealing in the 
firm’s securities, or even delisting. 
 
If a firm’s audit report is qualified, a representative from the Ministry of Commerce can 
attend the AGM and raise the matter for the attention of shareholders. They have the right 
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to take action, such as dismissing the management, the members of the board of directors 
or the external auditor. The Central Bank of Kuwait, which is responsible for supervising 
banks and finance and investment firms, relies on the audit report for monitoring 
compliance with IASs/IFRSs and other regulations. 
 
2.5.3 The enforcement process in Oman 
In Oman, the Surveillance Department of the respective Ministries of Commerce is also 
responsible for monitoring listed firms’ compliance. The stock market is also involved in 
the monitoring process in Oman. In Oman, it has been mandatory since 1986 to use IFRSs 
for all listed firms, except for Islamic institutions, which are still not required to use them 
(Al-Hussaini et al. 2008; Al-Shammari et al. 2008).  
 
In Oman, the Ministry of Commerce relies on the independent audit report to monitor a 
firm’s compliance with IASs and with the provisions of Company Law. After the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) was created, a Surveillance Committee was formed, comprising 
representatives from the Ministry of Commerce and the Muscat Securities Market (MSM), 
with the responsibility to monitor firms’ compliance with IASs and other regulations.  
 
The Surveillance Department of the MSM monitors compliance with IASs/IFRSs through 
a confidential checklist of IASs/IFRSs constructed by departmental staff; the staff inform 
the Surveillance Committee through reports. This practical surveillance is actually 
conducted for each listed firm and for every standard. If the departmental review detects a 
possible case of non-compliance with an IAS requirement or other regulations, and the 
external auditor did not report the violation, the Department can communicate with the 
firm’s manager and the external auditor to verify the matter. Depending on the outcome, it 
can ask the firm’s manager to amend the financial statements based on the Department’s 
view. If the manager refuses to make the change, then the Department can report the case 
to the Minister of Commerce for assessment and decision through the Surveillance 
Committee.  
 
The Surveillance Committee of the CMA has the authority to refer cases to the Disciplinary 
Committee to take further action. The Disciplinary Committee may impose a penalty, 
including a warning, suspension of dealing in the firm’s securities, or even delisting. If a 
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firm’s audit report is qualified, a representative from the Ministry of Commerce can attend 
the AGM and bring the matter to the attention of the shareholders. The shareholders have 
the right to take further action such as dismissing the management, the members of the 
board of directors or the external auditor. The Omani Central Bank, which is responsible 
for supervising banks and finance and investment firms, relies entirely on the independent 
audit report for monitoring compliance with IASs/IFRSs and other regulations. 
 
2.5.4 The enforcement process in Qatar 
In Qatar, a different Surveillance Department from Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman is 
responsible for the supervision and monitoring of firm and bank activities and reporting. In 
the absence of national accounting principles and practices, the Ministry of Economy and 
Commerce has accepted the adoption of standards promulgated by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as national accounting standards. In 1999, the 
Ministry of Economy and Commerce issued instructions to all public firms that annual 
financial statements should be drawn up in accordance with IASs (Sexton, 2002). Since 
2002, all listed firms in Qatar have been required to comply with IFRSs when preparing 
their financial statements (IASPlus, 2013). The Ministry of Economy and Commerce relies 
on independent audit reports for monitoring a firm’s compliance with IASs/IFRSs and 
company law requirements. 
 
The Qatar Central Bank (QCB), through their Banking Surveillance Department, is 
responsible for the supervision and monitoring of bank activities and reporting. The 
department relies entirely on independent audit reports for monitoring a bank’s compliance 
with IASs, company law and the Central Bank requirements. In 1999, when IASs were first 
adopted, the Central Bank required banks to appoint at least two external auditors from 
those registered with the Ministry of Commerce, in order to audit a firm’s accounts and to 
report any non-compliance with IASs or other regulations (Al-Hussaini et al., 2008). All 
corporate reporting by firms listed on the Doha Security Market (DSM) is directed by firm 
law and DSM law. An increasing number of foreign banks voluntarily apply IFRSs and the 
foreign banks compelled the country’s Central Bank (QCB) to require all banks to adopt 
IFRSs (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). 
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In 2005, under the law No. 33, the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) was 
established. The QFMA is an independent regulatory authority that supervises the financial 
markets and firms authorised to conduct activities related to securities in Qatar. It is 
authorised to exercise regulatory surveillance and enforcement over the capital markets 
(QFMA, 2014). Regarding banks and financial institutions in Qatar, the Central Bank 
Surveillance Department relies entirely on independent audit reports for monitoring a 
bank’s compliance with IFRSs, company law and the Central Bank’s requirements. 
 
2.5.5 The enforcement process in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, a different Surveillance Department from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and 
Qatar is responsible for the supervision and monitoring of firm and bank activities and 
reporting. In 1991, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) was 
established under Royal Decree No. M/12. It operates under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Commerce in order to promote the accounting and auditing profession, and all matters 
that might lead to the development of the profession and upgrading its status. It has been 
mandated that all Saudi firms must comply with SOCPA standards since 1991 (IASPlus, 
2016; Adoptifrs, 2016). The Ministry of Commerce relies on the independent audit report 
for monitoring firm compliance with SOCPA standards. The SOCPA approved, in 2013, 
an IFRS transition plan that requires listed firms to report using the “national standards that 
are closely converged with full IFRSs”. In addition, unlisted firms are required to report 
under IFRS for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) as adopted in Saudi Arabia 
(Deloitte, 2014). 
 
According to a press release by the SOCPA published on the SOCPA website in August 
2013, the earliest date for IFRS application is to be for financial statements of listed firms 
prepared for financial periods starting from 1st January 2017. For other firms, the earliest 
date for application will be for financial statements prepared for financial periods starting 
1 January 2018 (IASPlus, 2016; Adoptifrs, 2016).  
 
Although the accounting standards issued by SOCPA are 21 standards in total, those 
Standards cover 25 topics that are addressed individually by IASs/IFRSs (SOCPA, 2012). 
IASs/IFRSs have direct corresponding to SOCPA Accounting Standards including 
Presentation of Financial Statements (IAS 1), Inventories (IAS 2), Cash Flow Statements 
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(IAS 7), Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors (IAS 8), Events 
After the Balance Sheet Date (IAS 10), Construction Contracts (IAS 11), Income Taxes 
(IAS 12), Property, Plant and Equipment (IAS 16), Leases (IAS 17), Revenue (IAS 18), 
Accounting for Government Grants (IAS 20), Foreign Currency (IAS 21), Borrowing 
Costs (IAS 23), Related Party Disclosures (IAS 24), Consolidated and Separate Financial 
Statements (IAS 27), Investments in Associates (IAS 28), Earnings Per Share (IAS 33), 
Interim Financial Reporting (IAS 34), Impairment of Assets (IAS 36), Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (IAS 37), Intangible Assets (IAS 38), 
Financial Instruments - Recognition and measurement (IAS 39), Operating Segments 
(IFRS 8), Business Combinations (IFRS 3), Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations (IFRS 5). However, only 11 IASs/IFRSs have no corresponding 
to SOCPA Standards including Employee Benefits (IAS 19), Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans (IAS 26), Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies 
(IAS 29), Interests in Joint Ventures (IAS 31), Financial Instruments - Presentation (IAS 
32), Investment Property (IAS 40), First-time Adoption of IFRSs (IFRS 1), Insurance 
Contracts (IFRS 4), Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (IFRS 6), 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures (IFRS 7) and Financial Instruments (IFRS 9). 
 
Since 2008, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA, which is the Saudi Arabian 
Central Bank) has required banks and insurance firms in Saudi Arabia to report under 
IFRSs. In Saudi Arabia, the Central Bank Surveillance Department also relies on the 
independent audit report for monitoring bank compliance with IASs/IFRSs. The 
Department itself monitors bank compliance with company law requirements, including 
the lodgement of audited financial statements. 
 
2.5.6 The enforcement process in the UAE 
A different Surveillance Department form Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
is also responsible for the supervision and monitoring of firm and bank activities and 
reporting in the UAE. There are three main regulatory bodies governing the corporate 
sector, accounting practices, financial reporting, and corporate governance. These are the 
Ministry of Economy, the UAE Central Bank, and the Securities and Commodities 
Authority (SCA) (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). The Ministry of Economy issues federal 
regulations and rules, thus all firms in the UAE have to work under “The Federal 
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Commercial Law no 8/1984” and its amendments (Aljifri and Mousafa, 2007). The Federal 
Commercial Law states the requirements for registration and licensing, the responsibilities 
and duties of auditors, penalties and disciplinary measures, and other general rules (Al-
Qahtani, 2006). This law and its amendments govern accounting and auditing requirements 
for corporate entities, and companies also have to comply with it when preparing their 
financial reports (PWC, 2009). 
 
Since 1999, the Central Bank has made it mandatory for all commercial banks in the UAE 
to prepare their accounts in accordance with IASs/IFRSs (Hussain et al., 2002). Since 2003, 
it has been mandatory for listed firms on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and 
Dubai Financial Market (DFM) to comply with IASs/IFRSs (Deloitte, 2014). Although 
IASs/IFRSs are not required for unlisted firms other than listed firms and banks, it is 
considered best practice for these firms also to adopt IASs/IFRSs (Deloitte, 2014). 
 
Recently, the UAE Commercial Companies Law No. 2 of 2015, which came into force on 
1st July 2015, requires all firms (listed and unlisted) to apply IASs/IFRSs and practices 
when preparing their accounts. The previous Companies Law had required compliance 
with internationally accepted accounting practices, which had been interpreted to mean 
IFRSs. There has never been a local GAAP in the UAE (IASPlus, 2016; Adoptifrs, 2016). 
 
The Central Bank governs and lays down regulations for banks and financial institutions. 
The main responsibility of the Central Bank is the formulation and implementation of 
banking, credit, and monetary policies, to ensure the growth of the national economy of the 
UAE in a balanced manner (Al Suwaidi, 2011). The Central Bank governs the preparation 
of financial reports of banks and financial institutions in accordance with IASs/IFRSs 
(Hassan, 2009). The foundations of the Security and Commodities Authority (SCA) are 
based on the Federal Law No. 4 of 2004, which governs the main stock markets (e.g. ADX, 
DFM) and listed firms (SCA, 2000). Irvine and Lucas (2006) argue that the increased 
foreign trade with Western countries and the European Union's requirement for listed 
consolidated entities to follow IFRS from 1st January 2005, put pressure on the UAE to 
move towards the adoption of IFRS. They argue that there are several key factors that have 
influenced the UAE to adopt IFRS, such as global trade, capital markets, the presence of 
international auditing firms (the Big 4), and the World Bank policies. 
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 Limits to enforcement 
The above section identifies the significant differences between GCC countries in relation 
to monitoring and enforcing firms to comply with IFRSs. The enforcement bodies in 
Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not applied all of the provisions of their 
company law relating to proactive and reactive monitoring and enforcing compliance. Al-
Shammari (2005) discusses several reasons for the lack of complete governmental 
enforcement: 
1. There are limited budgets for monitoring compliance. There is little staff training, and it 
is difficult to employ qualified accountants due to low salary levels and a lack of incentives. 
2. There is a desire to avoid repeating compliance monitoring, given that two external 
auditors are required by law to audit the accounts. 
3. Surveillance Departments can be overloaded with other responsibilities. For example, in 
Bahrain, the department not only monitors joint stock firms but also all firms with limited 
liability. 
4. In Kuwait and Oman, although the enforcement bodies appear to be more active, the 
monitoring is difficult due to the short period given to the enforcement bodies to review 
the financial statements: a minimum of three weeks before the AGM. 
 
 Accounting harmonisation efforts in the GCC countries 
Recognition of the important role played by accounting in national economic affairs has 
motivated policy makers in the GCC administrations to become involved in financial 
reporting regulations (Gulf Co-Operation Council Accounting and Auditing Organization, 
2003b). The initial effort to harmonise regional financial reporting was marked by the 
formation of the Commercial Cooperative Committee in November 1982. The main 
objective of the Committee is to unify or harmonise accounting and auditing regulations 
and practices across the countries. 
 
Several steps have been taken by the Committee towards harmonising financial reporting 
regulations, including: (i) professionals in accounting have been permitted to register and 
practise in the country of their choice since 1987; (ii) GCC nationals have been allowed to 
invest in stocks listed on any stock exchange and in any joint stock firm within the GCC 
group of countries since 1988; (iii) joint stock firms have been permitted to list on any other 
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GCC stock exchange since 1989; (iv) GCC nationals have been permitted to establish joint-
stock firms in any country of their choice since 1994; and (v) Unified company law has 
been issued as guidance for the member states since 1998 (GCCAAO, 2003b). 
 
In spite of these developments, the committee has been criticised for not achieving its main 
objective of harmonising accounting and auditing standards. Al-Ruhaily (1997) attributes 
the failure of the committee to the absence of professional representatives. This has led the 
Secretariat General of the GCC (SGGCC) to highlight that professionals should play a 
major role in harmonising accounting and auditing regulations and practices in GCC 
countries. Consequently, the Gulf Co-Operation Council Accounting and Auditing 
Organization (GCCAAO) was established in December 1998. The GCCAAO began 
operations in May 2001 (GCCAAO, 2003b). The main objectives of the GCCAAO are to 
promote the accounting and auditing profession and to achieve coordination and integration 
between member states by unifying financial reporting laws and regulations in general, and 
accounting and auditing standards in particular. 
 
The GCCAAO has completed the first draft of its conceptual framework of accounting and 
auditing in June 2003 (GCCAAO, 2016). The conceptual framework proposes that 
IASs/IFRSs issued by the IASB should be the basis for setting accounting standards 
suitable for the GCC business environment. This suggestion reflects the fact that 
IASs/IFRSs have been adopted in all GCC member states except Saudi Arabia, which has 
adopted IASs/IFRSs in cases where there is no Saudi accounting standard (GCCAAO, 
2016). 
 
 Macroeconomic indicators of the GCC countries 
The GCC countries are a vital of the wider Arab regional system, and they are the most 
important regions in the Islamic culture, where they have natural resources of oil, gas and 
different kind of materials. In May 1981, the GCC countries were planning to get full 
economic integration including the monetary union by 2010. However, obstacles rise in 
establishing a common currency in 2010. It is well known that GCC countries are oil-based 
economies, for each oil incomes make up a large percentage of government revenues which 
are the drivers of economic growth.  According to the most recent data available in 2013, 
oil output represents more than 50% in Kuwait, 44% of the GDP in Saudi Arabia, more 
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than 34% in Oman, 24% in Qatar, 23% in UAE and less than 19% in Bahrain (worldbank, 
2016). However, those high ratios suggest that a change in oil price instability is highly 
pertinent to the instability of all GCC countries and consequently their competitive 
performance.   
 
Within this respect, the GCC countries are not only looking to increase their 
competitiveness but they are also trying to improve the quality of life of their citizen. Prior 
to 1970s, development was seen as an economic phenomenon in which rapid gains in 
overall and per capita GNP growth which can be seen in the form of creating jobs, economic 
opportunities and creating the necessary conditions for the wider distributions of the 
economic and social benefits of growth (Khalifa, 2012). There are some economic 
characteristics that may be more common among GCC countries as many of them are 
related by geographic, democratic, cultural and economic characteristics (Khalifa, 2012). 
A stable numbers of macroeconomic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, GDP growth, real growth rate, inflation tare, exchange rate, exportation, population 
and stock traded value are some among many of the common economic characteristics that 
this section deals with.   
 
There is a significant improvement in the key indicators of macroeconomic of GCC 
countries in the last two decades underpinned by a fixed exchange rate policy among 2010-
2013, which is one of the many factors that have contributed in increasing foreign direct 
investment to the GCC countries (Khalifa, 2012). Surprisingly, Qatar has the highest 
average GDP per capita income ($87,618). All of the GCC countries have a significant 
increase in the GDP and growth rate of GDP but high level of inflation for the last 20 years 
except 2013, this is could be because of the fall in the oil prices. This is illustrated in table 
2.4 below.  
 
The average GDP per capita growth rate for the GCC countries was around 0.13% during 
2010-2013. It is around 3.20% in Saudi Arabia in the last 4 years, it is 3.10% in Qatar, 
0.80% in Bahrain, 0.50% in UAE, -4.90 in Oman and -1.90 % in Kuwait. The GDP per 
capita in sum was around 202 billion dollars in 2010 increased to 243 in 2011 then 
increased and remaining the same to 256 in 2012 and 2013 billion dollars, this could be 
because the fall of oil prices and a beginning of a new recession during and after 2013. In 
contrast, the average inflation rate was around 8% in the all GCC countries during 2010-
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2013. The average inflation rate in Oman was 9.10% during the period 2010-2013, it was 
9.00% in Kuwait, it was 8.90% in Saudi Arabia, it was 8.80% in Qatar, where in UAE it 
was 6.60% and finally it was lowest in Bahrain 5.40%. 
 
Oil revenue increased sharply during the last two decades and it is the major export of the 
GCC countries (Khalifa, 2012). Also, the total export of goods and services among the 
GCC countries was 431 billion dollars during the period 2010-2013. The highest average 
export of goods and services among the GCC countries was in UAE 92.80 billion dollars, 
followed by Bahrain 74.10 billion dollars, Kuwait 71.40 billion dollars, Qatar 70.60 billion 
dollars, Oman 69.40 billion dollars and Saudi Arabia had the lowest average export of 
goods and services among the GCC countries 53.10 billion dollars.  
 
The average total population of the GCC countries among 2010-2013 was 47,89 million. 
The highest average population was in Saudi Arabia 29,14 million, followed by UAE  8,76 
million, Oman 3,40 million, Kuwait 3,32 million, Qatar 1,94 million and Bahrain which 
had the lowest population in the region 1,31 million.  The average value of shares traded 
in the GCC countries during 2010-2013 was 95.80 billion dollars. The highest average 
value of shares traded among the GCC countries was in Saudi Arabia 50 billion dollars, 
followed by Kuwait 21.50 billion dollars and Qatar 12.20   billion dollars. In contrast, the 
lowest average value of shares traded among GCC countries during 2010-2013 was in 
Bahrain 1.10 billion dollars, followed by Oman 5.10 billion dollars and UAE 6.10 billion 
dollars.  
 
Overall, this section presents numbers of major macroeconomic indicators of GCC 
countries during the period 2010-2013. It appears that there are some differences in 
macroeconomic indicators among GCC counties. Consequently, those macroeconomic 
indicators could play a major role in explaining the differences of financial disclosures in 
the GCC countries listed firms which is the main objective of this thesis. 
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Table 2.4. Macroeconomic indicators of the GCC countries during 2010-2013 
Economic indicator Years Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Total Average 
GDP per capita (current US$) 2010 20,386 37,725 19,921 70,870 18,754 34,342 201,998 33,666 
 2011 22,239 47,551 21,164 89,116 23,256 39,901 243,227 40,538 
  2012 23,063 50,904 21,534 94,407 24,883 41,712 256,503 42,751 
 2013 24,379 48,463 20,011 96,077 24,646 42,831 256,407 42,735 
  Average 22,517 46,161 20,658 87,618 22,885 39,697 239,536 39,923 
GDP growth (annual %) 2010 4.30 -2.40 4.80 19.60 4.80 1.60 32.70 5.45 
  2011 2.10 9.60 -1.10 13.40 10.00 5.20 39.20 6.53 
 2012 3.60 6.60 7.10 4.90 5.40 6.90 34.50 5.75 
  2013 5.40 1.10 3.90 4.60 2.70 4.30 22.00 3.67 
 Average 3.90 3.70 3.70 10.60 5.70 4.50 32.10 5.35 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2010 -1.00 -8.10 -1.70 7.80 2.20 -6.00 -6.80 -1.13 
 2011 -1.40 3.50 -9.30 5.00 7.30 0.30 5.40 0.90 
  2012 1.40 1.00 -3.00 -0.90 2.90 4.30 5.70 0.95 
 2013 4.20 -3.80 -5.70 0.30 0.30 3.30 -1.40 -0.23 
  Average 0.80 -1.90 -4.90 3.10 3.20 0.50 0.80 0.13 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 2010 7.40 11.20 15.60 7.00 17.20 11.00 69.40 11.57 
  2011 10.60 17.20 17.10 19.70 15.60 15.80 96.10 16.00 
 2012 2.20 7.50 4.90 6.90 4.00 0.20 25.80 4.28 
  2013 1.50 0.20 -1.40 1.40 -1.20 -0.60 -0.10 -0.02 
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Economic indicator Years Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Total Average 
 Average 5.40 9.00 9.10 8.80 8.90 6.60 47.80 7.97 
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, 
period average) 
2010 0.38 0.29 0.38 3.64 3.75 3.67 12.11 2.02 
 2011 0.38 0.28 0.38 3.64 3.75 3.67 12.10 2.02 
  2012 0.38 0.28 0.38 3.64 3.75 3.67 12.10 2.02 
 2013 0.38 0.28 0.38 3.64 3.75 3.67 12.11 2.02 
  Average 0.38 0.28 0.38 3.64 3.75 3.67 12.10 2.02 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 2010 69.54 66.67 57.13 62.32 49.70 78.75 384.12 64.02 
  2011 79.00 73.22 72.91 71.75 56.19 90.33 443.41 73.90 
 2012 74.30 74.73 71.81 75.08 54.42 100.63 450.99 75.16 
  2013 73.65 70.86 75.93 73.28 52.08 101.34 447.13 74.52 
 Average 74.10 71.40 69.40 70.60 53.10 92.80 431.40 71.90 
Population, total 2010 1,261,319 3,059,473 2,943,747 1,765,513 28,090,647 8,329,453 45,450,152 7,575,025 
 2011 1,306,014 3,239,181 3,210,003 1,905,437 28,788,438 8,734,722 47,183,795 7,863,966 
  2012 1,333,577 3,419,581 3,545,192 2,015,624 29,496,047 8,952,542 48,762,563 8,127,094 
 2013 1,349,427 3,593,689 3,906,912 2,101,288 30,201,051 9,039,978 50,192,345 8,365,391 
  Average 1,312,584 3,327,981 3,401,464 1,946,966 29,144,046 8,764,174 47,897,214 7,982,869 
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 2010 1.10 36.20 5.60 14.70 38.20 9.70 105.50 17.58 
  2011 0.50 13.90 3.80 13.50 43.50 4.30 79.50 13.25 
 2012 0.90 12.50 3.50 10.20 69.60 4.80 101.60 16.92 
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Economic indicator Years Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Total Average 
  2013 1.80 23.20 7.30 10.20 48.70 5.50 96.70 16.12 
 Average 1.10 21.50 5.10 12.20 50.00 6.10 95.80 16.00 
Source: Central Banks of the GCC countries and the World Bank  
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 Summary 
This chapter describes the relevant legal frameworks for corporate financial reporting 
present in the GCC group of countries. This is necessary because of their significant role 
in identifying the financial reporting regime, establishing a due process for monitoring and 
enforcing accounting standards, and because of their influence on the extent of compliance 
with those standards. 
 
Changes in the legal framework, based on common law, in relation to monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are highlighted to show their impact on compliance. The roles of 
external auditors and government enforcement bodies in monitoring and enforcing firms’ 
compliance with accounting standards and other regulations are also discussed. The chapter 
focuses on to outline the rules of the respective stock exchanges and the Central Banks’ 
requirements in relation to monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Although the GCC countries have much in common in relation to the adoption of 
IASs/IFRSs, there are some important differences. In Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, the 
Surveillance Departments of the respective Ministries of Commerce are responsible for 
monitoring listed firms’ compliance. The Surveillance Department of the Ministry of 
Commerce primarily relies on the external auditor’s report for monitoring firms’ 
compliance with IASs/IFRSs in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. In Kuwait and Oman, the 
stock markets are also involved in the monitoring process. The Central Banks of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Oman are responsible for supervising banks and finance and investment firms, 
relying on the auditor’s report for monitoring compliance with IASs/IFRSs and other 
regulations. IASs were adopted as mandatory accounting standards for all listed firms in 
Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman in 1996, 1991 and 1986 respectively. Since 2001, 2005 and 
1986, respectively, all firms listed in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman have adopted IFRSs as 
mandatory accounting standards.  
 
In Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, different Surveillance Departments form Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Oman, are responsible for supervising and monitoring firms’ activities and 
reporting. In each of the three member states, the stock market relies on the external auditor 
to report any non-compliance with IASs/IFRSs or other regulations affecting the financial 
statements. The Central Banks of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also responsible for 
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supervising banks and finance and investment firms, relying on the audit report for 
monitoring compliance with IASs/IFRSs and other regulations.  
 
In Qatar, the Ministry of Economy and Commerce relies on independent audit reports for 
monitoring firms’ compliance with IASs/IFRSs and company law requirements. In Saudi 
Arabia, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) operates under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce in order to promote the accounting and 
auditing profession. In the UAE, the Ministry of Economy, the UAE Central Bank and 
Securities and Commodities Authority are responsible for supervising and monitoring 
firms’ and banks’ activities and reporting. 
 
IASs were adopted as mandatory accounting standards in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
for banks, finance, and investment firms from 1995, 1991 and 1999 respectively. Since 
2002 and 2003 respectively, all listed firms in Qatar and the UAE have been required to 
comply with IFRSs as mandatory accounting standards. From 2008, only banks and finance 
and investment firms in Saudi Arabia have been required to comply with IFRSs. All other 
firms (listed and unlisted) have been required to comply with SOCPA standards since 1991. 
 
The comprehensiveness of the audit function is not the same in all GCC countries. The 
registration requirements of auditors and the existence of an effective supervisory body can 
affect the ability of external auditors to detect instances of non-compliance. The 
effectiveness of the enforcement body is reflected in its willingness to investigate any 
allegation against an auditor and to impose a penalty on an auditor who does not report an 
instance of non-compliance. For this reason, it might be expected to observe differences 
between states in the extent of non-compliance with IFRSs. 
 
Provisions for monitoring firms’ compliance with IFRSs differ across the member states. 
The enforcement bodies in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE primarily rely on the 
independent audit report. Kuwait and Oman undertake their own monitoring. Generally, 
there is little if any proactive monitoring, except for in Kuwait and Oman. However, 
provision is made for reactive monitoring if enough shareholders complain. Reactive 
monitoring is conducted by appointing another external auditor in all states except Oman. 
 
The provisions concerning compliance monitoring are less stringent in Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Potential reasons for the comparative absence of effective 
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monitoring by these enforcement bodies are the lack of professional training, insufficient 
salaries to attract qualified staff, and the lack of funding in the Surveillance Departments. 
 
Compliance with IFRSs and other regulations is not enforced uniformly across the GCC 
countries. This is another reason to expect that the level of compliance varies between GCC 
countries. In Qatar, there is no effective enforcement body, whereas in Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, the enforcement bodies monitor at least some regulations. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the level of compliance in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is higher than in Qatar. 
Assuming that the enforcement bodies in Kuwait and Oman are more active than in 
Bahrain, it can be expected that the level of compliance with IFRSs in Kuwait and Oman 
is higher than in Bahrain. Furthermore, the average level of compliance with IFRSs in 
Kuwait and Oman is expected to be higher than in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. 
 
In general, the level of compliance with IFRSs is expected to increase over time in the GCC 
countries only if enforcement activities increase in all GCC countries. At least two external 
auditors have been required to audit firms’ accounts in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In the UAE, 
although there is no legal requirement for more than one external auditor to be appointed, 
it is common practice for UAE firms to have their accounts audited by two and sometimes 
three external auditors. In Bahrain, shareholders have begun to question instances of 
possible violations of IFRSs or other regulations. This suggests that they may have become 
more aware of, and more willing to pursue, their statutory rights. In Kuwait and Oman, the 
enforcement bodies have become more active in monitoring firms’ compliance with IFRSs 
and other regulations in recent years.  
 
Overall, this chapter described the framework of financial reporting in each of the GCC 
countries, which taken together constitute the area of interest of this thesis which is the 
extent of financial disclosures in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. The chapter 
discussed the regulations that firms must comply with, and the formal mechanisms used by 
firms to promote their compliance. In addition, it reviewed each state’s legislation relating 
to financial reporting and any mandatory requirements relating to accounting standards that 
must be adhered to. It explains the role of auditors in promoting compliance with 
accounting standards, and the roles and tasks of the governmental body responsible for 
monitoring compliance and for enforcement. It also discussed the harmonisation efforts 
among the GCC countries to promote compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements 
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and other relevant regulations. In addition, this chapter reviews numbers of major 
macroeconomic indicators of GCC countries during the period 2010-2013. Those 
macroeconomic indicators are GDP per capita, GDP growth, real growth rate, inflation 
tare, exchange rate, exportation, population and stock traded value.  It appears that all of 
the GCC countries have a significant increase in the GDP and growth rate of GDP but high 
level of inflation during 2010 to 2012 except 2013, this is could refer to the fall in the oil 
prices and a start of new recession during and after 2013. Fixed exchange rate, which is 
consider as the key macroeconomic indicator in the GCC countries during 2010-2013, has 
contributed in increasing foreign direct investment to the GCC countries. It seems that, 
amongst GCC countries, the highest number of population (29,14 million) and value of 
shares traded (50 billion dollars) were in Saudi Arabia, whereas Bahrain had the lowest 
number of population (1,31 million) and value of shares traded (1.10 billion dollars). 
Finally, it appears that there are some differences in macroeconomic indicators among 
GCC counties. Those indicators could play a significant role in explaining the differences 
of financial disclosures in the annual reports of GCC listed firms which is the main 
objective of this thesis. 
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 The Extent of Corporate Mandatory Disclosure, 
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter is organised discusses the difference between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in firms and the different theoretical bases for mandatory disclosures. This 
chapter also outlines the theoretical framework used in the literature to explain mandatory 
disclosure and its determinants. Theories related to mandatory disclosure that are 
commonly employed in the literature include costs-based theories, agency theory, and 
market-based theories. In the following sections, those theories are briefly reviewed. In 
addition, the theories are selected because they are powerful in explaining the relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and its determinants, including a corporate’s characteristics, 
ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors, cultural characteristics (personal 
characteristics of firm managers), and the interaction between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures.  
The chapter reviews the existing literature examining firm level mandatory disclosure in 
both developed and developing countries. In addition, this chapter uses the theoretical 
framework and empirical findings from the current literature to develop the testable 
hypotheses of this thesis.  
 
 Accounting disclosure: mandatory vs. voluntary 
Owusu-Ansah (1998a, p. 154) defines voluntary disclosure as “any disclosure by 
companies that is not mandated by law and/or self-regulatory bodies”. However, 
mandatory disclosure is the minimum standard of financial or non-financial information 
which international accounting standards or other national standards require from a 
reporting entity. Therefore, mandatory disclosures differ from voluntary disclosures 
because the former force firms to talk about their current cash flows, profits, net assets and 
ownership rights rather than firms’ aspirations for future success (Leuz and Wysocki, 
2008). Thus, mandatory disclosures oblige firms to disclose both ‘good and bad news’ 
(Verrecchia, 2001). 
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In the case of voluntary disclosures, the quality and level of information disclosed by firms 
is a result of the rational decision of the managers based on the perceived, direct and 
indirect, costs and benefits of doing so (Gray et al., 1990). As regards mandatory 
disclosures, if firms comply with the requirements of accounting standards, the information 
provided is a result of what the accounting standards and regulations mandate. However, if 
enforcement is inefficient, the levels of mandatory disclosures provided are, similar to 
voluntary disclosures, mainly dependent on managers’ decisions. Therefore, the costs 
arising from the preparation and dissemination of positive or negative information that 
influences the provision of voluntary disclosures may also apply to mandatory disclosures. 
Nevertheless, there is an additional element of cost/benefit that managers assess when 
determining the level of mandatory disclosures they provide: that is ‘regulatory risk’, which 
consists of financial risk, litigation risk, regulatory engagement risk and reputation risk 
(Adams, 1994). Researchers, therefore, not only measure actual compliance with disclosure 
requirements but also examine attitudes towards compliance, i.e. company ‘compliance 
culture’ (Jenkinson, 1996). 
 
Therefore, firms’ levels of mandatory disclosures are determined by the forces of demand 
and supply as well as the regulatory risk that managers bear. The levels of mandatory 
disclosures are, of course, influenced by the regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in the 
countries in which firms operate. On the other hand, voluntary disclosures are less subject 
to regulation and enforcement mechanisms, and more to the forces of supply and demand. 
 
 The theoretical framework for corporate mandatory disclosure 
3.3.1 Regulatory and free market theories  
A large volume of accounting regulations exists in most countries, covering a broad range 
of issues, including financial disclosures. However, Admati and Pfeiderer (2000) argue that 
there is no universal agreement on the optimal level of mandatory disclosures that firms 
should provide. In fact, there is significant debate in the literature as to whether regulation 
is needed or not. Deegan and Unerman (2008) describe the two opposite schools of thought 
on the subject. The first school argues that regulation is necessary (Regulatory Theory), 
whilst the second school argues that it is not (Free Market Theory). 
 
Supporters of the first view argue that “regulation is supplied in response to the demand of 
the public for the correction of inequitable market practices” (Posner, 1974, p.335). Thus, 
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the regulatory body interferes in order to protect the public and maximise public welfare 
(Scott, 2003). This ‘public interest’ approach assumes that capital markets are not effective, 
and therefore users of the financial statements with few resources are unable to obtain 
information about a firm. Consequently, information asymmetries may lead to ‘moral 
hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ problems. 
 
The main criticism of regulatory mechanisms is that they may be captured (controlled) by 
particular interest groups. Therefore, the ‘regulated’ capture the ‘regulator’, resulting in 
regulation having different impacts across different groups because it acts for the interest 
of specific social or economic groups (Deegan and Unerman, 2008). Thus, according to the 
Free Market Theory, disclosure levels should be determined only by the forces of supply 
and demand (i.e. without regulation), as is the case for all other goods. ‘Consumers’ of that 
good (i.e. disclosures) will be prepared to pay for it if it has any use. Additionally, the 
market will ‘penalise’ any firms that do not provide the necessary information by treating 
them as ‘bad’, especially if other firms do provide such disclosures. This process will 
eventually lead to an optimal level of information disclosed. However, supporters of the 
regulatory theory argue that, as soon as the information is available to the public, there will 
be many individuals who will obtain it without incurring any costs (Cooper and Keim, 
1983). This is known as the ‘free rider problem’ (Coffee, 1984), which violates the market-
forces arguments and leads to non-functioning pricing mechanisms in a market. 
 
Following on from the above, the next section investigates in more detail the theoretical 
framework used to explain the mandatory disclosure levels identified in this study. 
However, not all theories relating to voluntary disclosures appear to be equally relevant. 
Those theories considered to be relevant for the objectives of the current study can be 
grouped into three categories: costs-based theories, agency theory, and capital market-
based theories. 
3.3.2 Costs-based theories  
The management of a firm considers the trade-off between the direct and indirect costs and 
the benefits of voluntary disclosures. This issue has more deep implications when managers 
make a rational decision on whether to comply with mandatory disclosures. Therefore, the 
information and political costs approaches are particularly relevant for the current study. 
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3.3.2.1 Information costs  
Direct information costs increase with the introduction of disclosure regulation (Benston, 
1985). Firms have to incur expenses for staff training, employing consultants and gathering 
the information needed, processing it and presenting it. These costs are quantifiable and, 
assuming that they know the marginal benefits arising from providing the mandatory 
information, the firm’s management will provide the information up to the point that the 
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs (Deegan and Unerman, 2008). Hence, direct 
information costs become very influential during the rational decision-making process as 
to whether to comply. This is particularly relevant to the research of this thesis since 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required for GCC listed firms, and 
there is evidence that firms expect high direct information costs to arise as a result of the 
implementation of IFRS. 
 
The indirect costs include those arising from the impact of disclosures on firms’ activities 
and/or decisions (Leventis, 2001). This is mainly referred to as disclosure of ‘proprietary’ 
information. “Proprietary information is defined as information whose disclosure reduces 
the present value of cash flows of the firm endowed with the information” (Dye, 1986, p. 
331). High compliance with accounting standards’ requirements may result in a higher 
amount of ‘proprietary’ information being disclosed. This is based on the argument that 
mandatory disclosures oblige the firms to disclose both ‘good and bad news’ (Verrecchia, 
2001). This can provide more incentives for non-compliance because managers will be 
unlikely to make a potentially damaging (to the firm’s value) disclosure (Dye, 1986). 
However, Skinner (1994) argues that, in order to avoid litigation, managers may be willing 
to disclose ‘bad news’. Therefore, to avoid litigation costs, a firm may be tempted to 
comply with all disclosures mandated by IFRS, even if they lead to the disclosure of 
proprietary information. 
 
Although a strong relationship between information costs and mandatory disclosures is 
expected, the above discussion and the mixed findings in the literature (e.g. Verrecchia, 
1983; Dye, 1985) do not allow for predicting the direction of this relationship. Verrecchia 
(1983) examines offers a rationale for a manager’s decision in the disclosure of 
information. The result relies on the existence of a proprietary cost associated with the 
disclosure of information. In other words, the existence of proprietary cost prevents full 
disclosure.  The proprietary cost is defined as “the cost associated with disclosing 
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information which may be proprietary in nature, and therefore proprietary damaging” 
(Verrecchia, 1983, p.181).   
3.3.2.2 Political costs  
The political cost theory does not focus on the wealth maximisation of firms and self-
interest (Haddad, 2005). It is derived from Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986, 1990) and 
the experience of politicians (e.g. government bodies and tax institutions) who have the 
power to impact on the wealth redistribution of firms. Foster (1986, p. 37) defines political 
costs as “the costs associated with government expropriating wealth from corporations and 
redistributing it to other parties in society”. A number of devices are selected by firms to 
alleviate the pressure they face from politicians, such as government lobbying, social 
responsibility operations in the media, and minimising reported earnings by the selection 
of accounting procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  
 
Political costs theory may provide additional theoretical underpinning to explain the level 
of mandatory disclosures. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that firms, particularly large 
ones or those with extremely large profits, are sensitive to the public eye. This means that 
they are under the inspection of various groups, for example, the government, employee 
unions, and environmental lobby groups (Deegan and Unerman, 2008). Politicians could 
act against large or highly profitable firms with the argument that it is in the ‘public 
interest’, while they actually act in their own interest to gain more votes (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1979). This leads firms to apply tax-driven accounting policies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979) and provides high voluntary 
disclosures (Lim and McKinnon, 1993). In some areas, tax-driven accounting choices of 
unconsolidated financial statements might follow through to consolidated IFRS statements. 
For instance, asset impairments are tax deductible in Germany (but not in the UK), so there 
is a bias in favour for them.  A number of devices are used by firms to alleviate the pressure 
they face from politicians, such as government lobbying, social responsibility operations 
in the media, and minimising reported earnings by means of the selection of accounting 
procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Correspondingly, management can reduce 
expected costs from unfavourable political actions by adopting accounting policies and 
complying with accounting standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Rahman and Scapens, 
1988). 
 
53 
 
Not complying with mandatory disclosures could provide an extra motivation for 
politicians to scrutinise firms’ financial statements. In addition, the regulatory body may 
identify cases of non-compliance by politically sensitive firms and then inform the 
government. Accordingly, even if firms do not face the risk of regulatory engagement in 
the period under examination, they may face the risk of attracting the government’s 
attention, with the latter acting against firms in relation to other matters, e.g. conducting 
tax audits, resulting in tax penalties.  
 
This is of particular relevance in the context of GCC countries. Although the regulatory 
bodies in the GCC are considered to be independent, they still operate under government 
influence. Additionally, GCC firms tend to apply tax-driven policies and are sensitive to 
any actions which may result in tax penalties (Papas, 1993). Thus, one might expect a 
positive relationship between political costs and levels of mandatory disclosures (in order 
to avoid the firm providing a motivation for political action). This is the argument given in 
the voluntary disclosure literature (e.g. Raffournier, 1995; Leventis, 2001; Camfferman 
and Cooke, 2002).  
 
However, Wallace (1987), Wallace et al. (1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) hold the 
view that, because comprehensive disclosure may cause political action, politically 
sensitive firms may disclose less information in an attempt to limit such attacks (Vlachos, 
2001). On that basis, the sign of the relationship between level of mandatory disclosures 
and political costs is difficult to predict. 
3.3.3 Agency theory  
Agency theory is widely used in the disclosure literature (Firth 1980; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; 1991; 1992; Hossain et al., 1994; Marston and Annika, 2004; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005; Bhuiyan et al., 2007; Aljifri, 2008; Nurunnabi and Monirul, 2012). It 
is concerned with the relationship between agents and principals, i.e. firms’ managers and 
shareholders, respectively (Morris, 1987). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) explain the 
basis for agency relationships:  
“A contract under which one or more persons (principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. 
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Jensen and Meckling define the managers of the firm as the ‘agents’ and the shareholder as 
the ‘principal’. This theory is based on the problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and management in firms.  
 
The separation of ownership and control creates conflicts between the agents and the 
principals, especially if one assumes that any individual’s main purpose is the maximisation 
of the principal’s personal wealth. The fundamental assumption of agency theory is 
concerned with the mechanisms that ensure that actions that benefit the managers also 
benefit firms. 
 
Deegan (2010) argues that agency theory focuses on the relationships between principals 
and agents, a relationship which, due to various information asymmetries, creates much 
uncertainty. Such a relationship involves the delegation of some decision-making to 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, managers have the power to use all of 
the resources available to the firm and, consequently, have all information about the firm. 
On the other hand, the owners who provide the resources have the power to hire managers 
to lead the business and they need information to evaluate the performance of the managers 
as well as the firm. Thus, the problem of information asymmetry arises. It is assumed that 
individuals’ actions are driven by self-interest to maximize their benefits. The theory is that 
there is a conflict of interest, or lack of goal congruence, between the agents (managers) 
and the principals (owners); the agents may take decisions that maximise their benefits, but 
not necessarily maximise the benefits of the owners. Such a conflict requires a number of 
mechanisms to measure and monitor the agent's behaviour and, therefore, leads to agency 
costs (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). 
 
Agents are relatively independent in making decisions and there are different risks arising 
from the agency framework. First, the principals are faced with the outcomes of the agents’ 
actual actions without being able to monitor and evaluate them. This results in the ‘moral 
hazard’ problem, i.e. the principal is exposed to risks that they cannot control and that 
possibly do not lead to outcomes which are in their best interest. Second, the optimality of 
the management’s decision is unknown to the principal. This results in the ‘adverse 
selection’ problem, i.e. leading to the prices of ‘good’ firms being sub-optimal. These 
information asymmetries generate ‘agency costs’, which can be disaggregated across the 
agency costs of equity and the agency costs of debt (Morris, 1987). 
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The agency costs of equity relate to the decline in the firm’s value when the principals 
believe that the agents do not pursue optimal decisions (i.e. the adverse selection problem). 
They also relate to the costs of monitoring to assure that the agents act in the principal’s 
interest. The agency costs of debt refer to the likelihood of agency costs that the debt 
holders incorporate in the price they pay for the debt. Some examples include the 
distribution of excessive dividends and engaging in unprofitable investments, as well as 
the associated monitoring and bonding costs (Morris, 1987). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that agency costs could be eliminated if incentives are provided to managers. 
Additionally, monitoring procedures, including the production of accounting reports, could 
facilitate this purpose (Morris, 1987). 
 
Alvarez et al. (2008) indicate that one of the possible ways to reduce agency costs is to 
disclose information about the managers’ actions and the economic reality of the firm. With 
that information, shareholders will be able to monitor managers more effectively. 
Consequently, the disclosure of information can serve as a mechanism for control on behalf 
of the firms’ shareholders, as well as a mechanism of legitimacy for managers. 
Shareholders will seek to control managers' behaviour through bonding and monitoring 
activities. The two parties may use the level of disclosure as a way to mitigate the severity 
of the problem of information asymmetry. Managers have an incentive to signal that they 
are acting in the interests of owners. On the other hand, the owners try to encourage, and 
sometimes force, managers to disclose more information. Therefore, managers may have 
an incentive to try to convince shareholders. Through greater disclosure, firms attempt to 
reduce the cost of capital by reducing investor uncertainty (Ball and Foster, 1982; Watson 
et al., 2002). 
 
Based on these arguments, it may be argued that increased mandatory disclosures reduce 
the agency costs arising from information asymmetries and strengthen the reputation of the 
management. Therefore, the firm management have an incentive to provide a high level of 
mandatory disclosures. 
 
3.3.4 Market-based theories 
Agency theory and free market theory make strong assumptions about the way that stock 
markets operate. For instance, the market principle of agency theory argues that managers 
want to signal that they are efficient because they maximise shareholder wealth. This 
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assumes that there are ways managers can transfer such signals to the ‘receivers’ of these 
signals, who are the investors. Market-based theories were developed in an attempt to 
provide further explanations for the provision of IFRS disclosures. Three theories falling 
into this category, signalling theory, capital need theory and efficient market theory, are 
discussed below. 
3.3.4.1 Signalling theory  
Signalling theory is considered to be an extension of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Buskirk, 2012). It was initially applied to consumer behaviour to explain the 
problems related to buyers being imperfectly informed about the quality of products 
(Akerlof, 1970). Signalling theory is concerned with the problems relating to information 
asymmetries in markets, and illustrates how these asymmetries can be reduced by the party 
with more information by signalling it to others (Morris, 1987). Akerlof (1970) explains 
that, given the existence of uninformed buyers, all products are valued at an average price 
based on buyers’ perceptions of the quality of the products, but not their actual quality. 
This implies an opportunity loss for the sellers because the higher quality products could 
be sold at a higher price. However, this loss can be reduced by communicating the higher 
quality of the products. 
 
Concerning corporate disclosure, managers with information that implies higher firm 
values than those set by the market will increase their disclosures with the intention that 
share prices will be increased (Lev and Penman, 1990). In contrast, managers with 
information that implies lower firm values than those set by the market will remain silent. 
The absence of disclosures will be interpreted by the market as the firm being ‘bad’, i.e. no 
information is perceived as bad information (Akerlof, 1970). This will result in those firms’ 
shares being revalued downwards. This downward price of non-disclosing firms will 
encourage even further those firms with ‘good news’, to ‘screen’ themselves out of the 
group by disclosing this information. In contrast, ‘bad news’ firms will provide an incentive 
for managers to release available information, as failure to do so may lead to an increase in 
agency costs. Signalling theory is considered to be particularly relevant for the purposes of 
this thesis. The transition to IFRS and the increase in disclosures required provide ‘good’ 
GCC firms with the opportunity to ‘screen’ themselves from those appearing to be lower 
quality firms. 
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3.3.4.2 Capital need theory  
Capital need theory hypothesises that a primary motivation for firms to increase disclosures 
is the need to raise capital (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Higher levels of financial disclosures may 
be perceived by managers as leading to a lower cost of new capital because they reduce 
information asymmetries (Choi, 1973; Firth, 1980; Cooke, 1993). The literature regarding 
the provision of voluntary disclosures illustrates that there is, indeed, a negative 
relationship between disclosures and a firm’s cost of capital (e.g. Welker, 1995; Botosan, 
1997; Francis et al., 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Rashid, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 
2002; Kothari and Short, 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). While 
the relationship is negative in the majority of studies, Spero (1979) argues that, depending 
on the type of information disclosed, the relationship may be positive or that there may not 
even be any relationship.  
 
Cooke (1989a) provides a number of justifications to support the capital need theory. 
Firstly, investors could be attracted by additional disclosure and it also helps in maintaining 
demand for a company’s shares. Secondly, additional disclosure could reduce information 
risk and that could lead to a lower cost of capital. Thirdly, listed firms tend to disclose more 
information than unlisted firms because listed firms are motivated to increase their 
disclosure in order to raise capital in the markets. In addition, multiple exchange listed 
firms are even more likely to disclose more information than single exchange listed firms. 
Fourthly, firms may have to disclose additional information in order to gain access to 
foreign capital. This is because foreign capital suppliers may have different disclosure 
requirements. Finally, firms might increase their social responsibility disclosures to show 
that they act responsibly in order to reach their position in the securities markets and attract 
new investors. 
 
A number of studies support the capital need theory. Most of them find that additional 
disclosure can lead to a reduced cost of capital, fewer estimation risks and enhanced stock 
liquidity (Horngren, 1957; Choi, 1973b; Firth, 1980; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Barry and 
Brown, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Frankel et al., 
1995; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Healy et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001). 
 
It is argue that capital need theory is relevant for the objectives of this thesis. Al-Shiab 
(2003) reports that compliance with IAS mandatory disclosures in Jordan has a cumulative 
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effect on the cost of capital. Hence, considering that the objective of a firm in being listed 
is to attract finance and that firms ‘compete’ in stock markets (Leventis, 2001), managers 
have the incentive to provide enhanced mandatory disclosures in order to attract more 
finance from investors. 
3.3.4.3 Efficient market theory 
Market efficiency is concerned with the way that information is absorbed and processed by 
market participants. So, financial information holds a key role in the level of market 
efficiency. Fama (1970) defines three forms of market efficiency. The weak form suggests 
that the price of a share at a particular point of time is a reflection of the sequence of its 
historical prices. The semi-strong form implies that the price of a share reflects all the 
publicly available information about a firm (including any information provided in annual 
reports). The strong form states that the price of a share reflects all the information available 
for a firm, even the information available to a group of individuals who have monopolistic 
access to the information (private information). 
 
According to Keane (1993), the requirements for a market to be informationally efficient 
are: a fairly strong regulated accounting and auditing profession; the clear and distinct 
information needs of the market participants; and the quick and wide distribution of the 
information provided by firms. These should also be supported by an efficient ‘institutional 
infrastructure’ (e.g. sophisticated and well-informed investors and analysts, effective 
investor protection mechanisms, and the systematic and rigorous monitoring of insider 
trading). 
 
The accounting and auditing profession is relatively strong in GCC countries, and 
professionals play a significant role in harmonising accounting and auditing regulations 
and practices in the region. However, GCC stock markets are considered to be developing 
markets and, recently, they have opened to foreign investors and are allowing them to 
invest in GCC listed firms. This implies that currently available information is reflected 
well in share prices. Thus, market-based theories are likely to provide a grounded 
framework for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
 Mandatory disclosure indices in developed and developing countries 
This section presents the findings of existing studies that examine the level of mandatory 
disclosures, as they are relevant to the first objectives of this thesis. The section highlights 
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existing findings regarding the disclosure index methods used to measure the level of 
mandatory disclosures and how they impact in terms of theory in developed and developing 
countries.  
 
3.4.1 Mandatory disclosure indices in developed country studies 
This section aims to explore how empirical existing studies measure the level of mandatory 
disclosure indices in developed countries, including methods and items used to measure 
their indices. It also presents the theories of mandatory disclosure that are used in developed 
country studies.  
 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the studies examining the level of mandatory disclosure 
in developed countries. These studies are classified according to the chronological order of 
the year of publication. Various inferences may be drawn from the findings of these studies. 
Of the 17 studies identified, seven studies examine the level of mandatory disclosure before 
and during the 1990s and ten studies during and after the year 2000. The studies are focused 
on developed capital markets. Furthermore, and of particular relevance to the first 
objectives of this thesis is the fact that, 14 out of the 17 studies employ only one disclosure 
index method, that is, the unweighted disclosure index (the commonly used dichotomous 
approach) for measuring the extent of mandatory disclosure requirements in developed 
capital markets. A dichotomous approach is applied in order to compare the items on the 
disclosure checklist with the contents of the annual reports. Firm is awarded 1 if it discloses 
a certain item and 0 if it does not disclose it when that item is applicable to such firms. The 
reviewed literature in developed countries reveals the existence of great differences among 
the mandatory disclosure indices used by previous studies, quite likely attributable to the 
absence of a theory providing the basis for determining the number or type of information 
items to be included in the mandatory disclosure index.  
 
The number of mandatory information items included in the mandatory disclosure indices 
ranged from a very limited number such as in Wallace et al. (1994) who used only 16 key 
mandatory items, and Patton and Zelenka (1997) who used 66 mandatory items to a large 
number of information items such as Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) who used 495 
mandatory items, Tsalavoutas et al. (2011) who used 481 mandatory items and Popova et 
al. (2013) who used 290 mandatory items. In addition, the majority of mandatory disclosure 
studies in developed countries applied unweighted disclosure indices.  
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Some studies, especially early ones, used unweighted indices reflecting the views of 
different users such as investors, financial analysts and regulators, regarding the relative 
importance of various information items (Cooke, 1992; Cooke, 1993; Patton and Zelenka, 
1997; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; 
Yeoh, 2005; Fekete et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas et al., 2011; Popova et al., 2013). For 
example, Patton and Zelenka (1997) test a disclosure model for the 50 Czech joint-stock 
companies that are included in the 1993 Prague Stock Exchange Index. They follow the 
commonly used dichotomous approach and introduce two further alternatives. In particular, 
they construct a disclosure index which includes only those items which are expected to 
apply to most companies (referring to it as the 'narrow' index). The other two indices 
include the initial index as well as items that may be more subject to the 'Not Applicable' 
problem such as 'somewhat broader' index and a 'broad' index. The disclosure index for a 
given firm is defined as: (number of items disclosed) / (number of items disclosed + number 
of items not disclosed). 'Not Applicable' items are omitted from the calculation. The value 
of a disclosure index can range from 0 to 1. An item scores 1 if it disclosed and 0 if it is not 
disclosed. There are 37 items used in the 'narrow' index, 12 items used in the 'somewhat 
broader' index and 17 items used in the 'broad' index. The result shows that average level 
of companies' mandatory disclosure is 60%. They report large variability in the level of 
mandatory disclosure from 25% to 80%.  
 
Street and Gray (2001) examine a worldwide of 279 samples of companies referring to the 
use of International Accounting Standards (IAS) to assess the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and most importantly to provide evidence of the factors associated with 
mandatory disclosure level. They employ two different mandatory disclosure indices. The 
first disclosure index is calculated by dividing the total number of required disclosures 
provided by the number of applicable disclosures. The second disclosure index is calculated 
as follows: the total number of required disclosures provided by the firm (for all the IAS 
under review) divided by the number of applicable disclosures, which is consistent with 
Cooke (1989, 1990), whereby each disclosure item receives an equal weighting. The first 
disclosure index contains 9 IASs (IAS 12 income taxes, IAS 14 segment reporting, IAS 16 
property, plant, and equipment, IAS 17 leases, IAS 19 retirement benefits, IAS 23 
borrowing costs, IAS 29 financial reporting in hyperinflationary economies, IAS 32 
financial instruments and IAS 33 earnings per share). The second disclosure index 
comprises 8 IASs (IAS 2 inventories, IAS 4 depreciation, IAS 8 net profit or loss for the 
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period, IAS 12 income taxes, IAS 19 retirement benefits, IAS 21 effects changes foreign 
exchange rates, IAS 29 accounting for operations in hyperinflationary economies and IAS 
22 business combinations, Goodwill). They find that there was no significant difference in 
the mean for overall disclosure indices, 72%, and 74%, respectively for the first and second 
disclosure indices.  
 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2011) examine 153 Greek listed companies' compliance with all IFRS 
mandatory disclosure during 2005. They used a disclosure checklist included 481 
mandatory disclosure items, required by 31 standards. They apply the two most commonly 
used disclosure methods: Cooke's method and the Partial Compliance (PC) method. The 
Cooke's method (unweighted disclosure index) is calculated as the ratio of the total items 
disclosed to the maximum possible score applicable for that company. However, this kind 
of disclosure index has an important limitation: the number of disclosure items required by 
different standards varies considerably. Some standards require a large number of items to 
be disclosed (e.g. IAS 1 ‘Presentation of financial statements) whilst some others require 
only a few (e.g. IAS 2 ‘Inventories’). As a result, “…standards which require more items 
to be disclosed or, in other words, standards with more items included in the index are 
unintentionally and indirectly not treated equally with those that require fewer items to be 
disclosed” (Al-Shiab, 2003, p.222). An alternative method that avoids this problem is the 
Partial Compliance (PC) method (unweighted approach) is calculated as “the degree of 
compliance for each company is measured by adding the degree of compliance for each 
standard and then dividing this sum by the number of standards applicable to each 
company” (Al-Shiab, 2003, p.223). The result indicates that Cooke's method (83%) 
produces significantly higher scores than the PC method (79%). This is in line with the 
approach taken by Al-Shiab (2003) who implements only the PC method and reporting 
substantially lower compliance scores compared to studies in other emerging markets for 
a similar period (e.g. Hassan et al. (2006) with reference to Egypt.) At the same time, the 
findings of existing studies using only “Cooke's method” may report relatively inflated 
scores (depending on the number of items from each accounting standard included in the 
research instrument).  
 
Some group of studies apply weighted approach (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994). 
For example, Malone et al. (1993) examine factors that are associated with the extent of 
financial disclosure for 125 US oil and gas firms in 1986 by using a weight disclosure index 
consist of 129 items. This set of disclosures is weighted by oil and gas financial analysts 
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according to the importance of each disclosure in an investment decision. The analysts are 
asked to weight each item on a scale of 0-2, with 0 representing no importance in the 
investment decision, a 1 representing intermediate importance, and a 2 representing the 
highest level of importance. The extent of financial disclosure, the disclosure index, was 
the ratio of a firm's total disclosure score to the firm's total possible disclosure. The results 
indicate that the average level of financial disclosure is 56%. However, the use of weighted 
indices is criticised since weighted indices may reflect the subjectivity of either researchers 
or users rather than the actual relative importance of items, and thus, unweighted indices 
are preferred (Cooke, 1992; 1993).  
 
Other group of studies apply both weighted and unweighted approaches (Hodgdon et al, 
2009). For example, Hodgdon et al. (2009) examine the impact of auditor choice on IFRS 
compliance under the assumption of strict exogeneity of auditor choice. They use both 
weighted and unweighted approaches to measure the disclosure level. The weighted 
approach index calculated as the sum of the weighted disclosures provided by the firm 
divided by the sum of the weighted disclosures that should have been provided by the firm. 
The unweighted approach index defined as the number of mandatory disclosures actually 
provided by a firm divided by the number of mandatory disclosures that should have been 
provided by the firm. Their disclosure index includes 209 mandatory disclosure items, each 
coded as disclosed, not disclosed, or not applicable, for a sample of 101 firms. Their results 
show that for the unweighted method, the average disclosure levels for 1999 and 2000 are 
58% and 64%, respectively. The weighted compliance score also indicates that there is 
variability in the level of disclosure provided by IFRS firms. The average disclosure levels 
for the weighted method in 1999 and 2000 are 45% and 50%, respectively.  
 
Furthermore, some studies which apply both weighted and unweighted indices report that 
there are no significant differences between either (Choi, 1973; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987). Consequently, most studies in developed countries use a dichotomous, unweighted 
disclosure index. Furthermore, it is noticed that many studies such as Cooke (1992), Street 
and Gray (2002) Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, (2005), Yeoh (2005), Tsalavoutas et al. (2011) 
and Popova et al. (2013) apply self-constructed disclosure indices, while others such as 
Glaum and Street (2003) and Fekete et al. (2008) apply existing ones. A few studies such 
as Malone et al. (1993) develop a disclosure index for the purpose of measuring disclosure 
practices by firms of a specific industry type (oil and gas), but in general, studies construct 
63 
 
comprehensive indices with the purpose of examining mandatory disclosure practices in a 
wide range of industries.  
 
The majority of financial disclosure literature is concentrated on developed countries, 
specifically countries such as the US and the UK. Before the late 1980s such studies 
investigating developing countries are rare. The chosen developed country studies use 
mandatory disclosure indices in order to assess mandatory disclosure practices in eighteen 
developed countries, namely Norway (Barrett, 1976); Japan (Barrett, 1976; Cooke, 1992; 
1993); France (Barrett, 1976; Zarzeski, 1996); Netherlands (Barrett, 1976; Hodgdon et al., 
2009); Sweden (Barrett, 1976; Hodgdon et al., 2009); Spain (Wallace et al., 1994); Hong 
Kong (Zarzeski, 1996; Hodgdon et al., 2009), Czech Republic (Patton and Zelenka, 1997; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009); UAS (Barrett, 1976; Malone et al., 1993; Street and Gray, 2002); 
Germany (Barrett, 1976; Zarzeski, 1996; Glaum and Street, 2003; Hodgdon et al., 2009); 
New Zealand (Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Yeoh, 2005); Hungary (Fekete et al., 2008; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009); Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Switzerland (Hodgdon et al., 
2009); Greece (Tsalavoutas et al., 2011) and UK (Barrett, 1976; Popova et al., 2013). These 
studies are considered the most influential as they have either introduced new empirical 
facts or presented rigorous analytical tools that help in supporting the research methods 
employed in this study.  
 
With the exception of samples used by Cooke (1992; 1993) and Fekete et al. (2008), the 
number of sampled firms in developed country mandatory disclosure studies is relatively 
high compared to that in the developing countries context such as Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) 761 firms and Camfferman and Cooke (2002) 322 firms, referable to 
the challenge of collecting data in such environments due to the lack of databases and the 
culture of secrecy surrounding the dissemination of information. This problem only arises 
in the literature related to developing capital markets (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Hassan, 
2006; Omar, 2007). The review of developed country mandatory disclosure studies shows 
that financial disclosure theories succeeded in providing a satisfactory and competent 
explanation for differences in mandatory disclosure levels among firms. This is to be 
expected since these theories originated in Western environments.  
 
The reliance on financial disclosure theories (e.g., agency theory, signalling theory, capital 
need theory, political cost theories, and cultural theories) in existing studies accompanied 
the development of voluntary financial disclosure literature for the purpose of interpreting 
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the determinants of management decisions to provide additional information in annual 
reports. Consequently, many studies employed financial disclosure theories in all 
disclosure studies (regardless of whether they examined voluntary or mandatory disclosure 
practices) in order to explain variations in levels of financial disclosure among sampled 
firms (e.g., Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 
1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2003; Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005; Omar, 2007; Samaha and Stapleton, 2008; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Popova 
et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). Table 3.1 summarises mandatory disclosure theories that 
are used through mandatory disclosure studies in developed countries. Those theories are: 
regulatory and free market theories, agency theory, information costs theory, political cost 
theory, signalling theory, capital need theory and efficient market theory. The explanation 
of those theories are reviewed in section 3.3.  
 
Overall, the studies reviewed focus on firms operating in significantly different institutional 
settings (including enforcement) and thus caution is needed when one tries to compare the 
findings from the studies and to draw conclusions. Additionally, the study samples refer to 
different periods, and the majority of the studies apply unweighted disclosure indices (self-
constructed indices) which may increase the subjectivity of the scoring process. However, 
it is notable that these studies reach similar broad conclusions. It is common that firms do 
not comply fully with international accounting standards disclosure requirements in 
developed countries. In particular, mandatory disclosure levels are very rarely close to, or 
higher than, 90%, with the majority of studies reporting average mandatory disclosures 
levels of approximately 70% to 80%. 
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Table 3.1. Existing mandatory disclosure studies for developed country firms 
Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
Barrett 
(1976) 
US, UK, Japan, 
France, West 
German, 
Netherlands, and 
Sweden. 
1963- 1972 103 (15 company 
from each country 
except Netherlands 
only 13 
companies). 
Weighted method (17 
categories of 
information) used by 
Cerf (1961), Singhvi 
(1971) and Buzby 
(1974).  
The average level of 
mandatory 
disclosure is 59 %. 
US and UK 
companies disclose 
72% and 73% 
respectively.   
France is the last in 
terms of extent of 
financial disclosure 
44%.  
Efficient capital 
and market 
theory. 
Cooke (1992) Japan 1988 35 listed companies. Unweighted method 
(165 items: 89 
mandatory and 76 
voluntary). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 
95%, with the range of 88% 
to 100%. 
 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
20%, with the range of 7% 
to 41%.  
 
 
Information and 
costs theory. 
Cooke (1993) Japan 1988 48 companies (15 listed, 
10 multiply listed, 13 
unlisted). 
Unweighted method 
(195 items: 106 
voluntary and 89 
mandatory). 
 
The average level of 
disclosure that are 
classified to both the 
Commercial Code (CC) 
and the Securities and 
Agency theory, 
capital need 
theory 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Exchange Law (SEL) is 
35% and 54% respectively.  
Malone et al. 
(1993) 
UAS 1986 125 US oil and gas 
companies (41 listed and 
84 unlisted). 
Weighted method (129 
mandatory and 
voluntary items). 
The average level of 
financial disclosure 
is 56%. 
Information 
costs theory. 
Wallace et al. 
(1994) 
Spain 1991 50 non-financial listed 
and unlisted companies 
(30 listed and 20 
unlisted). 
Weighted method (16 
key mandatory items) 
by the perceptions of 
any user group nor by 
our subjective ranking 
of the importance of the 
different items. 
Average mandatory 
disclosure level: 59%, 
range between 29% and 
80%. 
 
Political cost theory. 
Zarzeski (1996) France, 
Germany, Hong 
Kong, Japan, 
Norway, 
UK and USA 
1991-1993 256 companies (65 
companies in US; 47 in 
UK; 31 in France; 
39 in Japan; 16 in 
Norway; 29 in Germany 
and 29 in Hong Kong). 
Unweighted method 
(52 mandatory items) 
used by Chow and 
Wong (1987). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average extent of 
financial disclosure is 73% 
in US, 68.7% in UK; 
62.8% in France; 59.7% in 
Japan; 59.3% in Norway; 
57.3% in Germany; 56.8% 
in Hong Kong. 
 
Cultural theory (Gray’s 
Model). 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) 
Czech Republic 1993 50 listed companies 
Prague Stock Exchange 
(PSE). 
 
Unweighted method 
(66 mandatory items). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average level of mandatory 
disclosure is 60%. They 
report large variability in the 
level of mandatory 
disclosure: from 25% to 
80%. 
 
Information costs 
theory. 
Street and Gray 
(2001) 
UAS 1998 279 listed firms Unweighted method. 
The disclosure 
practices cover only 
nine IAS (IAS 12, 14, 
16, 17, 19, 23, 29, 32, 
and 33).  
The measurement and 
presentation practices 
cover only 10 issues in 
seven IAS (IAS 2, 4, 8, 
12, 19, 21, and 22). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
An average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 
74%, range from 60% to 
93%. 
 
None 
Camfferman 
and Cooke 
(2002) 
 
UK 
Netherlands 
 
1996 322 companies 
(161 from each 
country). 
 
Unweighted method 
(93 items classified 
into 13 categories 
include in the Fourth 
and Seventh EU 
Directives). 
 
UK companies provide 
more comprehensive 
disclosures to comply with 
EU requirements than their 
Dutch counterparts with 
mean scores 58.74% and 
Agency cost, 
informational cost and 
political cost. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
 
54.32% for the UK and the 
Netherlands respectively. 
 
Glaum and 
Street (2003) 
Germany 2000 200 companies (100 apply 
IASs and 100 apply US 
GAAP).  
 
Unweighted method 
(two checklists; 153 
IASs checklist and 144 
US GAAP checklist). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Levels of mandatory 
disclosure with IAS ranged 
from 41.6% to 100%, with 
an average of 84%. This 
was significantly lower 
compared to the levels of 
mandatory disclosure with 
US GAAP 87%. 
 
Efficient market 
theory. 
Archambault 
and 
Archambault 
(2003) 
 
37 countries 
 
1992 and 
1993 
761 listed companies  Unweighted method 
(85 mandatory items) 
included in the seven 
information categories. 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The average total 
disclosure is 75.69%, with 
a range from 16% to 94%. 
 
Agency cost, Cultural 
theory (Gray’s Model). 
Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh 
(2005) 
New Zealand 1992/1993 
1996/1997 
50 companies listed in 
New Zealand Stock 
Exchange for each year 
(200 observations for 
years 1992, 1993 before 
the new regulations and 
1996, 1997 after the 
Unweighted method 
(495 mandatory items) 
required by Financial 
Reporting Act (FRA). 
 
On average extent of 
mandatory disclosure is 
92.61%. 
Mandatory disclosure 
levels increased throughout 
this period, from an 
None. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
introduction of the new 
regulations). 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
average of 78% in 1992 to 
an average of 88% in 1997. 
 
Yeoh (2005) New Zealand 1996-1998 49 listed companies on 
New Zealand Stock 
Exchange (NZX). 
Unweighted method 
(495 mandatory items) 
required by Financial 
Reporting Standards 
(FRSs). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
On average the level of 
mandatory disclosure is 
94%, ranges from 84.1% to 
a maximum level of 99.5%. 
The number of companies 
whose mandatory 
disclosure level is between 
90% and 100% of statutory 
and regulatory disclosure 
requirements consistently 
increased over time from 
84% in 1996 to 98% in 
1998. 
Information costs 
theory and political 
cost theory. 
Fekete et al. 
(2008) 
Hungary 2006 18 listed firms Unweighted method 
(IFRS 3, IAS 27, IAS 
28, IAS 31, Deloitte 
IFRS presentation and 
disclosure checklist). 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory 
disclosure: 62%. Five 
companies exhibiting 
compliance levels lower 
than 50% and two 
exhibiting full compliance. 
 
Political cost theory 
and capital need 
theory. 
Hodgdon et 
al.(2009) 
13 different 
countries from 
(UE) 
1999 and 
2000 
101 listed firms Weighted and 
Unweighted methods 
(209 mandatory items). 
 
The mean mandatory 
disclosure levels for the 
weighted index in 1999 
and 2000 are 45% and 
50%, respectively. 
Information costs 
theory and efficient 
market theory. 
70 
 
Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
Weighted method 
weights each 
disclosure item by the 
percentage of firms in 
the sample that do not 
comply with the item. 
 
Unweighted method is 
consistent with Cooke 
(1989) = 1 if item is 
disclosed by firm and 0 
if the item is either not 
disclosed or not 
relevant. 
 
The mean mandatory 
disclosure levels for the 
unweighted index in 1999 
and 2000 are 58% and 
64%, respectively. 
 
 
Tsalavoutas et 
al. (2011) 
Greece 2005 153 listed firms Unweighted method 
(481 mandatory items). 
 
Two different 
disclosure index 
methods (Cooke's 
method) and the Partial 
Compliance (PC) 
method. 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory 
disclosure: 79% (PC 
method), 83% (Cooke's 
method). 
 
Agency theory, 
information costs 
theory, political cost 
theory, signalling 
theory, capital need 
theory and efficient 
market theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure 
index method 
used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation  
Popova et 
al.(2013) 
UK 2006 to 
2010 
100 listed firms Unweighted method 
(290 mandatory items). 
 
1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory 
disclosure: 92% 
 
Agency theory, 
regulation theory and 
efficient market theory. 
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3.4.2 Mandatory disclosure indices in developing country studies  
Table 3.2 below provides a summary of the disclosure studies examining the level of 
mandatory disclosure in developing country firms. These studies are classified according 
to the chronological order of the year of publication. Many conclusions can be drawn from 
the findings of these studies. From the 26 studies identified, six studies examine the extent 
of mandatory disclosure during the 1990s and 20 studies are based on samples during and 
after 2000. Moreover, 25 out of the 26 studies employ only one disclosure index method, 
which is the unweighted disclosure index (dichotomous approach) for measuring the level 
of mandatory disclosure in developing countries. An item scores one (1) if companies 
disclose a certain item and zero (0) if they do not disclose it but it is applicable to that 
company.  
 
The reviewed literature reveals the existence of great differences among the mandatory 
disclosure indices used by existing studies in developing countries, quite likely referable to 
the absence of a theory providing the basis for determining the number of items or type of 
information to be included in the mandatory disclosure index. The number of information 
items included in the mandatory disclosure indices ranged from a very limited number such 
as in Mensah (2013) who used only 20 mandatory items to examine the quality of 
disclosure, and Wallace and Naser (1995) who used 30 mandatory items to a large number 
of information items such as Al-Akra et al. (2010) who applied the Price Waterhouse 
Cooper checklist for the financial year 2004 that contains 641 items, Craig and Diga (1998) 
who used 530 mandatory items, Tower et al. (1999) who used 512 mandatory items consist 
of 26 IASs, Alfraih (2016) who used 439 mandatory items based on 26 IFRS/IAS and 
Aljifri et al. (2014) who used 317 mandatory items of information.  
 
The majority of mandatory disclosure studies in developed countries (about 96%) applied 
unweighted disclosure indices reflecting the views of different users of financial statements 
such as investors, financial analysts and regulators, regarding the relative importance of 
various information items. For example, Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) use unweighted 
disclosure index contains 94 mandatory disclosure items used by Cooke (1989a), applied 
in Bangladesh over the period 1987- 1988. They argue that Cooke acknowledges that this 
procedure would introduce an element of subjectivity. So, if a particular item is not 
mentioned in the annual report, it would be treated as not applicable. For example, if no 
mention is made in respect of a contingent liability, it is assumed that the item is not 
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applicable for the company. However, if it is disclosed without mentioning the amount, 
then the score obviously would be zero. They find that the level of mandatory is, on 
average, 58.7%. Only four companies exhibit compliance above 90%. 37 companies are 
found to be in the range of 60-80%. Wallace and Naser (1995) use unweighted disclosure 
index consists of 30 mandatory items required by companies’ ordinance the Hong Kong 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (HK SSAPs), and/or the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (SEHK) for the period 1988-1992. The result shows that average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 73%, with a range of 55% to 87%. Tower et al. (1999) apply 
unweighted disclosure index contains 512 mandatory disclosure items consist of 26 IASs 
in five Asian countries for the year 1997. They find that the average level of mandatory 
disclosure is 91%, with a range of 81% to 100%.  Naser et al. (2002) apply unweighted 
disclosure index comprises 86 mandatory items required by IASs in Jordon for the year 
1998. The result shows that on average, the extent of disclosure is 63.51%. Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2003) apply unweighted disclosure index includes 241 mandatory items 
required by IASs in Egypt for the period 1995 and 1996. They find that the average 
mandatory disclosure level is 83%, with a range of 57% to 98%. Al-Shiab (2003) uses 
unweighted disclosure index contains 273 mandatory items required by IASs in Jordon 
over the period 1995 and 2000. He finds that the average mandatory disclosure level range 
between 49% in 1995 and 68% in 2000.  Ali et al. (2004) use unweighted disclosure index 
comprise 131 mandatory items require by 14 national accounting standards applied in 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh for the year 1998. The result shows that the level of 
mandatory disclosure, on average, is 80%. For each country the level of mandatory 
disclosure is 81% for Pakistan, 79% for India and 78% for Bangladesh. Akhtaruddin (2005) 
uses unweighted disclosure index contains 160 mandatory items required by the 
Companies Act (CA), disclosure requirements of the stock exchanges and the approved 
IASs applied in Bangladesh for the year 1999. The mandatory disclosure items divided into 
6 categories including balance sheet items, income statement, accounting policies, 
historical summary and directors’ report. He finds that the on average the level of 
mandatory disclosure is 44%, with the minimum of 17.3% and the maximum of 72.50%. 
Hassan et al. (2006) apply unweighted disclosure index covers 75 mandatory items divided 
in to 7 categories in Egypt over the year 1995 and 2002. Those categories are: general 
information, income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement, accounting policies, 
stockholders information and supplementary information. The result shows that average 
mandatory disclosure level is 89.9%, with a minimum of 43.8% and maximum of 100%. 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007) apply unweighted disclosure index consists of 241 
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mandatory items required by Companies Act (CA), Capital Market Law (CML) and IASs 
in Egypt over the period 1991-1992 and 1995-1996. They find that the average mandatory 
disclosure level for CA is 92%, for CML is 73% and for IAS is 76%. Dahawy and Conover 
(2007) and Dahawy (2009) use unweighted disclosure index used by CML applied in Egypt 
for the years 2004 and 2002 respectively, and find that the average mandatory disclosure 
level is 62% and 54 %, respectively. Aljifri (2008) and Aljifri et al. (2014) use unweighted 
disclosure index consists of 73 and 317 mandatory disclosure items applied in UAE for the 
year 2003 and 2005, respectively. The results show that the average mandatory disclosure 
level is 67% and 57%, respectively. Al-Akra et al. (2010a) use unweighted disclosure index 
based on Epstein and Mirza disclosure checklist for the year 1996 consists of 301 
mandatory items, and Price Waterhouse Coopers disclosure checklist for the year 2004 
contains 641 mandatory items applied in Jordon, and find that the average level of 
mandatory disclosure is significantly higher for the year 2004 (79%) compared to the year 
1996 (55%). Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) and Alfraih (2016) use unweighted disclosure 
index consists of 199 and 439 mandatory disclosure items based on 18 IASs and 26 
IASs/IFRSs, respectively. The result shows that the average level of mandatory disclosure 
is 72% and 70%, respectively. 
 
Only one study applies weighted and unweighted disclosure indices consist of 56 
mandatory items (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003). They weighted the mandatory disclosure 
items by five weighting points are given to items viewed as very important by the 
respondents; four points for those viewed as important, two points for some importance, 
and one point for little importance. The result shows that the average level of mandatory 
disclosure is the same for both indices 89%.  
 
Furthermore, it is noticed that many studies such as Wallace and Naser (1995), Craig and 
Diga (1998), Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Tower et al. (1999), Naser et al. (2002), Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2003), Al-Shiab (2003), Ali et al. (2004), Akhtaruddin (2005), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007), Aljifri (2008), Al-Shammari et al. (2008), 
Peng et al. (2008), Al-Akra et al, (2010a), Ismail et al, (2010), Alanezi and Albuloushi 
(2011), Hassaan (2013), Mensah (2013), Aljifri et al, (2014), Alfraih, (2016)  apply self-
constructed disclosure indices which is usually relevant and applicable to the country’s 
environment and could appear in firm annual reports, while others such as Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2007) and Dahawy (2009) apply existing ones which is used by Egyptian 
Capital Market Authority. As discussed before, the adoption of IAS/IFRS does not 
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necessarily lead to a greater provision of mandatory disclosures; this is because the level 
of mandatory disclosure depends on firms’ country of domicile, for example the level of 
mandatory disclosure depends on the particular financial reporting system of each country 
(Craig and Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999; Al-Shammari et al., 2008).  
 
Arguably, many firms could have adopted IFRS to signal their validity of adoption, but 
without fully complying with its requirements. This phenomenon is called ‘formal 
compliance’ (McBarnet, 1984), i.e. firms’ financial reports claim compliance with certain 
accounting standards, while managers do not implement them completely (Touron, 2005). 
Al-Shiab (2003) reports low average mandatory disclosure scores in Jordan (average level 
of mandatory disclosure is 56%) compared to other studies examining mandatory 
disclosure levels in emerging markets over a similar period e.g. Hassan et al. (2006) with 
regard to Egypt (average level of mandatory disclosure is 89.9%). Although the finding of 
Al-Shiab may depend on the specific characteristics of the financial reporting system in 
Jordan, it also could refer to the different method and number of items used for measuring 
mandatory disclosure levels.  
 
Generally, the extent of mandatory disclosure in developing countries is much lower than 
that in developed countries (e.g., 44% in Akhtaruddin, 2005 applied to Bangladesh, 54% 
in Dahawy, 2009 applied to Egypt, 57% in Aljifri, 2014 applied to UAE and compared to 
93% in Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005 applied to Newzealand). It is also noticed that except 
for the studies of Craig and Diga (1998); Ali et al. (2004); Al-Shammari et al. (2008); 
Aljifri et al. (2014), which use samples of 145, 566, 137 and 153 firms respectively, the 
norm in developing country mandatory disclosure studies is to adopt a small sample size, 
usually not exceeding 100 firms, in contrast to the developed country studies. Table 3.2 
provides a summary of 26 mandatory disclosure studies in developing country by using a 
mandatory disclosure index covering Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005), Hong Kong (Wallace and Naser, 1995), Saudi Arabia (Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), Asian countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand (Craig and Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999), Zimbabwe (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998b), Jordan (Naser et al., 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Hassaan, 
2013), Egypt (Abd-Elsalam and Waneetman, 2003; Hassan, 2006; Abdelsalam and 
Weetman, 2007; Dahawy and Conover, 2007; Dahawy, 2009; Ismail et al., 2010), India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Ali et al., 2004), the UAE (Aljifri, 2008; Aljifri et al., 2014), 
Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states (Al-Shammari et al.,2008), China (Peng 
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et al., 2008), Kuwait (Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011; Alfraih, 2016) and Ghana (Mensah, 
2013). The review of mandatory disclosure studies in developing countries reveals that 
those studies are published during the period 1994 (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994) to 2016 
(Alfraih, 2016). The periods covered in those studies are from 1987 (Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994) to 2010 (Alfraih, 2016), the study samples range from 15 firms (Dahawy and 
Conover, 2007) to 566 firms (Ali et al., 2004), and the maximum number of items included 
in the mandatory disclosure index is 641 items (Price Waterhouse Cooper checklist for 
2004) in Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
 
Table 3.2 summarises mandatory disclosure theories that are used through mandatory 
disclosure studies in developing countries (e.g. regulatory theory, free market theory, 
agency theory, information cost theory, political cost theory, signalling theory, capital need 
theory and efficient market theory). The explanation of those theories are reviewed in 
section 3.3. 
 
Overall, many of the existing studies reach similar conclusions. It is common that in 
developing countries, firms also do not comply fully with international accounting 
standards disclosure requirements. In particular, mandatory disclosure levels are very 
rarely close to, or even higher than, 90%, with the majority of studies reporting average 
mandatory disclosure levels of approximately 60% to 70%.  
 
Finally, there is very little evidence regarding GCC listed firm compliance with IAS/IFRS. 
There is only one study (Shammari et al., 2008) which examines listed firm compliance 
with the disclosure items mandated by the IAS. The sample consists of 137 firm annual 
reports for the years 1996 and 2002. He finds an average mandatory disclosure level of 
68% in 1996 and 82% in 2002. The highest average mandatory disclosure level overall 
years sampled is found in the UAE (0.80). This is followed by Saudi Arabia (0.78), Kuwait 
(0.75), Oman (0.74), Bahrain (0.73), and Qatar (0.70). 
 
The general finding of moderate compliance with mandatory disclosures suggests that, 
although firms are expected to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements, they 
rarely do so in full. Therefore, these findings question the improvement in the ‘quality’ of 
financial statements in GCC countries after the adoption of IFRS (e.g. Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003; Aljifri, 2008; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Aljifri et al., 2014; Alfraih, 2016). 
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Table 3.2. Existing mandatory disclosure studies for developing country firms 
Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
Ahmed and 
Nicholls 
(1994) 
Bangladesh 1987- 1988 63 listed firms 
on Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 
(DSE). 
Unweighted method (94 
mandatory items adapted from 
Cooke, 1989a). 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise.  
The level of mandatory 
disclosure is, on average, 
58.7%. 
Only four companies disclose 
above 90%. 37 companies are 
found to be in the range of 60-
80%.  
None. 
Wallace and 
Naser (1995) 
Hong Kong 1988-1992 85 listed firms 
on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange 
(SEHK). 
Unweighted index (30 
mandatory items) required by 
companies’ ordinance the 
Hong Kong Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice 
(HK SSAPs), and/or the 
SEHK. 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 73%, with a range of 
55% to 87%. 
 
Information costs 
theory and political 
cost theory. 
Al-Mulhem 
(1997) 
Saudi Arabia 1994 40 listed and 
unlisted Saudi 
firms 
Unweighted method (163 
mandatory and voluntary 
items). 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The overall mean disclosure is 
60.25 %.The disclosure index 
means are found to range from 
the lowest being 38 % to the 
highest being 76%. 
 
Agency theory and 
free market theory. 
Craig and 
Diga (1998) 
Singapore, 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the 
1993 145 firms (30 
from Singapore, 
Malaysia, 
Unweighted method (530 
mandatory items which are 
require in at least one of the 
five Asian countries). 
In terms of disclosure 
requirements, Singapore has 
the highest level of disclosure 
(74%). It is followed closely 
Information costs 
theory, political cost 
theory and efficient 
capital market theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
Philippines and 
Thailand. 
Indonesia, 
Philippines and 
25 from 
Thailand). 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
by Malaysia (73%), the 
Philippines (68%), Thailand 
(65%) and Indonesia (52%).  
Owusu-
Ansah 
(1998b) 
Zimbabwe 1994 49 listed 
companies on 
Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE). 
Unweighted method (32 main 
mandatory items, sub-divided 
into 214 sub-items).  
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 74.43 %, with the 
range of 63% to 85%. 
Regulatory theory and 
free market theory. 
Tower et al. 
(1999) 
Australia, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, 
Singapore and 
Thailand. 
1997 60 listed 
companies (10 
from each 
country). 
Unweighted method (512 items 
consist of 26 IASs). 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 91%, with a range of 
81% to 100%. 
None. 
Naser et al. 
(2002) 
Jordon 1998 84 listed 
companies on 
Amman Stock 
Exchange 
(ASE). 
Unweighted method (86 
mandatory items) required by 
IASs. 
 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
On average, the extent of 
disclosure is 63.51% 
 
Agency theory, 
Information costs 
theory, political cost 
theory and efficient 
capital market theory. 
Abd-Elsalam 
and 
Weetman 
(2003) 
Egypt 1995 and 
1996 
100 listed 
companies on 
Egypt Stock 
Exchange (ESE). 
Unweighted method (241 
mandatory items) required by 
IASs. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 83%, with a range of 
57% to 98%. 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory and 
capital need theory. 
Al-Shiab 
(2003) 
Jordan 1995 and 
2000 
50 listed 
companies on 
ASE. 
Unweighted method (273 
mandatory items) required by 
IASs. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level range between 49% in 
1995 and 68% in 2000.  
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
political theory and 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
efficient capital 
market theory. 
Naser and 
Nuseibeh 
(2003) 
Saudi Arabia 1992 and 
1999 
67 listed firms Weighted and Unweighted 
methods (56 mandatory items).  
Five weighting points are given 
to items viewed as very 
important by the respondents; 
four points for those viewed as 
important, two points for some 
importance, and one point for 
little importance. 
For unweighted method 1 if the 
item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
They inter alia report a high 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level in both indices is 89%, 
range from 42% to 100%.  
None. 
Ali et al. 
(2004) 
India, Pakistan, 
and Bangladesh. 
1998 566 companies 
(118 from 
Bangladesh; 229 
from Pakistan 
and 219 from 
India). 
Unweighted method (131 items 
require by 14 national 
accounting standards). 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 80%.  
For each country (81% for 
Pakistan, 79% for India and 
78% for Bangladesh).  
Agency theory, 
informational cost and 
political cost. 
Akhtaruddin 
(2005) 
Bangladesh 1999 94 listed 
companies on 
DSE. 
Unweighted method (160 
mandatory items), divided into 
balance sheet items, income 
statement, accounting policies, 
historical summary and 
directors’ report. The 
disclosure index contains items 
that required by the Companies 
Act 1994, disclosure 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 44%, the minimum 
score is 17.3% and the 
maximum score is 72.50%. 
 
Agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory and 
political economy 
theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
requirements of the stock 
exchanges, and the approved 
IASs. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Hassan et al. 
(2006) 
Egypt 1995 and 
2002 
80 non-financial 
listed companies 
Unweighted method (75 
mandatory items subdivided in 
to 7 groups). 
Those groups are: general 
information, income statement, 
balance sheet, cash flow 
statement, accounting policies, 
stockholders information and 
supplementary information. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 89.9%, with a 
minimum of 43.8% and 
maximum of 100%. 
Agency theory, 
informational cost and 
political cost. 
Abd-Elsalam 
and 
Weetman 
(2007) 
Egypt 1991/1992 
1995/1996 
72 non-financial 
listed companies 
on ESE. 
Unweighted method (241 
mandatory items required by 
Companies Act (CA), Capital 
Market Law (CML) and IASs. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average mandatory 
disclosure for CA is 92%, 
CML is 73% and IAS is 76%. 
Political cost and 
capital need theory. 
Dahawy and 
Conover 
(2007) 
Egypt 2004 15 listed 
companies on 
ESE. 
Unweighted method (the 
researcher applied disclosure 
checklist used by Capital 
Market Authority). 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 62%, 
with a minimum of 52% and 
maximum of 76%.  
Cultural theory 
(Hofstede and Gray 
Models). 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
Aljifri (2008) United Arab 
Emirates 
2003 31 listed firms in 
the UAE 
Unweighted method (73 
mandatory items) relevant and 
applicable to the UAE 
environment and could appear 
in the annual reports. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 67%, 
with a range of 41% to 86%. 
Agency theory, 
informational cost, 
regulatory theory and  
efficient capital 
market theory. 
Al-Shammari 
et al. (2008) 
Gulf Co-
Operation 
Council (GCC) 
member states 
1996 and 
2002 
137 GCC listed 
companies 
Unweighted method (160 
mandatory items). 
The index contains 14 selected 
IASs are the ones most 
applicable to GCC companies. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The level of mandatory 
disclosure increases over time, 
from 68% in 1996 to 82% in 
2002. 
The level of mandatory 
disclosure with IASs differs 
between the GCC member 
states. The highest average 
mandatory disclosure level 
overall years sampled is found 
in the UAE (0.80), followed 
by Saudi Arabia (0.78), 
Kuwait (0.75), Oman (0.74), 
Bahrain (0.73), and Qatar 
(0.70).  
Agency theory, 
agency cost, 
informational cost, 
political cost and 
regulatory theory. 
Peng et al. 
(2008) 
China 1999 and 
2002 
79 listed 
companies 
Unweighted method (77 
mandatory items). 
A checklist instrument 
(checklist) containing 77 
measurement items based on 
IFRS 1–40. 
Companies exhibit a relatively 
high compliance with the 
items mandated by Chinese 
GAAP (97% for both years). 
The mandatory disclosure 
level with IAS improves from 
86% in 1999 to 90% in 2002. 
Regulatory theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Dahawy 
(2009) 
Egypt 2002 41 listed 
companies on 
Cairo and 
Alexandria stock 
exchanges 
Unweighted method (the 
researcher applied disclosure 
checklist used by Capital 
Market Authority). 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Average mandatory disclosure 
level is 54.37%. 
 
Cultural theory 
(Gray’s Model). 
Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) 
Jordon 1996 and 
2004 
80 listed non-
financial 
companies 
Unweighted method based on 
Epstein and Mirza checklist for 
1996 (301 mandatory items). 
Price Waterhouse Coopers for 
2004 (641 mandatory items). 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 
significantly higher in 2004 
(79%) compared to 1996 
(55%). 
Agency theory, 
agency cost and 
regulatory theory. 
Ismail et al. 
(2010) 
Egypt 2007 39 listed 
companies on 
the ESE. 
Unweighted method based on 
the checklist developed by the 
CMA for year 2000. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 74%, 
while the maximum disclosure 
level is 83%.  
Agency theory, 
informational cost, 
political cost and 
regulatory theory. 
Alanezi and 
Albuloushi 
(2011) 
Kuwait 2007 68 listed 
companies on 
Kuwait Stock 
Exchange 
(KSX). 
Unweighted method (199 items 
based on IAS). 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 72%, 
with a minimum of 48% and 
maximum of 96%.  
Agency theory, 
agency cost, 
informational cost, 
political cost and 
regulatory theory. 
Hassaan 
(2013) 
Jordan 2007 75 non-financial 
listed companies 
on the ASE. 
Unweighted method (275 
mandatory items based on 
IFRS). 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 76%, 
with a minimum of 56% and 
maximum of 88%. 
Agency cost and 
efficient capital 
market theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index 
method used 
Level of mandatory 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
used by the 
study 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
Mensah 
(2013) 
Ghana 2006 and 
2008 
35 listed firms 
on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange 
(GSE). 
Unweighted method (20 
mandatory items) based on 
Quality of Disclosure (QOD) 
made by companies complying 
with IASB's IFRS qualitative 
characteristics of relevance, 
faithful representation, 
understandability and 
comparability. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The results of the quality of 
financial information 
disclosure have a mean of 
76.80% (2006) and 87.09% 
(2008).  
Agency theory, 
political costs, and 
efficient capital 
market theory. 
Aljifri et al. 
(2014) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
2005 153 listed and 
unlisted firms  
Unweighted method (317 
mandatory items) based on 
IASs/IFRSs. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 57%, 
with a minimum of 23% and 
maximum of 70%. 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
capital market theory 
and cost-benefit 
theory. 
Alfraih 
(2016) 
Kuwait 2010 134 non-
financial 
companies 
Unweighted index (439 
mandatory items) based on 26 
IASs/IFRSs. 
1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. 
The average level of 
mandatory disclosure is 70%, 
ranging from 41% to 91 %. 
 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
capital market theory, 
litigation cost theory 
and proprietary cost 
theory. 
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 The determinants of mandatory disclosure in developed and developing country 
studies 
This section reviews existing empirical studies that measure the level of mandatory 
disclosure and its determinants. The section reviews existing findings regarding the 
determinants used to measure the level of mandatory disclosure in developed and 
developing countries.  
  
3.5.1 The determinants of mandatory disclosures in developed country studies 
The reviewed of mandatory disclosures in developed country studies refer differences in 
levels of mandatory disclosure to several corporate characteristic factors and ownership 
structure factors.  
 
Table 3.3 summarises the relationship between mandatory disclosure and its determinants 
that are used through mandatory disclosure studies in developed country studies. The 
existing studies find that the following factors are significantly positively related to the 
level of mandatory disclosure across developed country firms: firm size (Cooke 1992; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Fekete et 
al., 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009); industry type (Cooke 1992; Street and Gray, 2002; Fekete 
et al., 2008); profitability (Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; Tsalavoutas et al., 2011); leverage (Cooke, 1993; Hodgdon et al., 
2009; Popova et al., 2013); multiple listing status (Cooke 1992; Cooke, 1993; Malone et 
al., 1993;  Wallace et al., 1994; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Street and Gray, 2002; Glaum 
and Street, 2003; Hodgdon et al., 2009); Audit firm size (Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Street 
and Gray, 2002; Glaum and Street, 2003; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Hodgdon et al., 
2009; Tsalavoutas et al., 2011); firm age (Popova et al., 2013) and ownership structure 
such as: number of shareholders (Malone et al., 1993) In addition, only liquidly (Wallace 
et al., 1994) is found to be negatively significantly related to corporate mandatory 
disclosure level across developed country studies.  
 
However, some corporate characteristics variables including international activities 
(Malone et al., 1993; Fekete et al., 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009), and firm corporate 
governance factors such as: proportion of outside directors (Malone et al., 1993) are found 
not significantly related to the extent of mandatory disclosure in developed county studies. 
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Table 3.3. The relationship between mandatory disclosure and its determinants in developed country studies 
Determinants of 
mandatory 
disclosures 
Positive impact on mandatory disclosure Negative impact on 
mandatory 
disclosure 
No impact on mandatory 
disclosure 
Corporate 
characteristic factors 
   
Firm size Cooke (1992), Wallace et al. (1994), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 
(2005), Fekete et al. (2008), Hodgdon et al. 
(2009). 
 Malone et al. (1993), Street and 
Gray (2002), Glaum and Street 
(2003), Tsalavoutas et al. (2011), 
Popova et al. (2013). 
Industry type Cooke (1992), Street and Gray (2002), Fekete et 
al. (2008). 
 Malone et al. (1993), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh (2005), Tsalavoutas et al. 
(2011). 
Profitability Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh (2005), Hodgdon et al. (2009), 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2011). 
 Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Street and Gray (2002), 
Fekete et al. (2008), Popova et al. 
(2013). 
Liquidity  Wallace et al. 
(1994). 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005). 
Leverage  Malone et al. (1993), Hodgdon et al. (2009), 
Popova et al. (2013). 
 Fekete et al. (2008), Tsalavoutas et 
al. (2011). 
Multiple listing status Cooke (1992), Cooke (1993), Malone et al. 
(1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997), Street and Gray (2002), Glaum 
and Street (2003), Hodgdon et al.(2009). 
 Fekete et al. (2008), Popova et al. 
(2013). 
International activities   Malone et al. (1993), Fekete et al. 
(2008), Hodgdon et al. (2009). 
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Determinants of 
mandatory 
disclosures 
Positive impact on mandatory disclosure Negative impact on 
mandatory 
disclosure 
No impact on mandatory 
disclosure 
Audit firm size Patton and Zelenka (1997), Street and Gray 
(2002), Glaum and Street (2003), Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh (2005), Hodgdon et al. (2009), 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2011). 
 Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. 
(1994). 
Firm age  Popova et al. (2013).  Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005). 
Ownership structure 
factors 
   
Number of 
shareholders 
Malone et al. (1993).   
Corporate 
governance factors 
   
Proportion of outside 
directors 
 
  Malone et al. (1993). 
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3.5.2 The determinants of mandatory disclosures in developing country studies 
The reviewed studies refer differences in levels of mandatory disclosure in developed 
country studies, to several corporate characteristic factors, ownership structure factors, 
corporate governance factors and cultural factors.  
 
Table 3.4 summarises the relationship between mandatory disclosure level and its 
determinants that are used through mandatory disclosure literature in developing country 
studies. The studies reveal that several corporate characteristic variables are positively 
related to the level of corporate mandatory disclosure among developing country firms:  
firm size (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998b; Naser et al., 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Hassan et al., 2006; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; ; Ismail et al., 2010; Mensah, 2013; Aljifri 
et al., 2014); industry type (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Craig and Diga, 1998; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hassan et al., 2006; Aljifri, 2008; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011; Aljifri et al., 2014); profitability (Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Naser et al., 2002; Ali et al., 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hassan et 
al., 2006; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a); leverage (Alanezi and 
Albuloushi, 2011); multiple listing status (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Ali et al., 2004; Aljifri et al., 2014); Audit firm size (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994; Naser et al., 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Al-Shiab, 2003; Abd 
Elsalam and Weetman, 2007; Dahawy, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Ismail et al., 2010; 
Mensah, 2013); firm age (Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). In addition, 
the results also show only liquidity (Naser et al., 2002; Ismail et al., 2010) is found to be 
negatively significantly related to the level of corporate mandatory disclosure in developing 
country studies. 
  
Numbers of ownership structure variables are found to be positively significantly related 
to the level of corporate mandatory discourse in developing country studies including: 
proportion of shares held by insiders (Owusu-Ansah, 1998b) and government ownership 
(Abd Elsalam and Weetman, 2007). Additionally, only public ownership (Hassaan, 2013) 
is found to be negatively significantly related to the level of corporate mandatory disclosure 
in developing country studies.  
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Some corporate governance variables such as board size is found to be positively 
significantly related to the level of corporate mandatory discourse in developing country 
studies (Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Alfraih, 2016) Additionally, only CEO role duality is found 
be negatively significantly related to the level of corporate mandatory disclosure in 
developing country studies (Alfraih, 2016). However, only family members on board is 
found to have mixed result, some studies find that family members on board is positively 
related to the level of mandatory disclosure in developing countries (Alanezi and 
Albuloushi, 2011). Other studies find that family members on board is negatively related 
to the level of mandatory disclosure (Alfraih, 2016). 
 
A number of ownership structure variables, corporate governance variables and cultural 
variables are found to be insignificant determinants affecting the level of corporate 
mandatory disclosure in developing country studies, such as proportion of shares held by 
outsiders (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hassaan, 2013); number of shareholders (Naser et al., 
2002); foreign ownership (Naser et al., 2002; Aljifri et al., 2014); government ownership 
(Naser et al., 2002; Hassaan, 2013); institutional ownership (Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-
Akra et al., 2010a); management ownership (Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011; Hassaan, 
2013); individual ownership (Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2010a); privet ownership 
(Hassaan, 2013); number of non-executive directors (Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Hassaan, 2013; 
Aljifri et al., 2014); and professional qualifications of the accounting officer (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994). A number of possible explanations for inconsistent results are identified, 
such as differences in political and socioeconomic environments among countries, cultural 
and institutional frameworks, differences in sample size, statistical methods, disclosure 
index structure, weighting and scoring process and time periods. 
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Table 3.4. The relationship between determinants and mandatory disclosure in developing country studies 
Determinants of 
mandatory disclosures 
Positive impact on mandatory disclosure Negative impact 
on mandatory 
disclosure 
No impact on mandatory 
disclosure 
Corporate 
characteristic factors 
   
Firm size Wallace and Naser (1995), Al-Mulhem (1997), 
Craig and Diga (1998), Owusu-Ansah (1998b), 
Naser et al. (2002), Al-Shiab (2003), Ali et al. 
(2004), Akhtaruddin (2005), Hassan et al. (2006), 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Ismail et al. (2010), 
Mensah (2013), Aljifri et al. (2014). 
 Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), 
Tower et al. (1999), Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2003), Aljifri 
(2008), Dahawy (2009), Alanezi 
and Albuloushi (2011), Hassaan 
(2013). 
Industry type Wallace and Naser (1995), Craig and Diga (1998), 
Al-Shiab (2003), Akhtaruddin (2005), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Aljifri (2008), Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008), Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011), Aljifri et 
al. (2014). 
 Al-Mulhem (1997), Tower et al. 
(1999), Naser et al. (2002), Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, (2003), 
Dahawy (2009), Ismail et al. 
(2010), Hassaan (2013). 
Profitability Al-Mulhem (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Naser 
et al. (2002), Ali et al. (2004), Akhtaruddin 
(2005), Hassan et al. (2006), Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008), Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
Wallace and 
Naser (1995). 
Tower et al. (1999), Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (2003), Al-Shiab 
(2003), Aljifri (2008), Ismail et al. 
(2010), Mensah (2013), Hassaan 
(2013). 
Liquidity Al-Akra et al. (2010a). Naser et al. 
(2002), Ismail et 
al. (2010). 
Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu-
Ansah (1998b), Aljifri (2008), 
Hassaan (2013), Mensah (2013). 
Leverage  Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011).  Wallace and Naser (1995), Craig 
and Diga (1998), Tower et al. 
(1999), Ali et al. (2004), Dahawy 
(2009), Ismail et al. (2010), 
Mensah (2013). 
Multiple listing status Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Al-Mulhem (1997), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Ali et al. (2004), Aljifri et 
al. (2014). 
 Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), 
Dahawy (2009). 
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Determinants of 
mandatory disclosures 
Positive impact on mandatory disclosure Negative impact 
on mandatory 
disclosure 
No impact on mandatory 
disclosure 
International activities   Craig and Diga (1998), Ismail et al. 
(2010). 
Audit firm size Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Naser et al. (2002), 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), Al-Shiab 
(2003), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, (2007), 
Dahawy (2009), Al-Akra et al. (2010a), Ismail et 
al. (2010), Mensah (2013). 
 Wallace and Naser (1995), Al-
Mulhem (1997), Owusu-Ansah 
(1998b), Hassaan (2013). 
Firm age  Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Shammari et al. (2008).  Owusu-Ansah (1998b), 
Akhtaruddin (2005), Alanezi and 
Albuloushi (2011). 
Ownership structure 
factors 
   
Proportion of shares 
held by insiders 
 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b).   
Government ownership 
 
Abd Elsalam and Weetman (2007). 
 
 Naser et al. (2002), Hassaan 
(2013). 
 
Proportion of shares 
held by outsiders 
 
  Wallace and Naser (1995), 
Hassaan (2013). 
 
Public ownership 
 
 Hassaan (2013). 
 
 
Number of shareholders 
 
  Naser et al. (2002). 
 
Foreign ownership 
 
  Naser et al. (2002), Aljifri et al. 
(2014). 
 
Institutional ownership 
 
  Shammari et al. (2008), Akra et al. 
(2010a). 
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Determinants of 
mandatory disclosures 
Positive impact on mandatory disclosure Negative impact 
on mandatory 
disclosure 
No impact on mandatory 
disclosure 
 
Management ownership 
 
  Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011), 
Hassaan (2013). 
 
Individual ownership 
 
  Naser et al. (2002), Akra et al. 
(2010a). 
 
Private ownership 
 
  Hassaan (2013). 
 
Corporate governance 
factors 
   
Board size Al-Akra et al. (2010a), Alfraih (2016). 
 
 Hassaan (2013). 
 
Number of non-
executive directors 
  Akra et al. (2010a), Hassaan 
(2013), Aljifri et al. (2014). 
 
Family members on 
board 
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011). Alfraih (2016). 
 
 
CEO duality  Alfraih (2016). 
 
 
Cultural factors  
 
   
Professional 
qualifications of the 
accounting officer 
  Ahmed and Nicholls (1994). 
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 Hypothesis development 
The previous section provides the theoretical framework and reviews the existing empirical 
studies in developed and developing countries, which attempt to explain firm compliance 
with mandatory disclosures. The existing studies examine a range of variables as potential 
determinants of the degree of mandatory disclosures. The variety of the variables examined 
is, mainly, a result of the objectives of each particular study and the availability of data 
examined.  
 
In this thesis, the following criteria are applied for selecting the variables to be tested: first, 
the existence of theoretical frameworks and/or the results of empirical studies should 
indicate the relationship of a particular characteristic and the level of mandatory 
disclosures. Second, testing a particular variable should meet the objectives of the current 
study. Third, the variables selected should be able to be measured reliably and obtainable 
from dependable sources. Fourth, the variables tested should be of particular 
importance/relevance to the GCC setting. 
 
The purpose of this section is to develop a set of testable hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between several firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, 
ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors, cultural characteristics (firm 
manager personal characteristics) on the level of corporate mandatory disclosure. This 
section reviews existing studies, which investigate the relationship between mandatory 
disclosure and corporate characteristics, ownership factors, corporate governance factors 
and cultural factors. In addition to, the impact of voluntary disclosure level on the level of 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
Seventeen hypotheses are set to examine the extent of mandatory disclosure in annual 
reports of GCC listed firms. Nine corporate characteristics are selected for this study. These 
are (i) firm size; (ii) industry type; (iii) profitability; (iv) liquidity; (v) international listing; 
(vi) international sales; (vii) consolidated financial statements; (viii) the type of auditor; 
and (ix) firm age. Two ownership structures are also selected for this study: (i) institutional 
ownership; and (ii) state ownership. Three corporate governance factors are also selected: 
(i) board size; (ii) board independence; and (iii) role duality. Two cultural factors (firm 
manager personal characteristics) are selected: (i) education of directors; and (ii) the 
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educational level of financial controllers. In addition, this thesis examines the interaction 
between voluntary and mandatory disclosures on the extent of mandatory disclosure as a 
further explanatory factor. The next section discusses each of those characteristics and 
factors, leading to a formal statement of seventeen hypotheses. 
 
3.6.1 Corporate characteristic factors 
3.6.1.1 Firm size 
Firm size is considered to be an important driver of the mandatory disclosure practices of 
firms. Existing studies show that there is a positive relationship between the level of 
mandatory disclosure and firm size on the basis of a number of theoretical explanations. 
Firstly, in developed countries, political visibility can be used to explain a positive 
relationship between firm size and the extent of mandatory disclosure with IFRS. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) argue that larger firms are more likely to be subject to wealth 
transfers as a result of government intervention (political costs). It is argued that larger 
firms have an incentive to disclose more information in their annual reports than smaller 
firms in order to enhance their reputation and public image, and to minimise public 
criticism or the threat of government intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983).  
 
This theoretical argument is likely to apply in GCC countries for the following reasons. 
The impact of larger firms on the GCC economy is important given that larger firms are 
typically more diversified and account for much of the invested capital and a significant 
proportion of the goods and services produced. Such firms employ many nationals, 
consume a large quantity and value of raw materials and are responsible for a majority of 
imports (Al-Basteki, 1995; Abdulla, 1998; Hussain et al., 2002; Naser and Nuseibeh, 
2003a). Therefore, in GCC countries, larger firms are also more politically visible than 
smaller firms and they are also more likely to be subject to government intervention and 
potential political costs. Larger firms may disclose more information about how they are 
meeting their perceived responsibilities towards society in order to enhance their public 
image and to reduce political costs. Producing financial statements in accordance with IFRS 
raises the level of information disclosure and should also help reduce political costs. So, 
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larger firms may therefore have a greater incentive to comply with mandatory disclosure 
than smaller firms. 
 
The second explanation for an expected positive relationship between firm size and the 
extent of mandatory disclosure is that as part of their economic reforms, GCC countries 
have implemented privatisation programmes involving large, state-owned firms. As a 
consequence, larger firms are more likely to be closely followed by potential investors than 
are smaller firms. Investors may see larger firms as less risky because of their larger assets 
and the fact that they are typically multi-product business entities operating in several 
geographical areas and business sectors. The complexity of the business structure and the 
diversity of products require a large volume of information in order to keep managers in 
control of operations and enable them to make decisions. Thus, large firms have a greater 
incentive to comply with mandatory disclosure in order to keep managers in control of 
operations and enable them to make decisions. 
 
A third reason for expecting a positive relationship between firm size and the extent of 
mandatory disclosure is the demand for information by financial analysts. Larger firms are 
more likely to be exposed to the scrutiny of financial analysts than are smaller firms (Firth, 
1979; Barry and Brown, 1986; Naser et al., 2002). Compliance with IFRS enhances the 
level of disclosure and enables financial analysts to do a better job (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 
2001). Larger firms typically have a greater analyst following and, thus, have a greater 
incentive to comply with IFRS in order to help analysts to make better judgements. 
 
A fourth possible reason for an expected positive relationship between firm size and the 
extent of mandatory disclosure is related to proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Firms 
might limit disclosure when significant proprietary costs arise. Irrespective of whether the 
disclosure of information has a positive or negative impact on the value of the firm, costs 
are imposed when competitors, shareholders or employees can use the information in a way 
that is harmful to the firm. In the GCC countries, as in other countries, it might be expected 
that detailed disclosure is more likely to put smaller firms at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to their larger competitors. Given that compliance with IFRS increases the level of 
disclosure of smaller firms, they are more likely to be unwilling to comply (Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; El-Gazzar et al., 1999; Leuz, 2003). 
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A fifth reason for an expected positive relationship between firm size and the extent of 
mandatory disclosure is related to the direct cost of complying with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Since gathering, generating and disseminating information in the form of an 
annual report is a costly activity (Buzby, 1975), smaller firms may not be able to afford 
such costs. Disclosing the detailed information required by IFRS may be relatively less 
costly for larger firms because they are more likely to have the resources and expertise 
necessary for the production and publication of more detailed financial statements to meet 
the diverse needs of shareholders and creditors. In addition, they are more likely to already 
produce sufficiently detailed information for their internal purposes. Therefore, smaller 
firms may be less likely to comply with mandatory disclosure than larger firms. 
 
Existing studies provide mixed results regarding firm size and the level of mandatory 
disclosure. Owusu-Ansah (1998), Joshi and Al-Mudhahki (2001), Akhtaruddin (2005), Al-
Shammari et al. (2008) and Al Mutawaa (2010) find a positive significant relationship 
between firm size and mandatory disclosure. In contrast, Tower et al. (1999), Street and 
Bryent (2000) and Glaum, and Street (2003) report no evidence of any relationship between 
firm size and mandatory disclosure. 
 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) investigates the degree of influence of eight corporate attributes on 
the extent of mandatory disclosure and reporting of 49 listed companies in Zimbabwe 
during 1994. His results indicate that there is a positive relationship between company size 
and mandatory disclosure. Akhtaruddin (2005) examines drivers of the extent of mandatory 
disclosure of 94 listed companies in Bangladesh during 1999 and finds that the size of the 
firm is positively significant. Regarding GCC countries, few numbers of existing studies 
examine the impact of firm size on the level of mandatory disclosure. Joshi and Al-
Mudhahki (2001) investigate the extent to which 37 firms listed on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange (BSE) comply with the disclosure requirements of IAS 1 (presentation of 
financial statements) for the financial year 1999. He finds that firm size is positively 
associated with the degree of mandatory disclosure with IAS1. Al-Shammari, et al. (2008) 
investigates the extent of mandatory disclosure with international accounting standards 
(IASs) by firms in the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states namely, Bahrain, 
Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in 1996 and 2000, based 
on a sample of 137 firms. They find that there is significant positively relationship between 
country variation in the level of mandatory disclosure and among firms based on size. Al 
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Mutawaa (2010) investigates the extent of mandatory disclosure of Kuwaiti listed firms 
with IFRS disclosure at the end of 2006 and finds that firm size is positively significant 
related to IAS-required disclosures.  
 
In contrast, Tower et al. (1999) examines various determinants of mandatory disclosure 
with IAS in six countries in the Asia-Pacific region in 1997 namely, Australia Thailand 
Singapore Malaysia Hong Kong and Phillipines. They find that firm size is not related to 
the extent of mandatory disclosure. Street and Bryent (2000) examine the factors associated 
with the overall level of disclosure and the level of mandatory disclosure by analysing 1998 
annual reports of companies with U.S. listings and filings claiming to use IFRSs. The 
results show that firm size is not significant associated with overall level of disclosure. 
Glaum and Street (2003) investigate the extent to which companies comply with IAS and 
US GAAP disclosure requirements in Germany during 2000, based on a sample of 100 
firms. They find that the overall level of mandatory disclosure with IAS and US GAAP 
disclosures is not related to firm size.  
 
Although the mandatory disclosure literature offers mixed results on the relationship 
between firm size and mandatory disclosure, GCC listed firms would be expected to derive 
potential benefits from greater disclosure based on theoretical arguments mentioned above. 
These benefits, such as lower political cost, the cost of capital, proprietary costs and direct 
cost, are more likely to motivate larger firms to disclose more than smaller firms. Therefore, 
this study hypothesises that:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and firm 
size. 
 
3.6.1.2 Industry type 
In this study, industry type is included as a variable in order to account for any otherwise 
uncontrolled industry-specific factors that may influence the level of firm mandatory 
disclosure. There are three reasons for focusing on a firm’s type of industry:  
1. Industry type may capture sensitivity to political costs not captured by other proxies 
that differ by industry (Ball and Foster, 1982; Bazley, Brown and Izan, 1985; Watts and 
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Zimmerman, 1986). Ball and Foster (1982) argue that industry type can be a more 
appropriate proxy for political cost sensitivity than size.  
2. Industry type may also proxy for differences in the proprietary costs of disclosure, 
which are found to be correlated with accounting method choice (Malone et al., 1993). 
Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002), for instance, argue that firms in identifiable, highly 
competitive industries may disclose less information to avoid loss from the leakage of 
proprietary information.  
3. Accounting and disclosure practices are often observed to reflect industry 
commonalities. Malone et al. (1993) and Wallace et al. (1994), for example, argue that 
the adoption of industry-related practices may lead to different levels of disclosure by 
firms in different industries on similar items published in the financial reports. 
 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is expected to vary across industry types. Owusu-
Ansah (1998) argues that firms’ mandatory disclosure practices are likely to vary across 
different industry types. He suggests that the nature or importance of an industry type to 
either investors or the country might explain expected differences in mandatory disclosure 
levels across industries. For example, certain industry types are highly regulated due to 
their overall contribution to national income. These industry types might be subject to 
more strict regulations, which in turn might affect the disclosure practices of firms 
operating in these industry types. 
 
Gallery et al. (2008) note that differences in disclosure levels across industries are 
expected because some standards are more applicable within certain industry types. For 
instance, the banking industry is expected to comply with IAS 30 (Banks and Financial 
Institutions Disclosures) as this standard is clearly more applicable to banking sectors. 
 
However, Glaum and Street (2003) argue that no clear relationship exists between industry 
type and disclosure level, as existing research reports mixed results regarding this 
association. They find that, for firms listed on Germany’s New Market, industry type has 
no significant effect on IAS mandatory disclosures. Street and Bryant (2000) also find no 
evidence of an association between industry type and IAS mandatory disclosure level for 
companies with U.S. listings or filings. However, in contrast to Street and Bryant (2000), 
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Glaum and Street (2003), Street and Gray (2001) report a positive association between IAS 
mandatory disclosure and membership of the commerce and transportation industry by U.S 
listed firms in 1998. Gallery et al. (2008) find that firms in the mining and energy industry, 
and the biotechnology and technology industry, have higher quality IFRS disclosures than 
firms in other industries by large Australian companies between 1994 and 1995. Fekete et 
al. (2008) also find a positive relationship between industry type and extent of mandatory 
disclosure in Hungarian listed firms during 2006. 
 
Regarding GCC countries, the extent of mandatory disclosure and industry type is found to 
be positively significant in UAE (Aljifri, 2008), GCC member states (Shammari et al., 
2008), Kuwait (Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011) and UAE (Aljifri et al., 2014).  
 
Based on theoretical explanation and empirical existing results the level of mandatory 
disclosure is expected to differ by industry. In addition, because some standards are more 
applicable to certain industries, firms in those industries will probably comply more fully 
with mandatory disclosure that are more relevant to their operations. Thus, this study 
hypothesises: 
H2: The extent of mandatory disclosure differs by industry. 
 
3.6.1.3 Profitability  
The existing disclosure research determines that profitability influences a firm’s disclosure 
level (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 
1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; Gallery et al., 2008).  
Based on signalling theory, which suggest that highly profitable firms are more likely to 
signal their superior performance to the market by disclosing greater information in their 
annual reports. Singhvi and Desai (1971) claim that managers are more likely to disclose 
detailed information when profitability is high in order to increase the security of their 
positions, justify their compensation, and to signal their ability to maximise shareholder 
value. In addition, managers of profitable firms may feel proud of their success and wish to 
disclose more information to the public to promote a positive impression of their 
performance (Alsaeed, 2006). However, a firm may disclose less information when 
profitability is low to hide the various reasons for declining profitability or even losses. 
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Thus, firms with high profitability would be expected to disclose more information than 
firms with low profitability (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
 
Inchausti (1997) employs agency and signalling theory to argue that when managers have 
‘good news’ due to better performance, they disclose more detailed information to the 
market than when they have ‘bad news’, in order to prevent their shares becoming 
undervalued. In addition, from another explanation based on political cost theory Inchusti 
(1997) argues that managements of firms with high profits are motivated to disclose more 
in order to justify these profits. 
 
Since compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements provides more information to 
investors (Ashbaugh, 2001; Leuz, 2003), firms with larger profits are more likely to comply 
with mandatory disclosure requirements than firms with smaller profits. Political cost 
theory suggests that larger firms that tend to earn the largest profits in absolute terms are 
more vulnerable to regulatory intervention. It may be that providing financial statements 
based on IFRS enables a firm to meet the demand of the government for information and, 
thereby, reduce political costs. If so, then firms with larger profits have a greater incentive 
to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that firms with larger profits could be more interested 
in adopting accounting policies to reduce profit, or to disclose detailed information in their 
annual reports in order to justify their financial performance and to reduce political costs. 
However, Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that firms with low profits tend to disclose more 
in their annual reports; they argue that it is possible to suggest that reporting firms tend to 
view lower profit as bad news and probably accept the provision of more detail as part of 
their accountability to investors and other users of corporate annual reports. 
 
The empirical findings of the existing research on the relationship between mandatory 
disclosure levels and firm profitability are varied. For example, Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
investigates the degree of influence of profitability on the extent of mandatory disclosure in 
Zimbabwe in 1994. He finds that profitability is positively related to mandatory disclosure 
and reporting practices. Ali et al. (2004) examines the level of mandatory disclosure 
mandated by 14 national accounting standards for a large sample of companies within the 
three major countries in South Asia, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh during 1998 
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and they find that mandatory disclosure levels is found to be positively related to 
profitability. Gallery et al. (2008) examine a number of factors affecting financial reporting 
quality by large Australian companies after adopting the Australian equivalents of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS) between 31 December 2004 and 30 
September 2005. The regression result shows a significant positive relationship between 
profitability and mandatory disclosure. In contrast, Street and Gray (2001) in US, Glaum 
and Street (2003) in Germany, Al-Shammari et al. (2008) in GCC member states, Fekete et 
al. (2008) in Hungary, Ismail et al. (2010) in Egypt, Hassaan (2013) in Jordon and Popova 
et al. (2013) in UK provide no significant relationship between profitability and mandatory 
disclosure. On the other hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) test the multivariate impact of 
selected firm characteristics on corporate annual reports of firms listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). They report a negative relationship between profitability 
and mandatory disclosure level. 
 
Despite these varied results and based on signalling and political cost theories, GCC listed 
firms with high profitability would be more likely to disclose detailed information to signal 
their ability to increase the security of their positions, justify their compensation and to 
signal their ability to maximise shareholders’ value than firms with low profitability. Thus, 
this study hypothesises that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm 
profitability.  
 
3.6.1.4 Liquidity 
In general, the existing literature and according to agency theory agrees that a firm with a 
lower liquidity ratio will have a greater need to reduce the fears of investors and lenders by 
disclosing more information. Managers also need to meet stakeholders’ informational needs 
regarding the firm’s ability to meet short-term financial obligations without liquidating 
long-term assets or stopping the firm’s operations. To do this, a firm with lower liquidity 
tends to provide more detail in its annual reports than a firm with higher liquidity (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995). Regulatory authorities are also interested in a firm’s ability to meet its 
short-term financial obligations, as this might affect the firm’s future long-term financial 
obligations Thus, firms with a lower liquidity would be expected to disclose more 
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information and achieve a higher level of mandatory disclosure with IFRS than higher 
liquidity firms. 
 
However, according to signalling theory Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) argue that firms with 
higher liquidity will have greater disclosure because managers of financially strong firms 
have nothing to hide from users of financial statements and, therefore, will be more likely 
to disclose more information than a firm with lower liquidity. In addition, signalling theory 
argues that a firm with a high liquidity ratio is expected to disclose more information to 
distinguish itself from other firms with poorer liquidity positions (Cooke, 1989; Oyeler et 
al., 2003; Aly et al., 2010). 
 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
liquidity is mixed. Wallace et al. (1994) examine whether the firm characteristics on 
disclosure in annual reports of 50 non-financial Spanish firms in 1991. The result shows a 
significant negative association between disclosure levels and liquidity ratios. Naser et al. 
(2002) also find a significant negative association between mandatory disclosure levels and 
liquidity by Jordanian listed firms in 1998. In addition, Ismail et al. (2010) report a 
significant negative relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and liquidity 
ratio by Egyptian listed firms during 2007. In contrast, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) show a 
positive relationship between disclosures and liquidity ratios in Canada. In addition, Al-
Akra et al. (2010a) find a significant positive association between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and liquidity by non-financial listed firms between 1996 and 2004.  
 
 On the other hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) in Hong Kong, Owusu-Ansah (1998) in 
Zimbabwe, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) in New Zealand, Aljifri (2008) in UAE, 
Hassaan (2013) in Jordon find no relationship between mandatory disclosure levels and 
liquidity ratios. 
 
Despite these mixed results regarding the relationship between mandatory disclosure levels 
and liquidity ratios, it is expected that, consistent with signalling theory, GCC listed firms 
with higher liquidity ratios will be more likely to disclose more financial information than 
firms with higher liquidity ratios to distinguish themselves from other firms with poorer 
liquidity positions. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
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H4: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and firm 
liquidity.  
 
3.6.1.5 The degree of internationality 
Foreign activity in firms is positively related to the level of disclosure (Daske et al., 2013; 
Amiraslani et al., 2013). Existing studies examine internationality in terms of listing on a 
foreign stock market (Cooke, 1992; Glaum and Street, 2003; Amiraslani et al., 2013), 
foreign sales (Meek et al., 1995; Street and Gray, 2001), and the presence of foreign 
shareholders (Craig and Diga, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; Morris et al., 2004). Managers of 
firms that operate in several geographical areas have to provide greater disclosure, bearing 
in mind the greater complexity of the firms’ activities (Cooke, 1989). According to 
signalling theory, international trading activities (Oliveira et al., 2006; Depoers, 2000) and 
the presence on several stock exchanges (Oliveira et al., 2006; Hope, 2003) imply large and 
complex amounts of information to control and, consequently, this influences firms to 
express their international position to stakeholders by improving disclosure. 
 
It can be argued that firms with international activities are more likely to be subject to a 
broader range of regulatory authorities and to have diverse financiers, suppliers, and 
customers. Thus, they are more likely to disclose more detailed information and to do so in 
a more widely understood form (Malone et al., 1993). Foreign customers and suppliers, for 
example, are interested in the financial reliability of the firm with which they conduct 
business, especially when it involves credit or warranties (Zarzeski, 1996). Firms may 
attempt to address this by providing more detailed and higher quality information. It may 
be that providing IFRS financial statements enables a firm to do this (Murphy, 1999; Street 
and Gray, 2001). If so, then firms that have more international activities and want to produce 
more internationally comparable information have a greater incentive to comply with IFRS 
than less internationally-orientated firms. 
 
Existing studies find mixed results with respect to the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and internationality. Glaum and Street (2003) find that the level of 
mandatory disclosure is positively associated with Germany firms being cross-listed on US 
stock markets in 2000. On the other hand, Malone et al. (1993) report no association 
between level of financial disclosure and the presence of foreign operations in US firms 
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during 1986. Street and Gray (2001) find no relationship between the level of mandatory 
disclosure and foreign sales in US listed firms 1998. In addition, Ismail et al. (2010) also 
show no significant association between mandatory disclosure levels and firms with foreign 
activates by Egyptian listed firms in 2007.    
 
According to signalling theory, in GCC country listed firms, it is expected that firms more 
heavily engaged in international activities are more likely to comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements than firms with more local operations. Consequently, this study 
hypothesises that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firms 
being listed on a foreign stock market.  
H6: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of sales which are international. 
 
3.6.1.6 Type of auditors  
Several studies report a positive relationship between mandatory disclosure level and the 
quality of external audit. The literature provides a number of justifications for this 
relationship. DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger auditing firms have built strong 
reputational capital and if they fail to report violations or make errors or misrepresentations 
in their clients’ corporate annual reports they have more to lose. Therefore, DeAngelo 
discusses that larger auditing firms have a greater incentive to maintain independence from 
their clients and to report non-compliance with regulations and rules. Malone et al. (1993) 
argue that smaller auditing firms are sensitive to their clients’ demands because of the 
economic consequences of losing a client. Wallace and Naser (1995) claim that, due to this 
sensitivity phenomenon, larger auditing firms are less likely to depend on one or a few 
clients.  The apparent lack of bonding with clients enables larger auditing firms to demand 
greater disclosure in their clients ‘corporate annual reports (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
 
Wallace et al. (1994) argue that firms audited by international (Big-4) auditing firms are 
more likely to provide more detailed information than firms audited by local auditing firms. 
The rationale is that international auditing firms tend to be larger and offer greater expertise 
than local auditing firms. Craswell and Taylor (1992) examine information disclosure in 
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general and in particular by Australian oil and gas companies listed on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange at the end of 1984. The result show that listed firms are more likely to choose a 
Big 6 audit firm than smaller firms. Such a choice signals to investors that the contents of 
the annual reports are audited with high quality. 
 
Several existing studies examine empirically the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and the type of auditors. Street and Gray (2001) find a significant 
positive relationship between audits by one of the Big 5 auditing firms and the level of 
mandatory disclosure with IAS-required disclosures by US listed firms during 1998. Glaum 
and Street (2003) report a positive relationship between IAS-required disclosures and 
auditing by one of the Big 5 auditing firms in Germany listed firms during 2000. Gallery et 
al. (2008) and Palmer (2008) show that firms audited by the Big 4 auditing firms disclose 
better quality information on the effect of adopting Australian International Financial 
Reporting Standards (AIFRS) than firms audited by non-Big 4 auditing firms during 2004 
and 2005. 
 
Based on the existing literature, the level of mandatory disclosure in GCC listed firms 
should vary between those firms audited by Big 4 auditors and those audited by non-Big 4 
auditors. Firms audited by the international Big 4 auditing firms would also be expected to 
have a higher level of mandatory disclosure than those audited by the non-Big 4. In GCC 
countries, in general it is the larger firms that are audited by the international Big 4 auditing 
firms. Therefore, it is expected that the level of mandatory disclosure should increase with 
firms audited by Big 4 auditing firms. Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and a firm 
being audited by an international auditing (the Big 4) firm.  
 
3.6.1.7 Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS) 
Consolidated financial statements are the financial statements of a group in which the assets, 
liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the parent and its subsidiaries are 
presented as those of a single economic entity (iasplus, 2016). The standard IFRS 10 
requires a parent firm to present consolidated financial statements, defines the principle of 
control and establishes control as the basis for consolidation. It sets out how to apply the 
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principle of control to identify whether an investor controls an investee and, therefore, must 
consolidate the investee. It also sets out the accounting requirements for the preparation of 
consolidated financial statements (iasplus, 2016). 
 
Firms may apply IFRS 10 to an earlier accounting period, but, if doing so, it must disclose 
the fact that is has early adopted the standard, and they may also apply IFRS 11 Joint 
Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities, IAS 27 Separate 
Financial Statements, and IAS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures (iasplus, 
2016). Therefore, firms which have consolidated financial statements are expected to 
comply with more IAS and IFRS accounting standards and have a high level of mandatory 
disclosure.  
 
The lack of empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between consolidated 
financial statements (group accounting standards) and the level of mandatory disclosure in 
developed and emerging capital markets supports the need for further investigation. 
Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
H8: Firms with consolidated financial statements are expected to have a high level of 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
3.6.1.8 Firm age  
The level of a firm’s mandatory disclosure may be associated with its age or length of 
establishment. In the case of GCC firms, it is predicted that older firms are more likely to 
disclose more information, leading to greater mandatory disclosure level with than is the 
case for younger firms. Glaum and Street (2003) argue that younger firms tend to 
concentrate more on product and market development when establishing their businesses, 
rather than on accounting. In addition, managers of younger firms tend to be less 
experienced in running a listed firm and complying with regulatory requirements. Thus, 
they argue that younger firms’ accounting systems tend to be inadequate, resulting in lower 
quality accounting and disclosures. In contrast, older firms tend to have strong accounting 
systems and experienced managers and staff, resulting in higher quality accounting and 
disclosures. 
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However, the results regarding the relationship between firm age and extent of mandatory 
disclosure are varied. Owusu-Ansah (1998) finds a significant positive relationship between 
mandatory disclosure level and firm age among listed firms in Zimbabwe in 1994. Popova 
et al. (2013) also report a significant positive relationship between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and firm age in UK listed firms between 2006 and 2010. However, Glaum and 
Street (2003) find no evidence of a relationship between firm age and extent of mandatory 
disclosure in Germany listed firms during 2000. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) also find 
no evidence of a relationship between firm age and extent of mandatory disclosure in New 
Zealand firms between 1992-1993 and 1996-1997. Al-Sammari et al. (2008) show that, 
although firm age does not significantly affect the level of mandatory disclosure across their 
GCC sample of firms, it does significantly affect mandatory disclosure level among their 
sub-sample of 50 Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) listed firms during 1996 and 2002. 
 
Based on the existing literature, and due to the large variation in the ages of GCC listed 
firms (some firms have been in existence for more than 55 years, while others for two years), 
it is expected that older GCC firms will be more likely to comply with mandatory disclosure 
than younger GCC listed firms for two reasons. Firstly, older firms are more likely to have 
strong accounting systems and qualified, experienced staff. These characteristics will likely 
lead to increased gathering, processing and dissemination of the information needed to 
comply with mandatory disclosure and to reduce costs. Therefore, older firms are more 
likely to disclose more information than younger firms in their annual reports (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003). Secondly, a younger firm may suffer a greater 
competitive disadvantage if it discloses certain items, such as information on research and 
development expenditure, capital expenditure and new products. The competitive 
disadvantage would arise when the information disclosed by the younger firm is used to its 
detriment by others such as its competitors. Older firms may be more motivated to disclose 
such information, as its disclosure is less likely to hurt their competitive position (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998). Thus, this study hypothesises that: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm 
age. 
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3.6.2 Ownership structure factors 
3.6.2.1 Ownership diffusion 
Firm ownership diffusion is argued to be relevant in explaining variation in the extent of 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Agency theory suggests that firms with widely held 
ownership are more likely to disclose more information than firms with closely held 
ownership. This is because, when there is more widely held share ownership, the demand 
for publicly available information is likely to increase. In addition, firms with closely held 
share ownership are likely to have a smaller number of shareholders who are insiders and 
are therefore more likely to have greater access to the firm’s information than shareholders 
in firms with widely held share ownership.  
 
Compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements can be one way to increase disclosure 
in annual reports and allow other shareholders (outsiders) to monitor firm interests more 
efficiently, thereby reducing agency costs (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). Compliance 
with IFRS may allow managers to signal that they are acting in the shareholders' interests. 
For this reason, firms with widely held share ownership are more likely to comply with 
IFRS than firms with closely held share ownership. 
 
In GCC countries, three shareholder groups typically have substantial equity ownership in 
firms listed on the GCC stock exchanges: the government and its agencies, institutional 
investors, and dominant families. These groups may influence the level and quality of 
disclosure and the level of mandatory disclosure. In these countries, the groups are 
considered as insiders, because they usually have representatives on a firm’s board of 
directors, and thus, they have better access to internal information and low level of 
disclosure is expected. Evidence of institutional investors’ access to information directly 
from firms is observed in Saudi Arabia (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003a), in Kuwait (Al-
Shimmiri, 2003) and in Bahrain (Al-Bastaki, 1997). Government-controlled firms may not 
need to attract potential investors as they can obtain cheaper funds from local banks. Also, 
political affiliations may result in less detailed information being disclosed to protect the 
beneficial owners (Ghazali, 2004). 
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From another point of view, Eng and Mak (2003) suggest that government ownership 
increases moral hazard and the possibility of agency problems due to the conflict between 
the pure profit goals of a commercial enterprise and goals related to the interests of the 
nation; thus management is expected to disclose more information to reduce monitoring 
costs. Also, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) argue that dominant government ownership may 
result in more disclosure by firm management in order to reflect the state’s commitment to 
transparency. This argument is emphasised by Li and Harrison (2008) who state that when 
the government is a major owner, it is important for the board of directors to appear to be 
legitimate and accountable to the public to support the political goals of bureaucrats. Thus, 
levels of mandatory disclosure are expected to increase to reduce agency costs. 
 
Existing studies show that the relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
ownership diffusion and is not examined widely. Abd Elsalam and Weetman (2007) find 
that the proportion of governmental ownership is positively related to the level of IAS 
mandatory disclosure. However, Hassaan (2013) find a significant negative relationship 
between levels of mandatory disclosure with IFRS and public ownership ratio. On the other 
hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) report no relationship between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and ownership diffusion in Hong Kong between 1988 and 1992, measured by 
the proportion of shares owned by outsiders. Owusu-Ansah (1998) finds no relationship 
between the extent of mandatory disclosure and proportion of shares owned by insiders in 
Zimbabwe during 1994. Naser et al. (2002) and Hassaan (2013) report no association 
between the level of mandatory disclosure and the proportion of governmental ownership 
by Jordanian listed firms in 1998 and 2007 respectively. Shammari et al. (2008) find the 
level of mandatory disclosure with IAS is not related to the ratio of institutional ownership 
in GCC member states between 1996 and 2002. Akra et al. (2010a) find no relationship 
between the level of mandatory disclosure and the proportion of institutional ownership by 
Jordanian listed firms between 1996 and 2004. 
 
In this thesis, government ownership and institutional ownership are used to measure 
ownership diffusion in GCC listed firms. It may be possible for these investors to request 
information directly from companies. Therefore, consistent with agency theory, it is 
expected that firms with insider ownership (institutional ownership and governmental 
ownership) have less motivation to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements than 
firms with widely held share ownership. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
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H10: Firms with greater institutional ownership have a lower level of mandatory 
disclosure. 
H11: Firms with greater government ownership have a lower level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
3.6.3 Corporate governance factors  
3.6.3.1 Board size 
Board size is measured as the total number of executive and non-executive directors on a 
firm’s board. Agency theory suggests that large boards can play an important role in making 
strategic decisions and in monitoring the board. In addition, large boards lead to an increase 
in the diversity of expertise on the board, including financial reporting expertise (Yermack, 
1996; Singh et al., 2004; Laksamana, 2008). Existing empirical studies also find that there 
is a positive relationship between board size and earnings management, suggesting that 
higher disclosure quality is associated with large board size. For example, Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of monitoring functions of board 
size of directors in reducing earnings management among 97 firms listed in Malaysia over 
the period 2002-2003. The result shows that earnings management is positively related to 
the size of the board of directors. Therefore, firms with large board size are more likely to 
disclose more information in their annual reports.  
 
There are two schools of thoughts on board size. The first is that small board size contributes 
more to the success of a firm, as groups increase in size they become less effective because 
the coordination and process problems overwhelm the advantages from having more people 
to draw on (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). In addition, Yermack 
(1996) argues that a large board is slow in its decision-making and engages more in time 
wasting. Moreover, Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that that board members’ strategic 
decision-making is negatively affected by large board size and, eventually, there becomes 
a negative relationship between board size and disclosure. The second school of thought is 
that large board size improves firm performance (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998). Large board 
size enables the board to gather more information. Moreover, large board size brings a 
diversity of expertise in terms of financial and managerial terms (Laksmana, 2008). The 
existing literature also argues that a larger board size leads to a higher disclosure level, and 
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thus there is a positive relationship between board size and a firm’s disclosure level (Barako 
et al., 2006). 
  
The majority of the existing studies find a positive relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and size of the board (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; 
Gao and Kling, 2012; Matocsy et al., 2012; Alfraih, 2016). Kent and Stewart (2008) show 
a positive association between the level of AIFRSs disclosure and board size by Australian 
companies during 2004. Al-Akra et al. (2010a) report a positive relationship between the 
level of mandatory disclosure with IFRS and the size of the board by non-financial 
Jordanian listed firms between 1996 and 2004. Gao and Kling (2012) find that board size is 
positively affect the level mandatory disclosure of Chinese companies listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2007. Matocsy et al. (2012) examine the 
association between corporate mandatory disclosure and board size based on a sample of 
450 firms for the period of 2006-2007 and find that board size is positively related to 
corporate mandatory disclosure. Recently, Alfraih (2016) investigates the relationship 
between the characteristics of the board of directors and mandatory disclosure with IFRS in 
firms listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) in 2010. The result indecats that board 
size is positively correlated with mandatory disclosure with IFRS. In contrast, Hasan et al., 
(2013) investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial reporting disclosures 
of twenty non-financial companies listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and find no 
relationship between board size and corporate disclosure. Based on these arguments of 
agency theory and two schools of thoughts on board size, this study hypothesises that: 
 
H12: The level of mandatory disclosure is positively associated with board size. 
 
3.6.3.2 Board independence (non-executive directors) 
Board independence is measured as the percentage of the number of independent non-
executive directors to the total number of directors on the board. A board with more 
independent directors is expected to engage in improved financial disclosure and to be more 
effective in monitoring the firm’s management (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Dey, 2008). It is 
expected that insiders cannot effectively monitor themselves on behalf of the firm’s 
shareholders (Muslu, 2005).  
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Supporters of board independence use agency theory and resource dependency theory to 
explain its importance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). According to agency theory, Lim et al. 
(2007) argue that the employment of independent non-executive directors works as a 
mechanism to monitor management's performance and reduce information asymmetry 
between the managers and the owners. According to the resource dependency theory, 
independent directors are seen as a useful mechanism linking the firm to the external 
environment (Tricker, 1984; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
 
With regard to corporate financial disclosure, board independence is considered as a 
mechanism that can influence disclosure practices since a majority of independent directors 
work to maximise the board’s ability to force management to meet all of its disclosure 
requirements (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Forker (1992) finds 
evidence that increased numbers of non-executive directors on the board leads to an 
increased quality of financial disclosures. 
 
Existing empirical studies find mixed results on the relationship between the level of 
mandatory disclosure and board independence, making it difficult to predict the relationship 
between board independence and levels of mandatory disclosure requirements. Some 
researchers report a positive relationship between disclosure levels and board independence 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and Elmasry, 2008; Ezat 
and Elmasry, 2008; Verriest et al., 2013). Chen and Jaggi (2000) examine the association 
between independent non-executive directors and financial disclosure of 87 firms in Hong 
Kong during 1993 and 1994. They find that the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors on the board is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Abdelsalam and Street (2007) examines the 
significance of several corporate governance factors as potential determinants of the 
corporate internet reporting disclosure by 115 U.K. listed companies in 2006. The results 
provide an evidence of a significant association between corporate internet reporting 
disclosure and the proportion of board independence. Abdelsalam and Elmasry (2008) find 
that corporate internet reporting disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of 
board of director’s independence by 44 Irish-listed companies.  Ezat and Elmasry (2008) 
examine the key factors that affect the corporate internet reporting by 50 Egyptian listed 
corporations in 2006 and find a positive relationship between corporate internet reporting 
and the proportion of board independence. Verriest et al. (2013) investigate the association 
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between corporate governance and EU listed firms’ choices with respect to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in 2005. The results show that greater 
proportion of board independence in firms provides higher quality information. Other 
studies find no relationship between board independence and disclosure levels (Al-Akra et 
al., 2010; Matocsy et al., 2012; Hassaan, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). Al-Akra et al. (2010) 
examines the influence of accounting disclosure regulation, governance reforms on 
mandatory disclosure of a sample of 80 non-financial, listed Jordanian companies for the 
years 1996 and 2004. They find that mandatory disclosure with the IFRS is not significantly 
related to the proportion of board independence. Matocsy et al. (2012) examine the 
association between corporate mandatory disclosure and board independence based on a 
sample of 450 firms for the period 2006-2007 and find that there is no relationship between 
corporate mandatory disclosure and the proportion of board independence. Hassaan (2013) 
find no relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the proportion of board 
independence by Jordanian listed firms in 2007. 
 
The lack of empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between board independence 
and levels of mandatory disclosure with IFRS for GCC countries supports the need for 
further investigation. The majority of existing studies report a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of board independence and disclosure level. They 
attribute this result to the proposition that board independence improves the monitoring 
function of the board thereby resulting in better transparency and disclosure. Accordingly, 
this study hypothesises that: 
H13: There is a positively significant relationship between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and the proportion of board independence on board.  
 
3.6.3.3 CEO/Chairman role duality 
Role duality exists when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the Chairman of the 
board of directors. The CEO is a full-time position whereby the director is responsible for 
the daily management of the firm as well as setting and implementing firm strategies. 
However, the position of the Chairman is usually a part-time position where the main 
responsibility is to ensure the effectiveness of the board (Weir and Laing, 2001; Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005).  
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Agency theory argues that the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions improves the 
efficiency of management personnel (Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). As the CEO 
may have the right to control board meetings, select board members and to set agenda items 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; 
Kelton and Yang, 2008), separating the roles provides checks and balances over the 
management’s performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Moreover, Dahya and Travlos 
(2000) argue that outside Chairmen can provide an external perspective to the firm that may 
be important to the development of organisational goals and objectives, and strengthen the 
link between the firm and its environment. Role duality may also negatively affect the 
quality of firm performance as it may be difficult for one person to find the time and exert 
the effort needed to carry out the responsibilities of both positions effectively and 
efficiently. 
 
Some studies, however, argue that the separation of the two positions is not essential for 
good performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Dahya et al., 
1996; Gul and Leung, 2004). Eisenhardt (1989) and Stewart (1991) argue that role duality 
improves decision-making by permitting a sharper focus on firm objectives and promoting 
the faster implementation of operational decisions.  
 
Existing empirical studies find mixed results on the relationship between financial 
disclosure level and role duality. Some studies find a significantly negative relationship 
between the level of financial disclosure and role duality (Forker, 1991; Abdelsalam and 
Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and Elamasry, 2008). Forker (1991) argues that separation of the 
roles of Chair and Chief Executive will help to enhance monitoring and reporting quality. 
He finds a significantly negative relationship between role duality and the level of financial 
disclosure. Abdelsalam and Street (2007) find a significant negative association between 
corporate internet reporting disclosure in UK listed companies in 2006 and role duality. 
Abdelsalam and Elmasry (2008) find that corporate internet reporting disclosure is 
negatively associated with role duality by 44 Irish-listed companies. Alfraih (2016) find 
that the level of mandatory disclosure with IFRS is negatively associated with CEO role 
duality by Kuwaiti non-financial listed firms in 2010. In contrast, other studies demonstrate 
that there is no relationship between financial disclosure and role duality. For example, Ezat 
and El-Masry (2008) find no relationship between corporate internet reporting and role 
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duality in Egyptian listed corporations in 2006. However, some studies find a significantly 
positive relationship between the level of financial disclosure and role duality. For example, 
Gao and Kling (2012) find that role duality is positively effect on firm mandatory disclosure 
of Chinese companies listed from 2001 to 2007. 
 
The contradictory nature of the empirical results makes it difficult to predict the type of the 
relationship between role duality and level of mandatory disclosure in GCC countries. For 
developing countries, some studies show that role duality produces a lower level of financial 
disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Based on an agency theory argument, which supports 
the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions provides good performance, this study 
hypothesises that: 
H14: There is a negative association between the extent of mandatory disclosure and CEO 
/Chairman role duality. 
 
3.6.4 Cultural characteristics (manager’s personal characteristics) 
3.6.4.1 Education - board of directors  
Director educational background can be an important determinant of financial disclosure 
practice. Gray (1988) identifies education as one of the institutional consequences affecting 
accounting values and practices. Grace et al. (1995) believe that the education level of 
directors should be examined as a basic measure of professional status. Wallace and Cooke 
(1990, p. 84) suggest that “an increase in the level of education in a country may increase 
political awareness and demand for corporate accountability”. Therefore, if a board of 
directors consists of individuals with an academic background in accounting and business, 
they may choose to disclose more information to demonstrate accountability, improve the 
firm’s corporate image and also to confirm the credibility of the management team.  
 
In contrast, the directors may also not wish to disclose more than the minimum managers 
to avoid other costs and competitive disadvantage. In GCC countries, the lack of research 
requires more empirical study. Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
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H15: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of directors on the board who have a qualification in business and/or 
accounting.  
 
3.6.4.2 Education – financial controllers  
In addition to the educational background of the directors in general, the academic 
background of the financial controllers is equally important, because the disclosure policies 
adopted are also dependent accounting skills. The primary responsibility for preparing 
annual reports rests with the principal accounting officer of the firm (Abayo and Roberts, 
1993; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). However, Parry and Groves (1990) find no significant 
relationship between the number of qualified accountants on the board and the quality of 
financial reporting. 
 
Abayo and Roberts (1993) argue that a qualification in accounting alone cannot provide 
solutions to problems concerning the inappropriate accounting systems faced in developing 
countries. There is a conception that in developing countries, professionally qualified 
accountants might be expected to disclose more information, because they receive more 
professional training compared with locally trained accountants (Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994). Equally, professional training in accounting or finance will help financial controllers 
/chief accountants to be more aware of disclosure issues. In GCC countries, the paucity of 
research requires further empirical study. Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
H16: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of financial controllers who have a qualification in business and/or accounting.  
 
3.6.5 The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures  
This section aims to provide some general insights into financial statement disclosure 
information, percisly the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures and their 
interrelationship.  
 
Globalisation and the awareness of potential investors of published financial information 
leads to an increasing demand for quality information. One of the tools managers have to 
communicate information to investors is disclosure. If mandatory disclosure is the 
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responsibility of regulatory organisations (security exchange authorities, IASB, FASB), 
voluntary disclosure is the responsibility of managers. Therefore, investors must be aware 
when mandatory disclosure is no longer relevant and managers start employing voluntary 
disclosure “as managers are likely to consider their own interests when exercising 
managerial discretion” (Akhtaruddin, 2005). Wallace et al. (1995) and Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) consider disclosure as the communication of economic information, whether 
financial or non-financial, quantitative or otherwise, concerning a firm’s financial position 
and performance. Disclosure results in a combination of mandatory and voluntary items 
that constantly interact with each other. 
 
Mandatory disclosure is a firm’s obligation to disclose a minimum amount of information 
in its corporate reports (Wallace et al., 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998) whereas voluntary 
disclosure is the provision of additional information when mandatory disclosure is unable 
to provide a true picture of the firm’s value and managers’ performance. Mandatory 
disclosure is governed by regulatory agencies in all countries around the world (Healy et 
al., 2001; Akhtaruddin, 2005). Regulators force firms to disclose information that firms 
wish hidden (Darrough, 1993). One of the explanations for disclosure regulation is the 
concern of regulatory bodies for the welfare of ordinary investors (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; Taplin et al., 2002). By creating minimum disclosure requirements, regulators reduce 
the information gap between informed and uninformed investors (Healy et al., 1999) and 
redistribute wealth among them. Furthermore, the existence of disclosure regulation affects 
the credibility of the information in capital markets (Al-Htaybat et al., 2006) and ensures 
firms’ compliance with regulatory requirements. 
 
However, sometimes mandatory disclosure may be imperfect in addressing the expectations 
of investors. Thus, managers use voluntary disclosure as an important tool in their arsenal 
(Graham et al., 2005) to communicate their superior knowledge of company performance 
to investors (Healy et al., 2001). As argued above, the voluntary disclosure provides an 
additional offer of information, which depends on the firm's discretion, the relevant 
legislation and the external pressures of the consulting firms, financial analysts, capital 
markets and the cultural factor. It is something that is not required by the law, but is the 
voluntary provision of information. In other words, the voluntary offer of information 
represents an excess of information, dependent both on the free choice of the firm’s 
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leadership and on the regulations in force, the outside pressures of the capital markets, 
financial analysts, consulting firms and cultural factors.  
 
Thus, both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are potentially important (Omar et al., 
2011). They should not be seen as separate elements of financial reporting as they interact 
with each other constantly (Yu, 2011). When mandatory requirements are limited or 
regulations are vague and difficult to interpret, firms have an incentive to replace missing 
information with voluntary disclosures. When regulators mandate voluntary information, 
there is no need for the firm to create discretionary disclosure strategies (Einhorn, 2005).  
 
The interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures is examined by existing 
researchers (Dye, 1985; 1986; Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Naser et al., 2003; Al-Razeen et 
al., 2004; Einhorn, 2005; Yu, 2011). Dye (1985, 1986) investigates proprietary costs in 
modelling the influence of mandatory requirements on voluntary disclosure. This influence 
depends on whether mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes or complements. 
If they are substitutes, then more disclosure requirements will reduce voluntary disclosure. 
If they are complements, then more disclosure requirements will increase voluntary 
disclosure. Naser et al. (2003) find a positive and significant relationship between voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures, whereas Gigler and Hemmer (1998) explore analytically the 
interaction between mandatory accounting and managers’ voluntary disclosures. They show 
that increasing the frequency of mandated disclosures may eliminate managers’ voluntary 
disclosures. Al-Razeen et al. (2004) examine the interrelationship between the mandatory 
and voluntary corporate disclosure in the annual reports of 68 Saudi firms and find no clear 
association between these two disclosures. The potential explanation behind this unclear 
association between mandatory and voluntary disclosures is referring to a lack of 
cooperation between management and the board of directors. Indeed, many items are 
presented in both parts of the annual report: in the financial statements and the notes, and 
in the directors’ report, i.e. here voluntary disclosure complements mandatory disclosure. 
To summarise, there is no clearly defined relationship between these two concepts. Firms 
have to determine what the optimal level of total disclosure is appropriate for them (Leuz 
et al., 2008). Either a firm strictly follows regulatory requirements and limits its discretion 
over voluntary disclosure, or it meets minimum mandatory requirements and extends its 
reporting by the voluntary provision of information. 
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In GCC countries, the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is expected 
to be one of substitution, as private information that was previously reperted through 
voluntary disclosure is now directly reflected in mandatory financial reports. In other words, 
given a fixed amount of information that managers are willing to disclose, when more is 
disclosed in mandatory reporting, less is left for voluntary disclosure. Thus, greater 
mandatory disclosure will reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, this study 
hypothesises that: 
H17: There is a negative relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
 Summary 
This chapter reviews relevant theories and empirical studies in relation to corporate 
mandatory disclosure requirements. In addition, this chapter develops the research 
framework and hypotheses in order to address the study’s research questions regarding 
mandatory disclosure requirements. It also develops a set of testable hypotheses concerning 
the relationship between a number of firm-specific characteristics such as corporate 
characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors and cultural 
characteristics (manager’s personal characteristics) and the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
In addition, it tests the effect of the level of voluntary disclosure on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure requirements.  
 
Nine hypotheses address the influence of corporate on the extent of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Two hypotheses address the influence of ownership structure factors on the 
level of mandatory disclosure requirements. Three hypotheses address the influence of 
corporate governance factors on the level of mandatory disclosure requirements. Two 
hypotheses address the association between cultural characteristics (personal 
characteristics) on the extent of mandatory disclosure requirements. One remaining 
hypothesis addresses the influence of voluntary disclosure on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure requirements. 
 
In this thesis, the extent of mandatory disclosure is hypothesised to increase with firm size 
(H1), profitability (H3), international listing (H5), international sales (H6), type of auditors 
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(H7), consolidated financial statements (H8), firm age (H9), board size (H12), board 
independence (H13), board of directors’ education (H15) and financial controllers’ 
education (H16). It is hypothesised that the level of mandatory disclosure decreases with 
the liquidity ratio (H4), institutional ownership (H10), governmental ownership (H11),  
CEO/Chairman role duality (H14) and the high level of voluntary disclosures (H17). In 
addition, the level of mandatory disclosure differs by industry type (H2). 
 
The next chapter presents the theoretical frameworks and existing empirical literature to 
explain variation in the level of voluntary disclosure practices. It discusses the hypotheses 
formulated for testing the relationship between the level of corporate voluntary disclosure 
and firm-specific characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors 
and the extent of mandatory disclosure.  
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 The Extent of Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, 
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 
 Introduction   
This chapter aims to discuss the theoretical aspects of the voluntary disclosure in terms of 
the theories used in the literature to explain the extent of such disclosure, its determinants, 
and the common sources of voluntary information disclosure. The theories include agency 
theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, political cost theory, proprietary costs theory, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship and resource dependence theories. 
The theories reviewed are selected here because they are powerful in explaining the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and its determinants, including corporate 
characteristics, ownership factors, corporate governance factors and the level of mandatory 
disclosure.  
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature examining the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
both developed and developing countries. In addition, it links the theoretical framework 
and the empirical findings of the existing literature to enable the development of some 
relevant testable hypotheses.  
 
 The theoretical framework for corporate voluntary disclosure 
4.2.1 Agency theory 
The agency theory framework is reviewed in section 3.3.3. As discussed, the separation 
between the principal and the agent can create a conflict between their interests. This 
conflict creates agency costs that managers have an incentive to reduce. Agency theory is 
generally employed in accounting research to explain the manager incentives for voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Von 
Alberti-Alhtaybat et al., 2012). 
 
According to agency theory, the ownership of a firm (the principals) authorises the mission 
of managing the firm to the agent (the managers). As discussed earlier, the agency 
relationship that results from the separation between the stockholders and the management 
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may create a conflict of interest between the principals and the agent. This conflict leads to 
an agency problem when managers tend to make decisions that achieve their own interests, 
even though these decisions could be harmful to the interests of principals. Consequently, 
this relationship could lead to an information asymmetry problem due to the fact that 
managers have more access to than shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Contractual 
agreements are a means of alleviating the agency problem as they help in bringing 
shareholders’ interests in line with managers’ interests (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
 
Voluntary disclosure is another means of alleviating the agency problem, whereby 
managers disclose more voluntary information in order to reduce agency costs (Barako et 
al., 2006) and also to convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal 
way (Watson et al., 2002). Finally, regulations are another means of alleviating the agency 
problem as they require managers to fully disclose private information (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). However, full disclosure is never guaranteed, even with the existence of regulations 
(Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). The absence of full disclosure is explained by the conflict 
that exists between the interests of managers and shareholders (Lev and Penman, 1990; 
Samuels, 1990). In addition, corporate reporting regulations are intended to provide 
investors with the minimum quantity of information that helps in the decision-making 
process (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). 
 
In summary, an agency problem occurs due to differences in the aims of both the managers 
and the shareholders. The shareholders need to encourage the managers to perform in the 
shareholders' interests, yet they do not have appropriate information about the behaviour 
of those managers. However, the managers behave in a way that satisfies their own 
interests, even if it conflicts with the shareholders' interests. One way to alleviate this 
problem, according to agency theory, disclosing voluntary information by firms’ managers 
which tends to reduce the agency costs resulting from conflicts between firms’ managers 
and shareholders. 
 
4.2.2 Signalling theory 
The idea of signalling theory, as discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.3.4.1, is developed to 
explain the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Morris, 1987; 
Black et al., 2006a). Although the signalling theory was developed to explain the 
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information asymmetry in the labour market, it has been applied to explain the information 
introduced voluntarily by managers (Singh and Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2008; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013). 
 
Campbell et al. (2001) argue that the existence of an information asymmetry problem will 
encourage the firms to signal their quality to the market when they believe that they are 
better than other firms. In so doing, they can enhance the firm’s reputation and attract more 
investors. Although firms with good news have the motivation to signal their quality to 
others, firms with bad news also have incentives to disclose their bad news to avoid the 
reputational costs that may be incurred if they do not disclose such news within an 
appropriate time (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, in terms of increasing the confidence in firms 
with different types of news, either good or bad, firms should signal these types to their 
users to keep them updated.  
 
According to signalling theory, the senders (managers) hold private information about the 
firm, and the receivers (stakeholders) already have some information about the firm, but 
would like to have this private information as they think that this information may help 
them to make better decisions. Thus, information asymmetry between managers and 
stakeholders arises, and this problem may have a negative influence on the firm’s 
transparency. Consequently, managers have incentives to enhance transparency and prove 
their ability to manage the different activities of the firm. Voluntary disclosure is one of 
the signalling means, whereby firms disclose more information than is mandatorily 
required by laws and regulations in order to signal that they are better than other firms 
(Campbell et al., 2001). Stakeholders who receive these signals and interpret them as 
expected by managers may reward the managers with favourable consequences, such as an 
increase in the firm’s market value or a reduction in its cost of capital (Connelly et al., 
2011; Cotter et al., 2011; Omran and El-Galfy, 2014). 
 
In addition, in order to reduce information asymmetries and market uncertainty, firms are 
expected to adopt good corporate governance practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A 
reduction in information asymmetry could: (i) offer equal opportunities to both large and 
small shareholders in accessing information, which may help in reducing agency problems 
and the cost of capital (Morris, 1987; Hearn, 2011; Sharma, 2013); (ii) help the firm to 
attract both local and foreign investment and provide higher liquidity (Healy and Palepu, 
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2001; Chung and Zhang, 2011); and (iii) enhance the market as a corporate control 
mechanism and, in turn, help to create a highly efficient market (Klein et al., 2005). 
 
Similarly to the agency theory, signalling theory recognises the separation between control 
and ownership and also motivate managers to disclose voluntary information due to market 
pressures (Ross, 1979). Signalling theory is different from agency theory in that there are 
signalling costs which have a negative relationship with the quality of information (Morris, 
1987). Signalling theory suggests that managers tend to present quality information to 
minimise signalling costs. 
 
According to signalling theory, firms with better performance are inclined to disclose 
voluntary information to signal their superior performance and distinguish themselves from 
others (Akerlof, 1970). Logically, one might assume that firms with unfavourable 
information are inclined to be silent. However, being silent may not be the best solution 
because investors may interpret non-disclosure as a negative signal (Ross, 1979). Firms 
may suffer from reputational costs if they fail to disclose the bad news in a proper time 
(Skinner, 1994). 
 
When shares are mispriced, a firm would have signalling incentives to disclose voluntary 
information in order to adjust the share price to its `true' value and prevent undervaluation 
by the market (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hossain and Taylor, 2007). As signalling could 
have a strong impact on share price, it might encourage firms to provide false information. 
However, only short-term benefits could be obtained from providing misleading voluntary 
information. Being detected for misleading voluntary disclosure could lead a firm into 
disaster; it would damage the creditability of all future information provided by such a firm, 
which would eventually affect the share price (Sukthomya, 2011). 
 
4.2.3 Capital need theory 
Capital need theory can help to explain disclosure practice in that a higher level of 
disclosure reduces the firm’s cost of capital by lowering information asymmetry, reducing 
estimated risks related to expected future returns, and expanding information availability 
to a wider audience (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Firms aim to attract external finance 
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to increase their debt or equity capital. The capital need theory suggests that voluntary 
disclosure helps in achieving a firm's need to raise capital at a low cost (Choi, 1973). 
 
Foster (1986) suggests that enhanced voluntary disclosure can support capital raising or 
successful listing. A number of studies report that firms tend to increase disclosure 
activities around a period of capital raising (Choi, 1973b; Firth, 1980; Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). There is also empirical evidence that firms that frequently access capital markets for 
finance tend to increase their level of voluntary disclosure (Choi, 1973a; Firth, 1980; Healy 
and Palepu, 1993). The reason for increased disclosure is the belief that firms will benefit 
from a lower cost of capital (Choi and Mueller, 1992). There are a number of studies that 
support this argument, for example, those of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Healy et al. (1999). These studies argue that voluntary disclosure 
can reduce the cost of capital and enhance stock market liquidity through reduced 
transaction costs and increased demand for the firm’s stock. Additional disclosure can help 
to reduce investor uncertainty and risk, and also the required rate of return, which in turn 
leads to a lower cost of capital (Cooke, 1989b). 
 
In 2001, according to Improved Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary 
Disclosure, which is published by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the 
competition for capital leads to increased voluntary disclosure. The rationale behind this is 
the fact that “a company’s cost of capital is believed to include a premium for investors’ 
uncertainty about the adequacy and accuracy of the information available about the 
company”. Therefore, a reduction in a company’s cost of capital is achieved when investors 
are able to interpret the company’s economic prospects through voluntary disclosure 
(FASB, 2001). 
 
The relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital is found 
to be a negative; the higher the information disclosure by a firm, the lower is the cost of 
capital. However, Botosan (2006, p. 3) highlights that another “stream of research indicates 
that certain types of disclosure might have the opposite effect”. A number of studies support 
the capital need theory, most of which find that additional disclosure can lead to a reduced 
cost of capital, fewer estimation risks and enhanced stock liquidity (Horngren, 1957; Choi, 
1973b; Firth, 1980; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Barry and Brown, 1985; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Frankel et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997; 
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Sengupta, 1998; Healy et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Richardson and Welker, 
2001).  
 
4.2.4 Political cost theory 
The concept of political cost theory is discussed above in section 3.3.2.2. Political cost 
theory explains the reasons why firms disclose information voluntarily (Firth, 1980; Cooke, 
1989; Lim and McKinnon, 1993; Al- Modahki, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1997; Curuk, 1999; 
Milne, 2002). However, there is mixed relation between political costs and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. While some studies have find a positive relationship (Firth, 1980; 
Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995), others demonstrate a negative relationship (Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989; Panchapakesan and McKinnon, 1992; Owusu-Ansah, 1997; Milne, 2002). 
As previously discussed, the effects of political costs to a firm tend to relate to the firm’s 
political visibility, and existing studies have found that this applies to large firms (Buzby, 
1975) or highly profitable firms (Wong, 1988). In order to reduce political impact, firms 
that are politically visible may modify their accounting policy or apply voluntary disclosure 
in order to reduce potential political costs (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Gray and 
Roberts, 1989; Lim and McKinnon, 1993). 
 
Epstein et al. (1976) discuss the role of regulatory bodies on firm voluntary disclosure in 
terms of a forthcoming potential regulation. They conclude that firms may engage in 
procedures such as voluntary disclosure in order to diminish the potential for further 
governmental interference. Firms may increase their voluntary disclosure to avoid any 
governmental interference and reduce the enforceable role of regulatory bodies (Leventis, 
2001). Apart from disclosing voluntary information, management tends to reduce political 
cost by changes in the content or timing of disclosures (Foster, 1986).  
 
Large firms in particular are motivated to disclose more voluntary information to reduce 
their political costs (e.g. tax), as they are more in the public eye than smaller firms (Al-
Hatybat, 2005). Zimmerman (1983) argues that large firms are subject to higher tax rates 
and, consequently, higher political costs. Existing studies suggest that political costs may 
not only depend on firm size but also on industry membership (Patten, 1991; Ness and 
Mirza, 1991; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Patten and Nance, 1998; Ghazali, 2004). These 
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researchers indicate that firms extend their voluntary disclosure in the oil and gas industry 
to decrease future regulatory costs (Ghazali, 2004). 
 
4.2.5 Proprietary costs theory 
Proprietary costs theory states that firms limit voluntary disclosure information to the 
financial market because of the existence of disclosure related costs (proprietary costs) 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). These costs not only include the costs of 
preparing and disseminating information but also include the cost deriving from disclosing 
information which may be used by competitors and other parties in a way which could be 
harmful to the reporting firm. Proprietary costs theory is based on the assumption that, in 
the absence of these costs, firms are incentivised to voluntarily disclose relevant 
information to the market in order to reduce information asymmetry and, consequently, the 
cost of capital (Verrecchia, 1983; Diamond, 1985), as explained by signalling theory 
(Spence, 1973; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Morris, 1987). According to Verrecchia 
(1983), the higher the proprietary costs associated with the disclosure, the less negatively 
investors react to the withholding of relevant information, therefore the less the probability 
that firms will voluntarily disclose information. 
 
 
4.2.6 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is regarded as complementary to the political cost theory, as both aim to 
explain accounting choice in relation to avoidable future costs. Legitimacy theory proposes 
that businesses operate via a social contract between a firm and the society in which it 
operates (Patten, 1992; Hossain and Taylor, 2007). Legitimacy theory is used widely to 
explain the motivation of management for the disclosure of corporate social responsibility 
information. This is because corporate disclosure is a tool that managers use to inform the 
community about their responsiveness to specific social responsibilities of the firm 
(Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Since the objective of accounting is to provide users with 
information that helps them in their decision-making, for example, satisfying social 
interests, the theory has been integrated into accounting studies as a “means of explaining 
what, why, when and how certain items are addressed by corporate management in their 
communication with outside audiences” (Magness, 2006, p. 542). 
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Elliott and Jacobson (1994) suggest that firms may use disclosure to discharge some of 
their accountability obligations to society, as corporate citizenship is served partly by 
accounting disclosure. However, there is no strong evidence to support legitimacy theory 
in explaining voluntary disclosure. There are predictions of a higher level of disclosure in 
highly regulated firms (Ng and Koh, 1994) and also firms in politically sensitive industries, 
such as the energy sector (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). 
 
Generally, corporate performance is measured on the basis of the extent of profit 
maximisation. According to Ramanathan (1976), legitimacy theory perceives profit 
maximisation broadly as a measure of organisational legitimacy. Adams and Roberts 
(1995) argue that firm requires managers to provide adequate information to shield their 
self-interests to maintain, promote and legitimise relationships. Managers provide adequate 
information to avoid probable regulatory intervention (Gray and Roberts, 1989). Lindblom 
(1994) and Rizk (2006) argue that firms’ actions can be legitimised using three approaches. 
Firstly, stakeholders have to be made aware of alterations in firms’ performance. Secondly, 
stakeholders’ perceptions have to be changed rather than their actual behaviour. Thirdly, 
stakeholders’ concerns have to be diverted to other relevant issues with a view to 
influencing their perception.  
 
Disclosure plays a significant role in each of the above-mentioned approaches. Managers 
can easily contact stakeholders and society by revealing information deliberately. That is 
why managers will endeavour to legitimise corporate actions as well as their managerial 
positions. To elucidate disclosure practice, legitimacy theory has been applied. Most 
disclosure studies, such as on social and environmental disclosure, have been based on this 
theory. The concept of disclosure is supported by the evidence of these studies, which are 
perceived as a means of legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). 
 
Since legitimacy theory is based on society’s perception, management is forced to disclose 
voluntary information that could change the external users’ opinion about their company 
(Cormier and Gordon, 2001). The annual report has been identified as an important source 
of legitimisation (Dyball, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002). Legitimisation can occur both through 
mandatory disclosures - disclosures provided in financial statements because of regulations 
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- and voluntary disclosures provided in other sections of the annual report (Magness, 2006; 
Lightstone and Driscoll, 2008). 
 
4.2.7 Stakeholder theory 
Whenever an organisation’s achievements manipulate or are manipulated by any group of 
people or individual then that group of people or individual is referred to as a stakeholder 
(Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders are a number of people who have a direct or indirect interest 
in the business (Carroll, 2014). Gray et al. (1995) declare that agency theory deals with the 
relationship between managers (the agent) and shareholders (the principal), while 
stakeholder theory deals with the relationship between managers and all other stakeholders 
(the principal) such as staff, shareholders, customers, government, and suppliers. 
 
Stakeholder theory proposes that the firm has to protect the interests of different 
stakeholders, including shareholders (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). Nonetheless, 
stakeholders’ expectations of a firm will differ. For example, shareholders expect a decent 
return, while employees expect a good income and job security. However, lenders expect 
the firm to have a strong financial position in order secure the safety of their investment, 
while policy-makers expect compliance with corporate governance regulations for 
stakeholder protection. 
 
Deegan (2002) argues that managers disseminate voluntary information towards some 
specific group of stakeholders to prove that they are meeting those stakeholders’ desires. 
Watson et al. (2002) argue that managers use deliberate voluntary disclosure to contact the 
stakeholders with a view to obtaining their support. However, different stakeholders require 
different information and seek different priorities (Wolfe and Puder, 2002). Furthermore, 
stakeholders gather information in different ways. That is why effective usage of deliberate 
voluntary disclosure policy may assist in building faith with the firm’s stakeholders and 
shareholders. In this circumstance, Rowley (1997) explains that “firms do not respond to 
each stakeholder individually but instead must answer the simultaneous demands of 
multiple stakeholders” (Rowley, 1997, p. 907). 
 
Important here are issues such as the degree competition and information cost. Stakeholder 
power will affect the voluntary disclosure decision (Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, the 
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manager should find a balance between stakeholders’ information needs. Stakeholder 
theory is applicable in transitional economies, developing countries and highly controlled 
industries (Rizk, 2006). For a firm to establish a voluntary disclosure approach, different 
strategies should be considered to meet the information needs of stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholder theory presents a broader perspective on corporate governance. Although the 
theory has been widely embedded within governance codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009), it has been criticised from two perspectives (Sternberg, 1997): (i) the assumptions 
of stakeholder theory conflict with the central objective of the firm to maximise the wealth 
of shareholders; and (ii) it also conflicts with the agent-principal relationship, which 
suggests that managers are primarily accountable to the firm’s shareholders. As such, 
stakeholder theory conflicts with some of the basic principles of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, stakeholder theory remains a key corporate governance theory (Clarke, 1998; 
Solomon, 2010; Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
 
In general, from stakeholder theory perspective, firm has to protect the interests of different 
stakeholders, including shareholders, and one way to do this is disclosing voluntary 
information to meet those stakeholders’ desires. 
 
4.2.8 Stewardship theory  
In contrast to the predictions of agency theory, stewardship theory focuses on the idea that 
managers are not motivated by individual interest, but, instead, by the objectives of 
principals (Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, the theory suggests that the managers who run 
firms are reliable (Letza et al., 2004; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). The 
development of stewardship theory is based on a number of assumptions, as follows. First, 
managers’ interests are associated with owners’ interests (shareholders) (Davis et al., 
1997). So, mangers will chose to disclose the information voluntarily to meet the 
shareholders’ needs. Second, as long as managers are reliable, CEO duality could be the 
most appropriate governance system to run a firm (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Siebels 
and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). More specifically, agents have access to information 
about the firm, which makes them highly capable of working towards the firm’s welfare 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Finally, firm managers seek to employ the firm’s resources in 
the best possible way to maximise the firm value (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson and Kiel, 
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2007). This is because any misbehaviour in using firm resources may affect their reputation 
and future career prospects (Conyon and He, 2011). Thus, stewardship theory can 
contribute to explain corporate governance through voluntary disclosure practices. 
 
Thus, stewardship theory contrasts with agency theory which presumes the existence of a 
conflict of interest between agents and principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Stewardship theory suggests there is no agency problem, because of the common trust 
between firm insiders and ultimate owners (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
In general, stewardship theory is based on that managers’ interests are associated with 
shareholders’ interests. Thus, mangers will chose to disclose the voluntary information to 
meet the shareholders’ needs. 
 
4.2.9 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the board of directors is an essential link between 
the firm and the financial and non-financial resources that are fundamental to the firm’s 
growth (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Chen and Roberts (2010, p. 653) explain 
that “organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, they rely on their environment 
for existence, and the core of the [resource dependence] theory focuses on how 
organizations gain access to vital resources for survival and growth”. Therefore, the theory 
relies on two important assumptions. First, the board of directors not only performs a 
monitoring role but also provides necessary significant resources, such as business contacts 
and contracts, knowledge, experience and expertise (Hillman and Dalzel, 2003; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007; Bouwman, 2011; Chen, 2011). These resources can improve financial 
performance and maximise shareholders’ wealth (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Second, the 
board of directors has the ability to represent the interests of different stakeholders, such as 
local communities, government, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, regulators and 
policy-makers (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Therefore, the board 
can help the firm to achieve competitive advantage by serving as a direct link between the 
firm and the environment within which it operates through public voluntary disclosure 
(Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
 
In terms of the voluntary disclosure effects within a resource dependence theoretical 
perspective, the current conclusions and evidence seems to suggest that resource providers 
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would respond positively to voluntary disclosure and improve organisational access to 
resources in a similar vein to the stakeholder theoretical predictions (Chen and Roberts, 
2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). 
 
 Voluntary disclosure indices in developed and developing countries 
This section reviews existing empirical studies that measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, as they are relevant to the second objectives of this thesis. The section reviews 
existing findings regarding disclosure index methods used to measure the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and how they impact in terms of theory in developed and developing 
countries.  
 
4.3.1 Voluntary disclosure indices in developed country studies 
This section explores how existing empirical studies measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in developed countries, including the methods and items used to measure 
voluntary disclosure indices. It also highlights the theories of voluntary disclosure used in 
developed country studies.  
 
The extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries, where the markets are assumed 
to be more efficient, is expected to be higher than that observed in developing capital 
markets. Efficient capital markets tend to have fewer issues concerning disclosure (Nair 
and Frank, 1980). The efficiency of capital markets also relies on information production 
and disclosure (Ndubizu, 1992). According to Foster (1986), the US and some other 
developed capital markets disclose additional information in response to market forces 
rather than regulatory-based forces. Some US firms disclose financial information publicly 
well before the establishment of major regulatory bodies. Foster finds that Australian and 
UK firms noticeably disclose more information than regulation requires. 
 
Empirical studies of corporate disclosure have a long history, dating back to the early 
1960s. The first study that applied a quantifiable measure to disclosure in corporate annual 
reports was Cerf (1961) who examines the extent of disclosure in the corporate annual 
reports of 527 US firms using a disclosure index containing 31 items. The disclosure index 
is weighted by giving integers ranging from 1 to 4 to the disclosure items based on 
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interviews with financial analysts. He finds that asset size, the number of shareholders, and 
the rate of return are positively related to the extent of disclosure. Cerf also finds that 
disclosure in firm annual reports varies greatly across firms. Firms whose shares were 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) disclosed more information than those 
traded on an exchange other than the NYSE. The Cerf study is considered as a foundation 
for subsequent research on corporate disclosure. 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) provide an extension to the study of corporate disclosure by 
computing a weighted disclosure index that contains 34 disclosure items, 28 of which 
derived from Cerf (1961). Their sample consists of 100 companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 55 companies trading on the Over-The-Counter market 
(OTC) over the period 1965 to1966. Listing status is found to be the most significant 
determinants of the extent of disclosure. Singhvi and Desai find that firms disclosing 
insufficient information are likely to be small, less profitable, free from listing 
requirements, and audited by small audit firms. 
 
Buzby (1975) applies a different approach in his study by developing a disclosure index 
containing 39 disclosure items which are weighted by financial analysts using a scale from 
0 to 4. The sample consists of two sets of data, including 44 firms listed on the NYSE or 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 44 firms with shares trading on the Over the 
Counter (OTC) market. He matches firms from each data set in terms of asset size, 
industrial classification and financial year end. He finds that there is no significant 
relationship between the extent of disclosure and listing status, and only a moderately 
positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and size. The findings of Buzby are 
inconsistent with those of Cerf (1961) and Singhvi and Desai (1971). 
 
The earlier studies above provided the foundation for subsequent research. While early 
studies of corporate disclosure applied the weighting score approach to measuring the 
extent of disclosure (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976), 
subsequent studies refined the measurement of disclosure by using an unweighted 
disclosure index and testing a wider range of independent variables. This section will 
discuss the structure of voluntary disclosure indices that are used through the literature in 
developed country studies.    
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Table 4.1 presents a summary of the studies measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in developed countries. These studies are classified according to the chronological order of 
the year of publication. Several inferences may be drawn from the findings of these studies. 
Of the 22 studies identified, eight studies examine the extent of voluntary disclosure before 
the year 2000, and 14 studies thereafter.  Of particular relevance to the second objective, 
which is the extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC country listed firms, of this thesis is that 
18 of the 22 studies apply only one disclosure index method, that is, the unweighted 
disclosure index for measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries. 
The unweighted disclosure index is measured by that the voluntary disclosure item gives 
(1) if it disclosed and (0) otherwise. Those studies who compute the unweighted indices, 
reflecting the views of all uses of financial statements such as investors, financial analysts 
and regulations assuming that all disclosure items are important for all firms and all items 
are equally weighted.   
 
Many existing developed country studies (e.g. Cooke, 1989b; Hossain et al., 1995; Meek 
et al., 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Lim et al., 2007; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013) who used the unweighted disclosure index, classified the voluntary 
disclosure index into three major groups of information types and further, into different 
subgroups to examine the extent of voluntary disclosure such as (1) Strategic information: 
general corporate characteristics, corporate strategy, acquisitions and disposals, research 
and development, future prospects information; (2) Non-financial information: information 
about directors, employee information, social responsibility and value added disclosures; 
(3) Financial information: segment information, financial review information, foreign 
currency information and stock price information. The major reason for adopting the 
similar voluntary disclosure indices among those studies is explained by Meek et al. (1995, 
p.561) who state that “a disclosure checklist is compiled based on an analysis of 
international trends and observations of standard reporting practice, taking into account the 
relevant research studies as well as other comprehensive international surveys of 
accounting and reporting”. 
 
Other group of studies employ a weighted approach such as Firth (1979) who uses 48 
weighted voluntary items by sending the list of items to users of accounts and asking them 
to evaluate the importance of each item using a 5 point scale. Score of 5 meant the item is 
very important, the score of 4 meant the item is important, the score of 3 related to 
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moderately important items, the score of 2 related to slightly important, and the score 1 
meant unimportant. The scores for the individual items for each company are totalled. This 
total is expressed as a percentage of the maximum score (which is 190.83) and this figure 
is known as the disclosure index for each company. McNally et al. (1982) who use 41 
voluntary items weighted by questionnaire containing the voluntary disclosure items send 
to financial editors and stock exchange members. The questionnaire requests respondents 
to score the relative importance of disclosure items on a scale of 1 the item is little or no 
importance to 5 if the item is very important. Arcay and Vazquez (2005) who use weighted 
voluntary items based on the “Actualidad Economica” disclosure index that consists of 18 
indicators. Actualidad Economica is a Spanish magazine comparable to Fortune magazine 
and its publishing firm and it prepares a disclosure index that consists of 18 indicators. The 
index embraces issues that have little to do with voluntary disclosure: auditor’s opinion 
(Indicator #2), clarity in the presentation of data (Indicator #9), design of the report 
(Indicator #10), and use of additional venues to make the annual report visible to the public 
opinion (Indicator #18). Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) who use voluntary items 
weighted by a rating is measured on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 representing the best practice. 
However, the use of weighted indices is criticised since weighted indices may reflect the 
subjectivity of either the researcher or users rather than the actual relative importance of 
items, and therefore, unweighted indices are in general preferred (Cooke, 1989; 1991). 
 
The developed country studies identified use voluntary disclosure indices in order to assess 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in 19 developed countries, namely the UK (Firth, 1979; 
Meek et al., 1995; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012); New 
Zealand (McNally et al., 1982; Hossain et al., 1995); Sweden (Cooke, 1989b; Anderson 
and Daoud, 2005; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008); Japan (Cooke, 1991); Switzerland 
(Raffournier, 1995; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008); Spain (Inchausti, 1997; Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008); Hong Kong (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004); France (Depoers, 2000; Bauwhede and Willekens, 
2008); Singapore (Chau and Gray, 2002; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006); Greece (Leventis 
and Weetman, 2004); Czech (Makhija and Patton, 2004); Italy (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; 
Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Scaltrito, 2016); Australia 
(Lim et al., 2007); Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Norway (Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008); Ireland (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) 
and UAS (Meek et al., 1995).  
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The review of voluntary disclosure studies in developed countries shows that those studies 
are published over a period from 1979 (Firth, 1979) to 2016 (Scaltrito, 2016). The data 
covered in those studies are from 1976 (Firth, 1979) to 2012 (Scaltrito, 2016). The study 
samples range from 40 firms (Hossain et al., 1995) to 385 firms (Gul and Leung, 2004), 
and the maximum number of items included in the voluntary disclosure index is 285 items 
in Anderson and Daoud (2005). With the exception of the samples used by Cooke (1991), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), Makhija and Patton (2004), Anderson and Daoud 
(2005) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), the sample size for developed country voluntary 
disclosure studies is relatively high compared to that employed in the developing countries 
context, which includes studies such as Gul and Leung (2004) with 385 firms, and Meek et 
al. (1995) with 226 firms. The smaller sample size in the latter is explained by the challenge 
of collecting data in such environments due to the lack of databases and the culture of 
secrecy surrounding the dissemination of information.  
 
The number of voluntary information items included in the voluntary disclosure indices 
ranges from a small number in Inchausti (1997) who uses 20 voluntary items applied to 
Spain, Raffournier (1995) and Chen and Jaggi, (2000) who uses 30 voluntary items applied 
to Switzerland and Hong Kong respectively, and Scaltrito (2016) who uses 38 voluntary 
items applied to Italy, through to a large number of voluntary information items in 
Anderson and Daoud (2005) Cooke (1989b) who use 285 and 146 voluntary items, 
respectively, applied to Sweden.  
 
Many studies employ voluntary disclosure theories in order to explain variations in levels 
of voluntary disclosure among sampled firms (Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 1991; Hossain et al., 
1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Depoers, 2000; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Gul 
and Leung, 2004; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; 
Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 2011; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Scaltrito, 2016). Table 4.1 
summarises voluntary disclosure theories that are used through voluntary disclosure studies 
in developed countries. Those theories are: agency theory, signalling theory, capital need 
theory, political costs theory, proprietary costs theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
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theory, and stewardship theory.  The explanation of those theories are reviewed in section 
4.2.  
 
In general, the studies reviewed focus on firms operating in developed countries and 
therefore caution is needed when one tries to compare the results from these studies and to 
draw conclusions in a different setting e.g. developing countries. Furthermore, the studies 
focus on different time periods, and the majority of the studies employ unweighted 
disclosure indices that may increase the subjectivity of the scoring process. The literature 
shows that the extent of voluntary disclosure is very rarely close to, or higher than, 48% 
voluntary disclosure level, with the majority of studies finding average voluntary disclosure 
levels ranging from 20% to 40%. 
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Table 4.1. Existing voluntary disclosure studies for developed country firms 
Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Firth 
(1979) 
 UK 1976 180 companies (40 
unlisted companies, 
40 listed companies 
who are paired with 
the unlisted 
companies on the 
basis of size and 
industry, and 100 
listed on London 
Stock Exchange 
(LSE). 
Weighted method (48 voluntary 
items). 
The weighted disclosure index 
sent to a total of 120 financial 
analysts working for 
stockbrokers and investment 
institutions. 
 
Assigning the score of 5 meant 
the item was very important to 
the score 1 meant unimportant. 
 
The scores for the 
individual items for each 
company are totalled. This 
total is expressed as a 
percentage of the 
maximum score (which is 
190.83) and this figure is 
known as the disclosure 
index for each company. 
Information 
costs. 
McNally et 
al. (1982) 
 New 
Zealand 
1974-
1979 
103 listed 
companies 
Weighted method (41voluntary 
items). 
The weighted disclosure index 
sent to financial editors and 
stock exchange members. 
The questionnaire requests 
respondents to score the relative 
importance of disclosure items 
on a scale of 1 the item is little 
or no importance to 5 if the 
item is very important. 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure is very low.  
Only five items (12%) are 
disclosed by more than 
80% of the companies. 
Only nine items (22%) are 
disclosed by more than 
50% of the companies. 20 
items (49%) are disclosed 
by fewer than 10% of the 
companies and 7 of those 
None 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
 are not disclosed by any 
company.  
 
Cooke 
(1989b) 
 Sweden 1985 90 companies (33 
listed and 38 
unlisted and 19 
multiple listed in 
Sweden Stock 
Exchange (SSE). 
Unweighted method (146 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 6 different groups: (1) 
Financial statements 
information, (2) Measurement 
and valuation methods, (3) 
Ratios, statistics and segmental 
information, (4) Projections and 
budgetary disclosures, (5) Other 
social responsibility disclosures 
and (6) Financial history. 
A scale of disclosure which 
varies between zero and one. 1 
if the item is disclosed and 0 if 
the item is not disclosed.  
 
 
 
 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 
36.67%. 
The range of scores for the 
voluntary disclosure index 
varied from 13 to 70 per 
cent.  
77 per cent of listed 
companies have a score in 
excess of 35 per cent 
whereas 87 per cent of 
unlisted companies have a 
score of less than 35 per 
cent.  
Furthermore, within the 
listed category 15 per cent 
of companies in the SSE 
group have a score of at 
least 50 per cent compared 
with over 73 per cent of 
multiple listed companies. 
Capital need 
theory, agency 
theory, political 
costs theory. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
 
Cooke 
(1991) 
 Japan 1988 48 companies (25 
listed and 13 
unlisted on Tokyo 
Stock Exchange 
(TSE) and 10 listed 
on TSE as well as 
on other 
international stock 
markets). 
Unweighted method (106 
voluntary items). 
An item gives 1 if it disclosed 
and 0 if it not disclosed. 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 
32%. 
 
Capital need 
theory, agency 
theory, political 
costs theory. 
Hossain et 
al. (1995) 
 New 
Zealand 
1991 40 companies listed 
on New Zealand 
Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) with 15 
which are also listed 
on overseas stock 
exchanges. 
Unweighted method (95 
voluntary items are similar to 
those selected by Gray et al. 
(1992). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 11 different groups: (1) 
General corporate information, 
(2) Acquisition and disposal, 
(3) Future prospect, (4) 
Employee information, (5) 
Social reporting and value 
added information, (6) 
Financial overview, (7) 
Research and development, (8) 
Segmental reporting, (9) 
Foreign currency, (10) Capital 
In general the disclosure 
level varies from 2% to 
55%. The overall mean 
disclosure is only 18%. 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
signalling 
theory. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
market data and (11) 
Information about directors. 
If a company disclosed an item 
of information included in the 
index it received a score of 1, 
and 0 if it is not disclosed. 
 
Meek et 
al. 
(1995)  
 
 US, UK 
and 
Continental 
Europe 
 226 multinational 
companies 
Unweighted method (85 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 12 different groups: (1) 
General corporate information, 
(2) Corporate strategy, (3) 
Acquisitions and disposals, (4) 
Research and development 
(R&D), (5) Future prospects, 
(6) Information about directors, 
(7) Employee information, (8) 
Social policy and value-added 
information, (9) Segmental 
information, (10) Financial 
review, (11) Foreign currency 
information and (12) Stock 
price information. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
18.23%. 
Agency theory. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
Raffournier 
(1995) 
 Switzerland 1991 161 listed 
companies 
Unweighted method (30 
voluntary items). 
A list of items derived from the 
Fourth and Seventh EC 
Directives. 
The same methodology is first 
used by Cooke (1989, 1992). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
39.75%. 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
information 
costs theory, 
political costs 
theory. 
Inchausti 
(1997) 
 Spain 189 -
1991 
49 companies (for 
1989), 47 
companies (for 
1990) and 42 
companies (for 
1991). 
Unweighted method (50 items; 
30 mandatory and the 
remaining are voluntary). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
18.3%.  
Agency theory, 
political costs 
theory and 
signalling 
theory. 
Depoers 
(2000) 
 France 1995 Annual reports of 
102 industrial and 
commercial 
companies listed on 
Paris Stock 
Exchange (PSE). 
Unweighted method (65 
voluntary items). 
The items divided into two 
groups: financial information 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
29%. 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
information 
costs, political 
costs, proprietary 
costs. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
(45 items) and non- financial 
information (20 items). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
Chau and 
Gray 
(2002) 
 Hong Kong 
and 
Singapore 
1997 122 firms (60 from 
Hong Kong, 62 
from Singapore). 
Unweighted method (113 
voluntary items) used by Meek 
et al. (1995) which provides a 
useful benchmark for 
comparison with earlier 
research. 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure in 
Hong Kong and Singapore 
is 12.23% and 13.83%, 
respectively. 
 
Agency theory. 
Leventis 
and 
Weetman 
(2004) 
 Greece 1997 87 non-financial 
listed firms. 
Unweighted method (72 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 12 different groups: (1) 
General information about the 
economic environment, (2) 
General corporate information, 
(3) Specific corporate 
information, (4) Information 
about directors, (5) Employee 
information, (6) Social policy, 
(7) Segmental information, (8) 
Financial ratios, (9) Financial 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
37.57%. 
 
Agency theory, 
signalling 
theory, agency 
costs, 
information 
costs, political 
costs, proprietary 
costs. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
review and (10) Market related 
information.  
Gul and 
Leung 
(2004) 
 Hong Kong 1997 385 firms. Unweighted method (44 
voluntary items). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The overall voluntary 
disclosure level is 13.98%  
 
Agency theory, 
stewardship 
theory, agency 
costs. 
Makhija 
and Patton 
(2004) 
 Czech 1993 43 non-financial 
Czech firms. 
Unweighted method (66 
voluntary items divided into 
three different indexes: 37 
items for “Narrow” disclosure 
index, 12 items for “Somewhat 
Broader” disclosure index and 
17 for Comprehensive” 
disclosure index). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary Narrow” 
disclosure index is 55%, 
Somewhat Broader” 
disclosure index is 49% 
and Comprehensive” 
disclosure index is 44%. 
 
Agency theory 
and agency 
costs. 
Anderson 
and Daoud 
(2005) 
 Sweden 2003 54 listed companies. Unweighted method (285 
voluntary items). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average voluntary 
disclosure index is 29.4%. 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
information 
costs, legitimacy 
theory. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Arcay and 
Vazquez 
(2005) 
 Spain 1999 91 firms out of 117 
that were indexed in 
the “Actualidad 
Economica” Index 
in 1999 - all of 
which operate in the 
continuous 
(electronic) market 
of the Madrid Stock 
Exchange (MADX). 
Weighted method (based on 
“Actualidad Economica” 
disclosure index that consists of 
18 indicators). 
The average voluntary 
disclosure level is 48.24%.  
 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
information 
costs. 
Cheng and 
Courtenay 
(2006) 
 Singapore 2000 104 listed firms. Unweighted method (72 
voluntary items). 
The disclosure items divided 
into 3 categories: business data 
(40 individual items), 
management's discussion and 
analysis (13 individual items) 
and forward-looking 
information (19 individual 
items). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
28.91%. 
 
Agency theory, 
proprietary costs. 
Patelli and 
Prencipe 
(2007) 
 Italy 2002 175 companies. Unweighted method (74 
voluntary items). 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
15%. 
Agency theory, 
agency costs, 
signalling theory 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
The voluntary items divided 
into 6 different groups: (1) 
Background information, (2) 
Summary of historical results, 
(3) Segment information, (4) 
Key non-financial statistics, (5) 
Projected information and (6) 
Management discussion and 
analysis. 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
 
Lim et al. 
(2007) 
 Australia 1999-
2001 
181 companies. Unweighted method (67 
voluntary items) is based on the 
one used by Meek et al. (1995). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 11 different groups: (1) 
General corporate information, 
(2) Corporate strategy or vision, 
(3) Acquisitions and disposals, 
(4) Research and development, 
(5) Future prospects, (6) 
Employee information, (7) 
Social policy and value added 
information, (8) Segmental 
information, (9) Financial 
review, (10) Foreign currency 
The mean of voluntary 
disclosure level is 18.4%. 
 
Agency theory, 
signalling 
theory, agency 
costs and 
political costs. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
information and (11) Stock 
price information. 
An item scores 1 if it is 
disclosed, 0 if it is not disclosed 
or N/A if it is not applicable. 
Bauwhede 
and 
Willekens 
(2008) 
 14 
European 
countries 
2000 130 firms. Weighted method (a rating is 
measured on a scale of 5 to 1, 
with 5 representing the best 
practice). 
Indicators divided into 4 
categories (disclosure of 
general information, disclosure 
of information on the 
company’s capital and 
shareholder structure, 
information on the company’s 
board, information on the 
company’s committees, and 
information on stock options). 
 
The average corporate 
voluntary disclosure rating 
3.25 out of 5. 
Agency theory, 
and agency 
costs. 
Donnelly 
and 
Mulcahy 
(2008) 
 Ireland 2002 51 listed firms Unweighted method (79 
voluntary items) used by Eng 
and Mak (2003). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 3 main different groups: 
The maximum value for 
voluntary disclosure score 
is 40 and the minimum is 
13. 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory 
and agency 
costs. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Strategic information (general 
corporate information, 
corporate strategy, management 
discussion and analysis, future 
prospects and other useful 
strategic information), Financial 
information (performance 
indicators, financial ratios, 
projected information, foreign 
currency information and other 
useful financial information), 
and Non-financial information 
(employee information and 
other useful nonfinancial 
disclosure). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
21.40%. 
Allegrini 
and Greco 
(2013) 
 Italy 2007 177 companies Unweighted method (60 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items divided 
into 6 different groups: (1) 
Financial information, (2) 
Projected information, (3) 
Capital market data, (4) 
Strategic information, (5) Risk 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
35%. 
 
Agency theory, 
agency costs and 
proprietary costs. 
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Study  Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used  Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
information and (6) 
Sustainability information. 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
Scaltrito 
(2016) 
 Italy 2012 203 firms listed on 
Italian Stock 
Exchange (ISE)  
Unweighted method (38 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items classified 
into 8 categories (firm 
performance, general 
information, forward-looking 
information, human capital, 
research and development 
projects, stock market 
information, segment reporting 
information and other 
information). 
An item scores 1 if item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
32%. 
 
Stakeholder 
theory, 
legitimacy 
theory, agency 
theory, 
signalling 
theory, capital 
need theory, 
political costs 
theory and cost-
benefit theory. 
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4.3.2 Voluntary disclosure indices in developing country studies  
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the disclosure studies examining the extent of voluntary 
disclosure for firms in developing countries. The studies are reviewed in the chronological 
order of the year of publication of each study. From the 22 studies identified, four studies 
examine the level of voluntary disclosure before the year 2000 and 18 studies relate to 
thereafter. Additionally, 17 out of the 22 studies employ only one disclosure index method, 
which is the unweighted disclosure index (dichotomous approach) for measuring the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in developing countries. The unweighted method is measured by 
that, an item scores one (1) if companies disclose a certain item and zero (0) if they do not 
disclose it but it is applicable to that company. It is notable that in developed countries, the 
majority of voluntary disclosure studies apply unweighted disclosure indices, which are 
preferred due to the subjectivity that weighted measures might introduce (Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999).  
 
Many existing developing country studies (e.g. Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Al-Shammari, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hossain and Hammami, 2009) who used the 
unweighted disclosure indices, classified the voluntary disclosure index into many different 
categories to examine the extent of voluntary disclosure, range from 3 to 15 categories,  
such as general corporate information, corporate strategy, information about directors, 
capital market data, research and development, future prospects, financial review, 
acquisitions and disposals, segmental reporting, foreign currencies, community 
involvement, environmental information, employee information, product and service and 
value-added information. 
 
Only five studies applies a weighted disclosure index.  Ho and Wong (2001) use 35 
voluntary disclosure items for Hong Kong companies weighted by the preferences of 
analyst users to rate the importance of each item on a 5-point scale. On average the extent 
of voluntary disclosure is 29%, range from 5% to 85%. Eng and Mak (2003) use 42 
voluntary items weighted by research assistants on a 5-point scale applied to Singapore. 
On average the extent of voluntary disclosure is 21.75%, range from 2% to 66%. Barako 
et al. (2006) use 47 voluntary items weighted by bank loan officers on a scale of 0 to 4 
applied to Kenya. The level of voluntary disclosure is generally low. Only one company in 
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the finance and investment sector discloses at least 50 % of items contained in the 
disclosure index. The values attached to the points are 0 (unimportant), 1 (slightly 
important), 2 (moderately important), 3 (very important) and 4 (essential). Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013) use a voluntary disclosure index weighted by three levels of disclosure: 2 if it fully 
disclosed, 1 if it slightly disclosed, and 0 if it not disclosed, applied to Saudi listed firms. 
The voluntary disclosure items divided into 3 main categories: (1) General and financial 
information, (2) Corporate governance information and (3) Social and environmental 
information. On average level of voluntary disclosure is 31.73%. The corporate governance 
disclosure category is the highest category of disclosure with an average of 41.54%. The 
lowest category of disclosure is the social and environmental disclosure category with an 
average of 14.61%. As discussed above, the use of weighted indices is criticised since such 
indices may reflect the subjectivity of either researchers or users rather than the actual 
relative importance of the items, and thus, unweighted indices are in general preferred 
(Cooke, 1989; 1991). 
 
In general, in developing country firms the extent of voluntary disclosure is much lower 
than that observed in developed country firms (e.g. 4.92% in Huafang and Jianguo, 2007 
for China; 13.24% in Wang et al., 2008 for China; 13.43% in Samaha and Dahawy, 2011 
for Egypt; 15% in Al-Shammari, 2008 for Kuwait; 15.8% in Hossain et al., 1994 for 
Malaysia; 16.63% in Hassan, 2013 for the UAE; and 19.38% in Samaha and Dahawy, 2010 
for Egypt). It is also noted that except for the studies of Haniffa (1999, 2002); Eng and Mak 
(2003); Huafang and Jianguo (2007); Al-Akra et al. (2010b); Ntim et al. (2012a); Lan et 
al. (2013); Alotaibi (2014), which use large samples of 167, 158, 559, 243, 169, 1066 and 
155 firms, respectively, in developing country the average sample size for voluntary 
disclosure studies is small sample, and usually not exceeding 100 firms, in contrast to the 
developed country studies. Table 4.2 presents a summary of 22 voluntary disclosure studies 
in developing countries by using a voluntary disclosure index covering Mexico (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987), Malaysia (Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009), Jordan (Suwaidan, 1997; Al-
Akra et al., 2010b; Alhazaim et al., 2014; Albawwat and Basah, 2015), Hong Kong (Ho 
and Wong, 2001), Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member state (Ismail, 2002), 
Singapore (Eng and Mak, 2003), Kenya (Barako et al., 2006), Qatar (Naser et al., 2006; 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009), China (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Lan 
et al., 2013), Kuwait (Al-Shammari, 2008; Alotaibi, 2014), Egypt (Samaha and Dahawy, 
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2010, 2011;), South Africa (Ntim et al., 2012a), Saudi Arabia (Al-Janadi et al., 2013), UAE 
(Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Hassan, 2013), Bahrain (Juhmani, 2013).  
 
The review of voluntary disclosure studies in developing countries shows that those studies 
are published over a period from 1987 (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) to 2015 (Albawwat, 
and Basah, 2015). The data covered in those studies are from 1982 (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987) to 2013 (Albawwat, and Basah, 2015). The study samples range from 21 
firms (Naser et al., 2006) to 1,066 firms (Lan et al., 2013), and the maximum number of 
items included in the voluntary disclosure index is 123 items in Haniffa (1999). Overall the 
sample size for developing country voluntary disclosure studies is relatively low compared 
to that employed in the developed countries context. The smaller sample size in developing 
country studies is explained by the challenge of collecting data in such environments due 
to the lack of databases and the culture of secrecy surrounding the dissemination of 
information. 
 
The number of information items in the voluntary disclosure indices ranges from a very 
limited number in studies such as Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) who uses 24 voluntary 
disclosure items to study the extent of voluntary disclosure in Mexican firms, Naser et al. 
(2006) and Juhmani (2013) who uses 21 and 34 voluntary disclosure items to examine the 
level of voluntary disclosures in Qatar and Bahrain listed firms, respectively, to a large 
number of information items in studies such as Haniffa (1999) who uses 123 voluntary 
items divided into 41 items relating to social disclosure and 82 items relating to non-social 
disclosure items to examine the level of voluntary disclosures in Malaysia, and Lan et al. 
(2013) who apply voluntary items 119 divided into 3 main groups: general information, 
financial information and non-financial information to examine the level of voluntary 
disclosures in China.  
 
Many studies employ voluntary disclosure theories in order to explain variations in levels 
of voluntary disclosure among developing country firms (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Hossain et al., 1994; Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa, 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Naser 
et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Al-Shammari, 2008, Wang et al., 2008; 
Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010b; Samaha 
and Dahawy 2010; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Lan et al., 2013; 
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Alotaibi, 2014; Albawwat and Basah, 2015). Table 4.2 summarises voluntary disclosure 
theories that are used through voluntary disclosure studies in developing countries. Those 
theories are: agency theory, signalling theory, capital need theory, political costs theory, 
proprietary costs theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and 
resource dependence theory. The explanation of those theories are reviewed in section 4.2.  
 
In general, the studies reviewed focus on firms operating in developing countries. If we 
take into consideration the study sample, study period, methods and items used in relation 
to the voluntary disclosure index, the level of voluntary disclosure in developing countries 
is very rarely close to, or reaches, 49 % voluntary disclosure level, with the majority of 
studies reporting average voluntary disclosures levels range from 20% to 40%. 
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Table 4.2. Existing voluntary disclosure studies for developing country firms 
Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Chow and 
Wong-Boren 
(1987) 
Mexico 1982 52 listed companies on 
the Mexican Stock 
Exchange (MSE). 
Unweighted method (The officers 
from credit department of 16 
Mexican banks are asked to 
indicate the importance of each 
items on a seven-point scale: (1) 
no important at all, and (7) most 
important).  
Weighted method (24 voluntary 
items) by its mean importance 
rating. 
The unweighted disclosure 
score has a range from 0 to 
17, with a mean of 7.86. 
The weighted disclosure 
score has a range from 0 to 
79.37, with a mean of 38.25. 
 
Agency theory. 
Hossain et al. 
(1994) 
Malaysia 1991 67 non-financial listed 
companies on Kuala 
Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE), 12 
of them are also listed 
on London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). 
 
Unweighted method (72 
voluntary items) based on Meek 
et al. (1995) study.  
The item scores one (1) if 
companies disclose a certain item 
and zero (0) if they do not 
disclose it but it is applicable to 
that company. 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 
relatively low at 37.57%. 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
legitimacy theory, 
agency costs, 
informational costs, 
political costs and 
proprietary costs. 
Suwaidan 
(1997) 
Jordan 1980-
1991 
28 listed companies on 
Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). 
Unweighted method (75 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary items divided into 
7 different groups: (1) General 
information, (2) Balance sheet, 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 
33.19%. The lowest level of 
voluntary disclosure 2.61% is 
found in the market-based 
information group, while the 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
informational risk 
theory and capital 
need theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
(3) Income statement, (4) 
Projections and future, (5) 
Financial history, (6) Ratios and 
statistics and (7) Market-based 
information. 
If the item is disclosed it receives 
a weight of one, otherwise, it 
receives zero. 
balance sheet group shows 
the highest level 65.39%. 
Haniffa 
(1999) 
Malaysia 1994 139 non-financial listed 
companies on the main 
board of the KLSE. 
Unweighted method (123 
voluntary items) derived from 
prior research on Malaysia; 41 
items are related to social 
disclosure and 82 items are 
related to non-social disclosure. 
The voluntary disclosure items 
categorised into 15 sub-
categories: general corporate 
information, corporate strategy, 
information about directors, 
capital market data, research and 
development, future prospects, 
financial review, acquisitions and 
disposals, segmental reporting, 
foreign currencies, community 
involvement, environmental 
information, employees, product 
The mean aggregate 
voluntary disclosure index is 
19.24% and the range is from 
a minimum of 3.48 to a 
maximum of 50. 
The mean for the non-social 
voluntary disclosure index is 
21.27% and the range is from 
a minimum of 3.28 to a 
maximum of 50.63.  
The mean social reporting 
disclosure index is 15.47% 
and the range is from a 
minimum of 2.439 to a 
maximum of 53.66. 
The least disclosed category 
is information regarding 
Agency theory, 
Resource 
dependence theory, 
stewardship theory, 
signalling theory, 
capital need theory, 
cost-benefit theory 
and cultural theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
and service and value-added 
information. 
 
A company is awarded 1 if an 
item is disclosed and 0 if it is not 
disclosed. 
 
foreign currency (disclosed 
by only 9.3% of companies). 
On the other hand, the most 
disclosed category is 
information on future 
prospects (disclosed by 
94.2% of companies). 
 
Ho and Wong 
(2001) 
Hong 
Kong 
1998 98 listed companies on 
Hong Kong Exchange 
(HKEX). 
Weighted method (35 voluntary 
items) by a survey questionnaire 
and analyst users are asked to 
rate the importance of each item 
on a 5-point scale. 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 29% 
range from 5% to 85%. 
  
Information theory, 
agency theory and 
agency costs. 
Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) 
Malaysia 1995 167 non-financial listed 
companies. 
Unweighted method (65 
voluntary disclosure items) 
derived from Hossain et al. 
(1994) and Soh (1996). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
categorised into 11 different 
groups: (1) General corporate 
information, (2) Information 
about directors, (3) Corporate 
strategy, (5) Research and 
development, (6) Future 
prospects, (7) Social reporting 
and value-added information, (8) 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 31.3% 
and the range is from 6% to 
70%. 
 
Agency theory, 
Resource 
dependence theory, 
stewardship theory, 
signalling theory, 
capital need theory, 
cost-benefit theory 
and cultural theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Capital market data, (9) Financial 
review information, (10) 
Acquisitions and disposals and 
(11) Segmental reporting. 
An item scores one if disclosed 
and zero if it is not, although no 
penalty is imposed if the item is 
considered irrelevant. 
Eng and Mak 
(2003) 
Singapore 1995 158 listed companies 
on Singapore Exchange 
(SGX). 
Weighted method (42 voluntary 
items) weighted by two research 
assistants on a 5-point scale. 
The voluntary items divided into 
3 main different groups: Strategic 
information (general corporate 
information, corporate strategy, 
management discussion and 
analysis, future prospects and 
other useful strategic 
information), Financial 
information (performance 
indicators, financial ratios, 
projected information, foreign 
currency information and other 
useful financial information), and 
Non-financial information 
On average the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is 
21.75%. The highest 
disclosure score obtained is 
66%, and the lowest is 2%. 
 
Agency theory and 
signalling theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
(employee information and other 
useful nonfinancial disclosure). 
 
Barako et al. 
(2006) 
Kenya 1992 to 
2001 
43 listed firms on 
Kenyan Stock 
Exchange (NSE) 
Weighted method (47 voluntary 
items) by bank loan officers on a 
scale of 0–4. 
The values attached to the points 
are 0 (unimportant), 1 (slightly 
important), 2 (moderately 
important), 3 (very important) 
and 4 (essential). 
The disclosure items are 
classified into four categories: (1) 
General and strategic 
information, (2) Financial data, 
(3) Forward-looking information 
and (4) Social and board 
disclosure. 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure is generally low 
over the ten-year study 
period. Only one company in 
the finance and investment 
sector discloses at least 50 
per cent of items contained in 
the disclosure index.  
In 1992, 27 companies scores 
less than 10 per cent on the 
voluntary disclosure index; 
by 2001, only two companies 
are in this category, 
illustrating a marked increase 
in the voluntary disclosure 
practices of companies. 
Agency theory. 
Ghazali and 
Weetman 
(2006) 
Malaysia 2001 87 listed companies Unweighted method (53 
voluntary items) used by Meek et 
al. (1995). 
The voluntary items divided into 
11 main different groups: (1) 
General corporate information, 
The total voluntary 
disclosure scores range from 
6.3% to 74.0% with a mean 
score of 31.4%. Only 12 
companies (13.8%) disclosed 
Agency theory, 
legitimacy theory, 
signalling theory, 
political costs and 
proprietary costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
(2) Specific corporate 
information, (3) Chairman’s 
report, (4) Review of operations, 
(5) Product/service information, 
(6) Segmental information, (7) 
Research and development, (8) 
Employee information, (9) Social 
and environmental reporting, (10) 
Financial ratios and (11) Market 
related information. 
A company is awarded 1 if an 
item included in the disclosure 
checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is 
not disclosed. 
 
50% or more of the 53 items 
included in the index. 
 
Naser et al. 
(2006) 
Qatar 2001 21 listed companies on 
Doha Stock Exchange 
(DSM). 
Unweighted method (34 
voluntary items) divided into 
corporate general and social 
disclosure indices. 
A company is awarded 1 if an 
item is disclosed and 0 if it is not 
disclosed. 
The average corporate 
general disclosure score is 
65%, the average corporate 
social disclosure score is 
only 33%. 
Agency theory, 
political costs 
theory, legitimacy 
theory and 
stakeholder theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Huafang and 
Jianguo 
(2007) 
China 2002 559 firms Unweighted method (30 
voluntary disclosure items used 
by Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Cooke, 1991; Meek et al., 1995). 
The voluntary items divided into 
4 main categories: (1) 
Background information, (2) 
Business information, (3) 
Financial information and (4) 
Non-financial information. 
A company receives a score of 1 
if it voluntarily discloses 
information on the item and a 0 
otherwise. 
 
The average voluntary 
disclosure level is low 4.92% 
(range from 0 to 21). 
 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
agency costs and 
political costs. 
Al-Shammari 
(2008) 
Kuwait 2005 82 listed companies in 
the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange (KSE). 
Unweighted (76 voluntary 
disclosure items). 
The voluntary items divided into 
8 different groups: (1) Corporate 
environment, (2) General 
corporate information, (3) 
Specific corporate information, 
(4) Information about board of 
directors, (5) Social 
responsibility, (6) Social policy, 
The level of overall voluntary 
disclosure is relatively low at 
15% with a minimum of 3% 
and a maximum of 44%.  
The level of voluntary 
corporate environment is 
23% whereas it is 4% for 
social responsibility and 12% 
for financial disclosure. 
These results indicate that 
Agency theory, and 
signalling theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
(7) Financial information and (8) 
Market-related information. 
A company is awarded 1 if an 
item is disclosed and 0 otherwise.  
sample companies disclose 
more corporate environment 
than social responsibility and 
financial disclosure.  
Wang et al. 
(2008) 
China 2005 110 listed companies Unweighted method (79 
voluntary items) based on the 
model developed by Meek et al. 
(1995). 
The voluntary items divided into 
11 different groups: (1) General 
corporate characteristics, (2) 
Corporate strategy, (3) 
Acquisitions and disposals, (4) 
Research and development, (5) 
Future prospects, (6) Employee 
information, (7) Social 
responsibility and value-added 
disclosures, (8) Segment 
information, (9) Financial review 
information, (10) Foreign 
currency information and (11) 
Stock/price information. 
The overall voluntary 
disclosure index is 13.24 % 
with a minimum of 3% and a 
maximum of 28%.  
 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
agency costs and 
litigation costs.  
Akhtaruddin 
et al. (2009) 
Malaysia 2002 105 non-fanatical listed 
firms 
Unweighted method (74 
voluntary items). 
Total voluntary disclosure 
index for the sample firms is 
53.20% with a minimum of 
Agency theory and 
agency costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
The voluntary items divided into 
9 different groups: (1) General 
corporate information, (2) 
Corporate governance, (3) 
Financial information, (4) 
Financial review information, (5) 
Acquisitions and disposals, (6) 
Projected information, (7) 
Employee information, (8) Social 
responsibility information, (9) 
Graphic information. 
A firm is scored 1 for an item 
disclosed in the annual report and 
0 if it is not disclosed. 
35.14% and a maximum of 
75.68%.  
 
Hossain and 
Hammami 
(2009) 
Qatar 2008 25 listed firms in Doha 
Securities Market 
(DSM). 
Unweighted method (44 
voluntary items) used by Cooke 
(1991, 1992), Hossain et al. 
(1994), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Chau and Gray (2002) and 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
The voluntary items divided into 
8 different groups: (1) General 
corporate information, (2) 
Corporate strategy, (3) Corporate 
governance, (4) Financial 
performance, (5) General risk 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure is 
36.84% with a minimum of 
20% and a maximum of 
67%. 
Agency theory, 
legitimacy theory, 
agency costs and 
proprietary costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
management, (6) Accounting 
policy review, (7) Corporate 
social disclosure and (8) Others. 
An item scores 1 if disclosed and 
0 if not disclosed. 
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010b) 
Jordan 1996 to 
2004 
243 listed companies Unweighted method, two 
disclosure indices (The first 
index consists of 90 voluntary 
items applicable to the annual 
reports from the period 1996-
2002 and the second index 
consists of 81 voluntary items 
applicable for the annual reports 
from 2003-2004) used by 
Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak 
(2003) and Barako et al. (2006). 
They contain background 
information, strategic 
information, information about 
directors, capital market data, 
product/services information, 
financial data, employees’ 
information and segments and 
research information. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure in 1996 
is 16.8% with a minimum of 
3% and a maximum of 44%. 
The average level of 
voluntary disclosure in 2004 
is 26.40% with a minimum 
of 9% and a maximum of 
65%.  
 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
capital need theory 
and agency costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
An item scores 1 if disclosed and 
0 if not disclosed. 
Samaha and 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
Egypt 2006 30 listed companies Unweighted method (80 
voluntary items) based on the one 
developed by Chau and Gray 
(2002), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 3 main categories: 
financial, strategic and corporate 
social reporting.    
A firm is awarded 1 for an item 
disclosed in the annual report and 
0 if it is not disclosed. 
-The overall level of 
voluntary disclosure is very 
low at just 19.38% with a 
minimum of 4% and a 
maximum of 58%.  
 
Information 
asymmetry, agency 
theory, signalling 
theory, legitimacy 
theory and 
disclosure-related 
costs. 
Samaha and 
Dahawy 
(2011) 
Egypt 2006 100 listed companies Unweighted method (80 
voluntary items) based on the one 
developed by Chau and Gray 
(2002), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 3 main categories: 
financial, strategic and corporate 
social reporting.    
Overall voluntary disclosure 
was low at just 13.43%. 
Information 
asymmetry, agency 
theory, signalling 
theory, legitimacy 
theory and 
disclosure-related 
costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
A firm is awarded 1 for an item 
disclosed in the annual report and 
0 if it is not disclosed. 
Al-Janadi et 
al. (2013) 
Saudi 
Arabia  
2006 
and 
2007 
87 listed companies Weighted by 3 levels of 
disclosure (2 if fully disclosed; 1 
slightly disclosed, 0 not 
disclosed). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 3 main categories: 
(1) General and financial 
information, (2) Corporate 
governance information and (3) 
Social and environmental 
information. 
Overall level of voluntary 
disclosure is 31.73%.  
The corporate governance 
disclosure category is the 
highest category of 
disclosure with an average of 
41.54%. 
The lowest category of 
disclosure is the social and 
environmental disclosure 
category with an average of 
14.61%. 
 
Agency theory, 
resource 
dependency theory, 
stewardship theory 
and information 
asymmetry theory. 
Lan et al. 
(2013) 
China 2006 1066 listed firms (653 
firms listed on the 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and 
422 listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SHZ)). 
Unweighted method (119 
voluntary items) used by Hossain 
et al. (1995), Ferguson et al. 
(2002),Wang et al. (2008). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 3 main categories: 
General information, financial 
The overall voluntary 
disclosure score is 41.45%, 
with a minimum of 23% and 
a maximum of 70%. 
 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
agency costs and 
proprietary costs. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
information and non-financial 
information. 
If a firm disclosed an item from 
the list, it receives a score of 1 
and 0 otherwise. 
Alotaibi 
(2014) 
Kuwait 2007 to 
2010 
155 listed companies. Unweighted method (50 
voluntary items) used by Cooke 
(1991), Cooke (1992), Hossain et 
al. (1994), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Meek et al. (1995), Chau and 
Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 6 main categories: 
(1) General corporate 
information, (2) Board of 
directors and management, (3) 
Specific corporate strategy, (4) 
Employee information, (5) 
Corporate social disclosure and 
(6) Others. 
1 if item is disclosed and 0 if 
item is not disclosed. 
The overall level of voluntary 
disclosure is 12.90%, with a 
minimum of 3% and a 
maximum of 40%. 
General corporate 
information has the highest 
mean over the four years; its 
average is 48%. Employee 
information has the lowest 
mean over the four years; its 
average is 7.72%. 
 
Agency theory, 
stewardship theory, 
signalling theory, 
legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory 
and political cost 
theory. 
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Study Country Year Sample Disclosure index method used Level of voluntary 
disclosure % 
Theoretical 
explanation 
Albawwat 
and Basah 
(2015) 
Jordon 2009-
2013 
72 listed companies Unweighted method (56 
voluntary items). 
The voluntary disclosure items 
divided into 3 main categories: 
Strategic information, financial 
information and non-financial 
information. 
An item scores 1 if disclosed and 
0 if not disclosed. 
The overall voluntary 
disclosure is 48.8%. 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure is 57% for 
strategic information, 50% 
for financial information and 
54% for non-financial 
information. 
Agency theory, 
signalling theory 
and agency costs. 
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 The determinants of voluntary disclosure in developed and developing country 
studies 
This section reviews existing empirical studies that measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants. The section reviews existing findings regarding the 
determinants used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed and 
developing countries.  
 
4.4.1 The determinants of voluntary disclosures in developed country studies  
Studies of corporate voluntary disclosure in developed countries apply different sets of 
variables in order to explain disclosure behaviour. Table 4.3 summarises the determinants 
which drive differences in voluntary disclosure levels across firms in relation to factors 
such as corporate characteristics, ownership structures and corporate governance factors. 
The existing studies find that the following corporate characteristics factors are 
significantly positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure levels across developed 
country firms: firm size (Cerf, 1961; Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991, 
1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Raffoumier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000; Depoers, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2004; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; 
Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Scaltrito, 2016); industry type (Stanga, 1976;  
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; Cooke, 1989a, 1991, 1992; Raffoumier, 1995; Camfferman and 
Cooke, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Lim et al., 2007; 
Scaltrito, 2016); leverage (Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al.,1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2004); liquidity (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Wallace et al., 1994, Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004); firm with multiple listing status (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989a, 1991, 1992; 
Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Leventis 
and Weetman, 2004; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005); firms with 
higher international activities (Depoers, 2000) and Audit firm size (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 
2002; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Scaltrito, 2016). Assets in place (Bradbury, 1992; Hossain 
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et al., 1995) and firm age (Chung and Zhang, 2011) are found to be insignificant factors 
when explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries.  
Generally, firm size and listing status are found to be significantly positively associated 
with the level of corporate voluntary disclosure in most studies. Such studies explain the 
significance of firm size in terms of agency theory, which suggests that large firms tend to 
have higher agency costs as a consequence of complex business activities (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981). Further, larger firms are likely to have a high 
proportion of outside capital, which also results in higher agency costs (Hossain et al., 
1995).  
A firm listing on international markets results in a higher proportion of foreign shareholding 
and a more dispersed ownership structure. Therefore, firms with stocks listed on 
international markets tend to have high monitoring costs, which could be reduced through 
disclosure of voluntary information. Malone et al. (1993) suggest that stock exchange 
registration requirements for firms listed on international markets could be another reason 
for disclosing voluntary information. Most studies apply agency, signalling and capital 
need theories to explain the listing status relationship with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
Ownership structure is found to be significantly positively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in most studies for developed countries. Ownership structure variables that are 
found to be positively drivers of such disclosure include the number of shareholders 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989a, 1991, 1992; Malone et al., 1993; Anderson and 
Daoud, 2005); the extent of insider share ownership (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012); the extent of outsider share ownership (Chau and Gray, 
2002; Makhija and Patton, 2004); the extent of institutional ownership (Chung and Zhang, 
2011; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012); the extent of government ownership (Makhija and 
Patton, 2004) and the extent of director ownership (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). However, 
family ownership (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) is found to be negatively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in developed country firms.  
In developed countries, certain corporate governance variable is found to be significantly 
positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, including the extent of board 
independence (Adams and Hossain, 1998; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Donnelly 
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and Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). In 
addition, family member on board (Chau and Gray, 2002) is found to be significantly 
negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries. 
There appears to be conflicting results for some potential determinants, including firm 
characteristic variables such as profitability, some studies find that profitability is 
positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed counties (Cerf,1961; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Raffoumier, 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Leventis and Weetman, 
2004; Lim et al., 2007; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012); other studies find profitability is 
negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed counties (Belkaoui and 
Kahl, 1978; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  Concerning with ownership structure 
variables only ownership concentration is found to have conflicting results, some studies 
find that ownership concentration is positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in developed countries (Makhija and Patton, 2004; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Lim et al., 
2007); other studies find ownership concentration is negatively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008).  In relation to corporate governance 
variables such as board size and CEO role duality, some studies find that board size is 
positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries (Allegrini 
and Grec, 2013), other studies find board size is negatively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in developed countries (Yermack, 1996). Concerning with CEO role duality, 
some studies find that CEO role duality is positively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in developed countries (Anderson and Daoud, 2005), other studies find CEO 
role duality is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developed countries 
(Forker, 1992; Abbott et al., 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004; Lakhal, 2005).  Several possible 
reasons for inconsistent results include differences between countries in socioeconomic and 
political environments, and institutional frameworks and cultures, as well as variations in 
sample size, statistical methods, disclosure index construction, the use of judgement in the 
scoring process, and diversity in the nature of disclosure and sample time periods.
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Table 4.3. The relationship between voluntary disclosure and its determinants in developed country studies 
Determinants of 
voluntary 
disclosures 
Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact 
on voluntary 
disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
Corporate 
characteristics factors 
   
Firm size Cerf (1961), Firth (1979), McNally et al. 
(1982), Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), Wallace 
et al. (1994), Raffoumier (1995), Hossain et 
al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), Chen and Jaggi, 
(2000), Depoers (2000), 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Bhojraj et al. 
(2004), Leventis and Weetman (2004), 
Anderson and Daoud (2005), Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005), Patelli and Prencipe (2007), 
Lim et al. (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), 
Allegrini and Greco, (2013), Scaltrito (2016). 
 Malone et al. (1993), Makhija and 
Patton (2004). 
 
Industry type Stanga (1976), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), 
Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), Raffournier 
(1995), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005), Lim et al. (2007), Scaltrito 
(2016). 
 McNally et al. (1982), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Inchausti (1997), Gul and 
Leung (2004), Makhija and Patton 
(2004), Anderson and Daoud (2005). 
 
 
Leverage Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al. (1995), 
Chen and Jaggi, (2000), Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002), Bhojraj et al. (2004). 
 Wallace et al. (1994), Raffoumier 
(1995), Inchausti (1997), Depoers 
(2000), Gul and Leung (2004), Patelli 
and Prencipe (2007), Chung and 
Zhang (2011), Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2012), Allegrini and Greco, 
(2013), Scaltrito (2016). 
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Determinants of 
voluntary 
disclosures 
Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact 
on voluntary 
disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
Profitability Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), 
Raffoumier (1995), Chen and Jaggi, (2000), 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Lim et al. 
(2007), Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012). 
Belkaoui and Kahl 
(1978), 
Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002). 
McNally et al. (1982), Malone et al. 
(1993), Wallace et al. (1994),  
Inchausti (1997), Gul and Leung 
(2004), Makhija and Patton (2004), 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007), Chung 
and Zhang (2011), Allegrini and 
Greco, (2013). 
Liquidity Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Chen and Jaggi, (2000), Camfferman 
and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman 
(2004). 
 Gul and Leung (2004). 
Assets in place   Bradbury (1992) and Hossain et al. 
(1995). 
Multiple listing 
status 
Firth (1979), Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), 
Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Anderson and 
Daoud (2005), Arcay and Vazquez (2005). 
 Buzby (1975), Gul and Leung (2004), 
Makhija and Patton (2004), Allegrini 
and Greco, (2013). 
 
International 
activities 
Depoers (2000).  Raffournier (1995). 
Audit firm size Singhvi and Desai (1971), Raffournier (1995), 
Inchausti (1997), Chen and Jaggi, (2000), 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Makhija and 
Patton (2004), Scaltrito (2016). 
 
 Firth (1979), McNally et al. (1982), 
Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Hossain et al. (1995), 
Depoers (2000), Gul and Leung 
(2004), Anderson and Daoud (2005). 
 
Firm age   Chung and Zhang (2011). 
Ownership 
structure 
factors 
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Determinants of 
voluntary 
disclosures 
Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact 
on voluntary 
disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
Number of 
shareholders 
 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Cooke (1989a; 
1991; 1992), Malone et al. (1993), Anderson 
and Daoud (2005). 
 
  
Insider 
ownership 
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008), Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar (2012). 
 
 Raffournier (1995), Anderson and 
Daoud (2005), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008). 
 
Outsider 
ownership 
Chau and Gray (2002), Makhija and Patton 
(2004). 
 
  
Ownership 
concentration 
Makhija and Patton (2004), Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005), Lim et al. (2007). 
 
Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2008). 
Lutfi (1989), Depoers (2000). 
 
Institutional 
ownership 
Chung and Zhang (2011), Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2012). 
 
 Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008). 
 
Government 
ownership 
Makhija and Patton (2004). 
 
  
Director 
ownership 
 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005).  Chen and Jaggi, (2000), Gul and 
Leung (2004). 
 
Family 
ownership 
 
 Chen and Jaggi 
(2000). 
 
 
Corporate 
governance 
factors 
   
Board size  
 
Allegrini and Greco (2013). Yermack (1996). Anderson and Daoud (2005), Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006), Donnelly and 
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Determinants of 
voluntary 
disclosures 
Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact 
on voluntary 
disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
 Mulcahy (2008), Hussainey and Al-
Najjar (2012). 
 
Board 
independence 
Adams and Hossain (1998), Chen and Jaggi, 
(2000), Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006), Patelli and Prencipe (2007), 
Lim et al. (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), 
Allegrini and Greco, (2013). 
 
 Malone et al. (1993), Anderson and 
Daoud (2005). 
Role duality Anderson and Daoud (2005). 
 
Forker, (1992), 
Abbott et al., 
(2000), Gul and 
Leung (2004), 
Lakhal (2005). 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), 
Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008), Allegrini and 
Greco, (2013). 
 
Family members  Chau and Gray 
(2002). 
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4.4.2 The determinants of voluntary disclosures in developing country studies  
Many investors find developing capital markets attractive for various reasons. Due to 
significant growth in recent years, developing capital markets provide higher returns than 
developed capital markets (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997), though may be subject to greater 
risk. Despite the differences between developing countries in terms of their capital markets, 
they share some common characteristics, which may be different from those observed for 
more developed capital markets. In general, developing capital markets exhibit limitations 
in terms of market efficiency (Keane, 1993), liquidity (Feldman and Kumar, 1995) and 
volatility (Sedaghat et al., 1994). Inadequate regulatory frameworks and enforcement are 
also important factors influencing the quality of disclosure in a developing capital market 
(Saudagaran and Diga, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998a; Choi et al., 2002). Investors in 
developing capital markets tend to be less well informed or they may experience a delay in 
receiving market information (Errunza and Losq, 1985). Therefore, improvements in 
investor protection are very important for developing capital markets. In addition, there are 
substantial differences between developed and developing capital markets in terms of 
institutional characteristics, culture and political environment (Jaggi, 1975; Perera, 1989; 
Saudagaran and Diga, 1997). 
 
The studies reviewed for developing countries highlight differences in firm voluntary 
disclosure levels, corporate characteristics, ownership structure, and corporate governance 
factors. Table 4.4 summarises the relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and their 
determinants across the developing country existing studies. The studies reveal that several 
corporate characteristic variables are positively related to the extent of corporate voluntary 
disclosure levels among developing country firms: firm size (Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Hossain et al., 1994;  Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa, 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Ismail, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Naser et al., 2006; 
Al-Shammari, 2008; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Al-Akra 
et al., 2010b; Ntim et al., 2012a;  Hassan, 2013; Juhmani, 2013; Lan et al., 2013; Alotaibi, 
2014; Albawwat, and Basah, 2015); industry type (Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa, 1999; Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Akra et al., 2010b; Samaha 
and Dahawy, 2010); leverage (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ismail, 2002; Barako et al., 
2006; Naser et al., 2006; Al-Shammari, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Juhmani, 2013; 
Lan et al., 2013); profitability (Singhvi, 1968; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
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Ismail, 2002; Hassan et al., 2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Naser et al., 2006; Wang 
et al., 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Lan et al., 2013); assets in place (Chow and 
Boren,1987; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Lan et al., 2013); 
firm with multiple listing status (Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa, 1999; Ntim et al., 2012a); 
and Audit firm size (Hossain et al., 1994; Ahmed, 1996; Suwaidan, 1997; Al-Shammari, 
2008; Wang et al., 2008); Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010; Ntim et 
al., 2012a; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alotaibi, 2014).  
 
A range of ownership structure variables, in developing countries, are found to be positive 
drivers of the extent of corporate voluntary discourse, including: institutional share 
ownership (Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a); state share ownership (Suwaidan, 
1997; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al., 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; 
Lan et al., 2013; Albawwat and Basah, 2015) and foreign share ownership (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Al-Akra 
et al., 2010b; Alhazaim et al., 2014). In addition, the following ownership structure 
variables are found to be negatively related to the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure 
in developing countries: insider share ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003) and director share 
ownership (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
 
Many corporate governance factors are found to positively significant in explaining the 
level of corporate voluntary discourse in developing countries including board size 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Schiehll et al., 2013; Hassan, 2013) and board independence (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Samaha 
et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Alhazaim et al., 2014; Alotaibi, 
2014). In addition, only family members on board is found to be negatively related to the 
extent of corporate voluntary disclosure in developing countries (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). 
 
There are mixed results concerning the impact on the extent of voluntary disclosure of some 
variables, including firm characteristics such as liquidity. Some studies find liquidity is 
positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developing countries (Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2010; Alotaibi, 2014), other find liquidity is negatively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (Al-Akra et al., 2010b). concerning with ownership structure variables 
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only ownership concentration is found to have mixed result, some studies find ownership 
concentration is positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developing 
countries (Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 
2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), other studies find  ownership concentration is 
negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure (Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Juhmani, 2013; Alhazaim et al., 2014). In relation to corporate governance 
variables only CEO role duality is found to have mixed result, some studies find CEO role 
duality is positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in developing countries 
(Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Hassan, 2013) other studies find that CEO role duality is negatively 
related to the extent of voluntary disclosure (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Alotaibi, 2014). 
As discussed before several possible explanations for mixed results are identified, 
including differences in the socioeconomic and political environments between countries, 
institutional frameworks and cultures, and variations in sample size, statistical methods 
used, disclosure index construction, judgements in the scoring process, and diversity in the 
nature of disclosure and time periods.
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Table 4.4. The relationship between voluntary disclosure and its determinants in developing country studies 
Variables  Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact on 
voluntary disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
Corporate 
characteristics 
factors  
   
Firm size  Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Hossain et al. (1994),  
Suwaidan (1997), Haniffa (1999), Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ismail (2002), Eng and Mak 
(2003), Barako et al. (2006), Naser et al. (2006), Al-
Shammari (2008), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Hossain 
and Hammami (2009), Al-Akra et al. (2010b), Ntim et 
al. (2012a),  Hassan (2013), Juhmani (2013), Lan et al. 
(2013), Alotaibi (2014), Albawwat, and Basah (2015). 
 
 Wang et al. (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010), Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011), Ntim et al. (2012a), Al-Janadi 
et al. (2013). 
Industry type Suwaidan (1997), Haniffa (1999), Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Al-
Akra et al. (2010b), Samaha and Dahawy (2010). 
Al-Shammari (2008). Ismail (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Hassan (2013). 
Leverage Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Ismail (2002), Barako et 
al. (2006), Naser et al. (2006), Al-Shammari (2008), 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Juhmani (2013), Lan et al. 
(2013). 
Eng and Mak (2003). Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Hossain et al. 
(1994), Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Al-
Akra et al. (2010b), Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011), Hassan (2013). 
Profitability Haniffa (1999), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ismail 
(2002), Hassan et al. 2006, Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), Naser et al. (2006), Wang et al. (2008), 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Lan et al. (2013). 
 Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wong (2001), Eng 
and Mak (2003), Barako et al. (2006), Al-
Shammari (2008), Hossain and Hammami, 
(2009), Al-Akra et al. (2010b), Samaha and 
Dahawy (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Hassan (2013), Juhmani 
(2013), Alotaibi (2014). 
Liquidity Samaha and Dahawy (2010), Alotaibi (2014). Al-Akra et al. (2010b). Barako et al. 2006, Lan et al. (2013). 
Assets in place Chow and Boren (1987), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Hossain and Hammami (2009), Lan et al. (2013). 
 Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Hossain et al. 
(1994), Ho and Wong (2001), 
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Variables  Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact on 
voluntary disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
Multiple listing 
status 
Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa (1999), Ntim et al. 
(2012a). 
 Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Hassan (2013). 
Audit firm size Hossain et al. (1994), Ahmed (1996), Suwaidan (1997), 
Al-Shammari (2008), Wang et al. (2008), Akhtaruddin 
et al. (2009), Samaha and Dahawy (2010), Ntim et al. 
(2012a), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Alotaibi (2014). 
Al-Akra et al. (2010b), 
Lan et al. (2013) 
Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Barako et al. (2006), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), 
Hassan (2013), Alhazaim et al. (2014), 
Albawwat, and Basah (2015). 
Firm age  Prencipe (2004), Hossain and Hammami (2009), White 
et al. (2007). 
 Al-Shammari (2008), Alotaibi (2014). 
Ownership 
structure factors 
   
Ownership 
Concentration 
 
 
Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa (1999), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007). 
 
Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011), Ntim et al. 
(2012a), Juhmani 
(2013), Alhazaim et al. 
(2014). 
 
Eng and Mak (2003), Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Alotaibi (2014), Albawwat, 
and Basah (2015). 
Institutional 
ownership 
Barako et al. (2006), Ntim et al. (2012a). 
 
 Suwaidan (1997), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006). 
 
State ownership Suwaidan (1997), Eng and Mak (2003), Wang et al. 
(2008), Ntim et al. (2012a), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Lan 
et al. (2013), Albawwat and Basah (2015). 
 
 Suwaidan (1997), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Juhmani (2013), Alhazaim et al. (2014). 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Wang et al. (2008), Al-
Akra et al. (2010b), Alhazaim et al. (2014) 
 
 Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Albawwat, and Basah 
(2015). 
 
Family 
ownership 
  Ho and Wong (2001), Al-Janadi et al. (2013). 
 
Insider ownership  Eng and Mak (2003). Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Juhmani (2013). 
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Variables  Positive impact on voluntary disclosure Negative impact on 
voluntary disclosure 
No impact on voluntary disclosure 
  
Outsider 
ownership 
  Al-Shammari (2008). 
Director 
ownership 
 
 Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006). 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009). 
 
Number of 
shareholders 
  Suwaidan (1997), Alhazaim et al. (2014), 
Albawwat, and Basah (2015). 
 
Corporate 
governance 
factors 
   
Board size 
 
 
 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Ntim et al. (2012a), Al-
Janadi et al. (2013), Hassan (2013), Schiehll et al. 
(2013). 
 
 Alhazaim et al. (2014), Albawwat, and Basah 
(2015). 
 
Board 
independence 
Eng and Mak (2003), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), 
Samaha et al. (2012), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), 
Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), Alhazaim et al. (2014), 
Alotaibi (2014). 
 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Barako et al. 
(2006), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007). 
Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Lan et al. 
(2013). 
Role duality Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Hassan (2013). 
 
Huafang and Jianguo 
(2007), Alotaibi (2014). 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ho and Wong 
(2001). 
 
Family members Haniffa and Cooke (2000). Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), 
Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009). 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013). 
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 Hypothesis development  
The previous section provides the theoretical framework and reviews empirical existing 
studies which may explain the extent of firm voluntary disclosure and its determinants in 
developed and developing countries. The purpose of this section is to develop a set of 
testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between the extent of corporate voluntary 
disclosure and firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership 
structure factors, and corporate governance factors. The existing empirical literature 
suggests a number of variables that may explain variation in voluntary disclosure 
practices.  The nature of the GCC financial reporting environment is also an important 
factor when choosing variables to be included in empirical analysis. Variables considered 
in this study to potentially explain the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure include 
firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, 
corporate governance factors and time factors, as well as the impact of corporate 
mandatory disclosure levels. 
The following are the criteria for selecting variables included in this study: 
Criterion 1: Relevance to research objectives. 
Criterion 2: Support from theoretical frameworks/empirical studies. 
Criterion 3: Particular relevance to developing countries, specifically to GCC countries. 
Criterion 4: Reliability of the variables/sources of variables. 
Based on these criteria, eight corporate characteristics are selected: (i) firm size, (ii) 
industry type, (iii) leverage, (iv) profitability, (v) liquidity, (vi) assets in place, (vii) 
international listing and (viii) firm age. Further, four ownership structures are also selected 
: (i) director share ownership, (ii) foreign share ownership, (iii) institutional share 
ownership and (iv) state share ownership. In addition, four corporate governance factors 
are selected: (i) board size, (ii) board independence, (iii) family member on board, and (iv) 
the presence of role duality. In addition, this thesis examines the impact on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of mandatory disclosure as a further potential explanatory factor.  
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4.5.1 Corporate characteristic factors 
4.5.1.1 Firm size 
Firm size is one of the most common variables in determining the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the existing literature. Many reasons are given to justify the relationship 
between firm size and voluntary disclosure, based on a variety of theories. In terms of 
capital need theory, Cooke (1989) argues that in order to raise capital on stock markets, 
large firms increase their voluntary disclosure. He argues that there are scarce funds in the 
market and large firms compete with each other to maximise their share of these funds. 
Therefore, voluntary disclosure is a fundamental element to enhance the credibility of 
information and enable the firm to raise capital.  
 
According to agency theory, there is a need for greater information about large firms from 
their various shareholders. This need causes an agency problem between management and 
the shareholders as a result of information asymmetry, and a leads to an increase of agency 
costs. One way to mitigate these problems is by disclosing more information (Inchausti, 
1997). 
 
In addition, larger firms are more publicly visible and more politically sensitive than 
smaller firms. Therefore, in relation to political cost theory, large firms are subjected to a 
greater extent to the interests of regulators and government bodies, which may increase 
political costs. One way to alleviate the interventions and undesired pressure from these 
bodies and to improve the perception of the firm is by increasing voluntary disclosure (Gray 
and Roberts, 1989; Lim and McKinnon, 1993). 
 
Furthermore, due to the relatively higher cost of collection and dissemination of 
information, small firms may not be able to disclose more voluntary information than large 
firms, as they do not have the required resources for collecting, presenting and 
disseminating information (Buzby, 1975; Abdel-Salam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999). Thus, 
regarding cost-benefit theory, large firms tend to disclose more information, as they benefit 
from a larger volume of products over which they can reduce the average cost per unit of 
disclosed information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Abdel-Salam, 1999; Ahmed and Henry, 
2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006). 
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Many existing studies investigate the relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and firm size, and find that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated with the firm size (Cooke, 1989a; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013). Cooke (1989b) examines the extent of voluntary disclosure in the corporate 
annual reports of 90 Swedish companies for the year 1985. He finds that the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to firm size. Hossain et al. (1995) investigate the 
relationship between firm-specific characteristics and the level of accounting information 
voluntarily disclosed by 40 New Zealand listed firms in the year 1991 and show that the 
level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with firm size.  Raffournier (1995) 
examines the determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by 49 Swiss listed companies 
in the year 1991 and finds that firm size is positively related to the voluntary disclosure 
policy of firm. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine the determinants of voluntary 
disclosures in the annual reports of 167 Malaysian listed corporations in 1995 and show 
that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related to size of the firm. Barako et al. 
(2006) examine the determinants of voluntary disclosures in 43 Kenyan company annual 
reports over the period 1992 to 2001and find that size is positively associated with the 
voluntary disclosure for all types of information disclosures. Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
investigate the relationship between firm-specific characteristics, ownership structure and 
corporate governance on the level of voluntary disclosure among 177 Italy listed firms in 
2007. They find that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively affected firm size. 
 
Firm size is also found to be positively associated with corporate voluntary disclosure in 
GCC countries. Ismail (2002) investigates the factors influencing the voluntary disclosure 
of financial information on the internet by 128 firms in GCC countries, including Qatar, 
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. He finds that firm size is positively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) examines the annual reports of 40 non-financial Saudi 
firms and investigates the impact of firm characteristics on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure using a disclosure checklist consisting of 20 voluntary items. His results 
demonstrate that firm size is positively associated with the level of disclosure. Hossain and 
Hammami (2009) investigate the determinants of voluntary disclosure using the annual 
reports of 25 listed firms in Qatar. They find that firm size is positively related to the level 
of voluntary disclosure. Juhmani (2013) examines the relationship between firm size and 
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the level of voluntary information disclosures of 41 listed Bahraini firms for the year 2010 
and finds that firm size is positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Based on both existing theoretical and empirical studies, the extent of voluntary disclosure 
is expected to be positively associated with firm size. Therefore, this study hypothesises 
that:  
H18: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and firm 
size. 
 
4.5.1.2 Industry type 
The industry to which a firm belongs is a potential determinant of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure across firms. Inchausti (1997) argues that firms in one industry may disclose 
more information than those in another industry, and the evidence indicates variations in 
disclosure policies across industries. The impact of industry type on the level of voluntary 
disclosure relates to political cost theory and signalling theory. 
 
A higher level of disclosure might be expected in highly regulated companies (NG and 
Koh, 1994) and also companies in politically sensitive industries such as the energy sector 
(Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). Meek et al. (1995) find that companies in the oil, chemicals 
and mining industries disclose more non-financial information. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
find that there is a high level of voluntary disclosure in the construction sector, but a low 
level of voluntary disclosure in the consumer sector. Wallace et al. (1994), Naser et al. 
(2002) and Eng and Mak (2003) find no evidence that industry type is related to corporate 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
In connection with political cost theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) firms that engage 
in more vulnerable activities may use voluntary disclosure to minimise the political costs 
resulting from these activities (Oyelere et al., 2003). In addition, some firms will be under 
pressure to consider their social responsibility in terms of pollution, deforestation and 
potential human harm from chemical extraction which may burden them with extra political 
costs (Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa, 1999). One way to alleviate these costs is by disclosing 
more voluntary information. 
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Based on signalling theory, if any firm does not keep up with other firms, either in the same 
sector or in others, and adopt similar disclosure practices – including voluntary disclosure 
- this could be interpreted as the firm hiding valuable information, which could produce a 
bad signal for the firm (Craven and Marston, 1999; Oyelere et al., 2003). Therefore, firms 
in one sector will follow the same disclosure pattern of leading firms. Many empirical 
studies support this argument (Cooke, 1989; 1991; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  
 
Existing studies show that there is a significant relationship between the level of disclosure 
and industry type (Stanga, 1976; Cooke, 1989; Cooke, 1992; Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006; Aljifri, 2014; Scaltrito, 2016). Stanga (1976) examines 80 of 
the largest US. industrial corporations classified into eight different industry types. He 
discovers that the manufacturing industry scores the highest of the eight industry scores, 
while the beverage industry scores the lowest. Moreover, Cooke (1989) finds that firms in 
Sweden in certain industries, such as trading firms, disclose less voluntary information than 
do other industry types, such as manufacturing, services and conglomerates. In addition, 
Cooke (1992) finds that in Japan, manufacturing firms disclose more information than other 
firm types. He argues that this may be due to the economic growth which was founded on 
the development of the manufacturing sector in which corporations had sought to expand, 
often by obtaining foreign market shares. Suwaidan (1997) examines voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports of Jordanian listed companies over the period 1980 to 1991 and finds 
that industry type is positive in explaining variation in the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 167 non-
financial Malaysian companies in 1995 and find that industry type is positively associated 
with the extent of disclosure. More recently, Scaltrito (2016) assesses the level of voluntary 
disclosure for 203 companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in the year 2012. He 
finds that financial firms provide a lower level of voluntary disclosure than industrial firms. 
In contrast, some studies find no such relationship. Inchausti (1997) finds no association 
between industry type and the level of voluntary disclosure among 49 firms in 1991. Chau 
and Gray (2002), in a study of Hong Kong and Singaporean listed firms for the financial 
year 1997, find no association between industry type and voluntary disclosure. Akhtaruddin 
(2005) finds no association between the extent of disclosure and the business type for 105 
non-financial Malaysian listed firms in 2002.  
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In GCC countries, Ismail (2002) investigates the factors influencing the voluntary 
disclosure of financial information on the internet by 128 firms across GCC countries. He 
finds that industry type is related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. Aljifri (2014) 
examines the impact of firm-specific characteristics on corporate financial disclosures 
amongst UAE firms. He finds that industry type is significantly related to disclosure level. 
However, Alsaeed (2006) assesses the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of 40 non-financial Saudi firms using a disclosure checklist consisting of 20 voluntary 
items, and finds that industry type is not significant in explaining the variation of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
In the light of the political cost, signalling theories and the majority results of the existing 
studies, the level of voluntary disclosure is expected to differ by industry. This study 
hypothesises that:  
H19: The level of voluntary disclosure differs by industry. 
 
4.5.1.3 Leverage  
Firm leverage is a potential determinant of the level of voluntary financial disclosure. A 
high debt/equity ratio may encourage managers to disclose more information to lenders and 
shareholders. The importance of leverage can be explained in relation to agency theory. 
Agency theory suggests that the extent of voluntary disclosure tends to increase with higher 
firm leverage. Highly leveraged firms will be responsible for satisfying creditors’ needs by 
disseminating reliable information to make them more confident about the ability of the 
firms to service its debt. A number of existing studies argue that highly leveraged firms 
disclose more information to reduce the agency costs of debt (Wallace et al., 1994; Meek 
et al., 1995; Lakhal, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, according to signalling theory, highly leveraged firms may decide not 
to disclose more information to avoid the risks associated with this disclosure, which may 
provide a bad signal to the market. In the same way, it can be argued that the low-leveraged 
firms may disclose more information to reveal their financial structure to the stakeholders, 
which may provide a good signal. This argument is consistent with Ross (1979) who argues 
that firms with good news are more likely to disclose more information. 
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Existing empirical studies report mixed results on the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and leverage. Hossain et al. (1995) find a positive relationship between the 
extent of voluntary disclosure and leverage among 40 New Zealand listed firms in the year 
1991. Barako et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure level 
and leverage in 43 Kenyan company annual reports over the period 1992 to 2001. Recently, 
Lan et al. (2013) find that the level of voluntary disclosure in China is positively related to 
firm leverage for 1,066 listed firms for the year 2006. Other studies find a negative 
relationship between levels of voluntary disclosure and leverage. For example, Eng and 
Mak (2003) find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to leverage in 
158 firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in the year 1995. However, Chau and 
Gray (2002) find no evidence of a relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and leverage in 122 Hong Kong and Singapore listed firms for the year 1997. Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar (2012) find no evidence of an association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and leverage in 250 UK firms over the period 2003 to 2009. 
 
In GCC countries, leverage appears to have a significant impact on voluntary disclosure. 
Al-Shammari (2008) find a positive association between voluntary disclosure levels and 
leverage in 82 listed Kuwaiti firms in the year 2005. Ismail (2002) finds that leverage is 
positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure in 128 GCC country firms over the 
period 2001-2002. Juhmani (2013) finds that leverage is positively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in 41 Bahraini listed firms for the year 2010. However, Hassan (2013) 
show that leverage is not significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure in 95 
UAE listed firms in the year 2008. 
 
Taking account of these varied results, and in the light of agency theory, GCC country listed 
firms with high leverage are expected be more likely to disclose  more detailed information 
to satisfy creditors' needs and reduce agency costs. Therefore, this study hypothesises that:  
H20: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
leverage. 
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4.5.1.4  Profitability (ROA) 
Many existing studies identify profitability as an important factor that may affect the 
voluntary disclosure level of firms. There are many reasons for studying the relationship 
between profitability and voluntary disclosure. With respect to agency theory, managers of 
highly profitable firms are motivated to disseminate more voluntary information to achieve 
personal advantage such as the marinating their positions and justifying compensations 
(Wallace et al., 1994; Abdel-Salam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Leventis, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). In addition, in relation to political theory, the managers of higher profit firms 
are required to justify this level of profit to the public by disclosing more voluntary 
information (Inchausti, 1997). 
 
Further, signalling theory suggests that good performance firms have an incentive to 
voluntarily disclose additional information in order to distinguish themselves from poorer 
performing firms (Lan et al., 2013). This can help to capital raising easier (Akerlof, 1970). 
Managers of firms with good performance are motivated to disclose additional information 
in order to signal the quality of management and to support their continued appointment 
and remuneration (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Courtis, 1978). Moreover, only firms with 
‘good news’ and which have high profits are able to disclose more voluntary information 
in order to raise shareholders' confidence and reduce the risk of share undervaluation by 
the market. Therefore, based on signalling theory, higher profit firms disseminate more 
voluntary information to distinguish themselves from firms with lower profits. However, 
some studies suggest that firms with low profits (bad news) disclose more voluntary 
information to reduce the risk of legal liability, as well as a reduction in share capital and 
loss of reputation (Skinner, 1994; Leventis, 2001). 
 
Existing empirical evidence indicates mixed results for the relationship between the extent 
of voluntary disclosure and profitability. Some studies find a positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and profitability. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that the 
extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related to profitability in 167 Malaysian listed 
corporations in the year 1995. Leventis and Weetman (2004) find that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is positively associated with profitability in 87 non-financial Greek listed firms 
in the year 1997. Recently, Lan et al. (2013) also find that the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in is positively related to profitability in 1,066 Chinese listed firms in the year 2006. Other 
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studies find a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and profitability. For 
instance, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is negatively 
associated with firm profitability in 87 Hong Kong firms over the period 1993 to 1994. 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) also find that the level of disclosure is negatively related to 
profitability in 161UK listed firms in the year 1996. 
 
However, a number of studies find that profitability is not related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure. For example, Inchausti (1997) finds no relationship between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and profitability in 49 firms in the year 1991. Ho and Wong (2001) 
find that there is no relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and profitability 
in 98 Hong Kong listed firms in the year 1998. Eng and Mak (2003) find no evidence that 
the level of corporate voluntary disclosure is related to profitability in 158 Singapore listed 
companies in the year 1995. Patelli and Prencipe (2007) also find that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is not significantly influenced by profitability in 195 Italy firms in the year 2002. 
 
With relation to GCC countries, Ismail (2002) finds that the level of voluntary disclosure 
is positively related to profitability in a study of 128 firms in GCC countries over the period 
2001 to 2002. However, Hossain and Hammami (2009) find that profitability is not 
significant in explaining the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 25 listed 
firms in Qatar in the year 2008. More recently, Alotaibi (2014) find no significant 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and profitability in a sample of 155 
Kuwaiti listed companies over the period 2007 to 2010.  
   
Despite these mixed results, agency theory and signalling theory suggest that GCC-listed 
firms with high profitability would be more likely to disclose more detailed information to 
distinguish themselves from poorer performing firms in order to ease capital raising. 
Accordingly, this study hypothesises that:  
H21: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
profitability. 
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4.5.1.5 Liquidity  
Liquidity measures the ability of a firm to cover its short-term liabilities from its current 
assets. Signalling theory argues that a firm with a stronger liquidity ratio is expected to 
disclose more information to distinguish itself from other firms with weaker liquidity 
positions (Cooke, 1989; Oyeler et al., 2003; Aly et al., 2010). However, agency theory 
suggests that firms with weaker liquidity positions may provide more information to satisfy 
the demands of creditors and capital market players (Aly et al., 2010). 
 
Existing studies show mixed results concerning the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and liquidity. In terms of signalling theory, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) 
report a positive relationship between liquidity and disclosure in Canadian firms. Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) find that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to a firm’s 
liquidity in a study of 87 Hong Kong firms over the period 1993 to 1994. Leventis and 
Weetman (2004) also find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively associated 
with liquidity in a study of 87 non-financial Greek listed firms in the year 1997. Oyeler et 
al. (2003) find that liquidity is positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
internet financial reporting in a sample of 229 New Zealand listed firms. Samaha and 
Dahawy (2010) find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with 
liquidity in a study of 30 Egyptian listed companies in the year 2006. Recently, Alotaibi 
(2014) finds a significant positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure 
and liquidity in a study of 155 Kuwaiti listed companies over the period 2007 to 2010.    
 
In contrast, in terms of agency theory, Al-Akra et al. (2010b) find a negative relationship 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and liquidity in a study of 243 Jordanian annual 
reports over the period 1996 to 2004. However, Barako et al. (2006) find no significant 
relationship between voluntary disclosure level and liquidity in a study of 43 Kenyan firm 
annual reports over the period 1992 to 2001. Lan et al. (2013) also find that the level of 
voluntary disclosure is not related to liquidity in a sample of 1,066 Chinese listed firms in 
the year 2006. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) investigate the influence of liquidity on two 
data sets in the year 1996, one for 161 UK firms and the other for 161 Dutch firms, and 
find an insignificant relationship for UK firms and a positive relationship in the case of 
Dutch firms.  
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Despite these mixed results concerning the relationship between liquidity and voluntary 
disclosure levels, and consistent with  agency theory, it is expected that GCC country listed 
firms with lower liquidity ratios will be more likely to disclose more voluntary information 
than firms with higher liquidity ratios. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
H22: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
liquidity. 
 
4.5.1.6 Assets-in-place 
Assets-in-place refers to the value of fixed assets owned by companies in relation to other 
assets. An increase in the firm’s fixed assets results in lower agency costs and, 
consequently, lower disclosure (Myers, 1977). Firms have assets that are already owned 
and assets that are yet to be acquired (Al-Shammari, 2008). Myers (1977) argues that the 
value of the firm consists of two main elements: firstly, there are assets-in-place, which 
represents the investment of the firm at the present time. Secondly, there are assets yet to 
be acquired, which depend on the former and represent growth opportunities and future 
investments. However, if the firm has greater assets-in-place, the value of growth options 
is less. In other words, if assets-in-place are low, growth opportunities are high (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004). This argument is explained in terms of agency theory. The lenders' right 
in writing covenants restricts the shareholders' use of those assets in debt agreements. So, 
under this proposition, the extent of the disclosure will be inversely related to a company's 
proportion of assets-in-place.  
 
Haniffa (1999, p. 260) states that “a decrease in fixed assets (low assets in place) may also 
cause companies to disclose less to avoid high financing costs due to highly perceived risk”. 
Moreover, based on signalling theory, it can be assumed that firms with high fixed assets 
may signal this to their stakeholders to reflect their stability and future growth. To achieve 
this, firms tend to disclose more information in their annual reports. 
 
Very little empirical research investigates the relationship between assets-in-place and 
voluntary disclosure levels. Chow and Boren (1987) report on the voluntary disclosure 
practices of 52 Mexican listed firms and show that the extent of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the proportion of assets-in-place. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also find 
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a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and the proportion of assets-in-
place in a study of 167 non-financial listed firms in the year 1995. Recently, Lan et al. 
(2013) find that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
assets-in-place in a study of 1,066 listed Chinese firms in the year 2006. In contrast, some 
researchers find no significant relationship between the level of disclosure and assets-in-
place. Hossain et al. (1995) find no significant relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and assets-in-place in a study of 40 New Zealand listed firms in the year 1991. 
Ho and Wong (2001) also find no association between the extent of voluntary disclosure 
and assets-in-place in a study of 98 Hong Kong listed firms in the year 1998.  
 
In the GCC context, the impact of the assets-in-place on the voluntary disclosure level has 
not been investigated widely. Hossain and Hammami (2009) find that the proportion of 
assets-in-place is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure in a study of 25 
listed firms in Qatar in the year 2008. However, Al-Shammari (2008) finds that the 
proportion of assets-in-place is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 82 listed Kuwaiti companies in the year 2005.  
 
Given the inconsistency of empirical findings on the relationship between assets-in-place 
and disclosure in existing studies, there is a need to test such a relationship in the GCC firm 
context. Consistent with signalling theory, firms with a high proportion of fixed assets tend 
to disclose more information in their annual reports to reflect their stability and future 
growth. On the basis of the discussion above, the relationship between assets-in-place and 
the level of voluntary disclosure is hypothesised as follows: 
 H23: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and assets-
in-place. 
 
4.5.1.7 Multiple listing status  
Listing status is a potential factor explaining the variability of financial disclosure. Firms 
may have one of three listing statuses: unlisted, listed only on the local market or on a 
single exchange stock market, or listed on several stock markets (multiple listing). Firms 
with multiple listing are looking to expand their activities abroad (Cooke, 1991). Firms 
with multiple listing status might disclose information voluntarily because they have 
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different objectives regarding the growth of capital and development. Multiple listing 
allows the firm to better advertise through the press and to satisfy the information 
requirements of local users. When a firm is listed on international stock markets, there are 
more obligations to disclose additional information than is the case for national 
requirements. Thus, the quality of information disclosed increases in multiple listing firms. 
Shipper (1981) argues that the level of disclosure will be greater for multiple listing firms, 
so as to meet the interests of investors in the firm and its subsidiaries. 
 
Existing empirical studies find a positive relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and multiple listing status (Cooke, 1989a; 1989b; 1992; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005). For example, Cooke (1992) finds that multiple-listed firms disclose more voluntary 
and mandatory information in a study of 35 Japanese annual reports for the year 1998. In 
addition, Hossain et al. (1994) find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is associated with 
foreign listing status in a study of 67 non-financial listed Malaysian companies in the year 
1991. Anderson and Daoud (2005) show that multiple listing firms produce greater 
voluntary financial disclosure in a study of 54 Swedish listed firms in 2003.  
 
For GCC country firms, there is a lack of information on this factor which requires further 
investigation. In accordance with existing empirical studies, it is predicted that firms with 
a multiple market listing are more likely to disclose more voluntary information than 
locally listed firms so as to meet the interests of investors and the firm’s subsidiaries. 
Consequently, this study hypothesises that: 
H24: The extent of voluntary disclosure is likely to increase for multiple listing firms. 
 
4.5.1.8 Firm age  
The level of voluntary disclosure may be associated with firm age (length of establishment). 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, firms that have been listed for a longer time have a 
longer history and a reputation for providing stakeholders with proof of their social 
responsibility. The stakeholders expect the firm to continue to provide voluntary disclosure 
and may react to any marked changes in strategies (Roberts, 1992). Based on the theory of 
competitive advantage, younger firms are not likely to disclose full information in their 
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annual reports, because this could be harmful if sensitive information is disclosed to 
competitors. In contrast, older firms are less likely to withhold such information, since their 
competitive advantages cannot be easily challenged with increased disclosure (Owusu, 
1998). Akhtaruddin (2005) argues that older firms are more experienced and are therefore 
more likely to include more information in their annual reports in order to enhance their 
image and reputation in the market. 
 
 In general, the empirical results regarding the relationship between firm age and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure are mixed. For example, White et al. (2007) find that the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to firm age in a study of 96 Australian listed 
companies in the year 2005. Hossain and Hammami (2009) find a positive relationship 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and firm age in a study of 25 listed firms in Qatar 
in the year 2008. However, Al-Shammari (2008) finds no evidence of an association 
between voluntary disclosure levels and firm age in a study of 82 Kuwaiti listed firms in 
the year 2005. Alotaibi (2014) finds no evidence that the extent of voluntary disclosure is 
related to firm age in a study of 155 Kuwaiti listed companies over the period 2007 to 2010. 
 
Based on stakeholder and competitive advantage theories, it is expected that older firms in 
GCC countries will be more likely to disclose more voluntary information than younger 
firms. Thus, this study hypothesises that: 
H25: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and firm 
age. 
 
4.5.2 Ownership structure factors 
4.5.2.1 Director share ownership 
The importance of director share ownership arises from the important role that the board of 
directors plays regarding firm policies of corporate governance disclosure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chalevas, 2011). With regard to an agency theory 
perspective, the relationship between director share ownership and voluntary corporate 
disclosure is not conclusive (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
argue that directors may seek to maximise their wealth by using inside information only in 
matters where their own interest is served, and not necessarily for the best interests of the 
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firm. However, if director share ownership is low, this can reduce directors’ motivations to 
improve performance and can, consequently, lead to lower voluntary disclosure (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Eng and Mak, 2003). Shareholders may monitor board behaviour to alleviate 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but this will increase monitoring costs. 
Thus, voluntary disclosure may be considered as an alternative way to directly monitor firm 
directors, which can improve corporate governance practices equally well (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that director share ownership results in similar 
protection for directors and outside shareholders. This is due to an alignment of interests 
between directors and shareholders (Samaha et al., 2012). This implies that directors seek 
to enhance corporate transparency and disclosure in order to increase the value of the firm. 
However, directors with significant share ownership might not want to disclose information 
to the public, because they can use their power to use firm resources to fulfil their own 
interests at the expense of other shareholders. They may also want to hide any fraud or 
incompetence. Thus, a negative relationship between director ownership and disclosure 
may be expected (Htay et al., 2011).  
 
Existing empirical studies support a negative relationship between corporate voluntary 
disclosure and director share ownership. For instance, Chau and Gray (2002) find that the 
level of information disclosure is likely to be less in insider owned or family-controlled 
firms in a study of 122 Hong Kong and Singapore listed firms in the year 1997. Eng and 
Mak (2003) report that a lower level of board share ownership is associated with a higher 
level of disclosure in 158 Singaporean listed firms in the year 1995. Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2008) examine 130 firms from 14 European countries in the year 2000 and find 
that the percentage of shares closely held by insiders is negatively associated with voluntary 
disclosure practices. More recently, Samaha et al. (2012) examine the board ownership-
disclosure relationship for a sample of 100 Egyptian listed firms. Their results do not in 
general support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between director ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) find a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure in a sample 
of 130 UK firms over the period 2003 to 2009. 
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In a GCC country firm context, the association between voluntary corporate disclosure and 
director ownership has yet to be investigated. Based on existing studies that suggest a 
negative relationship between director ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g. 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012), this 
study hypothesises that: 
H26: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
director share ownership. 
 
4.5.2.2 Foreign share ownership 
The existing disclosure literature reports a strong relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and foreign ownership. Agency theory 
argues that, in a diffused ownership environment, firms have more incentive to provide 
additional financial and non-financial information in their annual reports in order to reduce 
agency costs and information asymmetry (Ho and Wong, 2001). It could be argued that 
firms with more diffused of shareholders might be expected to include more information 
in their annual reports than those firms with a smaller number of shareholders. Singhvi and 
Desi (1971) argue that the presence of foreign directors on the board may significantly 
influence the firm’s financial reporting system in order to meet their requirements. Through 
their ownership power and voting rights, foreign investors may encourage the management 
of a firm to disclose more information (Adam et al., 2005). 
 
Existing empirical voluntary disclosure studies find that firms with a greater proportion of 
foreign share ownership disclose more voluntary information (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Alhazaim et al., 2014). 
For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report a significant positive relationship between 
the proportion of foreign share ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of 167 Malaysian listed corporations in the year 1995. Barako et al. (2006) examine 
the relationship between the proportion of foreign ownership and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in a study of 43 listed Kenyan firms over the period 1992 to 2001and find that 
the proportion of foreign ownership is positively significantly related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, Wang et al. (2008) examine the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 110 Chinese listed firms in the year 2005 and find that 
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the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of foreign 
share ownership. More recently, Alhazaim et al. (2014) find that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of foreign ownership in a study of 
72 Jordanian listed companies over the period 2002 to 2011. 
 
In contrast, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find there is no association between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the proportion of foreign share ownership in 87 Saudi corporate 
annual reports for the years 2006 and 2007. Recently, Albawwat and Basah (2015) find no 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and foreign share ownership in a 
study of 72 Jordanian listed companies over the period 2009 to 2013.  
 
In the GCC country context, foreign share ownership is not common and is very much 
restricted by law. It is only allowed for foreign investors to acquire up to a 49% ownership 
proportion. Consistent with agency theory, voluntary disclosure is expected to positively 
related to the proportion of foreign share ownership. This study hypothesises that:  
H27: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and foreign 
ownership. 
 
4.5.2.3 Institutional share ownership 
Institutional share ownership refers to the proportion of shares that is owned by institutions. 
With regard to an agency theory perspective, the existence of financial institutions 
alleviates the conflict between management and shareholders, as they tend to encourage 
firms to disclose more information to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2010). Healy and Palepu (2001) and Ntim et al. 
(2012a) argue that an improvement in voluntary disclosure may lead to increased firm value 
(and a higher share price). Therefore, institutional investors can help to improve firm value 
and reduce information asymmetry (Aggarwal et al., 2011). On the other hand, Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2009, 2011) argue that institutional investors are not 
necessarily an important factor in improving the level of firm disclosure as they may play 
a weak role in motivating good corporate governance practices due to the short-term focus 
of their investment. 
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Existing empirical studies find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
voluntary corporate disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). Barako et al. (2006) find that the level of 
institutional ownership positively affects firm transparency and disclosure in a sample of 
53 Kenyan listed firms over the period 1992 to 2001. Chung and Zhang (2011) investigate 
institutional investor preferences in the US financial market over the period 2001 to 2006 
and find that firms with high voluntary corporate governance are highly attractive to 
institutional investors. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) examine 169 listed firms in South 
Africa over the period 2002-2006 and report that firms with higher institutional ownership 
disclose considerably more than firms with lower institutional ownership. Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar (2012) find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure in a study of 130 UK firms over the period 2003 to 2009. Therefore, 
there is agreement across most existing studies on the positive role of institutional 
ownership in the increase of firm voluntary disclosure. 
 
In the GCC context, the relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary 
corporate governance has yet to be examined. Form an agency theory perspective, and 
underpinned by evidence from both developed and developing economies, a positive 
relationship between voluntary corporate disclosure and institutional ownership is expected 
(e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). This study 
hypothesises that:  
H28: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
institutional ownership. 
 
4.5.2.4 State share ownership 
State share ownership refers to the proportion of firm shares owned by the government. 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, state (government) ownership is a key factor 
influencing corporate governance disclosure, particularly in emerging countries where 
concentrated ownership structures are widespread (Shleifer, 1998; Cornett et al., 2010; Al-
Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Agency theory suggests that where there is a separation 
between firm owners and control, the potential for agency costs arises because of incentive 
conflicts between shareholders and managers (Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995). 
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Therefore, firms’ with large shareholders should disclose more voluntary information as a 
means to alleviate the agency conflict with firm shareholders. Eng and Mak (2003) argue 
that agency problems are more likely to arise with large shareholders such as the 
government. In addition, it is argued that government share ownership regularly leads to 
intervention by the government in the running of the firm, which can lead to poor corporate 
governance practices (Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Konijn et al., 2011). For example, a 
government can use its power to appoint CEOs and directors, regardless of individual 
experience and qualifications (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2010). 
 
In contrast, stewardship theory predicts that executive directors/CEOs might not be affected 
by government ownership as the interests of the former are aligned with all corporate 
owners (Davis et al., 1997; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). CEOs seek to improve 
firm performance with the aim of improving their own future job opportunities, as well as 
protecting their own reputations (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Conyon and He, 2011). From 
a resource dependence theory perspective, government ownership may grant access to  
resources such as finance, government contracts, and tax subsidies, which may improve 
firm performance and disclosure (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Bauwhede and Willekens, 
2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). 
 
A number of empirical disclosure studies assess the impact of government share ownership 
on the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure. The findings of the majority of studies 
suggest a positive relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and government 
share ownership. Eng and Mak (2003) find that the extent of voluntary corporate disclosure 
is positively related to government ownership in a study of 158 Singapore listed firms in 
the year 1995. Makhija and Patton (2004) examine the effect of government ownership on 
the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure of 43 non-financial Czech firms in the year 
1993 and find that the proportion of government share ownership is a positive driver of the 
overall extent of disclosure. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) report that the proportion of 
government share ownership is positively related to voluntary corporate disclosure in a 
study of 169 South African listed firms over the period 2002 to 2006. A more recent study 
by Lan et al. (2013) finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with 
the proportion of government ownership in a sample of 1,066 Chinese listed firms in the 
year 2006. 
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The government share ownership variable has really yet to be tested in relation to the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. Only, Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013) find that the quality of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the 
proportion of government ownership in a study of 87 Saudi firm corporate annual reports 
for the years 2006 and 2007. Consistent with stewardship and resource dependence theories 
and existing empirical studies, a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and government ownership is expected. Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
H29: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
government ownership. 
 
4.5.3 Corporate governance factors 
4.5.3.1 Board size 
From an agency theory perspective, shareholders expect a high level of disclosure from the 
board of directors, as they have been selected to represent their interests (Davidson et al., 
1996). Agency theory suggests that board size is a key factor in monitoring management 
behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
indicate that the existence of experienced, knowledgeable and independent directors is 
linked to board size. Therefore, due to the complexity of their activities, large firms are 
more likely to have a larger number of directors in order to improve firm control and 
monitoring (Coles et al., 2008). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) argue that increased 
managerial monitoring positively affects voluntary disclosure. 
 
Existing empirical studies evidence a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary 
corporate disclosure and board size. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) investigate the extent of 
voluntary disclosure using a sample of 105 Malaysian listed firms in the year 2002 and find 
that the extent of corporate disclosure is positively related to board size. Ntim et al. (2012a) 
report a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary corporate disclosure and 
board size in a sample of 169 South African firms over the period 2002-2006. Allegrini and 
Greco (2013) examine the extent of voluntary disclosure of 177 listed firms on the Italian 
Stock Exchange in the year 2007 and find that larger boards tend to disclose more 
information about firm strategic objectives than smaller boards. However, Hussainey and 
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Al-Najjar (2012) find no significant relationship between corporate disclosure and board 
size in a sample of 130 UK listed firms. 
 
In the GCC context, the relationship between board size and voluntary corporate disclosure 
is not well tested. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in a sample of 87 Saudi listed firms for the years 2006 
and 2007. Their results show that board size makes a positive contribution to providing 
quality voluntary disclosure. In addition, Hassan (2013) also finds that board size is 
positively associated with corporate voluntary disclosure in a sample of 95 UAE listed 
firms for the year 2008. 
Based on the above theory and empirical findings, the relationship between board size and 
voluntary corporate disclosure can be tested by the following hypothesis: 
H30: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and board 
size. 
 
4.5.3.2 Board independence (non-executive directors) 
Shamsher and Annuar (1993) define board composition as “the proportion of outside 
directors to the total numbers of directors”. Agency theory suggests that non-executive 
directors are needed to control and monitor the actions of the executive directors due to 
their potentially poor behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An independent board has 
the capacity to protect shareholders and help reduce agency costs (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Chalevas, 2011). Agency theory predicts that the presence of independent directors can 
reduce information asymmetry (La Porta et al., 2002; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Similarly, greater board independence can enhance good governance by providing a better 
representation of stakeholders’ interests (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). A higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board may provide advantages, such as 
providing advice about strategic decisions and improving the monitoring of decisions and 
managers’ activities, which will help to reduce opportunism (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In 
contrast, Bozec (2005) suggests that a higher proportion of independent directors on the 
board may lead to extreme managerial monitoring, which could potentially obstruct 
managerial initiatives. 
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Empirical studies generally find a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary 
corporate disclosure and the proportion of independent directors (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Chen and Jaggi (2000) examine the 
association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial 
disclosure in Hong Kong firms during the years 1993 and 1994. They find that the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the 
board is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Arcay 
and Vazquez (2005) examine voluntary disclosure in a sample of 117 Spanish listed firms 
in the year 1999 and find that corporate governance mechanisms, such as the proportion of 
independent directors on the board, are positively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) examine the association between board 
monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure in a sample of 104 sample Singapore listed 
firms in the year 2000, and find a positive association between the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Similarly, Lim et al. (2007) examine the association between board composition and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 181 Australian companies over the period 
1991 to 2001 and find that there is a positive association between board composition (the 
proportion of independent directors on the board) and the voluntary disclosure of 
information. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) study the relation between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure in a sample of 51 Irish listed firms in the year 2002, 
and find evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of non-executive 
directors on the board. Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) find that the degree of 
independence of the board of directors is positively related to corporate disclosure in a 
sample of 130 listed UK firms over the period 2003 to 2009. Recently, Alhazaimeh et al. 
(2014) examine the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure 
and voluntary disclosure, in a sample of Jordanian listed companies over the period 2002-
2011and find that the proportion of non-executive directors has a positive influence on 
voluntary corporate disclosure. 
 
In the GCC context, few existing studies examine the impact of non-executive directors on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the impact of internal 
and external corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia for a sample of 87 listed firms the years 2006 and 2007. They find that the 
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quality of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of non-executive 
directors.  Alotaibi (2014) finds a positive significant relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and board independence in a sample of 155 Kuwaiti listed companies 
over the period 2007 to 2010. Since most of the theoretical and empirical literature suggests 
a positive relationship (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2010; Chen, 2011; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014), this study 
hypothesises that:  
H31: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
4.5.3.3 Family members on board 
The proportion of family member representation on the board may also exert an influence 
upon disclosure practice. There is generally little separation between those who own the 
firm and those who manage the firm’s capital in countries where families have considerable 
equity holdings (Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995). Capital owners do not need to rely heavily 
on public disclosure to monitor their investments since they have greater access to internal 
information (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). Therefore, the demand for reporting and for 
public disclosure will, in general, be lower in this case. Family members on the board might 
exert an influence on voluntary disclosure practices. The agency problem is not only about 
the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, but also between the majority 
and minority shareholders. Marisela (2005) notes that corporations in Latin America are 
controlled by family members and that the agency problem is typically between the 
majority and minority shareholders. It can be predicted that the presence of family members 
on the board produces lower disclosure as they have greater access to information and 
therefore do not have the intention of disclosing this information to others. 
 
The traditional view of family member firms is that they have access to any information 
required and have the incentive to run the firm in their own interest. Ali et al. (2007) argue 
that the characteristics of family firms raise interesting issues about their corporate 
disclosure practices. They argue that US family firms face two types of agency problems. 
The first arises from the separation between ownership and management, and the second 
arises between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.  Chen et al. (2008) argue that 
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family member firms tend to provide less voluntary disclosure about earnings forecasts and 
more earnings warnings information compared to non-family member firms. They argue 
that family owners have greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. As a result, 
potential investors may consider firms with family members on the board as unattractive. 
Therefore, it may be argued that such firms have the motivation to disclose more 
information to prove that they are a good investment opportunity. Furthermore, based on 
political cost theory and legitimacy theory, it may be expected that active family member 
firms will be in the public eye, and therefore have an incentive to legitimise and distinguish 
themselves by being more transparent. 
 
A number of empirical studies support a negative relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the proportion of family members on the board. Ho and Wong 
(2001) study 98 listed Hong Kong firms in the year 1998 and find that the proportion of 
family members on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Chau and Gray (2002) examine Hong Kong and Singapore firms in the year 1997 and find 
that the extent of outsider ownership is positively associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and the extent of insider or family ownership is negatively associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine the relationship between 
family members on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure in a sample of 167 
Malaysian companies that for the year 1995. Their results show that there is a significant 
negative association between the proportion of family members on the board and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examine for a sample of Malaysian 
firms after the 1997 financial crisis to assess whether the regulatory reaction to the crisis 
increased the awareness of disclosure as a tool of corporate governance and reduced the 
influence of insider domination on voluntary disclosure. They contrast director ownership 
and government ownership as determinants of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian company 
annual reports. Their results show that the proportion of director ownership and the 
proportion of family members on the board is negatively associated with extent of 
voluntary disclosure. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2000) investigate whether corporate 
governance attributes are determinants of voluntary disclosure in a sample of 167 
Malaysian non-financial listed firms in 1994 and find evidence of a positive influence of 
two corporate governance variables, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
and the proportion of family members on the board. 
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In a GCC context, the relationship between the proportion of family members on the board 
and the extent of voluntary corporate disclosure is not examined widely. Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure 
in Saudi listed firms using a sample of 87 Saudi Arabian listed companies over the period 
2006 to 2007, and find that the percentage of family members on the board has no impact 
on the level of voluntary disclosure. In GCC countries, there are many listed firms with 
family shareholdings that elect family members to sit on the board, both in the capacity of 
executive and non-executive directors. 
 
Most of the empirical studies that examine the relationship between the proportion of 
family members on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure find a negative 
relationship. Thus, this study hypothesises that:  
H32: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of family members on the board. 
 
4.5.3.4 CEO/Chairman role duality 
Role duality occurs when one person holds both the CEO (chief executive officer) and the 
Chairman role at the same time (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Role duality may be explained in 
terms of agency theory or stewardship theory. Agency theory suggests that a CEO who is 
also the Chairman tends to be more managerially dominated (Molz, 1988). The separation 
between the roles of CEO and Chairman could in theory provide checks and balances over 
management performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). However, stewardship theory 
suggests that managements are inclined to act in the best interests of the firm and its 
shareholders; role duality enables a CEO to easily lead a firm to achieve its goals with less 
intervention (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
 
Empirical evidence that supports agency theory provides evidence of a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure. For instance, Gul 
and Leung (2004) examine the relationship between board leadership structure in terms of 
CEO duality and voluntary corporate disclosures in a sample of 385 Hong Kong firms in 
the year 1997. Their results show that CEO role duality is associated with lower levels of 
voluntary corporate disclosures. Huafang and Jianguo (2007) examine a sample of 559 
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Chinese listed firms in the year 2002 and find that CEO duality is associated with lower 
disclosure. This finding supports the idea that the role separation of CEO and Chairman 
helps to enhance monitoring quality, which may in turn result in a higher level and higher 
quality of disclosure.  
 
In contrast, the empirical evidence that supports stewardship theory finds a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. For example, Felo (2009) 
examines the role of board composition, arguing that splitting the CEO and Chairman roles 
has the effect of improving voluntary disclosure transparency. However, he finds that 
having the same person fill the CEO and Chairman roles is related to greater voluntary 
disclosure transparency. Abed et al. (2011) examine the determinants of disclosing 
voluntary information for Jordanian listed industrial and service companies for the year 
2007. Their results show that voluntary disclosures are positively related to role duality. 
However, Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that the level of 
voluntary disclosure is not associated with the role duality in Hong Kong and Malaysian 
listed firms in the years 1998 and 1995, respectively.  
 
In a GCC context, CEO/Chairman role duality is quite common across GCC listed firms. 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure in a sample of 87 Saudi listed firms for the years 2006 and 2007 and 
find that CEO duality plays a positive role in providing quality voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, Hassan (2013) examines 95 listed firms from the UAE and finds that the extent 
of corporate voluntary disclosure is positively related to the presence of CEO duality.  
 
Based on the existing theoretical and empirical studies, a negative relationship is expected 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the existence of CEO/Chairman role duality. 
Thus, this study hypothesises that:  
H33: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
presence of CEO/Chairman role duality. 
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4.5.4 The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures 
As discussed in the Chapter 3, the interaction between the extent of voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure depends on whether voluntary and mandatory disclosures are 
substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, then greater mandatory disclosure 
requirements will reduce the extent of voluntary disclosure. If they are complements, 
greater mandatory disclosure requirements will increase the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures is examined by existing 
researchers (Dye, 1985; 1986; Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Naser et al., 2003; Al-Razeen et 
al., 2004; Einhorn, 2005; Yu, 2011). Naser et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between 
the extent of voluntary and mandatory disclosures, whereas Gigler and Hemmer (1998) 
find that increasing the frequency of mandated disclosures may eliminate managers’ 
voluntary disclosures and reduce the informational efficiency of prices. This finding 
leading to a negative relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. However, 
Al-Razeen et al. (2004) find no clear association between the two disclosure types.  
 
One potential explanation for no clear relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure is a lack of cooperation between the management and the board of directors. 
Many items are presented both in the financial statements and in the notes and directors’ 
report, i.e. a voluntary disclosure complements a mandatory one. Firms have to determine 
the optimal level of total disclosure that is appropriate for them (Leuz et al., 2008). Either 
firms strictly follow mandatory regulatory requirements and limit their discretion over 
voluntary disclosures, or they meet minimum mandatory disclosure requirements and 
extend their reporting through the voluntary provision of information. 
 
In GCC countries, as discussed before in Chapter 3, the interaction between the extent of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure is expected to be one of substitution, and thus a lower 
level of mandatory disclosure requirements will increase the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
H34: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
level of mandatory disclosure.  
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 Summary 
This chapter reviews theories and empirical existing findings in relation to the measurement 
and determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure. It goes on to develop the research 
framework and hypotheses in order to address the research questions regarding the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. It develops a set of testable hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure 
factors and corporate governance factors and the level of corporate voluntary disclosures. 
In addition, it examines the effect of mandatory disclosure level on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
  
This study hypothesises that the level of voluntary disclosure increases with firm size 
(H18), leverage (H20), profitability (H21), assets-in-place (H23), multiple market listing 
status (H24), firm age (H25), the extent of foreign ownership (H27), the extent of 
institutional ownership (H28), the extent of government ownership (H29), board size (H30) 
and the degree of board independence (H31). It is expected that the level of voluntary 
disclosure decreases with the liquidity (H22), the proportion of director share ownership 
(H26), the proportion of family members on board (H32), the presence of CEO/Chairman 
role duality (H33), and the extent of mandatory disclosure (H34). In addition, the level of 
voluntary disclosure is expected to differ by industry type (H19). 
 
The next chapter describes the development of the existing legal framework of financial 
reporting in the GCC countries. It describes the regulations that firms should comply with, 
and the role of external auditors in promoting compliance. It also discusses the role of the 
enforcement body charged with monitoring and enforcing compliance. 
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 Data Collection and Research Methods 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main research method and methodology to be followed in order 
to address the research objectives of this thesis. The quantitative methods employed will be 
discussed. Collis and Hussey (2013, p.59) define methodology as a “comprehensive 
approach which starts from developing the theoretical framework and ends with collection 
and analysis of data”. The research hypotheses to be tested will be discussed in relation to 
the association between, respectively, the mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure 
indices (the dependent variables) and a number of firm-specific characteristic factors such 
as: corporate characteristic factors, ownership structure factors, corporate governance 
factors, and cultural factors (managers’ personal characteristics). The interaction between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures, and the impact of such interaction on the level of 
mandatory disclosure and the extent of voluntary disclosures will also be examined. 
Moreover, the method used to measure the extent of mandatory disclosure and the level of 
voluntary disclosure will be discussed. Finally, the sample selection criteria and the source 
and collection process for the data will be explained. 
 
Before discussing the research objectives and how they are to be tested in detail, this chapter 
will discuss the choice between employing quantitative and qualitative methods. This thesis 
seeks to investigate the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual 
reports of GCC country-listed firms. It seeks to assess the relationship between firm-
specific characteristic factors such as: corporate characteristic factors, ownership structure 
factors, corporate governance factors, and cultural factors (managers’ personal 
characteristics). 
 
 The choice between quantitative and qualitative methods 
Punch (2013) argues that quantitative research is related to numbers and shows how the 
variables are organised, measured and analysed, whereas qualitative research is related to 
words, and categorising and coding the main subjects in order to build theories or 
generalisations. Neuman (2011) argues that the deductive approach adopted in quantitative 
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research includes well-organised research designs, sampling, and measurement before 
collecting and analysing the data. In contrast, an inductive approach is adopted by 
qualitative researchers in order to build theories or generalisations from the data. 
 
In an inductive approach, a researcher begins with collecting data that is relevant to the 
study. Once the data are collected, the researcher looks for patterns in the data, working to 
develop a theory that might explain those patterns (Blackstone, 2012). In other words, the 
researcher moves from data to theory or from the specific to the general. Figure 5.1 explains 
the steps involved in an inductive approach to research. 
Figure 5.1. Inductive research 
Gather Data                   Look for patterns                  Develop theory. 
In a deductive approach, the researcher starts with a social theory and then tests its 
implications with the data. It moves from a general level to a more specific one. The 
researcher studies what others have done, reads existing theories and then tests the 
hypotheses that emerge from those theories (Blackstone, 2012). Figure 5.2 explains the 
steps involved in a deductive approach to research. 
Figure 5.2. Deductive research 
Hypothesise                   Data analysis                   Hypotheses supported or not.                     
Quantitative and qualitative research are different in a number of respects. The first 
difference is linked to the nature of the data (Neuman, 2011). Quantitative data are ‘hard’ 
and designed from numbers which differ from soft data, while qualitative data are designed 
from words, impressions, symbols, and images. The second difference is associated with 
sample size. In quantitative research, samples are larger than in qualitative research and the 
population and sampling frame in quantitative research are small. In qualitative research, a 
theoretical generalisation is used for the results (Punch, 2013). 
 
The third difference between the two approaches is concerned with the type of problem 
presented in the research (Creswell, 2013). In quantitative research, the research problem is 
addressed in terms of factors that affect the results; the researcher determines the variables 
that explain the problem. “Researchers sometimes advance to test the theory, and they will 
incorporate the literature reviews to determine the research questions to answer them” 
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(Creswell, 2013, p.110). Creswell argues that in qualitative research, the research problem 
is designed by discussing a phenomenon or concept about often unknown relevant variables 
and theories. The fourth difference is that both types of research adopt different assumptions 
about social science. Quantitative researchers depend on a positivistic approach where the 
research follows an obvious path of linear research under the restructured logic of the 
research. In addition, in quantitative research, variables and hypotheses are identified. In 
contrast, qualitative researchers depend on critical or interpretative social sciences where 
the research follows a non-linear path and emphasises cases, contexts and practical logic 
(Neuman, 2011). Finally, the two types of research have a different design and employ 
different analytical methods. Quantitative research has well-developed methods for analysis 
and is more formalised than is the case for qualitative methods (Punch, 2013). Meanwhile, 
the structure of qualitative research is less strict than that of quantitative research and the 
method is less formalised. 
 
The discussion about whether quantitative or qualitative methods should be utilised is an 
important topic in social sciences. Kvale (1996) argues that there is an interaction between 
quantitative and qualitative methods in the whole research process. He argues that narrative 
and linguistic analyses (qualitative methods) and statistical analysis (quantitative methods) 
can be used in such research. Collis and Hussey (2013) state that the choice of a qualitative 
or quantitative method depends on the researcher's assumptions and objectives. In this 
thesis, the research objectives are related to disclosure practices, the objectives are related 
to the mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices in GCC country-listed firms. The thesis 
investigates a number of firm-specific characteristic factors such as: corporate characteristic 
factors, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors, cultural factors 
(manager’s personal characteristics) and how these factors impact on the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of GCC country listed firms. 
Therefore, a quantitative method is employed to achieve these objectives. 
 Data and methods used in this study 
This section describes the data collection and research methodology relevant to addressing 
the research objectives of this thesis. The data collection approach, including the selection 
of countries and companies to be included in the study, and the years for which annual 
reports were collected, are explained in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 explains the dependent 
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variable definitions for the mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices. Section 5.6 explains 
the research method used to measure the level of mandatory disclosure. It comprises the 
measurement of the level of mandatory disclosure, the selection of the appropriate 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), construction the mandatory disclosure 
index (the dependent variable), the weighting and scoring of the mandatory disclosure 
index, and the independent variables examine to explain the differences in the degree of 
disclosure. The research method used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure is 
explained in Section 5.7. It covers the construction of the voluntary disclosure index (the 
dependent variable), weighting and scoring the voluntary disclosure index, and the 
independent variables examined in order to explain the variation in the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The broad empirical techniques used to examine the hypotheses, outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4, are discussed in more detail in Section 5.8. The chapter concludes with a 
brief summary of the methodology employed in Section 5.9. 
 
 Data collection 
The data for this thesis is obtained from the annual reports of non-financial firms listed on 
GCC country stock markets over the period 2010 to 2013. The secondary data source is 
analysed to enhance our understanding of the extent of mandatory disclosure and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC country-listed firms. The countries 
and the firms selected, and the years for which annual reports are collected are discussed 
below. 
 
5.4.1 The selection of the study countries 
The six GCC member states are selected for analysis in this thesis: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These countries are selected 
because they have all made IFRSs mandatory, but demonstrate variety in relation to the 
year of adoption, the role of each country’s enforcement body, and the role of the auditor 
in promoting compliance with IFRSs. The discussion in chapter 2, reveals that these 
between-state differences can have an impact on the degree of mandatory disclosure 
(IASs/IFRSs). 
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Choosing all of the GCC member states means that the impact of state differences in the 
degree of mandatory disclosure (IASs/IFRSs) and the extent of voluntary disclosure can be 
observed. In addition, since these states are all developing countries, their selection could 
also yield insights into the degree of mandatory disclosure and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure for other developing countries in the region (e.g. Jordan and Egypt), and for 
developing countries in general. The final reason for this selection is that these countries 
are of special interest to the author as a citizen of Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.4.2 Sample selection and time period 
The firms which are the subject of this thesis are selected from GCC states listed firms using 
the Bloomberg database and company websites. A sample of 480 annual reports is collected 
for non-financial listed firms (the top 20 listed firms selected by highest market weight 
index x 6 countries x 4 years: 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013). The industrial classification of 
firms is based on Bloomberg classifications, which includes the following sectors: 
materials, consumer goods, healthcare, industrial, real estate, retail, telecoms, travel and 
leisure, utilities and energy. 
 
For this study, the years for which the annual reports are collected, 2010 to 2013, is based 
on the most recent years available at the time of collection in order to gauge the 
improvement in disclosure levels across GCC country-listed firms. 2013 was an important 
year as it saw an increasing number of IFRS adoptions in the region as every state was 
required to ensure that at least some firms adopted the new IFRSs. Since one purpose of 
this thesis is to explain the degree of mandatory disclosure (IASs/IFRSs) over time, it 
focuses both on the year 2013 and the changes over the three years leading up to that date 
in order to see the improvement in disclosure levels after adopting new IFRS standards in 
the region. 
 
The total initial sample consists of 480 annual reports. As this thesis focuses on non-
financial listed firms, banks, insurance and financial services firms (n = 88) are excluded. 
After the financial firms are excluded for Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, only 14, 13 and 11 
listed firms remain, respectively. Consequently, the total number of sample firms is reduced 
from 480 to 392. The names of the firms included in the study are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.1 illustrates the distribution of the sample across the GCC countries and industrial 
sectors for each year over the period 2010 to 2013. 
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Table 5.1. The distribution of the sample across GCC countries and sectors for each year over the period 2010 to 2013 
Countries 
Sector Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total 
Materials 1(7%) 5 (25%) 3 (23%) 1 (9.1%) 10 (50%) 6 (30%) 26 (27%) 
Consumer Goods 2 (14%) 4 (20%) 0 1 (9.1%) 4 (20%) 3 (15%) 14 (15%) 
Health Care 0 1 (5%) 0 1 (9.1%) 0 1 (5%) 3 (3%) 
Industrial Goods and 
Services 
2 (14%) 5 (25%) 4 (31%) 2 (18.2%) 1 (5%) 5 (25%) 19 (20%) 
Real Estate 0 0 0 1 (9.1%) 0 1 (5%) 2 (2%) 
Retail 3 (22%) 0 1 (8%) 0 1 (5%) 0 5 (5%) 
Telecoms 1 (7%) 2 (10%) 2 (15%) 2 (18.2%) 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 10 (10%) 
Travel and Leisure 5 (36%) 1 (5%) 0 1 (9.1%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 9 (9%) 
Utilities 0 0 1 (8%) 0 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 4 (4%) 
Energy 0 2 (10%) 2 (15%) 2 (18.2%) 0 0 6 (6%) 
Total for each year 14 
(100%) 
20 
(100%) 
13 
(100%) 
11 
(100%) 
20 
(100%) 
20 
(100%) 
98 
(100%) 
Total for four years 56  
(100%) 
80 
(100%) 
52 
(100%) 
44 
(100%) 
80 
(100%) 
80 
(100%) 
392 
(100%) 
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Market capitalisation covered by the sample as percentage to total market capitalisation is 
79% for non-financial GCC listed firms. The highest market capitalisation covered by the 
sample as percentage of total market capitalisation for non-financial firms is for Oman 
(100%), followed by Bahrain (99%), the UAE (97%), Qatar (91%), Saudi Arabia (74%) 
and  Kuwait (63%). Table 5.2 shows total market capitalisation of the sample firms as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation in GCC states. 
 
Table 5.2. Total market capitalisation of the sample firms as a percentage of total 
market capitalisation in GCC states 
GCC 
States 
Total market 
capitalisation of 
non-financial 
firms ($m) 
Total market 
capitalisation of 
the sample firms 
($m) 
Percentage 
Bahrain 2,029,189,129 2,005,104,883 99% 
Kuwait 12,154,869,822 7,675,608,800 63% 
Oman 3,744,478,138 3,744,478,138 100% 
Qatar 298,442,896,128 272,120,357,632 91% 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1,487,487,726,592 1,100,515,874,816 74% 
UAE 173,878,318,400 168,664,777,152 97% 
Total 1,977,737,478,209 1,554,726,201,421 79% 
 
 
 The dependent variables - the mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices 
Coy and Dixon (2004, p.79) state that: 
“Disclosure indices are an oft-applied method in accounting research, 
particularly in studies of annual reports, being used to provide a single figure 
summary indicator either of the entire contents of reports of comparable 
organization or of particular aspects of interest covered by such reports (e.g. 
voluntary disclosure and environmental disclosure”. 
 
Hope (2003) argues that the term disclosure refers to any piece of information released by 
a particular firm. Financial disclosure is a complex concept that cannot be measured 
directly. Hossain et al. (1995) indicate that a disclosure index can be used as a proxy to 
highlight the level of information disclosed by firms. A disclosure index is an appropriate 
tool to explore the level (quantity) and nature (quality) of disclosure. Marston and Shrives 
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(1991) indicate that a disclosure index has various purposes and functions. It could be used 
to determine the level of disclosure among different firms. In addition, it could be used to 
show the degree of compliance with regulations (IASs/IFRSs mandatory disclosure) or to 
measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, an index can include both mandatory 
and voluntary items, according to the purpose of the study. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, disclosure indices are developed based upon developments 
in the existing financial disclosure research (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Soh, 1996; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 
2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). Disclosure indices are developed based on the latest year-
end financial information released by firms. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure items are 
analysed separately in this thesis. The mandatory disclosure items are based on IASs/IFRSs 
requirements. In addition, voluntary disclosure items are categorised according to the 
groups of information concerned such as historical, strategic, financial and social 
responsibility, in order to enable the analysis of voluntary disclosure at a disaggregated 
level (Sukthomya, 2011). 
 
 The measurement of the degree of mandatory disclosure requirements 
The purpose of this section is to explain the method used to address the research questions 
related to the mandatory disclosure part of this study, i.e. the extent to which firms listed on 
the stock exchanges of the GCC countries complied with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements in their annual reports over the period 2010 to 2013. Measuring the degree of 
mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of each GCC country-listed firms for each year 
involves a five-step process: (i) measuring the degree of mandatory disclosure (IASs/ 
IFRSs); (ii) the selection of International Financial Reporting Standards (IASs/IFRSs); (iii) 
construction the mandatory disclosure index (the dependent variable); (iv) weighting and 
scoring the mandatory disclosure index; and (v) computing the independent variables used 
in MD models. A detailed description of each step is given below. 
 
5.6.1 Measuring the degree of mandatory disclosure 
The dependent variable is the degree of mandatory disclosure, measured in terms of a 
mandatory disclosure index. Marston and Shrives (1991) indicate that a well-constructed 
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mandatory disclosure index is a reliable device for measuring firm mandatory disclosure. 
Several studies have used a mandatory disclosure index to measure the level of mandatory 
disclosure (Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Hassaan, 2013). The self-constructed mandatory 
disclosure index is developed based on the applicable and relevant IASs and IFRSs for the 
GCC financial reporting environment and the study period. The mandatory disclosure index 
comprises 325 mandatory items that regulations such as IFRSs/IASs require firms to 
disclose. By the end of 2013, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) had 
issued 41 IASs/IFRSs (IFRS, 2016). Table B1 in Appendix B presents the current status of 
the IASs/IFRSs and their effective dates. 
 
5.6.2 Selection of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Marston and Shrives (1991), Wallace et al. (1994) and Barako et al. (2006) argue that there 
is no single theory that offers guidance on the number and selection of standards for 
inclusion in an IFRS mandatory disclosure index. However, Wallace et al. (1994) argue that 
the selection of standards for inclusion would usually be determined by the motivation for 
the research. 
 
Since all GCC-listed firms are legally required to comply with IFRSs (except for Saudi 
Arabia listed firms which are required to comply with SOCPA), the focus here is on all the 
IFRS mandatory disclosures required in the financial statements and footnotes. However, it 
should be noted that not all the IASs/IFRSs issued at the end of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
were applicable at that date, and, therefore, some standards are not relevant to this study. In 
addition, some standards are not applicable to the GCC financial reporting environment. 
Thus, the selection of IASs/IFRSs for inclusion in the constructed mandatory disclosure 
index is based on the following criteria: 
1. Applicability during the financial years ending 31 December 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
2. Relevance to the motivation of the study. 
3. Applicability and relevance to the GCC country-listed firm financial environment and 
firm practices. 
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Applicability and relevance to the financial year ending 31 December 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013 
Certain standards are not applicable for the study period and are excluded from the 
constructed IFRS mandatory disclosure index. For example, IFRS 7 (Financial 
Instruments) will become effective in January 2017; IFRS 9 (Financial Instruments) will 
become effective in January 2018; IFRS 14 (Regulatory Deferral Accounts) became 
effective in January 2014; IFRS 15 (Revenue from Contracts with Customers) became 
effective in May 2014; and IFRS 16 (Leases) will become effective on 1 January 2019. In 
addition, since the focus of this study is on non-financial firms’ annual reports, IAS 34 
(Interim Financial Reporting) and IAS 30 (Disclosures in the Financial Statements of 
Banks and Similar Financial Institutions) are also not relevant to this study and are 
excluded. 
 
Applicability and relevance to the GCC financial environment 
IASs/IFRSs are designed for application to firms on an international basis and are not, by 
definition, focused specifically on the GCC financial environment. Therefore, some of the 
standards are irrelevant to the GCC financial environment and the practices of GCC country 
listed firms. For the purposes of this thesis, each IAS/IFRS is classified as either applicable 
or not applicable as it can be observed that not all standards are applicable to firms in GCC 
countries. The main reason for this is that most standards are created with reference to 
developed country firms on the basis of the knowledge and experience of firms and auditors 
in those countries. The environment of developing countries is rather different because the 
accounting systems and the relevant regulations are not as well-organised as in developed 
countries. In addition, the accounting systems are not as sophisticated as in developed 
countries (e.g. the US and the UK). Therefore, those standards that are irrelevant to the GCC 
environment have been excluded. 
 
Three steps are used to determine the applicability and relevance of each IFRS to the 
financial environment of GCC country-listed firms: 
1. A review of studies that address the implementation of IAS/IFRS to examine their 
applicability to the financial environment of GCC country listed firms. 
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2. Communication with academic experts and practising professionals to determine the 
applicability of each IAS/IFRS to GCC country listed firms. 
3. To confirm and validate the identification of standards which do not apply, as obtained 
in steps 1 and 2, all of the sample annual reports are examined to identify any disclosures 
relating to such inapplicable standards. 
The process used to determine the applicability and relevance of each IAS/IFRS to the GCC 
country listed firm financial environment reveals that IFRS1, IFRS 2, IFRS 4, IFRS 6, IFRS 
7, IAS 8, IAS 10, IAS 11, IAS 12, IAS 14, IAS 19, IAS 20, IAS 26, IAS 29, IAS 30, IAS 
32, IAS 34, IAS 39 and IAS 41 are not applicable. 
 
IFRS 1 (First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards) technically 
does not apply to GCC-listed firms because any firm requesting listing in a GCC country 
must provide audited financial statements that fully comply with IFRS standards that cover 
at least two years prior to the listing request. IFRS 2 (Share-Based Payment), IFRS 7 
(Financial Instruments: Disclosures), IAS 8 (Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting 
Estimates and Errors), IAS 10 (Events after the Reporting Period), and IAS 11 
(Construction Contracts), IAS 14 (Segment Reporting), IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: 
Presentation), IAS 34 (Interim Financial Reporting) do not apply because they are 
irrelevant or inapplicable to annual reports and most sample members for the period 2010-
2013. As this study focuses on GCC country listed firms, IFRS 4 (Insurance Contracts) and 
IAS 30 (Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions) do not apply because they are outside the focus on non-financial firms in this 
study. IAS 12 (Income Tax) is not applicable to the GCC country listed firm financial 
environment because income taxes are not levied on the income of such firms. Although 
GCC country listed firms are not subject to income tax, all GCC-listed firms are required 
to pay a Zakat (religious tax) at 2.5% of their profit in accordance with Sharia. IAS 19 
(Employee Benefits) and IAS 26 (Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans) 
are not applicable because GCC country listed firms are obliged to follow the local labour 
and social security laws. IAS 29 (Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies), 
IFRS 6 (Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources), IAS 20 (Accounting for 
Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance) and IAS 41 (Agriculture) 
are not applicable to GCC country listed firms because none of the GCC country listed firms 
during the period of sample selection performed any activities related to these standards. 
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Although IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement) is a qualifying 
standard, and all GCC country listed firms are obliged to comply with it, there are no 
presentations or disclosure requirements associated with this standard. 
 
Assessment of the applicability of IFRSs to the GCC country listed firm financial reporting 
environment shows that 19 IAS/IFRS are not relevant to the study period or not applicable 
to the environments of the study firms. Thus, to summarise, six standards were not yet 
effective during the study period. Five standards were irrelevant to the majority of sample 
members. Three standards were inapplicable because they were outside the scope of this 
study. Four standards were excluded because none of the GCC country listed firms during 
the period of sample selection performed any activities related to these standards. One 
standard was excluded because there were no presentations or disclosure requirements 
associated with this standard. In all, only 24 standards established by the end of 2013 are 
applicable to this study. Table 5.3 shows the applicable IASs/IFRSs that are included in this 
study, and Table 5.4 lists the inapplicable IASs/IFRSs that have been excluded from this 
study. Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C present IASs/IFRSs that have been included and 
excluded in this study with justification for exclusion.  
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Table 5.3. IASs/IFRSs included in this study 
IFRS/IAS Number Standard Title 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
IFRS 5 Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 
IFRS 8 Segment Reporting 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 
IAS 2 Inventories 
IAS 7 Cash-flow Statements 
IAS 16 Property, Plant, and Equipment 
IAS 17 Leases 
IAS 18 Revenue 
IAS 21 Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 
IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 
IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 
IAS 33 Earnings Per Share 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
IAS 40 Investment Property  
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Table 5.4. IASs/IFRSs excluded from this study 
IFRS/IAS 
Number 
Standard Title 
IFRS 1 First-Time Adoption of IFRS  
IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral  
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures  
IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 
IAS 10 Events after the Balance Sheet Date 
IAS 11 Construction Contracts 
IAS 12 Income Taxes  
IAS 14 Segment Reporting 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits  
IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants  
IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans  
IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies  
IAS 30 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation 
IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting  
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
IAS 41 Agriculture  
 
5.6.3 Construction the mandatory disclosure index (the dependent variable) 
The degree of mandatory disclosure with IASs/IFRSs is measured using a self-constructed 
mandatory disclosure index, consistent with prior mandatory disclosure studies (Cooke, 
1989b, 1991, 1992; Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; 
Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Hassaan, 2013; Popova 
et al., 2013). The index focuses on mandatory disclosure requirements for the financial 
statements and footnotes. In the construction and development of the mandatory disclosure 
index, the official IASB volume 2010 is used to obtain details about the requirements of 
each IAS/IFRS. Based on these requirements, a comprehensive index is then developed to 
identify the disclosure requirements of each of the 24 standards applicable to the financial 
environment of the GCC country listed firms. This thesis uses a self-constructed checklist 
of 325 mandatory disclosure items, based on the IASs/IFRSs required to be followed by the 
IASB in preparing financial statements for the financial year beginning January 2010. 
 
The Mandatory Disclosure Index (MDINDEX) is constructed to specifically address the 
IFRS required disclosures in the GCC country listed firm financial statements. Each 
IAS/IFRS is scrutinised for mandatory disclosure requirements. Disclosures that are 
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obviously voluntary, or merely encouraged and suggested by IFRS, are not included in the 
MDINDEX. 
 
From the 24 applicable IFRSs, 325 mandatory disclosure requirements are obtained. The 
lowest number of disclosure requirements for a standard is two for IAS 23 (Borrowing 
Costs). The highest number is 42 for IAS 1 (Presentation of Financial Statements). Table 
5.5 shows the number of disclosure requirements for each IFRS in the MDINDEX. The 325 
mandatory disclosures and their information sources are set out in the developed 
MDINDEX (Appendix D). 
 
Table 5.5. Number of disclosure requirements for each IAS/IFRS included in the 
MDINDEX 
 
Standard 
 
Title 
Number of 
disclosure 
requirements 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 16 
IFRS 5 Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations 14 
IFRS 8 Segment Reporting 27 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 9 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 9 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 13 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 14 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 42 
IAS 2 Inventories 8 
IAS 7 Cash-flow Statements 14 
IAS 16 Property, Plant, and Equipment 15 
IAS 17 Leases 21 
IAS 18 Revenue 7 
IAS 21 Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 6 
IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 2 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 9 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 11 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 15 
IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 9 
IAS 33 Earnings Per Share 9 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 14 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 13 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 14 
IAS 40 Investment Property 14 
Total 24 standards 325 requirements 
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The completeness and comprehensiveness of the mandatory disclosure index 
(MDINDEX) 
Two steps are undertaken to validate the MDINDEX checklist. Firstly, to ensure the 
completeness and comprehensiveness of the MDINDEX, a comparison is made between 
the MDINDEX and the Big-4 firm disclosure checklists. The comparison confirms the 
MDINDEX’s completeness and comprehensiveness regarding the disclosure requirements 
of the 24 applicable IFRSs. Secondly, to further validate and ensure its completeness and 
comprehensiveness, two experienced auditors who specialise in the application of 
IASs/IFRSs, were asked to review and check the MDINDEX. 
 
5.6.4 Weighting and scoring the mandatory disclosure index 
Cooke (1989a) argues that the focus of a research study should determine whether to use a 
weighted or an unweighted approach. If the research is targeted at a particular user group, 
the weighted approach is preferable because it will attach a higher weight to items 
considered more important to that group. In contrast, if the research focuses on all users of 
financial statements rather than one particular user group, the unweighted approach is 
preferable because the implied assumption is that each disclosure item is equally important 
across the different groups (Cooke, 1989a). Furthermore, existing research indicates that 
there might be no significant difference between the weighted and unweighted disclosure 
index, especially when the index includes a large number of information items (Firth, 1980; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Abraham, 2008). In addition, a weighted approach might be 
misleading as the relative importance of each item may vary from company to company, 
industry to industry, and from time to time (Abd El-Salam, 1999). Because the focus of this 
thesis is to investigate the degree of voluntary and mandatory disclosure requirements, and 
because mandatory disclosures provide essential information for all financial statement 
users, each mandatory disclosure item is assumed to be of equal importance for all users. In 
addition, as discussed in chapter 3, the majority of mandatory disclosure existing studies in 
developed and developing countries applied unweighted disclosure indices. Based on this 
discussion, and consistent with Cooke (1989a), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Bryant 
(2000), Street and Gray (2001), Glaum and Street (2003), Al-Shammari et al. (2008), 
Alfaraih (2009), Hassaan (2013) and Popova et al. (2013), each disclosure requirement 
mentioned in the MDINDEX is assigned an equal weight. Each disclosure is coded one (1) 
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if the required disclosure has been made by a firm and zero (0) if it has not. If a disclosure 
is not applicable to the firm, the item is dropped from the scoring system for that firm. Two 
steps are taken to mitigate uncertainty in the coding process: 
1. The whole annual report of each company is read carefully. The purpose of reading the 
entire annual report before scoring is to enable the researcher to understand the nature and 
complexity of each firm’s operations and to form an opinion on whether undisclosed items 
applied to the firm or not. This is consistent with existing mandatory disclosure studies 
(Cooke, 1989a; Street et al., 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and 
Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009). 
2. Current figures for each information item are compared with those of the previous year 
in the firm’s annual report. This check is also consistent with existing studies (Wallace et 
al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998, 2000). 
This scoring procedure is based on a careful review of the each firm’s complete annual 
report. Following on from Cooke (1989a), Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001), 
Glaum and Street, (2003), Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Alfaraih (2009), Hassaan (2013) and 
Popova et al. (2013), a firm’s Total Mandatory Disclosure (ܶܯܦ) score for a firm is 
calculated as using Equation 5.1: 
ܶܯܦ௜௧ =  ෍ ݀௜
௠
௜ୀଵ
 
(5.1) 
Where: 
݀ = 1 if item ݀௜ is disclosed 
݀ = 0 if item ݀௜ is not disclosed, and 
݉ ≤ ݊ (see below). 
 
Cooke (1989a) states that a disclosure item is considered irrelevant to a firm if it appears 
that the information disclosure is not mandatory. Therefore, a firm is not penalised for not 
disclosing information that is not applicable to its business. In contrast, if there is evidence 
that a disclosure item is applicable to a firm (for example, if a finance lease is mentioned in 
the annual reports in the finance lease note sections without the related amounts), then ݀௜ = 
0. Cooke (1989a) declares that this approach introduces subjectivity to dichotomous 
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procedures. However, failure to use this approach could lead to more diversified firms 
obtaining greater disclosure scores than they otherwise would do. 
 
After the ܶܯܦ score is obtained for a firm, an index can be constructed to measure that 
firm’s relative disclosure level. The index is the ratio of a firm's actual mandatory disclosure 
score (ܶܯܦ) to the maximum score (ܯܦ) that the firm could achieve by fully complying 
with the IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. As a firm is not penalised for 
omitting a disclosure item that is not relevant or applicable to its business, the maximum 
score (ܯܦ) that a firm can earn will vary from firm to firm. It is computed as follows in 
Equation 5.2: 
 
ܯܦ௜௧ =  ෍ ݀௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
(5.2) 
Where: 
݀ is the expected disclosure item, and 
݊ is the number of items that the firm is required to disclose. 
 
Therefore, each firm’s ܯܦܫܰܦܧܺ is calculated using Equation 5.3 by dividing the total 
number of mandatory disclosures (ܶܯܦ) that the firm provides by the total number of 
Applicable Mandatory Disclosures (ܣܯܦ): 
ܯܦܫܰܦܧ ௜ܺ௧ =
ܶܯܦ௜௧
ܣܯܦ௜௧
 
(5.3) 
ܯܦܫܰܦܧܺ = mandatory disclosure index for firm ݆, 0 ≤ ܯܦܫܰܦܧܺ ≤ 1 
݅ = A number that uniquely identifies each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
 
5.6.5 The independent variables used in mandatory disclosure models 
After determining the degree of mandatory disclosure (IAS/IFRS), the next step is to 
investigate the relationship between the degree of mandatory disclosure and the firm-
specific characteristic factors such as: corporate characteristic factors, ownership structure 
factors, corporate governance factors, and cultural factors (managers’ personal 
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characteristics) to explain why firms differ in the degree of mandatory disclosure they 
produce. The MDINDEX obtained from the self-constructed mandatory checklist is used 
as the dependent variable in a multivariate linear regression model. To test H1–H17, the 
firm characteristics (firm size, industry type, profitability, liquidity, the degree of 
internationality, the identification of firms which consolidate their financial statements, and 
firm age); ownership factors (institutional ownership and state ownership); corporate 
governance factors (board size, board independence and role duality); cultural factors (the 
level of education of the board of directors and financial controller); and the firm’s level of 
voluntary disclosure are employed as independent variables. Table 5.6 summarises the 
definition of the independent variables used to explain the variation with IAS/IFRS 
mandatory disclosure across GCC country listed firms. 
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Table 5.6. Definitions of the mandatory disclosure independent variables 
Variable Variable label used in 
your econometric models 
Definition  
Firm size SIZE Total assets. 
 
 
 
Industry type 
 
IND1 
 
 
IND2 
 
 
IND3 
Manufacturing industry firm. Dummy variable for 
manufacturing firms (1) and (0) otherwise. 
 
Services industry firm. Dummy variable for 
services firms (1) and (0) otherwise. 
 
Energy industry firm. Dummy variable for energy 
firms (1) and (0) otherwise. 
 
Probability (ROA) 
 
 
ROA 
 
Return on assets = net income/total assets. 
 
Liquidity (Current 
ratio) 
LIQ Current ratio = current assets/current liabilities. 
 
International listening 
status 
IL Dummy variable for firms listed on an 
international stock exchange (1) and (0) 
otherwise. 
International sales IS Dummy variable for firms that have international 
sales (1) and (0) otherwise. 
Consolidated financial 
statement firms 
CFS Dummy variable for firms that have consolidated 
financial statements (1) and (0) otherwise. 
Audit firm size AUDIT Dummy variable for ‘big four’ audit firms 
(1) and (0) otherwise. 
Firm age AGE Firm age = current year minus year incorporated. 
Institutional share 
ownership 
 
IOWN The proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors to the total number of shares issued. 
 
State share Ownership 
 
SOWN The proportion of shares owned by the 
government to the total number of shares issued. 
Board size BOARDS The number of company directors on the board. 
Board independence BOARDIND The ratio of independent non-executive directors 
to the total number of directors on the board. 
 
Role duality DUALITY Dummy variable when the firm’s CEO serves as 
board chairman (1) and (0) otherwise. 
Education level of 
board of directors 
EDUBOARD The ratio of directors qualified in business or 
accounting to the total number of directors. 
Education level of 
financial controllers 
EDUFIN The ratio of financial controllers qualified in 
business or accounting to the total number of 
financial controllers. 
Level of voluntary 
disclosure  
LVD The total voluntary disclosure index scores for 
each firm for each year. 
Years 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 2010, 0 = 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 2011, 0 = 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 2012, 0 = 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 2013, 0 = 
otherwise. 
 
Notes: The source of information for the independent variables are firm annual reports or an annual guide 
published by the respective GCC country stock exchanges. Data relates to financial year-ends in each case. 
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The definition, measurement, and justification for including each independent variable that 
are used in MD models are discussed below.  
 
Firm size 
The firm’s total assets at the end of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are used to measure the firm 
size. This measure is consistent with existing studies (Cooke, 1991; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Palmer, 2008; Gallery et al., 2008).  
 
Industry type 
The Bloomberg database divides the GCC country listed firms into 10 sectors: materials, 
consumer goods, healthcare, industrial goods and services, real estate, retail, telecoms, 
travel and leisure, utilities and energy. However, due to the similarities among the GCC 
country sector operations, and to avoid categories with a small number of firms, this study 
combines the 10 sectors into three different categories: manufacturing, services and energy. 
Manufacturing firms are used as a default. Two dummy variables are used to explore the 
influence of industry categories on the degree of mandatory disclosures. 
 
Probability (ROA) 
Profitability is measured as the rate of return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of net 
income to average total assets, consistent with existing studies (Wallace et al., 1994; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Naser et al., 
2002; Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-Shammari et al. 2008; and Palmer 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; 
Hassaan, 2013; Popova et al., 2013). Return on equity (ROE), which is the ratio of net 
income to average common shareholders’ equity, is considered as an alternative way to 
measure profitability. ROA is used in this thesis to examine the influence of profitability on 
the level of mandatory disclosures. 
 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 
Liquidity (current ratio) is measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the 
end of the financial year. This measure is commonly used in the existing studies (Wallace 
et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Hassaan, 2013; Popova et al., 2013). 
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The degree of internationality (international listing and international sales) 
Some existing studies examine the degree of internationality in terms of whether the firm is 
listed on a foreign stock market (Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1995; Tarca, 2004; Amiraslani 
et al., 2013). Other studies explore internationality in terms of the proportion of foreign 
sales (Meek et al., 1995; Street and Gray, 2001). In this thesis, both measures (international 
listing and international sales) are used to examine the influence of internationality on the 
level of mandatory disclosures. This is captured in each case by a dummy variable (1) for 
firms that are listed on an international stock exchange or that have international sales, and 
(0) otherwise. 
 
Consolidated financial statement firms 
A dummy variable is used in this thesis to examine the impact of firms that have 
consolidated financial statements on the degree of mandatory disclosures. The lack of 
empirical evidence in the existing literature on this factor for both developed and emerging 
capital markets points to the need for further investigation here. 
 
Audit firm size 
Audit firm size is measured as a dummy variable coded one (1) if the company is audited 
by one of the Big-4 audit firms, and zero (0) otherwise, consistent with existing studies 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009). However, this variable is not included in the 
regression analysis models as 84% of the selected firms are audited by Big-4 audit firms. 
As most of the selected samples are audited by an international affiliation (Big Four), 
auditor size variable (Big Four vs. Non-Big Four) could not be showing a variation on the 
degree of mandatory disclosures. Thus, this variable will be excluded from the regression 
analysis. 
 
Firm age 
A firm’s age is measured as the number of years that have passed since the firm was 
founded, consistent with existing studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Popova et al., 2013). It gauges the length of 
establishment of a given firm. 
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The proportion of institutional share ownership 
The proportion of institutional ownership is measured as the ratio of shares owned by 
institutional investors to the total number of shares issued at the year end. This measure is 
commonly used by existing studies (Barako et al., 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). 
 
The proportion of state share ownership 
Consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), Makhija and Patton (2004), Said et al. (2009), and 
Ntim et al. (2012a), the proportion of state ownership is measured as the ratio of shares 
owned by the government to the total number of shares issued. 
 
Board size 
Board size is measured by a number of company directors on the board. This measure is 
consistent with existing studies (Barako et al., 2006; Kent and Stewart; 2008; Laksamana, 
2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Gao and Kling, 2012; Matocsy et al., 2012). 
 
The degree of board independence 
The degree of board independence is measured as the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors. This measure is commonly used in existing studies 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Anderson et al., 
2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; 
Felo, 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010; 2011; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). 
 
Role duality 
A dummy variable is used to examine the impact of role duality on the level of mandatory 
disclosures. A firm is coded 1 when the firm’s CEO also serves as board chairman, and 0 
otherwise, consistent with existing studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; 
Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and Elamasry, 2008). 
 
Education level of the board of directors 
The level of education of the board of directors is measured as the ratio of directors qualified 
in business or accounting to the total number of directors, consistent with existing studies 
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(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chiang and He, 2010). The lack of empirical evidence with 
respect to this relationship points to the need for further investigation in this thesis. 
 
Education level of the financial controllers 
The level of education of the financial controllers is measured as the proportion of financial 
controllers in a firm qualified in business or accounting to the total number of financial 
controllers. This measure is consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002). The paucity of 
research concerning the relationship between the education of financial directors and the 
levels of mandatory disclosure supports the further empirical study in this thesis. 
 
Level of voluntary disclosure  
The level of voluntary disclosure is measured by the total voluntary disclosure index score 
for each firm for each year (defined in the next section). In this study, the voluntary 
disclosure level is included to examine the interaction between mandatory disclosure level 
and the level of voluntary disclosure. The interaction between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures has been examined by number of existing researchers (Einhorn, 2005; Dye, 
1985, 1986; Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Naser et al., 2003; Al-Razeen et al., 2004; Yu, 
2011). 
 
Time 
Year dummy variables are designed to capture the fixed effects of any changes in the level 
of mandatory disclosure over time. These changes can be attributed to different positions 
over time in relation to the application of IASs/IFRSs, to the role of the audit function, to 
the effectiveness of the enforcement bodies, or to other unspecified factors. Year dummy 
variables are similarly used by Inchausti (1997) and Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005). Year 
2010 is used as a default. Three dummy variables are used to explore the influence of years 
on the level of mandatory disclosures. 
 
 The measurement of the extent of voluntary disclosure 
The section clarifies the method used to gauge the extent of firm voluntary disclosure for 
the purposes of addressing the extent to which GCC country listed firms voluntarily disclose 
information in their annual reports over the period 2010 to 2013. Measuring the level of 
voluntary information disclosure in the annual reports of each listed firm and each year 
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involves a three-step process: (i) Construction of the voluntary disclosure index (the 
dependent variable); (ii) scoring the voluntary information disclosure items; and (iii) the 
independent variables used in VD models. A detailed description of each step is given 
below. 
 
5.7.1 Construction of the voluntary disclosure index (the dependent variable) 
Cooke and Wallace (1989, p. 51) state that “financial disclosure is an abstract concept that 
cannot be measured directly”. The difficulty in measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure 
is a major limitation of studies in this area. In order to understand, analyse and compare the 
voluntary disclosure practices of different firms, a quantifiable measure is needed. A 
voluntary disclosure index is applied to the annual reports of firms to evaluate their 
voluntary disclosure practices. A voluntary disclosure index was first developed by Cerf 
(1961) and it has since been used in many studies in different countries over different 
periods of time (as discussed in chapter 4). Despite limitations relating to the subjectivity 
involved in the selection of voluntary disclosure items and the measurement process, the 
use of a disclosure index for measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure is widely accepted 
in the financial disclosure research literature. 
 
In order to assess voluntary disclosure level in GCC country listed firm annual reports, a 
disclosure index is constructed. The voluntary disclosure literature demonstrates that a self-
constructed disclosure index is a widely used method to assess the extent of voluntary 
information disclosed in firms’ annual reports (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006; Al-Shammari, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010b; Lan et al., 2013; Alotaibi, 2014).  A major 
step in the construction of the voluntary disclosure index is the selection of information 
items that may be disclosed voluntarily by GCC country listed firms in their annual reports 
and which are relevant to the GCC country firm environment. Wallace (1988, p. 354) argues 
that there is no general theory to guide what information should be considered when 
deciding upon a list of information items for inclusion in a disclosure index. 
 
To ensure that the procedure for constructing the voluntary disclosure index in this study is 
reliable, certain criteria for selecting disclosure items are developed: 
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(i) There should be theoretical and/or empirical support for including such items. 
(ii) The items have to be applicable to the voluntary disclosure of GCC country listed firms. 
(iii) The items should not be specified for disclosure in firm annual reports by any regulatory 
bodies. 
(iv) The items are not customised to the demands of any specific group of users. 
(v) There should be acceptable variability in the disclosure of such items across the sample 
firms. 
 
Once the criteria for the selection of disclosure items is established, the construction of the 
voluntary disclosure checklist can be constructed. The process starts with a review of 
existing studies on corporate voluntary disclosure in both developed and developing 
countries in order to set out the theoretical and empirical underpinning for the checklist. 
Next, the voluntary disclosure checklist is benchmarked to checklists constructed in the 
existing research (Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1988; 
Cooke, 1989, 1992; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 
1995; Botosan, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Depoers, 
2000; Chau and Gray, 2001; Robb, Single and Zarkeski, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Hope, 2003; Naser 
and Nuseibeh, 2003; Khanna, Palepu and Srinvasan, 2004; Xiao, Yang and Chow, 2004; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Here, greater focus is placed on studies that investigate the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC country listed firms (Hussain, et al., 2002; Al-
Qahtani, 2006; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Abd-El-Razik, 2009; Hossain and Hammami, 
2009). 
 
The voluntary disclosure index is based on the latest information released by GCC country 
non-financial listed firms in their annual reports. The final voluntary disclosure checklist 
contains 129 items, which can be divided into 13 main groups as follows: (1) general 
information; (2) financial overview and historical information; (3) ratios and other analyses; 
(4) projected and management information; (5) market-based information; (6) future 
prospects; (7) acquisitions and disposals; (8) research and development; (9) information 
about directors; (10) employee information; (11) social policy and value-added information; 
(12) segmental information; and (13) foreign currency information. The voluntary 
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disclosure checklist is presented in Appendix E. The voluntary item groups are presented 
in Table 5.7.  
Table 5.7. Voluntary disclosure items index groups 
Group Number 
of 
voluntary 
items 
 
Percentage 
% 
Group 1 General information 10 8% 
Group 2 Financial overview and historical 
information 
14 11% 
Group 3 Ratios and other analysis 16 12% 
Group 4 Projected and management 
information 
16 12% 
Group 5 Market-based information 11 9% 
Group 6 Future Prospects 13 10% 
Group 7 Acquisitions and disposals 5 4% 
Group 8 Research and development 6 5% 
Group 9 Information about directors 6 5% 
Group 10 Employee information 12 9% 
Group 11 Social policy and value-added 
information 
7 5% 
Group 12 Segmental information 8 6% 
Group 13 Foreign currency information 5 4% 
Total voluntary items 129 100% 
 
It can be seen from Tables 5.5 and 5.7, respectively, that the mandatory disclosure items 
constitute 325 items (72%), and the voluntary disclosure items constitute only 129 items 
(28%). This difference is due to the nature of IAS/IFRS, which is related to the mandatory 
information disclosed in the financial statements and their notes. In the existing literature, 
the proportion of mandatory and voluntary disclosure items varies, as shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8. Mandatory and voluntary items used in existing disclosure studies 
Study Number of 
mandatory items 
Number of 
voluntary items 
Total number of items 
Cooke (1989a) 77 34% 147 66% 224 100% 
Cooke (1992) 86 54% 79 46% 165 100% 
Ahmed (1996) 94 63% 56 37% 150 100% 
Al-Mulhem 
(1997) 
77 47% 86 53% 163 100% 
Inchausti (1997) 30 60% 20 40% 50 100% 
Hooks, Coy and 
Davey (2002) 
13 23% 44 77% 57 100% 
Omar (2007) 278 84% 53 16% 331 100% 
 
Sutthachai and 
Cooke (2009) 
219 83% 47 19% 264 100% 
 
 
The current regulations in GCC countries, especially those applying IASs/IFRSs and the 
major changes in GCC country stock markets, are the main reasons for the increasing 
number of mandatory items and the decreasing number of voluntary items in the disclosure 
index. Inchausti (1997) reports a similar observation for Spain, arguing that the impact of 
the new regulations introduced in 1989 has been to improve the quality of annual reports, 
as items that were previously voluntary have been made mandatory. Inchausti's index 
includes 50 items, 30 of which are compulsory and 20 of which are voluntary, and explains 
that in 1989, 14 items of the disclosure index (28%) are compulsory, and in 1991 this figure 
increased to 30 items (60%). Suphakasem (2008) develops a disclosure index of 191 items 
containing both mandatory and voluntary disclosure items, all of which are related to 
corporate governance disclosure. A disclosure index created by Sutthachai and Cooke 
(2009) consists of 219 mandatory items and 47 voluntary items. The 219 mandatory items 
contain 49 items that changed from voluntary to mandatory during the period of their study 
(1993-2002). Therefore, these 49 items are excluded in their study to ensure that the levels 
of disclosure in different years are comparable. Disclosure indices developed in previous 
studies provide the basis for constructing a disclosure checklist in this thesis. 
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In this thesis, then, both mandatory and voluntary disclosure items are studied. The majority 
of items in this study are mandatory (325 items, 72%) while the rest are voluntary (129 
items, 28%). The majority of mandatory items are from the following groups: general 
information, balance sheet information, income statement information, cash flow 
information, changes in equity statements information, other statements, supplementary 
information, and the notes. The explanation for this could is the nature of the IASs/IFRSs 
which are concerned with information in financial statements and their notes. The 
information in voluntary disclosure checklist contains 129 items, which can be divided into 
13 main groups, depends on the firm’s disclosure policies. Hence, the disclosure of such 
information is voluntary and varies among firms. 
 
The information within the both indices is varied in nature. General information and 
management and projected information contain mostly qualitative information. Descriptive 
data on the companies’ activities, strategies, plans, directors, managements, products and 
productivity are the main elements in these groups. However, some information is 
quantitative, especially that related to projected information, such as cash flow forecasts. 
The balance sheet, income statement, cash flow, and changes in equity information are 
quantitative by nature, and explanatory notes about this information are given in the 
supplementary information which interprets these figures. The other groups, i.e. financial 
history information, ratios and other analyses, and market-based information comprise 
quantitative data in the form of figures and charts about the company and its relationship 
with the market. 
 
5.7.2 Weighting and scoring the voluntary disclosure index 
The second important step is the measurement process after the voluntary disclosure 
checklist is constructed. This section is concerned with the approach and strategies 
employed in the measurement process, including a discussion of the weighting approach, 
and the manner in which non-applicable items are treated. A scoring sheet is prepared in 
order to evaluate the extent of voluntary disclosure in the firm annual reports. There is a 
wide debate on how to weight a disclosure index. The rationale for this approach is that 
different information might not be equally relevant or important in the voluntary disclosure 
index. Some existing studies apply a disclosure index weighted by the opinions of groups 
of users such as financial analysts (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; 
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Malone et al., 1993). However, having financial analysts assigning weights to the disclosure 
index means that the information needs of analysts alone are fulfilled, potentially ignoring 
the needs of other groups of users. Weighting is the perception of a specific group of users, 
which may not be applicable to all users of the corporate annual reports. Firer and Meth 
(1986) argue that there are external factors that cause changes in perceptions. They also find 
that the perceptions of financial analysts, who assign weights to disclosure indices, also 
differ in relation to institutional characteristics and countries. In addition, weights are 
assigned by respondents in a non-decisive situation. Therefore, the results are hypothetical 
and may not reflect the significance of the items to actual decision making. 
 
There is much discussion in the literature concerning the subjectivity of the weighting 
approach related to voluntary disclosure index. Cooke and Wallace (1989) state that there 
are other factors that affect the level of importance of the information including the entities, 
users, industry, country, and time of the study. Therefore, assigning weights to the 
disclosure items may be misleading. In addition, Marston and Shrives (1991) criticise the 
idea, declaring that the weighting approach cannot achieve the level of measurement of an 
interval scale as an item rated as a four has no reason to be four times as important as an 
item rated as a one. The judgement of researchers who assign the weights may also affect 
the validity of the weighted indices. Dhaliwal (1980) provides evidence of significantly 
different weights assigned by financial analysts to some items of information. Different user 
groups may have different views on the importance of disclosure items. Cooke (1989b, P. 
115) states that “clearly one class of user will attach different weights to an item of 
disclosure than another class of user”. 
 
Due to the discussion above, the unweighted approach is argued to be an appropriate 
approach for this thesis. The focus of this study is not on a particular group of users, but all 
users of corporate annual reports. Therefore, every item in the disclosure checklist is 
assumed to be equally important. This approach, the unweighted approach, is employed and 
supported by several existing studies for both developed and developing countries (see 
chapter 4). In addition, a number of existing studies test a weighted index versus an 
unweighted index, and find no significant difference in the results (Spero, 1979; Firth, 1980; 
Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 
1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Barako et al., 2006). 
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A dichotomous procedure is applied in order to compare the items on the disclosure 
checklist with the contents of the annual reports. Firms are awarded a 1 if they disclose a 
certain item and 0 if they do not disclose it when that item is applicable. Firms are not 
penalised for items that are irrelevant to them. Therefore, there are two different scores for 
the case of non-disclosure, either 0 if the item is relevant to that firm or no score in the case 
of being not-applicable (N/A). The applicability of the item concerned is an important issue 
in the application of the dichotomous procedure (Meek et al., 1995). The decision to assign 
N/A to the disclosure score may create a judgemental element in the scoring procedure; 
however, it can provide a more realistic assessment of corporate disclosure than a strict 
dichotomous approach (Cooke, 1992). In order to determine the non-applicable items 
correctly, Cooke (1989b; 1992) suggests that a review of the whole annual report is 
necessary. Therefore, a disclosure item is coded as N/A only after the whole annual report 
has been examined and no similar information has been found in any part of the annual 
report. A firm’s Total Voluntary Disclosure (ܸܶܦ) score is calculated as follows in 
Equation 5.4: 
ܸܶܦ௜௧ = ෍ ௜ܺ௝
௡ೕ
௜ୀଵ
 
(5.4) 
Where 
ܸܶܦ = total score for firm j 
௝݊= number of items applicable for firm ݆ 
௜ܺ௝ =1 if the item ݅ of company ݆ is disclosed, and 0 otherwise 
 
After receiving the total score, the Voluntary Disclosure Index (ܸܦܫܰܦܧܺ) is calculated 
by computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the number of items applicable for each 
firm using Equation 5.5. The number of Applicable Voluntary Disclosures (ܣܸܦ) can also 
be viewed as the maximum possible score attainable for a firm. The value of a disclosure 
index can range from zero to one. A higher disclosure score shows the greater extent of 
disclosure. 
 
ܸܦܫܰܦܧ ௜ܺ௧ =
ܸܶܦ௜௧
ܣܸܦ௜௧
 
(5.5) 
240 
 
Where 
ܸܦܫܰܦܧܺ = voluntary disclosure index for firm ݆, 0 ≤ ܸܦܫܰܦܧܺ ≤ 1  
݅ = A number that uniquely identifies each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
 
5.7.3 The independent variables used in voluntary disclosure models 
After determining the extent of voluntary disclosure, the next step is to examine the 
relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the corporate characteristics 
factors, ownership structure factors and corporate governance factors to explain why firms 
differ in their voluntary disclosure level. The ܸܦܫܰܦܧܺ obtained from the self-constructed 
checklist is used as the dependent variable in a multivariate linear regression model. To test 
H18-H34, the firm-specific characteristics such as: corporate characteristic factors, (firm 
size, industry type, leverage, profitability, liquidity, assets-in-place, international listing 
firms and age); ownership factors (director ownership, institutional ownership, and state 
ownership); corporate governance factors (board size, board independence, family 
members and role duality); and the degree of mandatory disclosure are employed as the 
independent variables. Table 5.9 summaries the independent variable definitions that are 
used to explain the variation in the level of GCC country listed firm voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 5.9. Definitions of the voluntary disclosure independent variables 
Variable Variable label used in your 
econometric models 
Definition 
Firm size SIZE Total assets. 
 
 
Industry type 
IND1 
 
 
 
IND2 
 
 
IND3 
Manufacturing industry firm. Dummy 
variable for manufacturing firms (1) and 
(0) otherwise. 
 
Services industry firm. Dummy variable 
for services firms (1) and (0) otherwise. 
 
Energy industry firm. Dummy 
variable for energy firms (1) and 
(0) otherwise. 
Leverage LEV Long-term debt to owners' 
equity ratio. 
Probability 
(ROA) 
ROA  
Return on assets = net income/total 
assets. 
 
Liquidity 
(Current ratio) 
LIQ Current ratio = current assets/current 
liabilities. 
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Variable Variable label used in your 
econometric models 
Definition 
 
Assets-in-
place 
AIP The ratio of the book value of 
fixed assets (net of depreciation) 
to the book value of total assets. 
Multiple 
listening 
status 
ML Dummy variable for firms listed 
on an international stock 
exchange (1) and (0) otherwise. 
Firm age AGE Firm age = current year minus 
year incorporated. 
Director share 
ownership 
DOWN The proportion of shares owned 
by the CEO and executive 
directors to the total number of 
shares issued. 
Institutional 
share 
ownership 
 
IOWN The proportion of shares owned by 
institutional investors to the total 
number of shares issued. 
 
State share 
ownership 
 
SOWN The proportion of shares owned 
by the government to the total 
number of shares issued. 
Foreign share 
ownership 
FOWN The proportion of shares owned 
by foreigners to the total number 
of shares issued. 
Board size BOARDS The number of company 
directors on the board. 
Board 
independence 
BOARDIND The ratio of independent non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors 
on the board. 
 
Family 
members on 
board 
FAMILY The ratio of family members to 
the total number of directors. 
Role duality DUALITY Dummy variable when the 
firm’s CEO serves as board 
chairman (1) and (0) otherwise. 
Level of 
mandatory 
disclosure 
LMD The total mandatory disclosure 
index scores for each firm for 
each year. 
Years 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 
2010, 0 = otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 
2011, 0 = otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 
2012, 0 = otherwise. 
Dummy variable coded 1 for the year 
2013, 0 = otherwise. 
 
Notes: The source of information for the independent variables are firm annual reports or an annual guide 
published by the respective GCC country stock exchanges. Data relates to financial year-ends in each case. 
 
The definition, measurement, and justification for including each independent variable that 
are used in VD models are discussed below. 
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Firm size 
The firm’s total assets at the year end of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are used as a proxy for 
the firm’s size. This measure is consistent with existing studies in both developed capital 
markets (Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) and emerging capital markets 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). 
 
Industry type 
The Bloomberg administrator has divided the GCC-listed firms into ten sectors: materials, 
consumer goods, healthcare, industrial goods and services, real estate, retail, telecom, travel 
and leisure, utilities and energy. However, due to the similarities among GCC-sector 
operations, and to avoid categories with a small number of firms, this study combines these 
sectors into three different categories. These three different categories are manufacturing, 
services and energy. Manufacturing firms are used as a default. Two dummy variables are 
used to examine the effect of industry categories on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to owners' equity. This measure is used 
in existing studies (Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Hanifa 
and Cooke, 2002; Ismail, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Sutthachai and 
Cooke, 2009; Juhmani, 2013). Leverage is also measured by the total debt to total assets 
ratio; this ratio is considered as an alternative way to measure the leverage. 
 
Profitability (ROA) 
Profitability is measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of net 
income to average total assets. This measure is used in many existing studies (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002; End and Mak, 2003; 
Barako et al., 2006; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Akhtaruddin et 
al., 2009; Aly et al., 2010; Omar and Simon, 2011; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Waweru, 2014). Return on equity (ROE), which is the ratio of 
net income to average common shareholders’ equity, is considered as an alternative way to 
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measure profitability. ROA is used in this thesis to examine the influence of profitability on 
the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 
Liquidity (current ratio) is measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the 
end of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. This measure is commonly used in existing studies 
(Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Naser et 
al., 2002; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Aly et al., 2010). 
 
Assets-in-place 
Assets-in-place is measured by the ratio of the book value of fixed assets (net of 
depreciation) to the book value of total assets. This measure is consistent with an existing 
study (Chow and Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al-
Shammari, 2008; Hossain and Hammami, 2009). 
 
Multiple listing status  
A dummy variable is used in this study to examine the multiple listing status. A dummy 
variable (1) is assigned to firms listed on a multiple stock exchange and (0) otherwise. This 
measure is used in many existing studies (Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1992; Hossain et al, 1994; 
Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Collet and Hasky, 
2005; Omar, 2007). 
 
Firm age 
The firm’s age is measured as the number of years that have passed since the firm was 
founded through the end of each year. This measure is consistent with existing studies 
(Prencipe, 2004; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Galani 
et al., 2011). 
 
The proportion of director share ownership 
The proportion of director ownership is measured by the ratio of shares owned by the CEO 
and executive directors to the total number of shares issued at the end of 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013. This measure is commonly used by existing studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). 
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The proportion of institutional share ownership 
The proportion of institutional ownership is measured by the ratio of shares owned by 
institutional investors to the total number of shares issued at the end of 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013. This measure is commonly used by existing studies (Barako et al., 2006; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). 
 
The proportion of state share ownership 
Consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), Makhija and Patton (2004), Said et al. (2009) and 
Ntim et al. (2012a), the proportion of state ownership is measured by the ratio of shares 
owned by government to the total number of shares issued. 
 
The proportion of foreign share ownership 
The proportion of foreign ownership is measured by the ratio of shares owned by foreigners 
to the total number of shares issued at the end of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. This measure 
is commonly used by existing studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; 
Barako, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Xiao and Yuan, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; 
Dhouibi and Mamoghli, 2013). This variable will not be included in the regression analysis 
models because the mean of foreign ownership in GCC-listed firms is too low at 3%, which 
indicates that GCC-listed firms are in the early stages of attracting foreign investors. 
 
Board size 
Board size is measured by number of corporate directors on the board. This measure is 
consistent with many existing studies (Barako et al., 2006; Kent and Stewart, 2008; 
Laksamana, 2008, Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Gao and Kling, 2012; Matocsy et al., 
2012). 
 
The degree of board independence 
The degree of board independence is measured by the ratio of non-executive 
directors/independence to the total number of directors. This measure is commonly used by 
existing studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; 
Anderson et al., 2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Lim et 
al., 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Ezat and El-
Masry, 2008; Felo, 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010, 2011; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). 
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The degree of family members on board 
The degree of family members are measured by the ratio of family members to the total 
number of directors. This measure is consistent with existing studies (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 
2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). 
 
Role duality 
A dummy variable is used to examine the impact of role duality on the level of voluntary 
disclosures. A firm is coded with (1) when the firm’s CEO serves as the board’s chairman 
and (0) otherwise. This measure is consistent with many existing studies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and 
Elamasry, 2008). 
 
Level of mandatory disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure degree is measured by the total mandatory disclosure index score for 
each firm for each year. In this study, the mandatory disclosure level is used to examine the 
interaction between the level of voluntary disclosure and the degree of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. The interaction between voluntary and mandatory disclosures is examined by 
existing researchers (Einhorn, 2005; Dye, 1985, 1986; Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Naser et 
al., 2003; Al-Razeen et al., 2004; Yu, 2011). 
 
Time  
Year dummy variables are designed to capture the fixed effects of any changes in the extent 
of voluntary disclosure over time. Year 2010 is used as a default. Three dummy variables 
are used to explore the influence of years on the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
 Econometric modelling techniques 
A number of econometric modelling techniques can be used to analyse data and to test the 
research hypotheses of this thesis. Univariate and multivariate analysis techniques are 
widely used by researchers in existing studies to test the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in annual reports (dependent variable) and the 
corporate characteristic factors, ownership structure factors, and corporate governance 
factors (independent variables) (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Cooke, 1989a; Akhtaruddin, 
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2005; Owusu-Ansah, 1998, 2005; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Al-Shammari 
et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Hassaan, 2013). In this thesis, both univariate and multivariate 
statistical analyses are performed to investigate the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures and the independent variables.  
 
5.8.1 Univariate analysis 
Univariate analysis is used to examine the relationship between a single independent 
variable and the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure (dependent variable). This 
study applies two types of univariate analysis: descriptive analysis for the dependent and 
independent variables, which include mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation, 
plus correlation analysis (the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient). A non-
parametric univariate test, and the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient are 
performed to investigate the significance of the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in firm annual reports (dependent variable) and each 
of the independent variable. A correlation coefficient is a statistical tool that describes how 
strongly variables are related to one another (Brown et al., 1989, p. 255). The Pearson 
correlation matrix is a basic tool to detect the problem of multicollinearity. The rule of 
thumb for detecting multicollinearity problem is when the correlation coefficient exceeds 
0.8 (Gujarati, 2009). 
 
5.8.2 Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis “refers to a group of statistical techniques for handling three or more 
variables at a time” (Kervin, 1992, p. 614). More precisely, multivariate analysis is 
concerned with testing the linear relationship between a single dependent variable and a 
combined set of independent variables. Multivariate techniques have emerged as a powerful 
tool to analyse data represented in terms of multiple variables (Kothari, 2004). According 
to Rencher (2002), multivariate analysis is more powerful than univariate analysis, and 
enables the researcher to explore the combined performance of the variables, and to 
determine the impact of each variable in the presence of the others. 
 
A multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression modelling approach is frequently 
used in many existing disclosure studies to assess the effect of firm-specific characteristics 
247 
 
on the extent of different disclosure levels (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; 
Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Depoers, 2000; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, 2008; Al-Shammari 
et al., 2008; Alfaraih, 2009; Hassaan, 2013; Popova et al., 2013). The OLS regression 
approach, as defined by Hair et al. (2007, p. 374), “is a relatively simple mathematical 
technique that makes sure the straight line will best represent the relationship between the 
multiple independent variables and the single dependent variable”. Thus, multiple 
regression models can be used to predict a single dependent variable using a set of many 
independent variables. Therefore, a multivariate OLS linear regression model with robust 
standard errors is used in this thesis to test the simultaneous effect of 17 corporate 
characteristic factors (firm size, industry type, profitability, liquidity, internationality, 
consolidated financial statement firms and age); ownership structure factors (institutional 
ownership and state ownership); corporate governance factors (board size, board 
independence and role duality); cultural factors (education of board of directors and 
financial controllers), and firm’s level of voluntary disclosure and the level of voluntary 
disclosure on the degree of overall mandatory disclosure requirements. It is used to 
determine which of these independent variables is significant in explaining variation in the 
mandatory disclosure levels among GCC country listed firms. The multivariate OLS 
regression model for mandatory disclosure is represented by is represented by Equation 5.6: 
 
ܯܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଵ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଷ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  +  ߚସ ܫܰܦ3௜௧  + ߚହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  
+  ߚ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚ଻ ܫܮ௜௧  +  ߚ଼ ܫ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଽ ܥܨ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵ଴ ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+  ߚଵଵ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  + ߚଵଶ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  + ߚଵଷ ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵସ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  
+  ߚଵହ ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଵ଺ ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ௜௧  +  ߚଵ଻ ܧܦܷܨܫ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵ଼ ܸܦ௜௧  
+ Ɛ௜௧  
(5.6) 
Where 
݅ = A number that uniquely identifies each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܯܦ = Mandatory disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
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ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܴܱܣ = Return on assets 
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܫܮ = International listing 
ܫܵ = International sales 
ܥܨܵ = Consolidated financial stalemates 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independent 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ = Education of board of directors 
ܧܦܷܨܫܰ = Education of financial controllers 
ܸܦ = Level of voluntary disclosure 
Ɛ = Error term 
 
With regard to the voluntary disclosure model, the multivariate OLS linear model is used 
in this study to test the simultaneous effect of 16 corporate characteristic factors (firm size, 
industry type, leverage, profitability, liquidity, assets in place, multiple listing status, firm 
age); ownership structure factors (director ownership, institutional ownership, state 
ownership); corporate governance factors (board size, board independence, family 
members and role duality), and the degree of mandatory disclosure on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. It is used to determine which of these independent variables is 
significant in explaining variation in the voluntary disclosure levels among GCC country 
listed firms. The multivariate OLS regression model for voluntary disclosure is given by by 
Equation 5.7: 
ܸܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଶ଴ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଵ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଶଶ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  +  ߚଶଷ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ + ߚଶସ ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧
+  ߚଶହ ܴܱܣ +  ߚଶ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  + ߚଶ଻ ܣܫܲ +  ߚଶ଼  ܯܮ ௜௧ +  ߚଶଽ  ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+  ߚଷ଴ ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଵ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଶ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଷ  ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  
+  ߚଷସ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  +  ߚଷହ  ܨܣܯܫܮ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷ଺  ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷ଻ ܯܦ௜௧  
+  Ɛ௜௧ 
(5.7) 
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Where 
݅ = A number that uniquely identifies each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܸܦ = Voluntary disclosure index; 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܮܧܸ = Long-term debt to owners' equity ratio 
ܴܱܣ = Return on assets 
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܣܫܲ = Assets-in-place; 
ܯܮ = multiple listing (1 if multiple listing and 0 if otherwise); 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܦܱܹܰ = Director ownership 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independence 
ܨܣܯܫܮܻ = Family members 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܯܦ = Level of mandatory disclosure 
Ɛ = Error term 
 
 Summary  
This chapter describes the methodology adopted and research methods employed to address 
the research questions that are related to the extent and determinates of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures in GCC country listed firms.  It describes the research methods used 
to test the research hypotheses of this thesis. This chapter discusses the approach taken and 
the method (quantitative method) applied to conduct the empirical work. The data collection 
procedures are then explained, as are the disclosure indices and the computing of those 
disclosure indices. 
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This chapter discusses the method used to measure the degree of mandatory disclosure. The 
discussion covers the measurement of the degree of mandatory disclosure (IASs/IFRSs), 
the selection of IASs/IFRSs, construction the mandatory disclosure index (the dependent 
variable), the weighting and scoring in the mandatory disclosure index, and the independent 
variables used to explain the differences in firm’s degree of mandatory disclosure. 
 
The chapter goes on to discuss the method employed to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, covering the construction of the voluntary disclosure index (the dependent 
variable), the scoring of the voluntary information disclosure items, and measurement of 
the independent variables used to explain the variation of firm voluntary disclosure level. 
 
This thesis presents 34 hypotheses, as discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. Seventeen 
hypotheses are employed to address the influence of corporate characteristic factors, 
ownership factors, corporate governance factors, cultural factors and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure on the degree of mandatory disclosure (IASs/IFRSs) over the period 2010 to 
2013. Seventeen hypotheses are employed to address the impact of similar set of 
independent variables on the extent of voluntary disclosure over that period. 
 
Finally, this chapter briefly describes and justifies the statistical analysis techniques 
(univariate and multivariate analyses) employed to test the research hypotheses. The results 
of the empirical techniques developed in this chapter to test the research hypotheses are 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
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 Empirical Analysis of Mandatory Disclosure in 
the Annual Reports of GCC Countries Listed Firms 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter aims to investigate the extent of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of 
GCC country listed firms, along with the determinants of that disclosure.  
The analysis is conducted first by examining the effect of each individual independent 
variable on the extent of mandatory disclosure (univariate analysis). Secondly, all 
independent variables are examined together in a regression model to determine their joint 
effect in explaining variation in the extent of mandatory disclosure among GCC country 
listed firms (multivariate analysis).  
This chapter seeks to address the research questions, which are as follows: 
Research question 1: What is the extent of mandatory disclosure in GCC country listed 
firms? 
Research question 2: What are the determinants of the extent of mandatory disclosure in 
GCC country listed firms? 
Research question 3: How and why do the determinants of mandatory disclosure differ 
across GCC country listed firms? 
The research questions are addressed in the univariate and multivariate analyses employed 
to identify factors significantly associated with variation in the level of mandatory 
disclosure information. The analysis is based on the theoretical frameworks and existing 
literature on mandatory disclosure discussed in chapters 2 and 4.  
 
Descriptive statistics and the nature of the bivariate relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables are presented in section 6.2. The multivariate mandatory 
disclosure models are presented in 6.3. Finally, a conclusion is provided in section 6.4. 
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 Descriptive statistics for the model variables 
6.2.1 The dependent variable 
As discussed in Chapter 5, one problem for the unweighted disclosure index is that that 
company may be penalized by assigning a score of zero for the absence of an item of 
information that is not applicable. In order to address this problem, the relevance of each 
absent item must be investigated, and then classified as either non-disclosure for a relevant 
item of reporting or non-applicable otherwise. For companies with non-applicable items, 
the use of a relative index is suggested (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). The relative index approach 
provides a ratio of items a particular company actually disclosed to items the company was 
expected to disclose. In order to distinguish between non-disclosure and non-applicable 
items (N/As), this approach is considered to be a more accurate measure than one which 
assumes that all companies are identical and, therefore, no difference need exist in 
disclosure requirements. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the Raw Index (before excluding N/As) and the Relative Index 
(after excluding N/As) are shown in Table 6.1 by country and year. The mean for the Raw 
Index has not changed very much over the years 2010 to 2012 across the GCC countries. 
This is because that the number of mandatory disclosure items remained the same over the 
years 2010 to 2012 across the GCC countries.  However, the mean for the Raw Index 
increased in UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in the year 2013, indicating that there is a trend 
towards greater mandatory disclosure in these countries towards the end of the sample 
period. However, in 2013 the mean for the Raw Index decreased in Kuwait, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia, as compliance with certain standards (IFRS10, IFRS11, IFRS12 and IFRS13) 
has no effect on the firm financial statements in these countries as they are at an early stage 
of IFRS adoption. In addition, as expected with the Raw index, a firm may be penalized by 
assigning a score of zero for the absence of an item of information that is not applicable to 
them, which may affect the overall IFRS disclosure level. 
 
The mean for the Relative Index has not also changed very much over the period 2010 to 
2012 across the countries. The highest level of mandatory disclosure was in the UAE (0.77), 
Qatar (0.76) and Kuwait (0.73), followed by Oman (0.72), Saudi Arabia (0.71) and Bahrain 
(0.70). However, the highest Relative Index for all countries in 2013 was for the UAE 
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(0.79), Qatar (0.78), and Kuwait (0.74), followed by Bahrain (0.73), Oman (0.72) and Saudi 
Arabia (0.72), indicating that there is a trend towards greater mandatory disclosure through 
the region over the sample period. This could be because by 2013 more of new applicable 
standards (IFRS10, IFRS11, IFRS12 and IFRS13) had an effect on firm financial statements 
which may result in greater mandatory disclosure. In other words, in 2013 firms adopted 
new applicable standards which may affect the overall IFRS disclosure level. IFRS 10 
Consolidated Financial Statements introduces a single control model to determine whether 
an investee should be consolidated. This new control model focuses on whether the Group 
has power over an investee, exposure or rights to variable returns from its involvement with 
the investee, and the ability to use its power to affect those returns.  
 
In addition, IFRS 12 Disclosures of Interests in Other Entities brings together into a single 
standard all of the disclosure requirements about an entity’s interests in subsidiaries, joint 
arrangements, associates and unconsolidated structured entities. It requires the disclosure 
of information about the nature, risks and financial effects of these interests.  
 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement provides a single source of guidance on how fair value 
is measured, and replaces the fair value measurement guidance that is currently dispersed 
throughout IFRSs. It unifies the definition of fair value as the price that would be received 
to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date. 
 
The T-tests for mandatory disclosure index to check variation across firms in each country 
are presented in Appendix F. 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for mandatory disclosure indices by country and 
year 
Country 
 
Raw Index Relative Index   
Mean Mean 
UAE (N=20) 
   
2010 
 
49.24% 76.40% 
2011 
 
49.26% 76.51% 
2012 
 
49.29% 76.60% 
2013 
 
52.46% 78.70% 
Average 
 
50.06% 77.05% 
Bahrain (N=14) 
   
2010 
 
40.16% 70.20% 
2011 
 
40.22% 70.31% 
2012 
 
40.29% 70.43% 
2013 
 
40.92% 73.22% 
Average 
 
40.39% 71.04% 
Kuwait (N=20) 
   
2010 
 
43.69% 73.23% 
2011 
 
43.71% 73.27% 
2012 
 
43.76% 73.35% 
2013 
 
38.07% 74.30% 
Average 
 
42.30% 73.53% 
Oman (N=13) 
   
2010 
 
45.20% 71.47% 
2011 
 
45.23% 71.52% 
2012 
 
45.27% 71.58% 
2013 
 
37.87% 71.63% 
Average 
 
43.39% 71.55% 
Qatar (N=11) 
   
2010 
 
46.08% 76.04% 
2011 
 
46.12% 76.11% 
2012 
 
46.17% 76.18% 
2013 
 
46.50% 77.60% 
Average 
 
46.24% 76.48% 
Saudi Arabia (N=20) 
   
2010 
 
37.37% 70.68% 
2011 
 
37.40% 70.72% 
2012 
 
37.42% 70.76% 
2013 
 
32.02% 71.60% 
Average  36.05% 70.94% 
 
The Raw Index is the number of items a company actually discloses to the total that it could disclose. The 
Relative Index is the ratio of what a particular company actually discloses to what the company is expected 
to disclose after excluding not-applicable (N/A) items.  N = the number of firms.  
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If we make the relatively strong assumption that mandatory disclosure indices in various 
empirical studies are comparable, the level of mandatory disclosure (the Relative Index) in 
each GCC member country for each year is in general somewhat lower than the level of 
mandatory disclosure in developed countries such as Australia (0.94, as estimated by Tower 
et al., 1999). In addition, the level of mandatory disclosure (the Relative Index) by 
companies listed on Germany’s “Neuer Markt” (0.81) is higher than in Bahrain, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia in each year. The mandatory disclosure index (the Relative Index) is also 
higher than the level of mandatory disclosure in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE in each year 
(Glaum and Street, 2003).  
 
Further, the average level of mandatory disclosure in GCC member state (0.73) is lower 
than in other developing countries such as Thailand (0.93), Singapore (0.90), Malaysia 
(0.90), Hong Kong (0.89), and the Philippines (0.88) (Tower et al., 1999). However, these 
comparisons may not be entirely valid because, as discussed in Chapter 5, there are 
differences between the number of accounting standards reviewed, the number of items in 
the checklists, the time periods covered, and the sample size used in this thesis and the other 
studies. 
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Table 6.2. The Mean Relative Index by standard for each year 
Standard 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
average 
IAS 1 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 
IAS 2 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 
IAS 7 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 
IAS 16 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 
IAS 17 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 
IAS 18 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 
IAS 21 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
IAS 23 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 
IAS 24 84% 84% 84% 84% 84% 
IAS 27 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
IAS 28 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 
IAS 31 82% 82% 82% 82% 82% 
IAS 33 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 
IAS 36 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 
IAS 37 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 
IAS 38 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 
IAS 40 62% 62% 62% 62% 62% 
IFRS 3 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
IFRS 5 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 
IFRS 8 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 
IFRS 10 NA NA NA 81% 81% 
IFRS 11 NA NA NA 92% 92% 
IFRS 12 NA NA NA 98% 98% 
IFRS 13 NA NA NA 99% 99% 
      
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, IAS 2 Inventories, IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows, IAS 16 
Property, Plant and Equipment, IAS 17 Leases, IAS 18 Revenue, IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates, IAS 23 Borrowing Costs, IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, IAS 27 Separate Financial 
Statements, IAS 28 Investments in Associates, IAS 31 Interests In Joint Ventures, IAS 33 Earnings Per Share, 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, IAS 38 
Intangible Assets, IAS 40 Investment Property, IFRS 3 Business Combinations, IFRS 5 Non-current Assets 
Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations, IFRS 8 Operating Segments, IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial 
Statements, IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities and IFRS 13 Fair 
Value Measurement. 
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Table 6.3: Average level of mandatory disclosure based on the number of items for 
each standard and for each GCC country 
Standard Number 
of items 
UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Overall 
average 
IAS 1 42 93% 95% 93% 98% 95% 99% 96% 
IAS 2 8 92% 94% 95% 96% 95% 94% 94% 
IAS 7 14 93% 80% 79% 86% 86% 71% 83% 
IAS 16 15 94% 76% 78% 78% 87% 78% 82% 
IAS 17 21 65% 40% 50% 62% 65% 44% 54% 
IAS 18 7 86% 87% 84% 86% 87% 86% 86% 
IAS 21 6 96% 100% 98% 96% 97% 100% 98% 
IAS 23 2 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 
IAS 24 9 82% 84% 83% 84% 83% 85% 84% 
IAS 27 11 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 
IAS 28 15 85% 80% 73% 88% 83% 80% 82% 
IAS 31 9 85% 75% 78% 100% 78% 78% 82% 
IAS 33 9 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 
IAS 36 14 66% 62% 76% 61% 57% 52% 62% 
IAS 37 13 76% 70% 85% 76% 77% 60% 74% 
IAS 38 14 93% 75% 73% 92% 97% 92% 87% 
IAS 40 14 56% 58% 70% 52% 74% 64% 62% 
IFRS 3 16 46% N/A 52% 38% 49% 63% 50% 
IFRS 5 14 62% 43% 74% 64% 59% 86% 65% 
IFRS 8 27 82% 72% 66% 60% 70% 78% 71% 
IFRS 10 9 78% 69% NA NA 89% 89% 81% 
IFRS 11 9 89% 100% N/A N/A 89% 89% 92% 
IFRS 12 13 94% 97% 100% N/A 100% 100% 98% 
IFRS 13 14 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% N/A 99% 
         
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, IAS 2 Inventories, IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows, IAS 16 
Property, Plant and Equipment, IAS 17 Leases, IAS 18 Revenue, IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates, IAS 23 Borrowing Costs, IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures, IAS 27 Separate Financial 
Statements, IAS 28 Investments in Associates, IAS 31 Interests In Joint Ventures, IAS 33 Earnings Per Share, 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, IAS 38 
Intangible Assets, IAS 40 Investment Property, IFRS 3 Business Combinations, IFRS 5 Non-current Assets 
Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations, IFRS 8 Operating Segments, IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial 
Statements, IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities and IFRS 13 Fair 
Value Measurement. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the mean Relative Index by accounting standard and by year. Table 6.3 
gives the average level of mandatory disclosure for each standard for each country. The 
level of mandatory disclosure for each standard was stable over the period 2010 to 2012, 
but 2013 differs in that the GCC member states started adopting more IFRS applicable 
standards as required by the IASB, such as IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12 and IFRS 13 from 
that date, showing that the countries were collectively progressing towards more a 
consistent usage of IFRSs. 
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The Relative Index across the years for each standard ranges from 0.50 for IFRS 3 Business 
Combinations to 0.99 for IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement. The highest level of mandatory 
disclosure (more than 0.90) was observed for IAS 1, 2, 21, 23, 27 and IFRS 11, 12 and 13, 
whereas the lowest level of mandatory disclosure was found for IAS 17, 36, 40 and IFRS 3 
and 5 (all of which were less than 0.65). Compliance with IAS 7, 16, 18, 24, 28, 31, 33, 37, 
38, IFRS 8 and 10 ranged between 0.74 and 0.87, and may be considered a medium level 
of mandatory disclosure.  
 
A possible explanation for the higher level of mandatory disclosure with IAS 1, 2, 7, 16, 
18, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31 and 38 is that it is easier to comply with these standards than with 
the other IASs/IFRSs which involve greater proprietary costs and more complex 
requirements. Proprietary information is defined by Dye (1985, p.123) as “any information 
whose disclosure potentially alters a firm’s future earnings gross of senior management’s 
compensation”, including information that may decrease customer demand for a company’s 
products. In addition, the higher level of mandatory disclosure associated with IFRS 11, 12 
and 13 could be explained in that a minority of firms started adopting these standards in 
2013 and had impact on their financial statements, but for the majority of the firms these 
standards had no impact on their financial statements. So, the majority of those firms are 
recorded as "N/A" as those standards had no impact on their financial statements. 
 
In addition, a possible explanation for the higher level of mandatory disclosure with IAS 1 
is that this standard (the original version, effective from January 1975) consists of only two 
items for which compliance is relatively easy. The original IAS 1 required companies to 
disclose their significant accounting policies as an integral part of their financial statements 
and to disclose them in one place. The new IAS 1 (effective from July 1998) also deals with 
issues that are not that difficult to comply with. For instance, companies are required to 
disclose their names, the balance sheet date, the reporting currency, and so on. As a result, 
Table 6.2 as expected shows that the level of mandatory disclosure with IAS1 was high at 
0.96 over the period 2010 to 2013. The average level of mandatory disclosure with IAS 1 
in this thesis is higher than that observed by Al-Shammari (2008) for GCC member states 
who observed the level of mandatory disclosure at 0.93 for the year 2002. It is possible that 
the potential reason for a high level of mandatory disclosure in Al-Shammari’s study is the 
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early adoption of IAS 1, so firms have more experience to comply with such standards. In 
addition, most of the requirements of IAS 1 are not difficult to disclose.  
 
IAS 2 provides another example of a standard that is relatively easy to comply with. It 
consists of only eight items. Table 6.2 reports that the average level of mandatory disclosure 
with IAS 2 was high at 0.94 over the period 2010 to 2013. This is could be that IAS 2 was 
issued in 1 January 1995, so firms and auditors are familiar to comply with such standards.   
 
The level of mandatory disclosure with IAS 7 averaged over all of the years was high at 
0.83. The standard consists of 14 items. The possible reason for high mandatory disclosure 
here is that the original IAS 7 was adopted by firms early in January 1994, and most of the 
firms in GCC countries complied with the provisions, which suggests little or no difficulty 
in meeting the requirements.  
 
The average level of mandatory disclosure with IAS 16 of 0.82 over the period 2010 to 
2013 is exactly the same as that reported by Alfaraih (2009) for the year 2006. Again, the 
possible reason for a high level of mandatory disclosure could be the early adoption of IAS 
16 on 1 January 2005, so firms and auditors are familiar to comply with such standards and 
the fact that it was easier to comply with than other IASs. 
 
A moderate level of mandatory disclosure was found for IAS 17 at 0.54%. This is possibly 
because IAS 17 requires 21 items of information, all of which are potentially complex issues 
which are difficult to comply with. It could also be because IAS 17 Leases prescribes the 
accounting policies and disclosures applicable to leases, both for lessees and lessors. Leases 
are required to be classified as either finance leases (which transfer substantially all of the 
risks and rewards of ownership, and give rise to asset and liability recognition by the lessee, 
and a receivable by the lessor) or operating leases (which result in expense recognition by 
the lessee, with the asset remaining recognized by the lessor). The type of information 
required may be more complex, and therefore prove more sophisticated to comply with, 
across GCC listed firms. In addition, adoption of IAS 17 Leases was not common business 
practice among GCC listed firms until 2005, so firms may not have had adequate experience 
with the requirements of this standard. Furthermore, in terms of this study, IAS 17 was 
found to be irrelevant for 23% of sample members. 
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A high average level of mandatory disclosure was found for IAS 18 Revenue (0.86), IAS 
21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates (0.98) and IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 
(0.98). This may be because of the early effective date (1 January 1995) for these standards. 
It could be also because of the relatively small number of items required to be disclosed for 
IAS 18 (7 items) IAS 21 (6 items) and IAS 23 (2 items).  
 
As expected, a similar average level of disclosure was found for IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosures (0.84), IAS 28 Investments in Associates (0.82) and IAS 31 Interests In Joint 
Ventures (0.82). This is possibly because those standards can be grouped together under the 
relationships between a parent and its subsidiaries as they are significantly related to each 
other. In addition, they require both the listing and description of significant investments in 
subsidiaries, associates and entities under joint control, though not all companies group the 
standards as they are disclosed in separate accounts. 
 
A medium level of mandatory disclosure was found for IAS 33 Earnings Per Share (0.78), 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (0.74) and IFRS 8 
Operating Segments (0.71). Some firms almost fully complied with the provisions, which 
suggests little difficulty in meeting the requirements. However, other firms failed to comply 
with any of the requirements of these standards, suggesting that variations in corporate 
characteristics among GCC listed firms such as firm size, industry type, profitability, 
internationality and firm age contributed to differences in the level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
A low level of mandatory disclosure was found for IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (0.62), 
IAS 40 Investment Property (0.62), IFRS 3 Business Combinations (0.50) and IFRS 5 Non-
current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations (0.65). This may be because 
some of those standards were not common business practice among GCC listed firms until 
2005 (the early adoption was on 1 January 2005), a fact which might contribute to a lack of 
company experience in dealing with the standards. The low mandatory disclosure could be 
also related to the greater proprietary costs and more complex requirements associated with 
these standards. Verrecchia (1983) argues that disclosure is limited by a ‘proprietary cost’. 
Scott (1994) defines proprietary cost as any possible reduction in future cash flows that are 
attributable to disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) argues that the release of greater information 
about a firm, either favourable or unfavourable, is useful to competitors, investors or 
employees in a way that could threaten the firm’s prospects and competition position. This 
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potential threat associated with disclosure may cause firms to limit their disclosure levels 
when proprietary costs arise. Healy and Palepu (2001) document that, when proprietary 
costs arise, companies have an incentive not to disclose information that will reduce their 
competitive position. 
 
In summary, calculation of disclosure scores for GCC country firms reveals that the mean 
level of mandatory disclosure with all applicable IASs/IFRSs required disclosures across 
firms over the period 2010 to 2013 was 81%, with a fairly wide range from 50% to 99%. 
The fact that none of the GCC country listed firms fully complied with all IASs/IFRSs 
requirements should raise concern about the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies in 
overseeing mandatory disclosure with IASs/IFRSs required disclosures. The role and 
quality of external auditing is also likely to be questioned as a result of these findings. 
 
The results show wide variations in mandatory disclosure levels across the 24 IASs/IFRSs. 
The standards with high mandatory disclosure levels were generally those with 
requirements that were relatively easy to comply with. Other standards attained a medium 
level of, possibly because differences in corporate characteristics such as firm size, industry 
type, profitability, liquidity, internationality and firm age may determine the level of 
mandatory disclosure with these standards. Firms exhibited a low level of with the other 
standards. Proprietary costs, difficulty in application, the sensitive nature of the disclosure 
requirement, and a lack of experience of firms and auditors may explain low mandatory 
disclosure scores (Alfaraih, 2009). 
 
6.2.2 The model independent variables 
Descriptive statistics for the following mandatory disclosure model independent variables 
for the full sample and for each country separately are presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.10: firm-
specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, 
corporate governance factors and cultural factors (manager’s personal characteristics) and 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Each of these variables was defined in Chapter 5. 
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Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics for the model variables across GCC member state 
firms 
All countries (N=392) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.61 0.87 0.73 0.06 
firm size (total assets in $US millions) 31 91,549 4,539 44,166 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 
Profitability (ROA) -0.27 0.45 0.08 0.08 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.16 12.86 2.35 2.08 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 
Auditor size (Big 4=1)  0.00 1.00 0.83 0.37 
Firm age 2.00 59.00 24.05 14.00 
Institutional ownership 0.00 0.92 0.27 0.21 
State ownership 0.00 0.74 0.14 0.20 
Ownership concentration 0.11 0.93 0.52 0.21 
Board size 5.00 17.00 8.11 1.88 
Board Independence 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.23 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.42 
Education - board of directors 0.36 1.00 0.64 0.14 
Education - financial controller 0.50 1.00 0.72 0.07 
VD index 0.09 0.68 0.31 0.15 
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Table 6.5. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for UAE firms 
UAE (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.65 0.87 0.77 0.05 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 31 23,143 2,457 5,100 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.49 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leverage 0.04 0.91 0.38 0.22 
Profitability (ROA) -0.27 0.14 0.04 0.05 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.50 9.31 2.58 2.00 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.58 0.50 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.44 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.31 
Firm age 4.00 38.00 22.61 11.59 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.81 0.31 0.20 
State share ownership 0.00 0.77 0.21 0.23 
Ownership concentration 0.18 0.87 0.54 0.21 
Board size (number of people) 5.00 17.00 8.29 2.62 
Board Independence 0.33 1.00 0.72 0.20 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.47 
Education - board of directors 0.44 1.00 0.71 0.16 
Education - financial controller 0.50 1.00 0.74 0.13 
VD index 0.09 0.50 0.24 0.14 
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Table 6.6. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Bahrain firms 
Bahrain (N=56) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.63 0.79 0.71 0.04 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 39 3,515 506 939 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leverage 0.04 0.52 0.20 0.14 
Profitability (ROA) 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.04 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.85 12.86 3.46 2.85 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.46 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.46 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.41 
Firm age 11.00 51.00 34.79 9.56 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.57 0.33 0.17 
State share ownership 0.00 0.78 0.14 0.26 
Ownership concentration 0.11 0.90 0.53 0.24 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 8.57 1.61 
Board Independence 0.01 0.78 0.47 0.21 
Role duality 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Education - board of directors 0.44 0.75 0.58 0.08 
Education - financial controller 0.60 0.83 0.71 0.06 
VD index 0.15 0.48 0.32 0.09 
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Table 6.7. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Kuwait firms 
Kuwait (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.66 0.83 0.74 0.04 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 37 12,280 1,460 2,556 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 
Leverage 0.07 0.83 0.38 0.17 
Profitability (ROA) -0.20 0.29 0.08 0.06 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.60 12.77 2.19 2.18 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.22 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 
Firm age 10.00 59.00 25.85 13.51 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.92 0.33 0.26 
State share ownership 0.00 0.29 0.05 0.10 
Ownership concentration 0.12 0.93 0.51 0.24 
Board size (number of people) 5.00 10.00 6.78 1.38 
Board Independence 0.40 1.00 0.69 0.15 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.49 
Education - board of directors 0.43 0.88 0.68 0.11 
Education - financial controller 0.67 0.75 0.73 0.04 
VD index 0.11 0.45 0.21 0.13 
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Table 6.8. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Oman firms 
Oman (N=52) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.61 0.84 0.72 0.06 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 39 1,965 628 609 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.51 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.48 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 
Leverage 0.12 0.80 0.48 0.20 
Profitability (ROA) 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.06 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.41 4.42 1.66 0.92 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.75 0.44 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.44 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 
Firm age 5.00 38.00 23.17 10.44 
Institutional share ownership 0.03 0.60 0.34 0.15 
State share ownership 0.00 0.70 0.15 0.22 
Ownership concentration 0.05 0.73 0.54 0.17 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 8.08 1.37 
Board Independence 0.33 1.00 0.81 0.23 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 
Education - board of directors 0.50 0.75 0.68 0.07 
Education - financial controller 0.60 0.80 0.69 0.05 
VD index 0.20 0.68 0.36 0.14 
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Table 6.9. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Qatar firms 
Qatar (N=44) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.66 0.84 0.76 0.05 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 117 27,592 6,691 7,83 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
Leverage 0.08 0.95 0.45 0.28 
Profitability (ROA) -0.08 0.26 0.06 0.07 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.49 10.80 2.08 1.96 
International listing 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.39 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Firm age 2.00 56.00 14.23 14.50 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.65 0.21 0.24 
State share ownership 0.00 0.72 0.26 0.22 
Ownership concentration 0.14 0.75 0.46 0.19 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 7.77 1.40 
Board Independence 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.24 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.45 
Education - board of directors 0.43 0.86 0.69 0.12 
Education - financial controller 0.67 0.80 0.75 0.03 
VD index 0.09 0.51 0.32 0.11 
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Table 6.10. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Saudi Arabia firms 
Saudi Arabia (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MD index 0.62 0.78 0.71 0.05 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 387 91.549 13.582 22.250 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.48 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 
Leverage 0.09 0.84 0.49 0.17 
Profitability (ROA) -0.08 0.45 0.10 0.12 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.16 9.03 2.08 1.66 
International listing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
International sales  0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 
Consolidated financial statements firms 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 
Auditor size (Big 4=1) 0.00 1.00 0.93 0.27 
Firm age 2.00 58.00 22.05 15.88 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.51 0.17 0.19 
State share ownership 0.00 0.84 0.25 0.29 
Ownership concentration 0.14 0.84 0.47 0.21 
Board size (number of people) 7.00 11.00 9.15 1.28 
Board Independence 0.33 0.80 0.45 0.14 
Role duality 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Education - board of directors 0.36 0.75 0.52 0.11 
Education - financial controller 0.67 0.75 0.71 0.04 
VD index 0.11 0.61 0.45 0.09 
 
Descriptive statistics for the MD index for the full sample and by countries are presented in 
Tables 6.4 to 6.10. The mean for the MD index across firms and years was 0.73, with a 
minimum of 0.61 and a maximum of 0.87. The highest mean for the MD index across the 
years was for the UAE with (0.77), followed by Qatar (0.76), Kuwait (0.74), Oman (0.72), 
Bahrain (0.71) and Saudi Arabia (0.71).  
 
Firm size  
For the full sample, firm size measured in terms of total assets varied greatly, ranging from 
$31 million to $91,549 million, with a mean of $4,539. On average, firms in Saudi Arabia 
were the largest in the sample ($13,582 million), followed by firms in Qatar ($6,691 
million), the UAE ($2,457 million), Kuwait ($1,460 million), Oman ($628 million), and 
Bahrain ($506 million). The differences in the means of company size are attributed to 
differences in industry composition. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have the largest 
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average firm size as their respective country samples are concentrated on the material, 
industrial and telecommunications industries which in turn contain larger-than-average 
firms. Further, the distribution of firm size is skewed, though the skewness is mitigated in 
this thesis by computing the natural logarithm of firm size in the regression analysis, 
consistent with previous studies. 
 
Industry type 
Based on the industry classifications for GCC countries described in Chapter 5, in the 
sample there are 26 materials firms (104 firm-year observations), 19 industrial firms (76 
observations), 14 consumer goods firms (56 observations), 10 telecommunication firms (40 
observations), 9 travel and leisure firms (36 observations), 6 energy firms (24 observations), 
5 retail firms (20 observations),  4 utilities (16 observations), 3 health care firms (12 
observations) and 2 real estate firms (8 observations). To see the differences in the 
mandatory disclosure level between these classifications, industry classifications are further 
sorted into the following three groups: manufacturing, services and energy. The ranking of 
industry groups is as follows: manufacturing (61% of firms), followed by services (32% of 
firms) and energy (7% of firms). 
 
Profitability (ROA) 
Profitability (ROA) is measured as net the proportion of income to total assets. Over the 
full sample, ROA ranges from –0.27 to 0.45, with a mean of 0.08. The figure of –0.27 
implies that for that particular company, its entire equity (in the UAE) was eroded in a 
single year (2010), but nonetheless the company survived. The highest mean for ROA of 
(0.11) was for Oman firms, followed by firms in Saudi Arabia (0.10), Kuwait (0.08), 
Bahrain (0.08), Oman (0.06), Qatar (0.06) and the UAE (0.04). Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998) argue that compliance with mandatory disclosure by profitable firms is one way to 
signal their superior performance to the market. Therefore, it is expected that firms with 
larger profits disclose more mandatory information than firms with smaller profits 
(Ashbaugh, 2001; Leuz, 2003). 
 
Liquidity  
Liquidity is measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Liquidity for the 
overall sample ranges from 0.16 to 12.86, with a mean of 2.35. The largest liquidity ratio 
relates to a company in Bahrain. Bahrain’s firm mean is 3.46, followed by that of the UAE 
270 
 
(2.58), Kuwait (2.19), Qatar (2.08), Saudi Arabia (2.08), and Oman (1.66). A high liquidity 
ratio implies a strong ability of firms to meet their short-term obligations, that is, a large 
margin of safety and an ability to continue as a going concern. It is expected that firms with 
higher liquidity will produce greater disclosure as the managers of financially strong firms 
have nothing to hide from the users of their financial statements and will therefore be more 
likely to disclose more information than a firm with lower liquidity. Signalling theory 
proposes that a firm with a high liquidity ratio is expected to disclose more information to 
distinguish itself from other firms with a weaker liquidity position (Aly et al., 2010; Oyeler 
et al., 2003; Cooke, 1989). 
 
International listing 
The mean for the multiple listed firms for the full sample is 0.13, indicating that only 13% 
of GCC listed firms are listed on more than one stock exchange. The highest mean for 
multiple exchange listed firms was in Bahrain (0.29) followed by the UAE (0.21), Kuwait 
(0.20), Qatar (0.18), Oman (0.17) and Saudi Arabia (0), the latter showing that Saudi listed 
firms do not currently operate in foreign stock exchanges. The degree of mandatory 
disclosure is expected to be greater for multiple listing firms. Shipper (1981) argues that 
the level of disclosure will be greater for multiple exchange listed firms, in order to meet 
the interests of investors in the firm and its subsidiaries. When a firm is listed on 
international markets, there are obligations to disclose additional information when 
compared to national requirements alone.  It is argued that the quality of information 
disclosed increases with the proportion of multiple exchange listed firms. 
 
International sales 
International sales firms for the full sample range from 0.00 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.50. 
If a firm has international sales, it scores (1) and (0) otherwise. This indicates that half of 
GCC listed firms have some international sales. The highest mean for international sales 
was in Oman (0.75) followed by Kuwait (0.70), the UAE (0.58), Bahrain (0.43), Saudi 
Arabia (0.30) and Qatar (0.18). As explained by signalling theory, international trading 
activities imply large and complex amounts of information to control, and consequently, 
this influences firms to express their international position to stakeholders by improving 
their disclosure. Therefore, the extent of mandatory disclosure is expected to be higher in a 
firm with foreign activities (Daske et al., 2013; Amiraslani et al., 2013).  
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Consolidated financial statement firms 
Group firms for the full sample range from 0.00 to 1.00, with the mean of 0.72. If a firm 
has consolidated financial statements, it scores (1) and (0) otherwise. This indicates that the 
majority of GCC country listed firms have consolidated financial statements. The highest 
proportion of group firms were in Kuwait (0.95) followed by Qatar (0.82), the UAE (0.74), 
Bahrain (0.71), Saudi Arabia (0.70) and Oman (0.25). According to IFRS 10 Consolidated 
Financial Statements, a firm may apply IFRS 10 to an earlier accounting period, but if doing 
so it must disclose the fact that is has early adopted the standard and also apply: IFRS 11 
Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities, IAS 27 Separate 
Financial Statements, IAS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures (IASPlus, 
2016). Therefore, firms who have consolidated financial statements are expected to disclose 
more IAS/IFRS accounting standards and provide a high level of mandatory disclosure.  
 
Auditor size  
Of the 392 firms studied in this thesis, 328 firms (83%) were audited by an international 
auditing firm affiliate (Big Four) and 64 firms (16%) were audited by local audit firms. Of 
the 328 firms, 112 were audited by affiliates of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, followed by EY 
(96), KPMG (80) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (40). The market for auditing listed firms 
in GCC member states is clearly dominated by local audit firms with an international 
affiliation. As most of the selected sample firms (83%) were audited by an international 
affiliation (Big Four), the auditor size variable (Big Four vs. Non-Big Four) may not show 
a variation in the degree of mandatory disclosure. Thus, this variable will be excluded from 
the regression analysis.  
 
Firm age 
The age of the firms (length of establishment) ranges from 2 to 59 years, with a mean of 24 
years for the whole sample. The age range differs across countries. The highest mean firm 
age was for Bahrain (35 years), with a minimum of 11 years and a maximum of 51 years. 
Qatari firms were, on average, the youngest in the GCC, with a mean of 14 years, a 
minimum of 2 years, and a maximum of 56 years. Many of the sample firms are young 
compared to western firms, and many were created as the region became rich due to oil 
wealth in the second half of the 20th century.  
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The proportion of institutional share ownership 
Institutional ownership is defined as the proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors to the total number of shares issued by a firm. The degree of institutional 
ownership ranges from 0.00 to 0.92, with a mean of 0.27 for the whole sample. Firms in 
Oman had the highest institutional ownership (mean of 0.34), followed by those in Kuwait 
(0.33), Bahrain (0.33), the UAE (0.31), Qatar (0.21) and Saudi Arabia (0.17). Firms in 
Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain may have the highest institutional ownership as they have the 
largest number of investment firms. These, by their nature, have substantial holdings in 
other listed firms. In addition, firms with widely held share ownership (outsiders) are more 
likely to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements than firms with closely held share 
ownership (insiders) in order to satisfy user needs and to reduce agency costs (Dumontier 
and Raffournier, 1998). Therefore, firms with a high degree of institutional ownership 
(insiders) are expected to disclose less mandatory disclosure information.   
 
The proportion of state share ownership 
State ownership is measured as the proportion of shares owned by the government to the 
total number of shares issued by the firm. The degree of state ownership of firms for the 
full sample ranged from 0.00 to 0.74, with a mean of 0.14. The highest mean degree of state 
ownership of firms was for Qatar (0.26) followed by Saudi Arabia (0.25), the UAE (0.21), 
Oman (0.15), Bahrain (0.14), and Kuwait (0.05). Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have 
the highest state ownership as the majority of their firms are from the materials, telecoms, 
utilities and industrials sectors that are typically owned by respective governments. In 
addition, as mentioned above, firms with widely held share ownership (outsiders) are more 
likely to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements than firms with closely held share 
ownership (insiders) in order to satisfy user needs and to reduce agency costs (Dumontier 
and Raffournier, 1998). Therefore, firms with a high degree of state share ownership 
(insiders) are expected to disclose less mandatory disclosure information.      
 
The proportion of ownership concentration 
The degree of ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
substantial shareholders (5% or more of the total shares). The ownership concentration for 
the full sample ranged from 0.11 to 0.93 with a mean of 0.21. The highest mean ownership 
concentration of firms was for the UAE (0.54) and Oman (0.54), followed by Bahrain 
(0.53), Kuwait (0.51), Saudi Arabia (0.47), and Qatar (0.46). As ownership concentration 
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includes both institutional and state ownership which are used in the regression analysis, 
this variable will be excluded from the regression analysis to avoid double-counting in the 
independent variables.    
 
Board size 
Board size is measured as the number of corporate directors on the board of a firm. For the 
full sample, firm board size ranges from 5 to 17 members, with a mean of 8 members. Firms 
in Saudi Arabia have the highest board size (mean of 9.15), followed by those in Bahrain 
(8.57), the UAE (8.29), Oman (8.08), Qatar (7.77), and Kuwait (6.78). It appears that, on 
average, GCC listed firms have a large board size compared to some existing studies such 
as Hassaan (2013) who finds that the average board size was 7 in Jordon and Alfraih (2016) 
who finds that the average board size was 6 in Kuwait. Large board size improves firm 
performance, enables the board to gather more information, brings diversity of expertise to 
the board in financial and managerial terms, and is expected to lead to higher disclosure 
level (Barako et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008). 
 
The degree of board Independence 
The degree of board independence is measured as the ratio of independent directors to the 
total number of directors in a firm. The degree of board independence in firms ranges from 
0.00 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.63 for the whole sample. Firms in Oman have the highest 
mean board independence (0.81), followed by the UAE (0.72), Kuwait (0.69), Qatar (0.66), 
Bahrain (0.47), and Saudi Arabia (0.45). It therefore appears that GCC listed firms have a 
high degree of board independence compared to some existing studies such as Hassaan 
(2013) who finds that the average board independence was 0.40 in Jordon and Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) who finds that the average board independence was 0.59 in Jordon. A high 
degree of board independence may provides a mechanism to increase the level of disclosure 
practices, since a majority of independent directors will work to maximise the board’s 
ability to force management to meet all of its disclosure requirements (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). 
 
Role duality 
Role duality exists when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the Chair of the board 
of directors. When the firm’s CEO serves as board chairman (1) and (0) otherwise. For the 
full sample the proportion of firms with role duality ranged from 0.00 to 1.00, with a mean 
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of 0.77. The highest incidence of role duality was in Saudi Arabia (1.00) and Bahrain (1.00), 
followed by Oman (0.92), Qatar (0.73), UAE (0.68) and Kuwait (0.40). The separation 
between the roles of CEO and chairman might improve the efficiency of management, 
provide an external perspective to the firm that may be important to the development of 
organisational goals and objectives, and strengthen the link between the firm and its 
environment (Dahya and Travlos, 2000). It is therefore expected that a higher degree of role 
duality may result in minimum lower degree of mandatory disclosure in firms. 
 
Education level of board of directors 
The educational level of the board of directors is defined as the proportion of directors 
qualified in business or accounting to the total number of directors. Over the full sample, 
the proportion of qualified directors ranges from 0.36 to 1.00 with a mean of 0.64. The 
highest proportion of educated directors ratio relates to firms in the UAE (0.71), followed 
by Qatar (0.69), Oman (0.68), Kuwait (0.68), Bahrain (0.58), and Saudi Arabia (0.52). The 
mean educational level of the board of directors for GCC listed firms appears to be high 
(0.64) compared to Haniffa and cooke (2002) they find that the educational level of the 
board of directors was 0.43 in Malaysian corporations. The degree of mandatory disclosure 
can be affected by the educational level of the directors in two ways.  If the board of 
directors consists of individuals with an academic background in accounting and business, 
they may choose to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements and disclose more 
information to demonstrate accountability, improve the firm’s corporate image, and to 
demonstrate the credibility of the management team. However, educated directors may also 
not wish to comply with mandatory disclosures and disclose more than the minimum to 
avoid other costs and competitive disadvantage. 
 
Education level of financial controller 
The educational level of the financial controller is measured as a dummy so that financial 
controllers qualified in business or accounting as recorded as a 1.00, and those without such 
qualifications are recorded as a 0.00. The table shows for the full sample that the proportion 
of educated financial controllers by country ranges from 0.50 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.72. 
The highest mean ratio is for firms in Qatar (0.75), followed by the UAE (0.74), Kuwait 
(0.73), Bahrain (0.71), Saudi Arabia (0.71), and Oman (0.69). It appears that the educational 
level of financial controllers in GCC listed firms is high (0.72) compared to Haniffa and 
cooke (2002) they find that the educational level of the financial controller was 0.47 in 
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Malaysian corporations. Therefore, a high degree of mandatory disclosure would be 
expected in such firms on this basis. In addition to the educational background of the 
directors, the academic background of the financial controllers is equally important because 
disclosure policies adopted are also very much dependent on the financial controller as the 
primary responsibility for preparing annual reports rests with the principal accounting 
officer of the firm (Abayo and Roberts, 1993; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994).    
 
The level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) 
The level of voluntary disclosure, for the full sample, ranged from 0.09 to 0.68 with the 
mean of 0.31. The highest mean voluntary discourse level was for Saudi Arabia (0.45), 
followed by Oman (0.36), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE (0.24) and Kuwait (0.21). 
It is expected that a low level of mandatory disclosure will increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure in GCC country listed firms. This depends on whether mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, greater mandatory 
disclosure requirements will reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. If they are 
complements, greater disclosure requirements will increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure. In other words, given an amount of information that managers are willing to 
disclose, when more is disclosed in mandatory reporting, less is left for voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
6.2.3 Bivariate relationships among the independent variables 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), high correlation among variables can give rise to 
the problem of multicollinearity and thus the reliability of model estimates will be affected 
(Adcock, 2008). Moreover, the problem of multicollinearity can cause a problem when 
evaluating the significance of the variables in the regression. Therefore, it is important to 
explore the correlation among all of the independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007).  
 
The Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix is a basic tool to detect the problem of 
multicollinearity. Gujarati and Porter (2009) argue that if the correlation is greater than 
0.80 for variables the correlation is considered high. Therefore, in this study, 
multicollinearity is not considered a problem if individual correlation coefficients are less 
than 0.80.  
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Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices across all of the 
independent and dependent variables employed in this study. The results show that the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations tend to be relatively consistent in both magnitude and 
significance. As they are relatively low (less than 0.80) across all of the variables, 
indicating that there is not a problem with multicollinearity. 
 
Table 6.11 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
continuous variables. With regard to the dependent variable, the table shows that the 
highest correlation is between the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) and the education 
level of financial controllers (EDUFIN) (0.524), the use of consolidated financial statement 
firms (CFS) (0.318), and the education level of directors (EDUBOARD) (0.222). In relation 
to the independent variables, the table shows that the highest correlation is between firm 
size (SIZE) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) (0.468), firm size (SIZE) and the 
degree of state ownership (SOWN) (0.436), the degree of board independence 
(BOARDIND) and the education level of the directors (EDUBOARD) (0.389), the degree 
of state ownership (SOWN) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) (0.387), and 
between board size (BOARDS) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) (0.329). The 
other variables are also correlated to varying degrees, but not enough to impair the 
regression results.  
 
Table 6.12 shows the Spearman correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
continuous and dummy variables. Concerning with dependent variable, the table shows that 
the highest correlation is between the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) and the 
education level of the financial controller (EDUFIN) (0.591), the use of consolidated 
financial statements (CFS) (0.280), and the education level of the directors (EDUBOARD) 
(0.198). In relation to the independent variables, the table shows that the highest correlation 
is between firm size (SIZE) and the degree of state ownership (SOWN) (0.489), firm size 
(SIZE) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) (0.464), the degree of board 
independence (BOARDIND) and the education level of the directors (EDUBOARD) 
(0.389), board size (BOARDS) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) (0.344), and 
between the degree of state ownership (SOWN) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) 
(0.343). The other variables are also correlated, but not enough to impair the regression 
results. 
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Table 6.11. Pearson correlation coefficients for the independent variables calculated for all observations 
Ind. 
Variables 
LMD SIZE 
IND1 
(Service) 
IND2 
(Energy) 
ROA LIQ IL IS CFS AGE IOWN SOWN BOARDS BOARDIND DUALTY EDUBOARD EDUFIN LVD 
LMD 1                  
SIZE .139** 1                 
IND1 
(Service) 
.016 .123* 1                
IND2 
(Energy) 
.170** -.014 -.194** 1               
ROA -.169** -.131* .002 -.035 1              
LIQ -.029 -.183** -.171** -.100* .183** 1             
IL .086 .145** .239** -.066 -.036 -.155** 1            
IS .122* -.165** -.111* -.040 .011 -.127* .047 1           
CFS .318** .191** -.063 .086 -.060 -.124* .042 .209** 1          
AGE -.062 -.231** -.140** -.169** .191** .163** -.029 .019 -.076 1         
IOWN -.058 -.327** .086 -.026 -.137** .068 -.036 -.107* -.184** -.147** 1        
SOWN .074 .436** .210** -.077 -.011 -.146** .142** .047 .092 -.046 -.368** 1       
BOARDS -.012 .330** .182** .005 -.002 -.069 .036 -.058 .049 .106* -.170** .138** 1      
BOARDIND .199** -.126* .033 .024 -.073 .010 .130* .143** -.023 -.120* .175** -.032 -.036 1     
DUALTY -.280** .112* -.047 -.133** .093 .118* -.095 -.198** -.286** .300** -.189** -.014 .177** -.376** 1    
EDUBOARD .222** -.130* .103* -.048 -.090 .013 .094 .091 .107* -.118* .262** .049 -.202** .389** -.337** 1   
EDUFIN .524** .124* .062 .094 -.119* -.037 -.056 -.077 .215** -.147** .134** -.183** .150** .130* -.133** .137** 1  
LVD -.025 .468** .014 .157** .087 -.200** .185** -.006 .119* -.100 -.272** .387** .329** -.130* .143** -.153** .073 1 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.12. Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables calculated for all observations 
Ind. 
Variables 
LMD SIZE 
IND1 
(Service) 
IND2 
(Energy) 
ROA LIQ IL IS CFS AGE IOWN SOWN BOARDS BOARDIND DUALTY EDUBOARD EDUFIN LVD 
LMD 1.000                  
SIZE .157** 1.000                 
IND1 
(Service) 
.027 .118* 1.000                
IND2 
(Energy) 
.170** -.012 -.194** 1.000               
ROA -.214** -.227** .062 -.049 1.000              
LIQ -.051 -.196** -.234** -.078 .161** 1.000             
IL .091 .145** .239** -.066 -.026 -.253** 1.000            
IS .117* -.160** -.111* -.040 .046 -.082 .047 1.000           
CFS .280** .187** -.063 .086 -.041 -.089 .042 .209** 1.000          
AGE -.060 -.255** -.146** -.150** .151** .130* -.032 .033 -.067 1.000         
IOWN -.070 -.330** .116* -.025 -.098 .037 -.018 -.116* -.211** -.119* 1.000        
SOWN .036 .489** .198** -.037 .020 -.113* .161** -.064 .048 -.056 -.309** 1.000       
BOARDS -.031 .349** .162** .009 .003 -.102* .062 -.092 .047 .140** -.196** .281** 1.000      
BOARDIND .223** -.149** .033 .061 -.041 .022 .131* .138** -.031 -.137** .202** -.007 -.103* 1.000     
DUALTY -.260** .116* -.047 -.133** .059 .118* -.095 -.198** -.286** .283** -.157** -.030 .260** -.397** 1.000    
EDUBOARD .198** -.144** .072 .004 -.074 .051 .117* .082 .049 -.094 .277** .073 -.230** .477** -.356** 1.000   
EDUFIN .591** .101* .044 .164** -.100* -.016 -.035 -.019 .276** -.153** .105* -.161** .089 .160** -.138** .061 1.000  
LVD -.056 .464** .036 .127* .089 -.200** .207** .001 .121* -.123* -.261** .343** .344** -.186** .138** -.155** .074 1.000 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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 Multivariate analysis: multiple regression analysis 
This section presents the multivariate analysis. It reviews the mandatory disclosure model 
specifications and the results of the regression analysis for the mandatory disclosure 
models. The multiple regression analysis is run using the SPSS econometrics package and 
the forced entry regression method. According to this method, all of the explanatory 
variables are entered into the model simultaneously in order to indicate whether they 
contribute significantly to the prediction of the mandatory disclosure level (Suwaidan, 
1997). This section of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.3.1 reviews the 
mandatory disclosure model specifications. The results of the regression analysis for 
mandatory disclosure are presented in Section 6.3.2. 
 
6.3.1 Mandatory disclosure model specifications 
To investigate the effect of the firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics 
factors, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors, cultural factors, and the 
level of voluntary disclosure on the extent of mandatory disclosure, this thesis employs the 
mandatory disclosure multivariate regression models as explained in Chapter 5. In order to 
assess the impact of each variable on the extent of mandatory disclosure, four regression 
model specifications are estimated, as presented in Table 6.13: 
 
Table 6.13. Summary of the mandatory disclosure empirical model specifications 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Corporate characteristics factors (CCF) X X X X 
Ownership structure factors (OSF)  X X X 
Corporate governance factors (CGF)   X X 
Cultural factors (CF) X X X X 
Level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) X X X X 
Fixed year effects (FE) X X X X 
Sub-sample effect (high level of exports)    X 
 
Model I in Table 6.13 includes the overall mandatory disclosure index with corporate 
characteristics factors (CCF), cultural factors (CF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) 
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and the fixed year effects (FE). Model II contains the overall mandatory disclosure index 
with corporate characteristics factors (CCF), cultural factors (CF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and the fixed year effects (FE). 
Model III comprises the overall mandatory disclosure index with corporate characteristics 
factors (CCF), cultural factors (CF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate 
governance factors (CGF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and the fixed year 
effects (FE). Model IV includes the overall mandatory disclosure index with corporate 
characteristics factors (CCF), cultural factors (CF), ownership structure factors (OSF), 
corporate governance factors (CGF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD), the fixed 
year effects (FE) and the sub-sample effect (high level of exports). 
 
The models are estimated for the full sample, with the selection of independent variables 
in each model consisting of corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), cultural factors (CF), the level of 
voluntary disclosure (LVD) and three dummy variables to represent the four study years. 
In order to assess the impact of each variable on the mandatory disclosure level, the 
following regression models are estimated: 
Model I 
This model specifies the level of mandatory disclosure as a function of corporate 
characteristics factors (CCF) such as firm size, industry type, probability, liquidity, 
international listed firms, international sales firms, consolidated financial statement firms, 
firm age, cultural factors (CF) such as the education level of the board of directors and 
financial controller, the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD), and fixed year effects (FE) 
follows by Equation 6.1:  
 
ܯܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  + ߚଵ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  + ߚଷ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚସ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ + ߚହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  
+  ߚ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚ଻ ܫܮ௜௧  +  ߚ଼ ܫ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଽ ܥܨ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵ଴ ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+  ߚଵଵ ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ௜௧  +  ߚଵଶ ܧܦܷܨܫ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଷܮܸܦ௜௧  + ߚଵସ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧
+  Ɛ௜௧ 
 
(6.1) 
Where, 
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݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܯܦ = Mandatory disclosure index 
SIZE = Firm size measured in terms of total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܴܱܣ = Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܫܮ = International listing 
ܫܵ = International sales 
ܥܨܵ = Consolidated financial statements 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ = Education board of directors  
ܧܦܷܨܫܰ = Education financial controllers 
ܮܸܦ = Level of voluntary disclosure  
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
Ɛ = Error term 
 
Model II 
This model includes the corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure factors 
(OSF) such as institutional ownership and state ownership, cultural factors (CF), the level 
of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and fixed year effects to test the effect of those factors on 
the extent of mandatory disclosure as follows by Equation 6.2: 
ܯܦ௜௧ =  ߚ݋ ௜௧ +  ߚଵ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଷ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚସ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ + ߚହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  
+  ߚ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚ଻ ܫܮ௜௧  +  ߚ଼ ܫ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଽ ܥܨ ௜ܵ௧  + ߚଵ଴ ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+  ߚଵଵ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଶ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଷ ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ௜௧  +  ߚଵସ ܧܦܷܨܫ ௜ܰ௧  
+  ߚଵହ ܮܸܦ௜௧  + ߚଵ଺ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧ +  Ɛ௜௧  
(6.2) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98}, 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
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ܯܦ = Mandatory disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܫܮ = International listing 
ܫܵ = International sales 
ܥܨܵ = Consolidated financial statements 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ = Education board of directors  
ܧܦܷܨܫܰ = Education financial controllers 
ܮܸܦ = Level of voluntary disclosure 
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013  
Ɛ = Error term  
 
Model III 
This model employs the corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF) such as board size, board independence 
and role duality, cultural factors (CF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and fixed 
year effects (FE) to investigate the effect of those factors on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure as follows by Equation 6.3:  
 
ܯܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଵ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଷ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚସ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ + ߚହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  
+ ߚ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚ଻ ܫܮ௜௧  + ߚ଼ ܫ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଽ ܥܨ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵ଴ ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+ ߚଵଵ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଶ  ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଷ ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵସ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  
+ ߚଵହ ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଵ଺ ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ௜௧  +  ߚଵ଻ ܧܦܷܨܫ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵ଼ ܮܸܦ௜௧  
+ ߚଵଽ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧ +  Ɛ௜௧  
(6.3) 
Where, 
283 
 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98}, 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܯܦ = Mandatory disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܫܮ = International listing 
ܫܵ = International sales 
ܥܨܵ = Consolidated financial statements 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independent 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ = Education board of directors  
ܧܦܷܨܫܰ = Education financial controllers 
ܮܸܦ = Level of voluntary disclosure  
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
Ɛ = Error term  
 
Model IV 
This model uses the corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure factors 
(OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), cultural factors (CF), the level of voluntary 
disclosure (LVD), fixed year effects (FE) and the sub-sample effect (high level of exports) 
to investigate the effect of those factors on the extent of mandatory disclosure as follows 
by Equation 6.4:  
284 
 
ܯܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଵ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଷ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚସ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ + ߚହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  
+  ߚ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  + ߚ଻ ܴܱܣ×ܮܫܳ௜௧ +  ߚ଼ ܫܮ௜௧  + ߚଽ ܫ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଵ଴ ܥܨ ௜ܵ௧  
+  ߚଵଵ ܣܩܧ௜௧  + ߚଵଶ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଷ  ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵସ ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  
+  ߚଵହ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  +  ߚଵ଺ ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  + ߚଵ଻ ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ௜௧  
+  ߚଵ଼ ܧܦܷܨܫ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଵଽ ܮܸܦ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଴ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧  
+  ߚଶଵ ܵݑܾ − ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ (ℎ݅݃ℎ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ݋݂ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ)௜௧  +  Ɛ௜௧  
(6.4) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98}, 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܯܦ = Mandatory disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܴܱܣ×ܮܫܳ = Interaction between return on assets and liquidity 
ܫܮ = International listing 
ܫܵ = International sales 
ܥܨܵ = Consolidated financial statements 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independent 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܧܦܷܤܱܣܴܦ = Education board of directors  
ܧܦܷܨܫܰ = Education financial controllers 
ܮܸܦ = Level of voluntary disclosure  
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
ܵݑܾ − ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ (ℎ݅݃ℎ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ݋݂ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ)= UAE, Bahrain and Qatar  
Ɛ = Error term  
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The regression models contain 11 continuous variables: firm size, profitability, liquidity, 
firm age, the degree of institutional ownership, the degree of state ownership, board size, 
the degree of board independence, education level of board of director, education level of 
financial controller and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
In addition, the model contains ten dummy variables, two dummies for industry type 
(manufacturing, services or energy), one dummy for listing status (international listing or 
not), one dummy for international sales, one variable dummy for firms have consolidated 
financial statements, one dummy for role duality, three dummies for years and one dummy 
for country group UAE, Bahrain and Qatar (high level of exports). 
 
The reason for choosing these variables to enter the regression analysis was explained by 
Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994):  
The motivation for selecting the variables to enter into the reduced 
regression is derived from their popularity in previous research. Popularity, 
here, means that a firm characteristic has featured, and has been shown to 
be significant predictor of disclosure indexes. Firm size, liquidity, industry 
type, auditor size have shown to be significant predictors of indexes of 
disclosure be previous studies. That is why these variables were entered in 
the reduced regression. 
 
6.3.2 Results of mandatory disclosure models  
Since the aim of this thesis is to discover if the extent of mandatory disclosure is influenced 
by corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate 
governance factors (CGF), cultural factors (CF) and the level of voluntary disclosure 
(LVD), this study uses the multivariate regression models. Similar empirical models are 
employed by Inchausti (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Akhtaruddin (2005) and Al-
Shammari et al. (2008).  
 
The dummy variable for the year 2010 takes the value of 1 if the annual report relates to 
2010, and 0 otherwise. The other three dummy variables represent 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
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A trend towards increasing mandatory disclosure will be evidenced by the coefficients 
being ordered as follows: 2010 < 2011 < 2012 < 2013 < 0. 
 
In this model, ܵܫܼܧ (measured by total sales) and ܴܱܧ (return on equity) are excluded to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity with ܵܫܼܧ (measured by total assets) and ܴܱܣ 
(return on assets). Multicollinearity exists when there is a significant degree of correlation 
between two or more independent variables (predictor variables) in the regression model 
(Brace, Kemp and Snelgar, 2003). Field (2005) argues that if the collinearity is found to be 
high, the probability that a good predictor will be found to be non-significant increases. 
Hence, in this case, such a predictor is inappropriately rejected from the regression model.
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Table 6.14. Regression results for the mandatory disclosure models 
 
Independent variables 
 
Hyp. 
 
Exp. 
sign 
            Model I 
(FSC+CF+LVD+FE) 
Model II 
(Model I+OS) 
Model III 
(Model II+CGF) 
Model IV 
(Model III+ Interactions+ 
Sub-sample: high level of 
exports) 
   coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat 
Constant   0.336*** (9.658) 0.363*** (10.377) 0.389*** (11.030) 0.392*** (10.761) 
a) Corporate factors: 
SIZE 
 
H1 
 
+ 
 
0.008*** 
 
(3.521) 
 
0.004* 
 
(1.701) 
 
0.006** 
 
(2.442) 
 
0.007** 
 
(2.692) 
IND1 (Services) H2 N/A 0.001 (0.285) 0.000 (-0.048) 0.003 (0.544) 0.004 (0.751) 
IND2 (Energy) H2 N/A 0.038*** (4.246) 0.037*** (4.271) 0.035*** (3.987) 0.038*** (4.351) 
ROA H3 + -0.056* (-1.851) -0.065** (-2.161) -0.070** (-2.358) -0.145*** (-3.214) 
LIQ H4 + 0.002 (1.360) 0.002 (1.411) 0.002 (1.640) -0.002 (-1.093) 
ROA X LIQ - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.031*** (2.928) 
IL H5 + 0.027** (2.587) 0.030*** (2.903) 0.024** (2.318) 0.019* (1.857) 
IS H6 + 0.017*** (3.624) 0.015*** (3.176) 0.013*** (2.747) 0.013*** (3.911) 
CFS H8 + 0.018*** (3.409) 0.016*** (3.037) 0.013** (2.359) 0.010* (1.751) 
AGE H9 + 0.000** (2.045) 0.000 (1.328) 0.000** (2.558) 0.000* (1.734) 
b) Ownership factors: 
IOWN 
 
H10 
 
- 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
-0.030** 
 
(-2.463) 
 
-0.035** 
 
(-2.924) 
 
-0.037*** 
 
(-3.087) 
SOWN H11 - N/A N/A  0.029** (2.141)  0.025* (1.825)  0.024* (1.829) 
c) Governance factor: 
BOARDS 
 
H12 
 
+ 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
-0.003** 
 
(-2.307) 
 
-0.002* 
 
(-1.913) 
BOARDIND H13 + N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.013 (1.241)   0.020* (1.876) 
DUALITY H14 - N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.016** (-2.487) -0.012* (-1.875) 
d) Culture factors: 
EDUBOARD 
 
H15 
 
+ 
 
0.071*** 
 
(3.000) 
 
0.071*** 
 
(2.918) 
 
 0.041 
 
(1.575) 
 
  0.026 
 
(0.990) 
EDUFIN H16 + 0.352*** (11.246) 0.384*** (11.842)  0.384*** (11.867)   0.366*** (11.340) 
e) Level of voluntary 
disclosure 
(LVD) 
 
 
H17 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.060*** 
 
 
(-3.389) 
 
 
-0.075*** 
 
 
(-4.083) 
 
 
-0.056*** 
 
 
(-2.997) 
 
 
-0.047*** 
 
 
(-2.429) 
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Independent variables 
 
Hyp. 
 
Exp. 
sign 
            Model I 
(FSC+CF+LVD+FE) 
Model II 
(Model I+OS) 
Model III 
(Model II+CGF) 
Model IV 
(Model III+ Interactions+ 
Sub-sample: high level of 
exports) 
f) Sub-sample (high 
level of exports as a % 
of GDP): UAE, 
Bahrain and Kuwait  
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
0.014** 
 
(2.250) 
g) Years: 
2011 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.100) 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.084) 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.120) 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.140) 
2012 N/A N/A -0.001 (-0.146) -0.001 (-0.173) -0.001 (-0.188) -0.002 (-0.258) 
2013 N/A N/A  0.014** (2.229)  0.014** (2.300)  0.013** (2.244)  0.014** (2.324) 
Adjusted R2   0.405  0.424  0.443   0.460  
F    18.357   17.584   16.219   15.822  
Prob. (F)   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
No. of observations    392   392   392   392  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
** Significant at the 5% level  
* Significant at the 10% level 
289 
 
Table 6.14 summarises the results of OLS regression models of the relationship between 
the extent of the mandatory disclosure information and the corporate characteristics factors 
(CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), cultural 
factors (CF), and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD). 
 
Model I in Table 6.14 reports the results for the full sample model with corporate 
characteristics factors (CCF), cultural factors (CF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) 
and fixed year effects (FE) after excluding not applicable (NA) items. Each item in the 
disclosure checklist used in this study was scored as disclosed (1), not disclosed (0), or not 
applicable (N/A). Thus, if a disclosure item is applicable to a firm then such an item scores 
1 if it appears and is disclosed in the firm's annual report, i.e. a company complied with the 
IAS-disclosure requirement, or scored 0 otherwise. An "N/A" is given to a disclosure item 
when it can be identified that a firm is not disclosing such an item because there is no reason 
to disclose it (e.g. if property, plant and equipment of a firm is stated on a historical cost 
basis, then there is no reason to disclose information about the revaluation amount of its 
property, plant and equipment as required by the IAS 16). The results in Model I show that 
the model is significant overall (F = 18.357, p < 0.000) and with an adjusted R2 of 0.405.  
 
Model II shows the results for the full sample model with corporate characteristics factors 
(CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), cultural factors (CF) and the level of voluntary 
disclosure (LVD) and fixed year effects (FE). The results show that the model is significant 
overall (F = 17.584, p < 0.000) and with an adjusted R2 of 0.424.  
 
Model III reports the results for the full sample model with corporate characteristics factors 
(CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), cultural 
factors (CF) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and fixed year effects (FE). The 
results show that the model is significant overall (F = 16.219, p < 0.000), with an adjusted 
R2 of 0.443.  
 
Model IV shows the results for the full sample model with corporate characteristics factors 
(CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), cultural 
factors (CF), the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD), the fixed year effect (FE), and the 
sub-sample effect dummy variable (high level of exports as a percentage of GDP). The 
results show that the model is significant overall (F = 15.822, p < 0.000), with an adjusted 
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R2 of 0.460. The adjusted R2 for model IV is higher than that for existing mandatory 
disclosure studies (such as the R2 of 0.432 found by Shammari et al., 2008; and the R2 of 
0.297 found by Glaum and Street, 2003).  
In brief, the results reveal that, as predicted, the extent of mandatory disclosure increases 
with firm size, firms with high profitability and liquidity,  international listing, international 
sales, the consolidated financial statements, firm age, the degree of state ownership, the 
degree of board independence, the level of education of the board of directors, and that of 
the financial controller. The results also show that the level of mandatory disclosure differs 
by industry type. Further, there are significant differences in the level of mandatory 
disclosure over the years. The level of mandatory disclosure is less in each of the three 
preceding years than the level of mandatory disclosure in 2013. The 2013 year dummy is 
found to be positive and significant at the 5% level with a clear upward trend in the level 
of mandatory disclosure over time. However, the extent of mandatory disclosure decreases 
with increases in firm profitability (ROA), the proportion of institutional share ownership, 
board size, the presence of role duality, and the level of voluntary disclosure. The details 
of mandatory disclosure multivariate regression results are presented in Appendix G. 
6.3.2.1 Firm size 
The level of mandatory disclosure is significantly positively associated with firm size at the 
1%, 10%, 5%, and 5% levels in models I, II, III and IV. This finding provides support for 
hypothesis H1, which states that there is a positive relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure information and firm size. This result is consistent with Owusu-
Ansah (1998), Joshi and Al-Mudhahki (2001), Akhtaruddin (2005), Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008), and Gallery et al. (2008).  
A number of theoretical explanations justify the positive relationship between firm size and 
the level of mandatory disclosure. Firstly, political visibility can be used to explain a 
positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm size. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) argue that larger firms have a 
greater incentive to disclose more information in their annual reports than smaller firms in 
order to enhance their reputation and public image, and to minimize public criticism or the 
threat of government intervention. A second explanation is related to the direct cost of 
complying with mandatory disclosure requirements. Since gathering, generating, and 
disseminating information in the form of an annual report is a costly activity (Buzby, 1975), 
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smaller firms may not be able to afford such costs and therefore will disclose less 
information. 
In the GCC countries, larger firms are expected to have a higher level of mandatory 
disclosure because they are likely to have the resources and expertise necessary to produce 
the detailed information sufficient to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements for 
internal purposes. Given that the number of listed firms operating in the GCC region 
increased over the period of the study, it is likely that competition among them increased. 
6.3.2.2 Industry type 
The level of mandatory disclosure is significantly associated with industry type IND2 
(Energy) in models I, II, III and IV at the 1% level in each case. The level of mandatory 
disclosure for energy industry firms is significantly different from the level in firms in other 
industries (manufacturing and services). This provides some support for hypothesis H2. 
This confirms that there are differences in mandatory disclosure levels across the industries 
as certain standards and some disclosure items are more common within certain or 
particular industry classes. Table 6.4 shows that 7% of the sample firm were energy 
industry firms that reported the highest level of mandatory disclosure, ranging from 75% 
to 84%. 
This finding is consistent with Street and Gray (2001) who report a positive relationship 
between mandatory disclosure level and membership of the commerce and transportation 
industry. In addition, Gallery et al. (2008) find that firms in the mining and energy industry, 
and the biotechnology and technology industry, have higher quality mandatory disclosures 
than firms in other industries, though this contrasts some existing studies (Street and 
Bryant, 2000; Glaum and Street, 2003) which find that the level of mandatory disclosure is 
not significantly different from the level in firms in other industries. The result confirms 
that differences in mandatory disclosure level occur across the GCC industries as certain 
standards are more common within certain industry types. 
6.3.2.3 Profitability (ROA) 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is found to be significantly negatively related to 
profitability, as measured by return on equity (ROA), in models I, II, III and IV at the 10%, 
5%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Thus, hypothesis H3, which states that there is a 
positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and profitability, is not 
supported. The models show that the extent of mandatory disclosure decreases with higher 
292 
 
profitability firms, which is unexpected, consistent with Wallace and Naser (1995) and Al-
Shiab (2003). Wallace and Naser argue that firms with lower profits may disclose more 
detailed information as part of their responsibility to their stakeholders, that is, investors 
are satisfied with firms reporting high profits and so do not require additional information 
whereas lower profitability firms will need to disclose more information in order to justify 
declining profitability or losses. 
Model IV is augmented with the addition of an interaction term between profitability and 
liquidity (ROA*LIQ) to see whether firms with high profitability and liquidity disclose 
more mandatory information. This interaction is found to be significantly positively related 
to the extent of mandatory disclosure at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Owusu-Ansah (1998), Ali et al. (2004) and Gallery et al. (2008). Consistent 
with agency and signalling theories, the result suggests that the managers of higher 
profitability and liquidity firms agree to disclose more detailed information to the market 
as they are able to convey ‘good news’ due to their better performance, to increase the 
security of their positions, to justify their compensation, and to signal their ability to 
maximise shareholders’ value. 
6.3.2.4 Liquidity 
The existing literature suggests that a firm with a lower liquidity ratio will tend to provide 
more detail in its annual report than a firm with higher liquidity (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
However, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) argue that a firm with higher liquidity will provide 
greater disclosure because managers of financially strong firms have nothing to hide from 
users of financial statements, and therefore will be more likely to disclose more information 
than a firm with lower liquidity. Signalling theory proposes that a firm with a high liquidity 
ratio is expected to disclose more information to distinguish itself from other firms with a 
lower liquidity position (Aly et al., 2010; Oyeler et al., 2003; Cooke, 1989). 
In this thesis, the model results show that liquidity is not a significant explanatory variable. 
Therefore hypothesis H4, which states that there is a positive relationship between the level 
of mandatory disclosure and liquidity, is not supported. The lack of explanatory power of 
the liquidity variable is consistent with the findings of the mandatory disclosure models of 
Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) and Al-
Sammari et al. (2008).  
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6.3.2.5 The degree of internationality (international listing and international sales) 
The international listing variable is significantly positively associated with the extent of 
mandatory disclosure in models I, II, III and IV at the 5%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The international sales variable is positively significant related to the extent 
of mandatory disclosure in models I, II, III and IV at the 1% level. Therefore hypotheses 
H5, which state that there is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure requirements and firms being listed on a foreign stock market is supported. In 
addition hypotheses H6, which state that there is a positive relationship between the extent 
of mandatory disclosure requirements and firms enjoying more a greater proportion of 
international sales on, is supported. This result is consistent with previous studies regarding 
international listing on a foreign stock market (Cooke, 1992; Glaum and Street, 2003; 
Amiraslani et al., 2013), and the extent of international (foreign) sales (Meek et al., 1995; 
Street and Gray, 2001).  
Due to the signalling theory, international trading activities and presence on several stock 
exchanges imply the control of large, complex amounts of information, and consequently, 
this encourages firms to underpin their international position to stakeholders by improving 
their disclosure (Depoers, 2000; Hope, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006). In addition, firms with 
international activities are more likely to be subject to a broader range of regulatory 
authorities and to have diverse financiers, suppliers, and customers. Thus, they are more 
likely to disclose more detailed information, and to do so in a more widely understood form 
(Malone et al., 1993).  
In the GCC countries, it can be argued that international-orientated firms may attempt to 
provide more detailed and higher quality information. It is argued that providing IFRS 
financial statements enables a firm to do this (Murphy, 1999; Street and Gray, 2001). Thus, 
firms that have more international activities and want to produce more internationally 
comparable information have a greater incentive to disclose more mandatory disclosure 
information than less internationally orientated firms. 
6.3.2.6 Consolidated financial statement firms (CFS) 
Firms that prepare consolidated financial statements, measured as a dummy variable in the 
models, are significantly likely to provide greater mandatory disclosure in models I, II, III 
and IV at the 1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Therefore hypothesises H8, which 
states that firms which consolidate their financial statements firms are expected to disclose 
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a higher level of mandatory disclosure information, is supported. Firms which consolidate 
their financial statements firms (group accounting standards) are expected to comply with 
more IASs and IFRSs and will have a high level of mandatory disclosure as they are 
required to comply with certain accounting standards such as:  IFRS 10 Consolidated 
Financial Statements, IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in 
Other Entities, IAS 27 Separate Financial Statements, IAS 28 Investments in Associates 
and Joint Ventures. 
6.3.2.7 Firm age 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is significantly positively related to firm age (length of 
establishment), measured by the number of years since formation, in models I, III and IV 
at the 5%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Therefore hypothesis H9, which states that 
there is a positive relationship between firm age and the extent of mandatory disclosure 
requirements, is supported, consistent with Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Al-Sammari et al. 
(2008).  
Generally, managers of younger, less established firms tend to be less experienced in 
running a listed firm and complying with regulatory requirements. Glaum and Street (2003) 
argue that younger firms’ accounting systems tend to be inadequate, resulting in lower 
quality accounting and disclosures. In contrast, older firms tend to have stronger, more 
developed accounting systems, and experienced managers and staff, resulting in higher 
quality accounting and disclosures. Owusu- Ansah (1998) and Glaum and Street (2003) 
argue that having well-established accounting systems can reduce costs and increase the 
ease of gathering, processing and disseminating the information needed to comply with 
required disclosures. Another possible explanation for the significant positive association 
between firm age and mandatory disclosure level is the potential competitive disadvantage 
to younger firms in disclosing certain information, such as capital expenditures, research 
and development expenditures, and new products, at an early stage in their growth process. 
6.3.2.8 The proportion of institutional share ownership 
Agency theory suggests that firms with outsider (widely held) ownership are more likely 
to disclose more information than firms with insider (closely held) ownership. This is 
because when there is more widely held share ownership, the demand for publicly available 
information is likely to increase. In addition, firms with closely held share ownership are 
likely to have a smaller number of shareholders who are insiders and are more likely to 
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have greater access to firm information than shareholders in firms with widely held share 
ownership.  
The level of mandatory disclosure is negatively associated with institutional ownership, 
measured as the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors to the total number 
of shares issued, in models II, III and IV at the 5%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Thus 
hypothesis H10, which states that firms with higher insider share ownership (institutional 
share ownership) will provide a lower level of mandatory disclosure, is supported. This 
result is consistent with Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), who find an inverse relationship 
between the degree of institutional ownership concentration and disclosures in Finland 
firms. In the GCC countries, institutional ownership is considered as insider ownership 
because they usually have representatives on the firms’ boards of directors, and thus they 
have greater access to internal information. Consequently, the inverse relationship between 
the percentage of institutional ownership and the level of mandatory disclosure level is to 
be expected. 
6.3.2.9 The proportion of state share ownership 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is positively related to the degree of state ownership, 
as measured by the proportion of shares owned by the government to the total number of 
shares issued, in models II, III and IV at the 5%, 10% and 10% levels respectively. Thus 
hypothesis H11, which states that firms with a high degree of insider (state) share 
ownership will provide a lower level of mandatory disclosure, is not supported. In other 
words, the result shows that extent of mandatory disclosure increases with the degree of 
state ownership, consistent with the Eng and Mak (2003) and Suwaidan (1997). Among 
GCC listed firms, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the highest degree of state 
ownership as the majority of their firms are from the materials, telecoms, utilities and 
industrial sectors that are typically owned by the government. There exists an argument 
that state ownership increases moral hazard and agency problems, and disclosure is a means 
of mitigating these problems. Therefore, a positive relationship between the degree of state 
ownership and the extent of mandatory disclosure is expected to be found among GCC 
listed firms.  
6.3.2.10 Board size 
The level of mandatory disclosure is found to be significantly negatively related to board 
size in models III and IV at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. Thus hypothesis H12, 
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which states that the level of mandatory disclosure is positively related to board size, is not 
supported. Thus, the level of mandatory disclosure decreases with board size. This is 
consistent with Goodstein et al. (1994), who argue that the motivation of the board 
members monitoring and improve disclosure is negatively affected by the larger board size. 
In addition, Jensen (1993) claims that large boards may be slower to make urgent decisions 
than smaller boards. Moreover, he observes that as more directors are added, boards lose 
their ability to be direct and critical in their operations which may result in dominance by 
the CEO. Furthermore, good governance practice calls for limitations on the size of the 
board (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). Hence, consistent with agency theory, smaller board 
size is expected to strengthen the monitoring role of the board, thereby leading to a greater 
level of mandatory disclosures.  In GCC listed firms, small board size contributes more to 
the success of a firm and is fast in monitoring and improve disclosure. 
6.3.2.11 The degree of board independence 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is significantly positively associated with the degree of 
board independence, measured as the proportion of independent non-executive directors to 
the total number of directors, in model IV only at the 10% level. Thus hypothesis H13, 
which states that there is a positive significant relationship between board independence 
and the extent of mandatory disclosure, is only weakly supported. The result is consistent 
with Chen and Jaggi (2000), who find that the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors on the board is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Forker (1992) finds evidence that an increase 
in the number of non-executive directors on the board leads to an increased quality of 
financial disclosures. In GCC country listed firms, board independence is considered as a 
mechanism that can influence disclosure practices, since the majority of independent 
directors work to maximise the board’s ability to force management to meet all the 
disclosure requirements (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
6.3.2.12 CEO Role duality 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is found to be significantly negatively associated with 
role duality in models III and IV at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Thus, hypothesis 
H14, which states that there is a negative association between role duality and the extent of 
mandatory disclosure, is supported. In other words, the extent of mandatory disclosure is 
likely to be higher in the absence of CEO role duality. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Forker (1992), Abbott et al. (2000), Gul and Leung (2004), Lakhal (2005), Xiao 
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and Yuan (2007). Consistent with agency theory, the separation of the CEO and Chair 
positions improves the efficiency of management personnel, and also provides checks and 
balances over the management’s performance which leads to an increase the extent of 
mandatory disclosure among GCC listed firms. 
6.3.2.13 Education level of board of directors 
The education level of the board of directors is significantly positively related to the level 
of mandatory disclosure in models I and II, both at the 1% level. Thus hypothesis H15, 
which states that there is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure 
and the educational level of the board of directors, is supported. This result is consistent 
with Gray (1988) who argues that education level of the board of directors is one of the 
institutional consequences affecting accounting values and practices. According to Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) and Chiang and He (2010), board members with higher-level degrees 
are expected to have better general knowledge, and they should be able to ensure more 
disclosure of firm information. 
In GCC listed firms, the educational level of the board of directors thus appears to play a 
significant role in firms providing a high level of mandatory disclosure. This is because 
that they may choose to disclose more information to demonstrate accountability, improve 
the firm’s corporate image, and also to underpin the credibility of the management team. 
6.3.2.14 Education level of financial controllers 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is significantly positively associated with the education 
level of the financial controller in models I, II, III and IV, all at the 1% level. Therefore 
hypothesis H16, which states that there is a positive relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and the educational level of financial controller, is supported. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) who argue that there is 
a perception that professionally qualified accountants overseas receive more rigorous 
professional training and exposure compared to locally trained accountants, and as such, 
the former may be expected to disclose more information than the latter. Similarly, 
professional training in accounting or finance will help financial controllers to be more 
aware of disclosure issues. An analysis of the qualifications of financial controllers in GCC 
listed firms in this thesis indicates that most of controllers have accounting or finance 
qualifications. Similarly, in GCC listed firms, professional training in accounting or finance 
helps financial controllers to be more aware of disclosure issues. 
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6.3.2.15 The impact of voluntary disclosure level on mandatory disclosure level 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is found to be significantly negatively associated with 
the level of mandatory disclosure in models I, II, III and IV, all at the 1% level in each case. 
Therefore hypothesis H17, which states that there is a negative relationship between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and the extent of mandatory disclosure, is supported. This 
result is consistent with Gigler and Hemmer’s (1998) finding that increasing the rate of 
mandatory disclosure may eliminate managers’ voluntary disclosures, and vice versa.  
The influence of voluntary disclosure level on the extent of mandatory disclosure depends 
on whether voluntary and mandatory disclosures are substitutes or complements. If they 
are substitutes, more mandatory disclosure requirements will reduce the voluntary 
disclosure level. If they are complements, more mandatory disclosure requirements will 
increase the voluntary disclosure level. In GCC countries, as expected, the interaction 
between voluntary and mandatory disclosures is that they are clearly substitutes, and 
therefore greater mandatory disclosure reduces the level of voluntary disclosure. 
6.3.2.16 Country group (high level of exports) 
The sub-sample dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm is registered in the UAE, 
Bahrain or Kuwait (which all have a high level of exports as a percentage of GDP), and 0 
otherwise. Model IV reports the results which include this sub-sample dummy variable. It 
shows that the level of mandatory disclosure is significantly positively associated with the 
sub-sample dummy variable at the 5% level. Thus, sub-sample 1 firms (in the UAE, 
Bahrain and Kuwait which have a high level of exports), exhibit mandatory disclosure 
which is significantly higher than for firms within sub-sample 2 (Oman, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia with a lower level of exports). In other words, firms in high export countries (the 
UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait) disclose more mandatory disclosure information than firms in 
low export countries (Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).  
6.3.2.17 Time 
Significant differences in the level of mandatory disclosure are seen through time in the 
dummy coefficients in models I, II, III and IV. The level of mandatory disclosure 
monotonically increases each year until 2013. Further, the year 2013 is found to be positive 
and significant at the 5% level, most likely as a result of the introduction of new IFRSs in 
2013 which had an effect on firm financial statements which may result in greater 
mandatory disclosure. 
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Overall the results show that the extent of mandatory disclosure increases with firm size 
(H1), international listing firms (H5), firms with high international sales (H6), consolidated 
financial statement firms (H8), firm age (H9), state share ownership (H11), board 
independence (H13), board of directors’ education (H15) and financial controllers’ 
education (H16). The results also show that the level of mandatory disclosure differs by 
industry type (H2). The results reveal that the level of mandatory disclosure decreases with 
profitability (H3), the institutional share ownership (H10), board size (H12), 
CEO/Chairman role duality (H14) and firms with high level of voluntary disclosures (H17). 
However, liquidity (H4) is found not to be significant factors for explaining variations in 
the level of mandatory disclosure. Table 6.15 summarises this study’s mandatory disclosure 
corresponding hypotheses, as well as the test results for those hypotheses. 
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Table 6.15. Mandatory disclosure corresponding hypotheses and hypotheses test results 
Variables Hypotheses Results   
Corporate characteristic 
factors: 
  
Firm size H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and firm 
size. 
Supported (+) 
Industry type H2: The extent of mandatory disclosure differs by industry. Supported (+) 
Profitability H3: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm 
profitability.  
Not supported (-) 
Liquidity H4: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and firm 
liquidity.  
Not supported 
International listing status H5: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firms 
being listed on a foreign stock market. 
Supported (+) 
International sales H6: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of sales which are international. 
Supported (+) 
Consolidated financial statements 
firms 
H8: Firms with consolidated financial statements are expected to have a high level of 
mandatory disclosure. 
Supported (+) 
Firm age H9: There is a positive relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm 
age. 
Supported (+) 
Ownership structure factors:   
Institutional share ownership H10: Firms with greater institutional ownership have a lower level of mandatory 
disclosure. 
Supported (-) 
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Variables Hypotheses Results   
State share ownership H11: Firms with greater government ownership have a lower level of mandatory 
disclosure. 
Not supported (+) 
Corporate governance factors:   
Board size H12: The level of mandatory disclosure is positively associated with board size.  Not supported (-) 
Board independent H13: There is a positively significant relationship between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and the proportion of board independence. 
Supported (+) 
CEO Role duality H14: There is a negative association between the extent of mandatory disclosure and CEO 
/Chairman role duality. 
Supported (-) 
Cultural factors:   
Education -board of directors H15: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of directors on the board who have a qualification in business and/or 
accounting. 
Supported (+) 
Education- financial controllers H16: There is a positive relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
proportion of financial directors who have a qualification in business and/or accounting.  
Supported (+) 
Voluntary disclosure level:   
Level of voluntary disclosure H17: There is a negative relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Supported (-) 
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 Summary  
This chapter presents the results of models of the degree of mandatory disclosure in GCC 
country listed firms. It reviews the set of testable hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between the extent of mandatory disclosure and a numbers of factors such as: corporate 
characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate governance 
factors (CGF), cultural factors (CF), and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD). This 
chapter also presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (MD disclosure 
indices), which gives the level of mandatory disclosure of GCC listed firms using IFRSs. 
It also presents descriptive statistics for the mandatory disclosure level determinants 
(corporate characteristics factors, ownership structures factors, corporate governance 
factors, and cultural factors) and presents the results of bivariate correlations with each 
other. The chapter also presents the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
year dummy variables, in addition to the sub-sample groups of countries dummy (to 
account for differences in the internal exposure of the countries). 
 
The first research question of this chapter seeks to investigate the extent of mandatory 
disclosure information in GCC listed firms, while the second and third research questions 
attempt to clarify which determinants cause variations among GCC country listed firm 
mandatory disclosure levels and how and why the determinants differ across GCC listed 
firms. This chapter aims to address these research questions by testing 17 hypotheses. A 
self-constructed, item-based mandatory disclosure index measures the level of mandatory 
disclosure with 24 IASs/IFRSs, focusing on the mandatory disclosures found in the 
financial statements and footnotes from the annual reports of 392 non-financial GCC-listed 
firms over the period 2010 to 2013. 
 
The results of this chapter reveal that the average level of mandatory disclosure with all 
applicable and relevant IFRSs mandatory disclosures across GCC country listed firms is 
73%. The highest mean degree of mandatory disclosure was for the UAE (0.77), followed 
by Qatar (0.76), Kuwait (0.74), Oman (0.72), Bahrain (0.71) and Saudi Arabia (0.71). The 
level of mandatory disclosure among GCC country listed firms is found to be not only 
lower than the mandatory disclosure levels for more developed countries, but also lower 
than in some developing countries. In this thesis, the level of mandatory disclosure is found 
to be lower than that found by Al-Shammari et al. (2008), where the level of mandatory 
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disclosure in their study of 14 IASs for all years for the entire region was 75%. This 
difference may be explained by the number of applicable IFRS standards used in this thesis 
(24 IASs/IFRSs) compared with Al-Shammari et al. who studied only 14 IASs. In addition, 
the effective dates of some of the standards included in this thesis are as recent as 2005 
(which were therefore not included in the Shammari et al. study). None of the 392 non-
financial GCC listed firms complied fully with all IFRS required disclosures between 2010 
and 2013.   
 
The observed variation in mandatory disclosure levels across listed firms raises concerns 
about the effectiveness of the enforcement bodies that oversee compliance with the IFRS 
required disclosures in GCC country listed firms, as well as the effectiveness of external 
auditing in the promotion of a high level of mandatory disclosure. While some GCC-listed 
firms report less than 65% of the mandatory disclosures, it is interesting to observe that 
none of those firms received qualified audit opinions regarding IFRS non-compliance with 
mandatory disclosure. 
 
The results show wide variations in mandatory disclosure levels across the 24 IASs/IFRSs. 
In general, the standards which evidenced a high level of disclosure were characterised by 
requirements that are easy for firms to meet. Many of the standards attain only a medium 
level of disclosure, and for these standards that variations in corporate characteristics 
among GCC listed firms such as firm size, industry type, profitability, internationality and 
firm age appear to be a factor to the differences in the mandatory disclosure level. Other 
standards exhibit a low level of mandatory disclosure due to proprietary costs, difficulty of 
application, the sensitive nature of some standards, and a lack of experience of firms and 
auditors in interpreting the requirements seen as possible explanations. 
 
Mandatory disclosure levels may be explained, in part, by variables other than the influence 
of the enforcement bodies and the activities of external auditors in the GCC countries. With 
respect to differences in average mandatory disclosure levels across countries, they may be 
explained by the financial reporting environment, the independent audit, and the 
enforcement process, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
The results provide strong support for the impact of corporate characteristics factors (CCF), 
ownership structure factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF) and cultural factor 
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(CF) and the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) hypotheses on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure. Consistent with expectations, the results indicate a significant positive 
relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and firm size, the interaction 
between firm profitability and liquidity, international presence (international listing and 
international sales), firms with group accounting standards or preparing consolidated 
financial statements, firm age, the proportion of state share ownership, the degree of board 
independence, the educational level of the board of directors, and that of the financial 
controllers. In addition, the findings reveal significant differences in mandatory disclosure 
levels across the GCC firms by industry type.  
 
In contrast, profitability, the proportion of institutional share ownership, board size, CEO 
role duality, and the level of voluntary disclosure are significantly negatively related to the 
extent of mandatory disclosure among GCC listed firms. However, liquidity is found not 
to be significant factors for explaining variations in the level of mandatory disclosure.  
 
There are significant differences in the level of mandatory disclosure through time and 
across country groups (grouped by high level of exports). The level of mandatory disclosure 
is monotonically increased each year until 2013, with a clear upward trend in the level of 
mandatory disclosure over time. This could be the result of the introduction of new IFRSs 
in 2013. The level of mandatory disclosure for firms within sub-sample 1 (UAE, Bahrain 
and Kuwait with a high level of exports as a percentage of GDP) is significantly higher 
than for firms within sub-sample 2 (Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia with a low level of 
exports as a percentage of GDP). This finding is consistent with the increasing influence 
of enforcement bodies, more comprehensive auditing through time, in addition to economic 
and cultural factors. The finding is also consistent with the growth in firm incentives to 
disclose more mandatory disclosure for other commercial reasons through time. 
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 Empirical Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure in 
the Annual Reports of GCC Countries Listed Firms 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter aims to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure of GCC country listed 
firms and the determinants of that disclosure. The analysis is firstly conducted by 
examining the effect of each variable on the extent of voluntary disclosure in a univariate 
analysis. Secondly, variables such as corporate characteristics, ownership factors and 
corporate governance factors are combined in a regression model to determine their joint 
effect in explaining variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure across GCC country 
listed firms in a multivariate analysis by employing a regression model using the entry 
method.  
This chapter seeks to address the following research questions: 
Research question 1: To what extent do GCC country listed firms disclose voluntary 
information?  
Research question 2: What are the determinants of voluntary disclosures in GCC country 
listed firms? 
Research question 3: How and why do the determinants of voluntary disclosure differ 
across GCC country listed firms? 
The chapter therefore discusses the results of the measurement and analysis undertaken to 
address the research questions above. The remainder of the chapter is divided into four 
sections. Section 7.2 provides descriptive statistics for the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
GCC country listed firms over the period 2010 to 2013. Section 7.3 presents descriptive 
statistics for the extent and trend of voluntary disclosure divided into groups of information 
category. Section 7.4 discusses the descriptive statistics for each item of information 
disclosed by GCC country listed firms. Section 7.5 provides discussion of the key empirical 
findings of the multivariate analysis for each hypotheses. Section 7.6 provides a summary 
and conclusion of the chapter. 
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 Descriptive statistics for the model variables 
7.2.1 The dependent variables 
In order to measure the extent of voluntary information disclosure (i.e. VDINDEX) in the 
annual reports of GCC listed firms for the four years of the study, a self-constructed 
disclosure scoring sheet is applied, comprising 129 voluntary disclosure index items 
divided into 13 information categories, and then a GCC listed firm’s disclosure score is 
calculated. The scoring technique records a (1) if a firm discloses a certain item, or grants 
and (0) if it does not disclose it. Thus, a relative voluntary disclosure index (the dependent 
variable in this study) is calculated for each GCC listed firm for each year as the ratio of 
the actual number of items disclosed by a firm to the maximum number of items (129) 
potentially disclosed by each firm in its annual report. 
 
The voluntary disclosure index for firms by country and year are displayed in Table 7.1. 
The mean for the voluntary disclosure index has not changed very much over the years 
2010, 2011 and 2012 across the states. The highest level of voluntary disclosure was in 
Saudi Arabia (0.44), followed by Oman (0.38), Qatar (0.32), Bahrain (0.32), the UAE 
(0.23) and Kuwait (0.21). However, the highest level of voluntary disclosure across all 
states in 2013 was in Saudi Arabia (0.46), followed by Oman (0.39), Qatar (0.32), Bahrain 
(0.32), the UAE (0.24) and Kuwait (0.21), indicating that there is a trend towards more 
voluntary disclosure across the countries. However, the mean for the voluntary disclosure 
index increased for firms in the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia in 2013, indicating 
that there was a trend towards more voluntary disclosure in those countries. However, in 
2013, the mean for the voluntary disclosure index for firms in Kuwait and Qatar remained 
the same, indicating that there was no increase in voluntary disclosure information in those 
states.     
 
The T-tests for voluntary disclosure index to check variation across firms in each country 
are presented in Appendix F.  
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Table 7.1. The voluntary disclosure index for firms by country and by year 
Voluntary disclosure index (Group) 
The UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Total 
Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % 
Group 1: General information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
49.50% 
49.50% 
50.00% 
50.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
57.14% 
57.86% 
57.86% 
57.86% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
44.00% 
44.00% 
45.00% 
45.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
85.38% 
85.38% 
85.38% 
86.15% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
71.82% 
71.82% 
72.73% 
72.73% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
93.00% 
93.00% 
93.00% 
93.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
66.81% 
66.93% 
67.30% 
67.46% 
Group 2: Financial overview and 
historical information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.79% 
31.79% 
32.14% 
32.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.51% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
22.14% 
22.14% 
22.14% 
22.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
37.91% 
37.91% 
37.91% 
39.01% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
44.16% 
44.16% 
44.16% 
44.81% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
54.29% 
54.29% 
54.29% 
54.64% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
35.88% 
35.88% 
35.94% 
36.49% 
Group 3: Ratios and other analyses 
 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
27.81% 
27.81% 
27.81% 
29.69% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
23.66% 
23.66% 
23.66% 
23.66% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
25.31% 
25.31% 
25.31% 
25.31% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
40.87% 
40.87% 
40.87% 
40.87% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
35.80% 
35.80% 
35.80% 
35.80% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
19.06% 
19.06% 
19.06% 
19.06% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
28.75% 
28.75% 
28.75% 
29.07% 
Group 4: Projected and 
management information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
17.81% 
17.81% 
17.81% 
18.44% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
30.80% 
30.80% 
30.80% 
31.25% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
18.75% 
18.75% 
18.75% 
18.75% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
38.46% 
38.46% 
38.46% 
39.90% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
34.09% 
34.09% 
34.09% 
34.09% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
40.00% 
40.00% 
40.00% 
43.13% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
29.98% 
29.98% 
29.98% 
30.92% 
Group 5: Market-based 
information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.36% 
31.36% 
31.36% 
32.27% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
45.45% 
45.45% 
45.45% 
46.10% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
34.55% 
34.55% 
34.55% 
35.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
50.35% 
50.35% 
50.35% 
51.05% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
36.36% 
36.36% 
36.36% 
36.36% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
55.00% 
55.00% 
55.00% 
55.45% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
42.17% 
42.17% 
42.17% 
42.70% 
Group 6: Future prospects 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
4.62% 
4.62% 
4.62% 
5.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
6.59% 
6.59% 
6.59% 
7.14% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
9.23% 
9.23% 
9.23% 
9.23% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
13.02% 
13.02% 
13.02% 
14.79% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
6.29% 
6.29% 
6.29% 
6.29% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
3.46% 
3.46% 
3.46% 
8.46% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
7.20% 
7.20% 
7.20% 
8.49% 
Group 7: Acquisition and disposal 
 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
15.00% 
15.00% 
1500% 
19.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
8.57% 
8.57% 
8.57% 
8.57% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
46.15% 
46.15% 
46.15% 
46.15% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
47.27% 
47.27% 
47.27% 
47.27% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
40.00% 
40.00% 
40.00% 
40.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
27.83% 
27.83% 
27.83% 
28.49% 
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Voluntary disclosure index (Group) 
The UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Total 
Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % Year % 
Group 8: Research and 
development 
 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
9.17% 
9.17% 
9.17% 
9.17% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
5.83% 
5.83% 
5.83% 
5.83% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
6.41% 
6.41% 
6.41% 
6.41% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
9.09% 
9.09% 
9.09% 
9.09% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
23.33% 
23.33% 
23.33% 
27.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
8.79% 
8.79% 
8.79% 
9.66% 
Group 9: Information about 
directors 
 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
34.17% 
34.17% 
34.17% 
34.17% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
76.19% 
76.19% 
77.38% 
77.38% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
24.17% 
24.17% 
24.17% 
24.17% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
65.38% 
65.38% 
65.38% 
65.38% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
65.15% 
65.15% 
65.15% 
65.15% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
90.83% 
90.83% 
90.83% 
90.83% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
59.30% 
59.30% 
59.51% 
59.51% 
Group 10:  Employee information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
5.00% 
5.00% 
5.00% 
5.42% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
19.05% 
19.05% 
19.05% 
19.05% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
10.83% 
10.83% 
10.83% 
10.83% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
26.92% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
9.85% 
9.85% 
9.85% 
9.85% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
33.33% 
33.33% 
33.33% 
34.17% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
17.17% 
17.17% 
17.17% 
17.70% 
Group 11:  Social policy and value 
added information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
10.71% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
29.59% 
29.59% 
29.59% 
33.67% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
8.57% 
8.57% 
8.57% 
8.57% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
19.78% 
19.78% 
19.78% 
29.67% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
10.39% 
10.39% 
10.39% 
10.39% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
59.29% 
59.29% 
59.29% 
59.29% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
22.95% 
22.95% 
22.95% 
25.38% 
Group 12:  Segmental information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
20.00% 
20.00% 
21.88% 
27.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
64.29% 
64.29% 
64.29% 
64.29% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
22.50% 
22.50% 
22.50% 
22.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
26.92% 
26.92% 
26.92% 
27.88% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
17.05% 
17.05% 
17.05% 
17.05% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
36.25% 
36.25% 
36.25% 
37.50% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.17% 
31.17% 
31.48% 
32.78% 
Group 13 : Foreign currency 
information 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
42.00% 
42.00% 
42.00% 
42.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
41.43% 
41.43% 
41.43% 
41.43% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
36.00% 
36.00% 
36.00% 
36.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
32.31% 
32.31% 
32.31% 
32.31% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
32.73% 
32.73% 
32.73% 
32.73% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
88.00% 
88.00% 
88.00% 
88.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
45.41% 
45.41% 
45.41% 
45.41% 
Total 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
22.56% 
22.56% 
22.75% 
23.80% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.28% 
31.34% 
31.40% 
31.84% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
21.20% 
21.20% 
21.36% 
21.40% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
37.63% 
37.63% 
37.63% 
39.00% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.85% 
31.85% 
31.92% 
31.99% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
44.30% 
44.30% 
44.30% 
45.70% 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
31.47% 
31.48% 
31.56% 
32.30% 
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The level of voluntary disclosure based on groups of information did not change very much 
over the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. However, in 2013, firms disclosed more voluntary 
information for the following groups: group 4: projected and management information, 
group 5: market-based information, group 6: future prospects, group 8: research and 
development, group 10: employee information, group 11: social policy and value added 
information and group 12: segmental information. More specifically, in 2013 the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the UAE increased in groups 3: ratios and other analyses, 5: market-
based information, 7: acquisition and disposal, 11: social policy and value added 
information and 12: segmental information by 2%, 1%, 4%, 1%, and 6% (percentage 
points), respectively. In Bahrain, the level of voluntary disclosure improved just in group 
11: social policy and value added information by 4 percentage points. In Oman, the level 
of voluntary disclosure raised in groups 6: future prospects, 10: employee information, 11: 
social policy and value added information and 12: segmental information by 2%, 2%, 10% 
and 2% (percentage points), respectively. In Saudi Arabia, the level of voluntary disclosure 
increased in groups 6: future prospects, 8: research and development, 10: employee 
information and 12: segmental information by 5%, 5%, 1% and 2% (percentage points), 
respectively. Overall, in 2013, the level of voluntary disclosure increased in the UAE, 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia from 23% to 24%, 31% to 32%, 38% to 39%, and 44% 
to 46%, respectively. However, in 2013, the level of voluntary disclosure remained at the 
same level in Kuwait and Qatar at 21% and 32%, respectively. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the voluntary disclosure index by country are shown in Table 7.2.  
The mean voluntary disclosure levels across years, from the highest to lowest, are as 
follows: Saudi Arabia (0.45), Oman (0.38), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE (0.23) 
and Kuwait (0.21). The mean of the voluntary disclosure level increased across the study 
years in the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, indicating there was a trend towards 
more voluntary information disclosure across those countries. However, the level of 
voluntary disclosure remained the same in Kuwait and Qatar across the study years, 
showing that there was no increase in voluntary information disclosure across those states.       
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Table 7.2. Descriptive statistics for the firm voluntary disclosure index by country 
Country Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
UAE 0.09 0.50 0.23 0.14 
Bahrain 0.15 0.48 0.32 0.09 
Kuwait 0.11 0.45 0.21 0.13 
Oman 0.20 0.68 0.38 0.14 
Qatar 0.09 0.51 0.32 0.11 
Saudi Arabia 0.11 0.61 0.45 0.09 
 
Descriptive statistics for the voluntary disclosure index by information group are shown in 
Table 7.3. The mean voluntary disclosure by group varies from a minimum of 7% for 
“future prospects”, to a maximum of 67% for “general information”. A detailed analysis of 
each group is presented in the next section. 
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Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosure index by group of categories 
Groups of voluntary disclosures 
Number of 
voluntary 
disclosure items in 
each group 
Voluntary 
disclosure items in 
each group to total 
number of 
voluntary 
disclosure items 
 
Minimum of 
voluntary 
disclosure in 
each group 
 
Maximum of 
voluntary 
disclosure in 
each group 
 
Mean of 
voluntary 
disclosure in 
each group 
 
Std. Deviation 
of voluntary 
disclosure in 
each group 
 
Group (1): General information 10 0.08 0.20 1.00 0.67 0.29 
Group (2): Financial overview and 
historical information 
14 0.11 0.00 0.79 0.36 0.19 
Group (3): Ratios and other 
analysis 
16 0.12 0.13 0.69 0.29 0.15 
Group (4): Projected and 
Management Information 
16 0.12 0.00 0.75 0.30 0.20 
Group (5): Market-based 
Information 
11 0.09 0.09 0.91 0.42 0.22 
Group (6) Future: Prospects 13 0.10 0.00 0.69 0.07 0.13 
Group (7): Acquisition and 
Disposal 
5 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.38 
Group (8): Research and 
Development 
6 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.20 
Group (9): Information about 
Directors 
6 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.38 
Group (10): Employee Information 12 0.09 0.00 0.92 0.17 0.20 
Group (11): Social Policy and Value 
Added Information 
7 0.05 0.00 0.86 0.24 0.28 
Group (12): Segmental Information 8 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.31 
Group (13): Foreign Currency 
Information 
5 0.04 0.20 1.00 0.45 0.23 
Total number of voluntary 
disclosure items 
129 - - - - - 
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Group 1: General information 
The information in this group has 10 items, including: a brief history of the company, a 
description of its organisational structure, the general objective statement, financial 
objective statement, social objective statement, a statement discussing major product types, 
a description of major plans, and information on major industry trends. The mean of 
disclosure was 67%, with a range of 20% to 100%. The mean for this group is higher than 
the mean observed in the existing studies such as: Suwaidan, 1997 who uses 17 general 
information items in Jordan over the period 1980 to 1991 and finds a score of 40%; 
Sukthomya, 2011 who used 23 general information items in Thailand over the period 1995 
to 2005 and finds a score of 60%; Al Otaibi, 2014 who used 10 general information items 
in Kuwait over the period 2007 to 2010 and finds a score of 48%. It is interesting to note 
that the general information group mean is the highest across all information groups, 
indicating that GCC country listed firms disclose more voluntary general information than 
other information types. This information group remains the most commonly disclosed 
group across all years, 2010 to 2013. The relatively higher disclosure of firm general 
information is not surprising given that this is basic information such as a brief history of 
the company, a description of organisational structure and the general objective statement, 
that most firms already have, and is easily obtained. Therefore, the cost of processing the 
information is low. Further, the nature of this information is not very sensitive, and firms 
would not lose their competitive advantage by disclosing such information (Sukthomya, 
2011). The highest mean voluntary disclosure level in this group was for Saudi Arabia 
(0.93), followed by Oman (0.85), Qatar (0.72), Bahrain (0.58), the UAE (0.50) and Kuwait 
(0.44), as presented in Table 7.1.  
Group 2: Financial overview and historical information 
The overall mean of disclosure for this group is fairly low, at 36%. The range for disclosure 
in this group is between 0% and 79%. The mean for this group is higher than the mean 
observed in existing studies such as: Suwaidan (1997) who uses 7 financial overview and 
historical information items in Jordan over the period 1980 to 1991 and finds a score of 
33%; Omar, 2007 who uses 7 financial overview and historical information items in Jordon 
in 2003 and finds a score of 35%, and lower than Sukthomya, 2011 who uses 7 financial 
overview and historical information items in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and 
finds a score of 45%. The highest mean voluntary disclosure level in this group was in 
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Saudi Arabia (0.54), followed by Qatar (0.44), Oman (0.38), the UAE (0.32), Bahrain 
(0.25) and Kuwait (0.22), as presented in Table 7.1.   
 
The information in this group has 14 items, and includes: the balance sheet and income 
statement for the last three years, sales (revenue) for the last two to five years, sales 
(revenue) for the last six to ten years, a historical summary for important financial and 
operating data, other financial data for the past 2 to 5 years, other financial data for the past 
6 to 10 years, the effect of interest rates on current and future results, and the market value 
of inventory and advertising information. Only 100 (26%) of the firms disclosed their 
balance sheets and income statements for the last three years. “Sales (revenue) for the last 
2 to 5 years” was disclosed by 340 (89%) of the firms, and 76 (20%) of the firms disclosed 
sales revenue for the last 6 to 10 years. Interestingly, “other financial data for the past 2 to 
5 years” was disclosed by 352 (90%) of the firms, 344 (88%) of the firms disclosed a 
historical summary for important financial and operating data, whereas only 80 (21%) of 
firms disclosed other financial data for the past 6 to 10 years. More than half of the firms, 
200 (52%), disclosed the effects of interest rates on the current results, while only 56 (15%) 
of firms disclosed the effects of interest rates on future results. The “Market value of 
inventory” was disclosed only by 52 (13%) of the firms, and just 64 (16%) of firms 
disclosed advertising information. However, none of the GCC listed firms disclosed their 
"Provisions for securities".  
In general, a low level of disclosure for financial overviews and historical information 
(36%) was found across GCC country listed firms. The low level of scores highlights the 
view that these items were not considered as important as other types of information for 
disclosure in firm annual reports. Most of the information in this category can be obtained 
easily from the financial statements, which makes the processing cost of financial 
information low. However, the decision to disclose the financial overviews and historical 
information might depend on other factors such as firm performance, competitive 
disadvantage and management perception (Sukthomya, 2011). 
Group 3: Ratios and other analyses 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) point out that ratio analysis is an important tool for 
performance measurement. Most information in this category can be obtained easily from 
the financial statements, which makes the processing cost of financial information low. 
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However, the decision to disclose the ratios and other analyses might depend on other 
factors such as firm performance, competitive disadvantage, or management perception. 
However, GCC country listed firms showed a low level of disclosure for this type of 
information, as the mean for disclosure was 2٩% with a range of 13% to 69%. The mean 
in this thesis, which contains 16 voluntary items, is higher than that found by Suwaidan 
1997 who uses 10 ratios and other analyses items in Jordan from 1980 to 1991 and finds a 
figure of 18%, and lower than other existing studies such as: Omar, 2007 who uses 19 ratios 
and other analyses items for firms in Jordan for the year 2003 and finds a figure of 33%; 
Sukthomya, 2011 who uses 7 ratios for firms in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and 
finds a score of 45%. Only 16 (4%) of firms disclosed liquidity ratios, 16 (4%) of firms 
disclosed leverage ratios, and 68 (18%) of firms disclosed profitability ratios. Other 
important performance measures, particularly for investors, show a weak level of 
disclosure, such as return on assets (14%), return on shareholders' equity (21%), return on 
capital employed (11%) and rate of return required by the firm for its project (3%). When 
reviewing GCC firm annual reports, it is noted that 46% disclose other ratios such as 
debt/total assets, distributed profit/capital, current assets/total assets, fixed assets/total 
assets, administrative expenses/ total expenses, selling and marketing expenses/total 
expenses, and distributed profit/total profit. Furthermore, a low degree of disclosure (35%) 
is observed for some items such as the growth rate in earnings, while 97% of GCC firms 
breakdown net income by different criteria (e.g. product lines), and 83% of those firms 
breakdown sales according to these criteria (product lines, customer classes or geographical 
areas). The highest mean voluntary disclosure level for this group was firms in Oman 
(0.41), followed by firms in Qatar (0.36), the UAE (0.28), Kuwait (0.25), Bahrain (0.24), 
and Saudi Arabia (0.19). 
Group 4: Projected and management information 
The overall mean of disclosure for this group is low, at 30%. The range for disclosure in 
this group is between 0% and 75%.  The mean for this group is higher than that found by 
Suwaidan, 1997 who uses nine projected and management information items in firms from 
Jordan over the period 1980 to 1991 and finds a score of 18%, and lower than other existing 
studies such as: Omar, 2007 who uses 17 projected and management information items in 
Jordan in 2003 and finds a score of 43% and Sukthomya, 2011 who uses 14 projected and 
management information items in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds a score 
of 42%. 
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The information in this group comprises 16 items. Four items which represent 31% of this 
group have a disclosure level more than 50%: description of major types of products (52%), 
new product (services) development (52%), factors affecting business future (i.e. political, 
economic, technological) (66%) and comparison of actual business performance to 
previous performance and reasons for changes in a firm's performance (54%). One item 
(6%) has a disclosure level of more than 70%: discussion of management’s future plans 
(80%). The high level of disclosure indicates that GCC firms were better able to forecast 
their future information. 
On the other hand, five items scored a level of disclosure of less than 10%: planned 
advertisement and promotion expenditures (4%), raw material sources (6%), labour market 
(i.e. wage settlement, turnover) (2%), quantitative forecasts of sales and profit (7%) and 
cash flow forecast (2%). Regarding new developments in the firm, 200 firms (52%) 
disclose their new products (services), while 168 firms (44%) explain their completed and 
uncompleted projects. Moreover, only 52 firms (14%) report their capital expenditure for 
the next year. 
 
Although 15% of GCC firms present qualitative forecasts of sales and profits, only 7% of 
these companies support these forecasts with numbers. In terms of the production process, 
the extent of disclosure level for productive capacity was 32%. Of the firms, 172 (45%) 
describe their production methods/services techniques.  
Overall, GCC firms' disclosures for projected and management information vary across the 
items. Botosan (1997) argues that projected and management information is important for 
investors and analysts, but in many cases the users prefer to develop their own forecasts. 
In the Middle Eastern context, Suwaidan (1997) argues that the weak disclosure for 
projected and management information is due to the volatile political and economic 
situation in the Middle East, which makes it difficult to make accurate forecasts about 
business activities. However, GCC listed firms are better able to forecast their future 
information compared to Middle Eastern context, and the evidence appears to show that 
the mean disclosure for projected and management information in this study (30%) is 
significantly higher than that in Suwaidan's study (18%). This information may reassure 
users that firms are developing steadily and, as such, have the opportunity to grow and 
survive in their industries. This kind of information also enhances corporate image and 
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shows that firms have the resources to invest in new development. The highest mean 
voluntary disclosure level in this group was for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.40), followed by 
firms in Oman (0.39), Qatar (0.34), Bahrain (0.31), Kuwait (0.19) and UAE (0.18).  
Group 5: Market-based information   
The mean disclosure for this group was high 42%, with a range of 9% to 91%, compared 
to the other groups in the index, as shown in table 7.3. The mean in this thesis for this 
group, which comprises 11 voluntary items, was higher than existing studies such as: 
Suwaidan, 1997 who uses only 3 market-based information items in Jordon for the period 
1980 to 1991 and finds a score of 3%; Omar, 2007 who uses eleven market-based 
information items in Jordon in 2003 and finds a score of 31% and Sukthomya, 2011 who 
uses 5 market-based information items in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds 
a score of 20%. 
Three voluntary items which represent 27% of this group disclose more than 50%: 
information about geographical concentration in the sales base of a firm 66%, geographical 
distributions of shareholders 56% and size or type of shareholders 67%. In addition, price 
range of the firm's share for the past few years is disclosed by 44% of GCC firms. This 
could be considered as the most important disclosed voluntary item in this group as GCC 
country listed firms disclose their share price for the past few years, supported sometimes 
by charts, in order to illustrate the growth of their share value. Therefore, investors may 
depend on such information to make appropriate decisions about investing in such firms. 
Of the sample firms, 148 (38%) disclose measures of customers' satisfaction with their 
products or services. Regarding stock exchange where shares are listed, all GCC country 
listed firms, as expected, indicate in which market in the GCC they were listed as this is 
basic information that most firms already have and is easily obtained. Finally, market ratios 
(i.e. the number of customers by sector, the change in market share in major areas of 
activity) are not common across GCC country listed firms since only 19% of firms disclose 
such ratios. The scores here indicates that this item is not considered as important as the 
other types of information for disclosure in firm annual reports. The highest mean voluntary 
disclosure level in this group is for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.55), followed by those in Oman 
(0.50), Bahrain (0.45), Qatar (0.36), Kuwait (0.35) and the UAE (0.31). Overall, it is argued 
that GCC country listed firms should focus on displaying market information in their 
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annual reports in order to increase the credibility of this information (e. g. market share 
price). 
Group 6: Future prospects 
Information on future prospects informs users that firms are developing well and, as such, 
have the opportunity to survive and grow in their industries. This kind of information 
enhances the corporate image and shows that companies have the resources to invest in 
new developments. However, the overall mean of disclosure for this group is the lowest 
amongst groups, at ٧%. The mean in this thesis for this group is lower than that found by 
Sukthomya (2011) who uses five future prospects items for firms in Thailand over the 
period 1995 to 2005 and finds a figure of 26%. 
Of the firms, 88(22%) disclose the index of selling prices. Four items which represent 31% 
of items in this group score less than 20%: economic factors affecting future business 18% 
such as: changes in the interest rate, wage rates, and the rate of inflation, political factors 
affecting future business 12% such as: trade control, government stability and related 
changes, government involvement in trade unions and agreements, import restrictions on 
quality and quantity of product and laws that regulate environment pollution, index of 
quantity sales 11% and technological factors affecting future business 10% such as: 
technological changes and technological products. 
Three items which represent 23% of items in this group score less than 10%: profit forecast- 
quantitative and qualitative 5%, sales forecast-quantitative and qualitative 2% and index of 
raw material prices 1%. However, none of the GCC county listed firms disclose 
quantitative or qualitative information about cash flow projections.  
For the information on future prospects, firms appear to prefer disclosing non-numerical, 
descriptive information (a discussion of future industry trends, new developments, future 
risks or opportunities for the firm) rather than forecasted figures such as earnings, profits 
or cash flows. This may indicate that management is more cautious about disclosing 
forecasted figures which may have adverse effects on the firm. Other reasons for not 
disclosing this information could be that it may create competitive disadvantage, fear of 
giving an incorrect prediction, difficulties in obtaining information, or the cost of providing 
such information (Sukthomya, 2011). The low level of disclosure of quantitative future 
prospects information is consistent with the findings of Haniffa (1999). The highest mean 
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voluntary disclosure level in this group was for firms in Oman (0.14), followed by firms in 
Kuwait (0.09), Bahrain (0.07), Qatar (0.06), the UAE (0.05) and Saudi Arabia (0.04). 
Group 7: Acquisitions and disposals 
GCC country listed firms show a low level of disclosure for this type of information as the 
mean of disclosure level is 2٩%. The reason for this may be the difficulties in obtaining the 
information and the cost of providing it. This group consists of four voluntary items for 
firms. 116 (30%) firms disclose reasons for the acquisitions and 108 (28%) firms disclose 
financing details of the acquisition. Only 48 (12%) firms disclosed reasons for the 
disposals. The amount of consideration realised from the disposals is disclosed by 132 
(34%) firms. The highest mean voluntary disclosure level in this group is for firms in Oman 
(0.50), followed by Qatar (0.50), Saudi Arabia (0.40), the UAE (0.15), Kuwait (0.10) and 
Bahrain (0.09). 
Group 8: Research and development 
The mean level of disclosure in this group was very low at 9%. The item with the highest 
disclosure is new product development 35%, which is the only item that has an acceptable 
level of disclosure in GCC country listed firms for this group. The least disclosed item is 
the number employed in research and development 1%. Only one Saudi firm (Almarai Co., 
consumer staples) discloses all items in this group.  
Overall, GCC country listed firms do not appear to pay much attention to this disclosure 
category. There is a low level of disclosure in GCC county listed firms over the period 2010 
to 2013 regarding research and development. The reason for this may be attributed to 
competitive disadvantages for firms if they provide too many facts or information about 
the firm's research and development activities, in addition to the high cost associated with 
providing such information. The highest mean voluntary disclosure level for this group is 
for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.24), followed by Qatar (0.09), the UAE (0.09), Oman (0.06), 
Kuwait (0.06) and Bahrain, the latter of which did not disclose any type of information for 
this group. 
Group 9: Information about directors 
The overall mean of disclosure for this group is high 59%, compared to other voluntary 
disclosure information groups. The mean in this thesis, which contains six voluntary items, 
is higher than Sukthomya (2011) who uses five information about directors items for firms 
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in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds a score of 43%, and Al Otaibi (2014) 
who uses 11 information items about directors for firms in Kuwait from 2007 to 2010 and 
finds a score of 26%. One item which represent 17% of items in this group score above 
80%, the name and age of directors 82%. Three items which represent 50% of items in this 
group score less than 70%: commercial experience of the non-executive directors 63%, 
commercial experience of the executive directors 63%, and position or office held by 
executive directors 65%. Two items which represent 33% of items in this group score less 
than 40%: salary and other remunerations (amounts) 39% and the academic qualifications 
of directors 31%, which give the lowest percentage score in the group.  
There is a high level of disclosure for this information group during the period of the study. 
The items are all information relevant to the personal characteristics of the directors, the 
most important people who manage firm capital resources and have the highest 
responsibility in achieving the firm’s business effectiveness. It is might be that management 
experience a large demand from shareholders and potential investors for director 
information, and therefore they disclose such information in detail. Overall, GCC country 
listed firms appear to pay much more attention to disclosure in this category. This could 
possibly be a response of companies to the corporate governance campaigns carried out by 
GCC governments in the last decade. The Omani code of corporate governance, entitled 
“Code of Corporate Governance for MSM (Muscat Securities Market) Listed Companies” 
was the first issued in the region in 2002, and was then amended and replaced in 2003 
(Oyelere and Al-Jifri, 2011). In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority 
(SACMA) issued a corporate governance code in 2006 entitled “Corporate Governance 
Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. In 2006, The Emirates Securities and 
Commodities Authority (SCA) drafted the corporate governance code that was released in 
2007 (Shehata, 2015). The Qatari corporate governance code, “Corporate Governance 
Code for Companies Listed in Markets Regulated by the Qatar Financial Markets 
Authority”, was issued in 2009. Lastly, the Kuwaiti code, “CSR’s Corporate Governance 
Code: “Principles and Recommended Best Practices for Public Companies”, as well as the 
Bahraini code “Corporate Governance Code” were both issued in 2010 (Shehata, 2015).  
The highest mean voluntary disclosure level for firms in this group was for firms in Saudi 
Arabia (0.91), followed by Bahrain (0.77), Oman (0.65), Qatar (0.65), the UAE (0.34) and 
Kuwait (0.24). 
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Group 10: Employee information 
The mean disclosure score for employee information is low at 17%. The mean in this thesis, 
which contains 12 voluntary items, is higher than that found by Al Otaibi (2014) who uses 
seven employee information items for firms in Kuwait over the period 2007 to 2010 and 
finds a score of 8%, and lower than Sukthomya (2011) who uses five employee information 
items for firms in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds a score of 25%. The 
highest disclosed items are employee appreciation 57%, followed by corporate policy on 
employee training 35% and number of employees trained 26%. The lowest disclosed items 
are categories of employees by function 2%, followed by categories of employees by 
gender 3%, geographical distribution of employees 4%, and breakdown of employees by 
line of business 4%. There is only one Omani firm, from the energy sector, which achieved 
the maximum disclosure level 92% under this category during the period of study. This is 
may be because that particular large firm has more employee information that they need to 
disclose due to a large number of employees. In addition, this kind of information enhances 
corporate image and shows that firms have a clear policy and plan for staff training, and 
this reflects positively on the stakeholders’ confidence about the qualification of employees 
in the firm. Thus, firms should disclose more about this item group in order to increase the 
confidence of their stakeholders and appear committed to training their staff according 
modern methods. 
In general, GCC country listed firms appear to pay more attention to employee appreciation 
and training. Employee appreciation and training may help a firm to enhance its value and 
to reach its objectives. However, there is a low level of disclosure in GCC country listed 
firms for this information group. The highest mean disclosure level for this group is for 
firms in Saudi Arabia (0.33), followed by Oman (0.26), Bahrain (0.19), Kuwait (0.11), 
Qatar (0.10) and the UAE (0.05). 
Group 11: Social policy and value added information 
The motivation underlying the disclosure of social policy and value-added information is 
to be found in firm philosophy or managerial perception towards ethical issues. The nature 
of social policy and value added information disclosure may therefore be more 
sophisticated than for other information. The average disclosure score for this group is low 
at 24%. The mean in this thesis for this group is slightly higher than that found by 
Sukthomya (2011) who uses eight social policy and value added information items for 
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firms in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds a score of 23%, and Al Otaibi 
(2014) who uses six policy and value added information items for firms in Kuwait over the 
period 2007 to 2010 and finds a score of 18%. Four items which represent 57% of items in 
this group score more than 30%: environmental protection programme qualitative 31%, 
description of community involvement 36%, value added statement 34% and general value 
added information 37%. The value added statement is a statement showing the net added 
value of a business during a certain period on its total transactions. In addition, it shows 
how much value (wealth) has been created by an enterprise through the utilization of its 
capacity, capital, manpower, and other resources, and how it is allocated among different 
stakeholders in an accounting period. One item which represent 14% of items in this group 
scored less than 20%, charitable donations (amount) at 17%. The least disclosed item is 
value added ratios at 3%. GCC country listed firms appear unwilling to disclose value 
added ratios as they might not see the benefits from disclosing such information. 
 
Overall, GCC country listed firms do not appear to pay much attention to the disclosure of 
social policy and value added information. It is possible that GCC firms pay more attention 
to responding to the government's call for enhanced corporate transparency and issues 
related to the economic situation. Therefore, the social policy and value added information 
issue has not been the first priority for voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms. The highest 
mean disclosure level in this group is for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.59), followed by Bahrain 
(0.31), Oman (0.23), the UAE (0.10), Qatar (0.10), and Kuwait (0.09).  
Group 12: Segmental information 
The voluntary disclosure score of segmental information is moderately low, at an average 
of 32%. The mean for this group in this thesis, which covers eight voluntary items, is higher 
than that observed by Sukthomya (2011) who uses two segmental information items for 
firms in Thailand over the period 1995 to 2005 and finds a score of 12%. The highest 
disclosed item is geographical profit-quantitative 57%, followed by discussion of market 
share of products 45%. Four items which represent 50% of items in this group score 30% 
or more: discussion of competitors 30%, line of business production-quantitative 33%, 
Geographical capital expenditure-quantitative 36% and geographical production-
quantitative 36%. One item which represent 13% of items in this group scores less than 
5%, the proportion of local production raw 4%, which is the lowest disclosure item. Only 
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two firms 2%, (Aluminium Bahrain BSC and Abu Dhabi National Energy Co.), disclose 
all voluntary information items in this group.  
 
In summary, a moderate level of disclosure for segmental information is found across GCC 
firms. The reason could be due to mandatory requirements for such information IFRS 8 
(Segment Reporting), as GCC country listed firms have a high level of disclosure (71%) 
for such information during the period of the study. The highest mean disclosure level in 
this group is for firms in Bahrain (0.64), followed by Saudi Arabia (0.37), Oman (0.27), 
the UAE (0.24), Kuwait (0.23) and Qatar (0.17). 
Group 13: Foreign currency information 
The mean of disclosure for this group, which contains five voluntary items is relatively 
high at 45% compared to other voluntary disclosure groups. The mean for this group in this 
thesis is higher than in Chau and Gray (2002) who uses six foreign currency information 
items for firms in Hong Kong and Singapore during the year 1997and finds a score of 11%; 
higher than in Charumathi and Ramesh (2013) who uses five foreign currency information 
items for firms in India in the year 2012 and finds a score of 44%, and lower than in 
Albawwat and Basah (2015) who uses three foreign currency information items in Jordan 
for the period of 2009-2013 and finds a score of 50%. Two items which represent 40% in 
this group scored higher than 80%: major exchange rates used in account 88% and foreign 
currency exposure management description 96%. Two items which represent 40% of items 
in this group score 20% or more: long-term debt by currency 20% and discussion on impact 
of foreign currency 23%. Only one item which represents 20% of items in this group scores 
just above 10%, short-term debt by currency 11%.  
Overall, there is a high level of disclosure 45% for this group compared to the other 
voluntary disclosure groups. The reason may due be the small number of items required by 
mandatory disclosures (6 items) for such information (IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in 
Foreign Exchange Rates), thus GCC listed firms pay more attention to disclosing more 
information voluntarily in this category. The highest mean voluntary disclosure level for 
this group is for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.88), followed by the UAE (0.42), Bahrain (0.41), 
Kuwait (0.36), Qatar (0.33) and Oman (0.32). 
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Summary  
The examination of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC country listed firms 
selected for this study shows a range of mean voluntary disclosure levels from a low of 7% 
to a maximum of 67%. Further investigation of the sub-categories of information reveals 
that general corporate information, information about directors and foreign currency 
information are the most disclosed categories. In contrast, future prospects, research and 
development and employee information are the least disclosed categories. The results show 
a significant improvement in voluntary disclosure of GCC country listed firms in the year 
2013, especially for items related to the economic situation and corporate governance. This 
could be due to the response of firms to government campaigns to improve corporate 
transparency after the global financial crisis of 2008. 
There appears to be a substantial gap in the voluntary disclosure of each sub-category of 
information. GCC country listed firms typically do not appear to provide information that 
is too specific in nature. For example, there is a relatively low level of quantitative 
information disclosure. Information which is costly to produce, either with regard to 
information processing costs or competitive disadvantage costs, is not disclosed frequently. 
This suggests that GCC country listed firms are aware of the potential costs and benefits of 
voluntary information disclosure. 
Overall, the level of voluntary disclosure varies across countries. The highest mean 
voluntary disclosure levels for all groups is for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.45), followed by 
Oman (0.38), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE (0.23) and Kuwait (0.21), as presented 
in Table 7.1. The reason for this may be that the highest voluntary disclosure level countries 
disclose less mandatory information. In other words, countries which disclose less 
mandatory information tend to disclose more voluntary information.  
The next section applies univariate and multivariate analyses to examine the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and firm-specific characteristics such as corporate 
characteristics factors, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors, as well 
as time factors. 
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7.2.2 The model independent variables 
Descriptive statistics for the following voluntary disclosure model independent variables 
for the full sample and for each country separately are presented in Tables 7.4 to 7.9: firm-
specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics factors, ownership structure 
factors, corporate governance factors, and the extent of mandatory disclosure. Each of these 
variables is defined in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 7.4. Descriptive statistics for the model variables across the GCC member 
state firms 
All countries (N=392) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.09 0.68 0.31 0.15 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 31 91,549 4,539 11,859 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 
Leverage 0.04 0.95 0.40 0.22 
Profitability (ROA) -0.27 0.45 0.08 0.08 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.16 12.86 2.35 2.08 
Assets-in-Place 0.00 0.99 0.38 0.24 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 
Firm age 2.00 59.00 24.05 14.00 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.58 0.09 0.13 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.08 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.92 0.27 0.21 
State share ownership  0.00 0.74 0.14 0.20 
Board size (number of people) 5.00 17.00 8.11 1.88 
Board independence 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.23 
Family members 0.00 0.64 0.16 0.19 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.42 
MD index 0.61 0.87 0.73 0.06 
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Table 7.5. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for UAE firms 
UAE (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.09 0.50 0.23 0.14 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 31 23,143 2,457 5,100 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.49 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leverage 0.04 0.91 0.38 0.22 
Profitability (ROA) -0.27 0.14 0.04 0.05 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.50 9.31 2.58 2.00 
Assets-in-Place 0.00 0.99 0.41 0.23 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 
Firm age 4.00 38.00 22.61 11.59 
Director share ownership  0.05 0.58 0.28 0.15 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.30 0.04 0.07 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.81 0.31 0.20 
State share ownership  0.00 0.77 0.21 0.23 
Board size (number of people) 5.00 17.00 8.29 2.62 
Board independence 0.33 1.00 0.72 0.20 
Family members 0.00 0.40 0.16 0.15 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.47 
MD index 0.65 0.87 0.77 0.05 
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Table 7.6. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Bahrain firms 
Bahrain (N=56) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.15 0.48 0.32 0.09 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 39 3,515 506 939 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leverage 0.04 0.52 0.20 0.14 
Profitability (ROA) 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.04 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.85 12.86 3.46 2.85 
Assets-in-Place 0.01 0.87 0.30 0.25 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.46 
Firm age 11.00 51.00 34.79 9.56 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.58 0.14 0.15 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.06 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.57 0.33 0.17 
State share ownership  0.00 0.78 0.14 0.26 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 8.57 1.61 
Board independence 0.01 0.78 0.47 0.21 
Family members 0.00 0.64 0.14 0.21 
Role duality 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
MD index 0.63 0.79 0.71 0.04 
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Table 7.7. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Kuwait firms 
Kuwait (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.11 0.45 0.21 0.13 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 37 12,280 1,460 2,556 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 
Leverage 0.07 0.83 0.38 0.17 
Profitability (ROA) -0.20 0.29 0.08 0.06 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.60 12.77 2.19 2.18 
Assets-in-Place 0.03 0.67 0.29 0.20 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 
Firm age 10.00 59.00 25.85 13.51 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.50 0.11 0.13 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.92 0.33 0.26 
State share ownership  0.00 0.29 0.05 0.10 
Board size (number of people) 5.00 10.00 6.78 1.38 
Board independence 0.40 1.00 0.69 0.15 
Family members 0.00 0.60 0.24 0.24 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.49 
MD index 0.66 0.83 0.74 0.04 
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Table 7.8. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Oman firms 
Oman (N=52) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.20 0.68 0.38 0.14 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 39 1,965 628 609 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.51 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.48 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 
Leverage 0.12 0.80 0.48 0.20 
Profitability (ROA) 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.06 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.41 4.42 1.66 0.92 
Assets-in-Place 0.03 0.75 0.40 0.19 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 
Firm age 5.00 38.00 23.17 10.44 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.45 0.12 0.13 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.48 0.12 0.15 
Institutional share ownership 0.03 0.60 0.34 0.15 
State share ownership  0.00 0.70 0.15 0.22 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 8.08 1.37 
Board independence 0.33 1.00 0.81 0.23 
Family members 0.00 0.44 0.14 0.17 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 
MD index 0.61 0.84 0.72 0.06 
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Table 7.9. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Qatar firms 
Qatar (N=44) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.09 0.51 0.32 0.11 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 117 27,592 6,691 7,983 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.49 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
Leverage 0.08 0.95 0.45 0.28 
Profitability (ROA) -0.08 0.26 0.06 0.07 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.49 10.80 2.08 1.96 
Assets-in-Place 0.08 0.82 0.35 0.25 
Multiple listings 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 
Firm age 2.00 56.00 14.23 14.50 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.10 0.02 0.03 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.65 0.21 0.24 
State share ownership  0.00 0.72 0.26 0.22 
Board size (number of people) 6.00 11.00 7.77 1.40 
Board independence 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.24 
Family members 0.00 0.50 0.21 0.17 
Role duality 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.45 
MD index 0.66 0.84 0.76 0.05 
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Table 7.10. Descriptive statistics for the model variables for Saudi Arabia firms 
Saudi Arabia (N=80) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VD index 0.11 0.61 0.45 0.09 
Firm size (total assets in $US millions) 387 91,549 13,582 22,250 
Industry Type (Manufacturing =1) 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.48 
Industry Type (Services =1) 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 
Industry Type (Energy =1) 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 
Leverage 0.09 0.84 0.49 0.17 
Profitability (ROA) -0.08 0.45 0.10 0.12 
Liquidity (current ratio) 0.16 9.03 2.08 1.66 
Assets-in-Place 0.00 0.82 0.49 0.22 
Multiple listings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm age 2.00 58.00 22.05 15.88 
Director share ownership  0.00 0.54 0.10 0.14 
Foreign share ownership 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.02 
Institutional share ownership 0.00 0.51 0.17 0.19 
State share ownership  0.00 0.84 0.25 0.29 
Board size (number of people) 7.00 11.00 9.15 1.28 
Board independence 0.33 0.80 0.45 0.14 
Family members 0.00 0.63 0.09 0.15 
Role duality 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
MD index 0.62 0.78 0.71 0.05 
 
Descriptive statistics for the VD index for the full sample and by countries are presented in 
the tables above. The mean for the VD index across firms and years is 0.31, with a 
minimum of 0.09 and a maximum of 0.68. The highest mean VD index across the years is 
for Saudi Arabia (0.45), followed by Oman (0.38), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE 
(0.23) and Kuwait (0.21). 
Firm size  
For the full sample, firm size measured in terms of total assets varies greatly, ranging from 
$31 million to $91,549 million, with a mean of $4,539 million. On average, firms in Saudi 
Arabia are the largest in the sample ($13,582 million), followed by Qatar ($6,691 million), 
the UAE ($2,457 million), Kuwait ($1,460 million), Oman ($628 million), and Bahrain 
($506 million). The differences in mean company size are attributed to differences in 
industry composition across the countries. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have the 
largest average firm sizes as their samples are concentrated in the material, industrial and 
telecommunication industries, which are characterised by larger than average firms. 
Further, the distribution of firm size is skewed, though the skewness is mitigated in this 
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thesis by computing the natural logarithm of firm size in the regression analysis, consistent 
with previous studies. 
Industry type 
Based on the industry classifications for GCC countries described in Chapter 5, in the 
sample there are 26 materials firms (104 firm-year observations), 19 industrial firms (76 
observations), 14 consumer goods firms (56 observations), ten telecommunications firms 
(40 observations), nine travel and leisure firms (36 observations), six energy firms (24 
observations), five retail firms (20 observations),  four utilities (16 observations), three 
health care firms (12 observations) and two real estate firms (eight observations). To 
observe the differences in voluntary disclosure level, industry classifications are further 
sorted into the following three groups: manufacturing, services and energy. The ranking of 
industry groups is as follows: manufacturing (61% of firms), followed by services (32% of 
firms), and energy (7% of firms). 
Leverage  
Leverage is measured as the long-term debt to owners' equity ratio. For the full sample, 
leverage ranges from 0.04 to 0.95, with a mean of 0.40. The figure of 0.04 shows that some 
firms are almost entirely equity financed, while a ratio of 0.95 implies that a firm is highly 
geared. Tables 7.5 to 7.10 also show that Saudi companies have the highest mean leverage 
(0.49), followed by Oman (0.48), Qatar (0.45), Kuwait (0.38), the UAE (0.38), and Bahrain 
(0.20). It is expected that the extent of voluntary disclosure tends to increase in more highly 
leveraged firms. Wallace et al. (1994) argue that high leverage firms have a greater 
obligation to satisfy the informational needs of their long-term creditors, and thus may 
provide more detailed information in their annual reports than lower leverage firms. 
Profitability (R0A) 
Profitability (ROA) is measured as net the ratio of income to total assets. For the full 
sample, ROA ranges from –0.27 to 0.45, with a mean of 0.08. The figure of –0.27 implies 
for that UAE particular company, that its entire equity was eroded in a single year (2010), 
but nonetheless the company survived. The highest mean for ROA of 0.11 is for firms in 
Oman, followed by firms in Saudi Arabia (0.10), Kuwait (0.08), Bahrain (0.08), Oman 
(0.06), Qatar (0.06) and the UAE (0.04). It is expected that well performing firms have an 
incentive to voluntarily disclose additional information in order to distinguish themselves 
from lower performing firms, as suggested by signalling theory (Lan et al., 2013). 
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Liquidity  
Liquidity, measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, for the full sample 
ranged from 0.16 to 12.86, with a mean of 2.35. The highest liquidity ratio relates to a 
company in Bahrain. The mean for firms in Bahrain is 3.46, followed by the UAE (2.58), 
Kuwait (2.19), Qatar (2.08), Saudi Arabia (2.08), and Oman (1.66). Firms from Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and Oman yielded the lowest liquidity as such firms have high levels of 
current liabilities in the form of demand and short-term deposits. It could be predicted that, 
as proposed by signalling theory, firms with weaker liquidity positions may provide more 
voluntary information in order to satisfy the demands of creditors and capital market 
players (Aly et al., 2010). 
Assets-in-Place 
Assets-in-place for the full sample ranges from 0.00 to 0.99, with a mean of 0.38. The 
highest mean assets-in-place is for firms in Saudi Arabia (0.49), followed by the UAE 
(0.41), Oman (0.40), Qatar (0.35), Bahrain (0.30) and Kuwait (0.29). As proposed by 
agency theory, a higher proportion of assets-in-place in a firm results in a higher level of 
disclosure. The result of descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosure level is consistent 
with that for Saudi Arabia (0.49), Oman (0.38) and Qatar (0.32), which shows a high level 
of voluntary disclosure across GCC country listed firms.  
Multiple listing status  
The mean for the multiple market listed firms for the full sample is 0.13, indicating that 
only 13% of GCC listed firms are listed on several stock exchanges. The highest mean for 
multiple listed firms is for firms in Bahrain (0.29) followed by the UAE (0.21), Kuwait 
(0.20), Qatar (0.18), Oman (0.17) and Saudi Arabia (0), the latter showing that Saudi listed 
firms do not currently operate in foreign stock exchanges. Firms with multiple listing status 
may disclose information voluntarily as they have different objectives regarding the growth 
of capital and development. When a firm is listed on the international market, there are 
more obligations to disclose additional information than national requirements alone. 
Therefore, it is expected that the level of voluntary disclosure will be higher for multiple 
market listing firms. 
Firm age 
The age of the firms (length of establishment) ranges from 2 to 59 years, with a mean of 24 
years for the whole sample. The age range differs across countries. The highest mean firm 
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age is for Bahrain (35 years), with a minimum of 11 years and a maximum of 51 years. 
Qatari firms are, on average, the youngest in the GCC, with a mean of 14 years, a minimum 
of 2 years, and a maximum of 56 years. As discussed in Chapter 5, all GCC listed firms are 
less than 60 years old. Thus, many of these firms are still young compared to western firms, 
and a large proportion are created as the region became rich on the back of oil wealth in 
the second half of the 20th century.  
The proportion of director share ownership 
Director share ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by executive 
directors to the total number of shares issued by a firm. Over the full sample, director share 
ownership ranges from 0.00 to 0.58 with a mean of 0.09. The highest mean for director 
share ownership is for firms in the UAE (0.28), followed by Bahrain (0.14), Oman (0.12), 
Kuwait (0.11), Saudi Arabia (0.10), and Qatar (0.02). As mentioned in previous chapter, it 
appears that GCC listed firms have a low percentage mean of director share ownership 
(0.09) which may affect the level of disclosure for such firms in two ways. If director share 
ownership is low, this can reduce the motivation of directors to improve performance, and 
can consequently lead to a lower level of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). However, if 
director share ownership is high, directors might not want to disclose such information to 
the public as they can use their power to employ firm resources to fulfil their own interests 
(Htay et al., 2011). 
The proportion of foreign share ownership 
The degree of foreign ownership is measured as the proportion of shares owned by 
foreigners to the total number of shares issued by the firm. The proportion of foreign share 
ownership ranges from 0.00 to 0.48, with a mean of 0.03 for the full sample. This low mean 
confirms that GCC member states are in the early stages of attracting foreign investors. 
Firms in Oman have the highest proportion of foreign ownership (a mean of 0.12). The 
lowest mean is for Kuwaiti firms (0.00) as Kuwait has not yet opened its share market to 
direct ownership by foreign investors. The mean proportion of foreign ownership in the 
other four states is as follows: for the UAE (0.04), Bahrain (0.02), Qatar (0.02), and Saudi 
Arabia (0.01). However, this variable will not be included in the regression analysis models 
as only 3% of the whole sample have at least some foreign share ownership, thus providing 
insufficient variation for explaining the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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The proportion of institutional share ownership 
Institutional share ownership is defined as the proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors to total number of shares issued by a firm. The degree of institutional ownership 
ranges from 0.00 to 0.92, with a mean of 0.27 for the whole sample. Firms in Oman have 
the highest degree of institutional ownership (mean of 0.34), followed by Kuwait (0.33), 
Bahrain (0.33), UAE (0.31), Qatar (0.21) and Saudi Arabia (0.17). It is likely that firms in 
Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain may have the highest institutional share ownership as they have 
the largest number of investment firms which by their nature have substantial holdings in 
other listed firms. In addition, firms with institutional share investors have a strong 
incentive to monitor corporate disclosure practices. Thus, managers may voluntarily 
disclose more information to meet the expectations of large shareholders. 
The proportion of state share ownership 
State share ownership is measured as the proportion of shares owned by the government to 
the total number of shares issued by the firm. The degree of state ownership of firms for 
the full sample ranges from 0.00 to 0.74, with a mean of 0.14. The highest mean degree of 
state ownership of firms is for firms in Qatar (0.26), followed by Saudi Arabia (0.25), the 
UAE (0.21), Oman (0.15), Bahrain (0.14), and Kuwait (0.05). Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE have the highest proportion of state share ownership as the majority of their firms are 
from the materials, telecoms, utilities and industrials sectors that are typically owned by 
respective governments. As proposed by resource dependence theory, a higher proportion 
of government share ownership may grant a firm access to resources such as finance, 
government contracts and tax subsidies, which can improve a firm’s performance and thus 
disclosure (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2012). 
Board size 
Board size is measured as the number of directors on the board of a firm. For the full 
sample, firm board size ranges from 5 to 17 members, with a mean of eight members. Firms 
in Saudi Arabia have the highest board size (mean of 9.15), followed by those in Bahrain 
(8.57), the UAE (8.29), Oman (8.08), Qatar (7.77), and Kuwait (6.78). It appears that GCC 
country listed firms have large board sizes. Therefore, a high level of voluntary disclosure 
and more information disclosed may be expected in such firms. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, large firms, due to the complexity of their activities, are more likely to have a larger 
number of directors in order to improve firm control and monitoring (Coles et al., 2008). 
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An increase in managerial monitoring positively affects the degree of voluntary disclosure 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
The degree of board Independence 
The degree of board independence is measured as the ratio of the number of independent 
directors to the total number of directors in a firm. The degree of board independence in 
firms ranges from 0.00 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.63 for the whole sample. Firms in Oman 
have the highest mean board independence (0.81), followed by the UAE (0.72), Kuwait 
(0.69), Qatar (0.66), Bahrain (0.47), and Saudi Arabia (0.45). As discussed before, it 
appears that GCC listed firms have a high percentage of board independence which is 
considered a mechanism that can influence disclosure practices, since a majority of 
directors who are independent will work to provide advice and monitoring on strategic 
decisions and the managers’ activities, and should encourage the management to meet all 
of their disclosure requirements (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In addition, increasing 
numbers of non-executive directors on the board should providing a better representative 
of shareholders’ interests, protect shareholders and reduce information asymmetry. Thus, 
increasing numbers of non-executive directors on the board should lead to an increase in 
the quality and the level of financial disclosures (Forker, 1992). 
Family members on board  
The degree of family board membership is defined as the proportion of family member 
directors to the total number of directors. The table shows that, for the full sample, the 
proportion of family members ranges from 0.00 to 0.64 with a mean of 0.16. The highest 
mean proportion of family members on the board is for Kuwait (0.24), followed by Qatar 
(0.21), UAE (0.16), Bahrain (0.14), Oman (0.14), and Saudi Arabia (0.09). It appears that 
GCC listed firms have a high proportion of family members on the board compared to some 
existing studies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find the mean 
proportion of family members on the board is 0.14 and 0.15 among Malaysian corporations 
for the year 1995 and 2001 respectively. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find the mean proportion 
of family members on the board is 0.13 among Saudi listed companies over the period 2006 
and 2007. The traditional view of family member firms is that they have access to required 
information and have an incentive to run the firm in their interests (Adhikari and Tondkar, 
1992). Therefore, it is expected that the presence of family members on the board should 
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lead to lower disclosure because they have greater access to information and do not have 
the intention of disclosing this information to others. 
Role duality 
Role duality exists when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the Chair of the board 
of directors. When the firm’s CEO serves as board chairman the variable dummy is set to 
1, and 0 otherwise. For the full sample, the proportion of firms with role duality ranges 
from 0.00 to 1.00, with a mean of 0.77. The highest incidence of role duality is in Saudi 
Arabia (1.00) and Bahrain (1.00), followed by Oman (0.92), Qatar (0.73), UAE (0.68) and 
Kuwait (0.40). Consistent with stewardship theory, when the role is combined, it should be 
easier for the CEO to shape the firm in achieving its objectives as there will be less 
interference, and thus this helps the CEO to act in the best interests of the firm and its 
shareholders. Therefore, it is expected that a higher degree of role duality helps the firm to 
act in the best interests of its shareholders, resulting in a higher level of voluntary 
disclosure.  
The level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) 
The level of mandatory disclosure for the full sample ranges from 0.61 to 0.87, with a mean 
of 0.73. The highest mean mandatory disclosure degree is for firms in the UAE (0.77), 
followed by Qatar (0.76), Kuwait (0.74), Oman (0.72), Bahrain (0.71) and Saudi Arabia 
(0.71). It is expected that a high degree of mandatory disclosure will result in a low level 
of voluntary disclosure in GCC country listed firms. However, this depends on whether 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, 
then greater mandatory disclosure requirements will reduce the level of voluntary 
disclosure. In other words, given an amount of information that managers are willing to 
disclose, when more is disclosed in mandatory reporting, less is left for voluntary 
disclosure. If they are complements, greater disclosure requirements will increase the level 
of voluntary disclosure.  
Country group (developed stock markets) 
The country group dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a firm is registered in Bahrain, 
Oman or Kuwait, all of which have longer established stock markets, and 0 otherwise. 
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7.2.3 Bivariate relationships among the independent variables 
Tables 7.11 and 7.12 presents a correlation matrix for the model dependent and independent 
variables. As discussed in Chapter 6, it is important to determine whether multicollinearity 
could cause estimation problems. Multicollinearity is a potential statistical problem when 
the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359). The tables show the 
Pearson and Spearman's rho correlation matrices across all independent and dependent 
variables employed in this thesis. The Pearson and Spearman's rho coefficients are 
relatively low across the variables, in all cases less than 0.80, indicating that there are no 
multicollinearity problems. Most of the correlations are below 0.80. 
 
Table 7.11 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
continuous and dummy variables. With regard to the dependent variable, the table shows 
that the highest correlation is between the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and firm size 
(SIZE) (0.468), the degree of state ownership (SOWN) (0.387), board size (BOARDS) 
(0.329) and leverage (LEV) (0.327). In relation to the independent variables, Table 7.11 
shows that the highest correlation is between the percentage of director ownership (DOWN) 
and the percentage of family members (FAMILY) (0.443), between firm size (SIZE) and 
the degree of state ownership (SOWN) (0.436), leverage (LEV) (0.377), and and board size 
(BOARDS) (0.330).  
 
Table 7.12 shows a Spearman's rho correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
continuous variables. Concerning the dependent variable, Table 7.12 shows that the highest 
correlation is between the level of voluntary disclosure (LVD) and firm size (SIZE) (0.464), 
board size (BOARDS) (0.344), the degree of state ownership (SOWN) (0.343), and and 
leverage (LEV) (0.336). In relation to the independent variables, Table 7.12 shows that the 
highest correlation was between firm size (SIZE) and the degree of state ownership 
(SOWN) (0.489), and leverage (LEV) (0.379), board size (BOARDS) (0.349), and also 
between the proportion of director ownership (DOWN) and the presence of role duality 
(DUALITY) (0.310).  
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Table 7.11. Pearson correlation coefficients for the independent variables calculated for all observations 
Ind. Variables LVD SIZE 
IND1 
(Services) 
IND 2 
(Energy) 
LEV ROA LIQ AIP IL AGE DOWN IOWN SOWN BOARDS BOARDIND FAMILY DUALITY LMD 
LVD 1                  
SIZE .468** 1                 
IND1 (Services) .014 .123* 1                
IND 2 (Energy) .157** -.014 -.194** 1               
LEV .327** .377** .016 .256** 1              
ROA .087 -.131* .002 -.035 -.300** 1             
LIQ -.200** -.183** -.171** -.100* -.550** .183** 1            
AIP .153** .175** .028 .107* -.015 -.001 -.093 1           
IL .185** .145** .239** -.066 -.016 -.036 -.155** -.012 1          
AGE -.100 -.231** -.140** -.169** -.387** .191** .163** -.053 -.029 1         
DOWN -.197** -.229** -.187** -.132** -.077 .193** .006 -.113* -.169** .091 1        
IOWN -.272** -.327** .086 -.026 -.041 -.137** .068 -.016 -.036 -.147** -.079 1       
SOWN .387** .436** .210** -.077 .189** -.011 -.146** .217** .142** -.046 -.301** -.368** 1      
BOARDS .329** .330** .182** .005 .003 -.002 -.069 .023 .036 .106* -.076 -.170** .138** 1     
BOARDIND -.130* -.126* .033 .024 -.015 -.073 .010 -.062 .130* -.120* -.192** .175** -.032 -.036 1    
FAMILY -.197** -.171** -.026 -.117* -.064 .005 -.025 -.053 .064 .194** .443** -.068 -.284** -.117* -.156** 1   
DUALITY .143** .112* -.047 -.133** -.188** .093 .118* -.060 -.095 .300** .157** -.189** -.014 .177** -.376** .111* 1 -. 
LMD -.025 .139** .016 .170** .064 -.169** -.029 -.017 .086 -.062 -.115* -.058 .074 -.012 .199** .091 -.280** 1 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.12. Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables calculated for all observations 
Ind. Variables LVD SIZE 
IND1 
(Services) 
IND 2 
(Energy) 
LEV ROA LIQ AIP IL AGE DOWN IOWN SOWN BOARDS BOARDIND FAMILY DUALITY LMD 
LVD 1.000                  
SIZE .464** 1.000                 
IND1 
(Services) 
.036 .118* 1.000                
IND 2 
(Energy) 
.127* -.012 -.194** 1.000               
LEV .336** .379** .009 .236** 1.000              
ROA .089 -.227** .062 -.049 -.298** 1.000             
LIQ -.200** -.196** -.234** -.078 -.534** .161** 1.000            
AIP .147** .151** .033 .103* -.040 .010 .014 1.000           
IL .207** .145** .239** -.066 -.011 -.026 -.253** -.017 1.000          
AGE -.123* -.255** -.146** -.150** -.386** .151** .130* -.055 -.032 1.000         
DOWN -.208** -.254** -.175** -.178** -.142** .082 .057 -.061 -.259** .175** 1.000        
IOWN -.261** -.330** .116* -.025 -.080 -.098 .037 -.004 -.018 -.119* -.002 1.000       
SOWN .343** .489** .198** -.037 .125* .020 -.113* .177** .161** -.056 -.339** -.309** 1.000      
BOARDS .344** .349** .162** .009 .036 .003 -.102* .035 .062 .140** -.035 -.196** .281** 1.000     
BOARDIND -.186** -.149** .033 .061 -.047 -.041 .022 -.052 .131* -.137** -.246** .202** -.007 -.103* 1.000    
FAMILY -.220** -.139** -.033 -.113* -.082 -.015 -.002 -.032 .029 .186** .275** -.037 -.295** -.134** -.129* 1.000   
DUALITY .138** .116* -.047 -.133** -.137** .059 .118* -.052 -.095 .283** .310** -.157** -.030 .260** -.397** .120* 1.000  
LMD -.056 .157** .027 .170** .025 -.214** -.051 -.001 .091 -.060 -.256** -.070 .036 -.031 .223** .127* -.260** 1.000 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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 Multivariate analysis: multiple regression analysis 
This section of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.3.1 reviews the voluntary 
disclosure model specifications. Section 7.3.2 presents the results of the regression analysis 
for voluntary disclosure. 
 
7.3.1 Voluntary disclosure model specifications 
To examine the effect of firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics 
factors, ownership structures factors, and corporate governance factors on the level of 
voluntary disclosure, this thesis estimates the voluntary disclosure multivariate regression 
model set out in Chapter 5. In order to assess the impact of each variable on the voluntary 
disclosure level, four regression model specifications are constructed, as presented in table 
7.13: 
 
Table 7.13. Summary of different voluntary disclosure empirical models used in this 
study 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Corporate characteristics factors (CCF) X X X X 
Ownership structure factors (OSF)  X X X 
Corporate governance factors (CGF)   X X 
level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) X X X X 
Fixed year effect (FE) X X X X 
Country group (developed stock markets)    X 
 
Model I in Table 7.13 models the overall voluntary disclosure index against the corporate 
characteristic factors (CCF), the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) and the fixed year 
effects (FE). Model II models the overall voluntary disclosure index against the corporate 
characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), the level of mandatory 
disclosure (LMD) and the fixed year effects (FE). Model III models the overall voluntary 
disclosure index against the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), the level of mandatory disclosure 
(LMD) and the fixed year effects (FE). Model IV models the overall voluntary disclosure 
index against the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structure factors (OSF), 
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corporate governance factors (CGF), level of mandatory disclosure (LMD), the fixed year 
effects (FE), and country group (developed stock markets). 
The models are estimated for the full sample, with the selection of the independent variables 
in each models consisting of corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), the level of mandatory disclosure 
(LMD), and three dummy variables to represent the four study years. In order to assess the 
impact of each variable on the voluntary disclosure level, the following regression models 
are constructed: 
Model I 
This model specifies the extent of voluntary disclosure as a function of the corporate 
characteristic factors (CCF) such as firm size, industry type, leverage, profitability, 
liquidity, assets-in-place, multiple listed firms, firm age, the level of mandatory disclosure 
(LMD) and fixed year effects is given in Equation 7.1:  
 
ܸܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  + ߚଶ଴ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଵ  ܫܰܦ1௜௧ +  ߚଶଶ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚଶଷ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ +  ߚଶସ ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧  
+ ߚଶହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଻ ܣܫ ௜ܲ௧  +  ߚଶ଼ ܯܮ௜௧  +  ߚଶଽ ܣܩܧ௜௧  
+ ߚଷ଴ ܮܯܦ௜௧  + ߚଷଵ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧ +  Ɛ௜௧ 
(7.1) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܸܦ = Voluntary disclosure index; 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܮܧܸ = Long term debt to owners' equity ratio 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܣܫܲ = Assets-in-place 
ܯܮ = Multiple listing (1 if multiple listing and 0 if otherwise); 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
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ܮܯܦ = Level of mandatory disclosure 
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013  
Ɛ = Error term 
Model II 
This model uses the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), and ownership structures 
factors (OSF) such as director ownership, institutional ownership and state ownership, the 
level of mandatory disclosure (LMD), and fixed year effects to test the effect of those 
characteristics and factors on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The model’s specification 
is given in Equation 7.2: 
 
ܸܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଶ଴ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଵ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଶଶ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚଶଷ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ +   ߚଶସ ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧  
+  ߚଶହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଺  ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଻ ܯܮ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଼ ܣܩܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଽ  ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  
+  ߚଷ଴ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଵ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଶ ܯܦ௜௧  + ߚଷଷ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧ +   Ɛ௜௧   
(7.2) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܸܦ = Voluntary disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise)  
ܮܧܸ = Long term debt to owners' equity ratio. 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by the current ratio 
ܣܫܲ = Assets-in-place; 
ܯܮ = multiple listing (1 if multiple listing and 0 if otherwise); 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܦܱܹܰ = Director ownership 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܯܦ = Level of mandatory disclosure  
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ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013  
Ɛ = Error term 
Model III 
This model employs the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structures 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF) such as board size, board independence, 
family members and role duality,  the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD) and fixed year 
effects to investigate the effect of those factors on the extent of voluntary disclosure as 
given in Equation 7.3:  
 
ܸܦ௜௧  =  ߚ଴  +  ߚଶ଴  ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଵ ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଶଶ  ܫܰܦ2௜௧  +  ߚଶଷ ܫܰܦ3௜௧ +  ߚଶସ ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧
+  ߚଶହ  ܴܱܣ + ߚଶ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଻ ܯܮ ௜௧ +  ߚଶ଼ ܣܩܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଽ  ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  
+  ߚଷ଴  ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଵ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  + ߚଷଶ ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଷଷ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  
+  ߚଷସ  ܨܣܯܫܮ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷହ  ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷ଺ ܯܦ௜௧  + ߚଷ଻ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧ +   Ɛ௜௧   
(7.3) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܸܦ = Voluntary disclosure index; 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܮܧܸ = Long term debt to owners' equity ratio 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܣܫܲ = Assets-in-place; 
ܯܮ = multiple listing (1 if multiple listing and 0 if otherwise); 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
ܦܱܹܰ = Director ownership 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
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ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independent 
ܨܣܯܫܮܻ = Family members 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܯܦ = Level of mandatory disclosure  
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013  
Ɛ = Error term 
Model IV 
This model uses the corporate characteristics factors (CCF), ownership structures factors 
(OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD), and 
fixed year effects and the country group (developed stock markets) to investigate the effect 
of those factors on the extent of voluntary disclosure as given in Equation 7.4:  
 
ܸܦ௜௧  =  ߚ݋ + ߚଶ଴ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧  +  ߚଶଵ  ܫܰܦ1௜௧  +  ߚଶଶ ܫܰܦ2௜௧  + ߚଶଷ ܫܰܦ3௜௧  + ߚଶସ ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧
+ ߚଶହ ܴܱܣ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଺ ܮܫܳ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଻ ܯܮ௜௧  +  ߚଶ଼  ܣܩܧ௜௧  + ߚଶଽ ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  
+  ߚଷ଴ ܫܱܹ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଵ ܱܹܵ ௜ܰ௧  +  ߚଷଶ  ܤܱܣܴܦ ௜ܵ௧  +  ߚଷଷ ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ௜௧  
+  ߚଷସ ܨܣܯܫܮ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷହ ܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧  +  ߚଷ଺ ܯܦ௜௧  +  ߚଷ଻ ܻܧܣܴ ௜ܵ௧  
+  ߚଷ଼ ܵݑܾ − ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ (݋݈݀ ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐݏ) ௜௧  +  Ɛ௜௧  
(7.4) 
Where, 
݅ = identifier for each company, i.e., i = {1, 2, 3, …, 98} 
ݐ = Year of operation, i.e., I = {2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013} 
ܸܦ = Voluntary disclosure index 
ܵܫܼܧ = Firm size measured by total assets 
ܫܰܦ1 = Industry type (1 if service and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ2 = Industry type (1 if energy and 0 if otherwise) 
ܫܰܦ3 = Industry type (1 if manufacturing and 0 if otherwise) 
ܮܧܸ = Long term debt to owners' equity ratio 
ܴܱܣ= Return on assets  
ܮܫܳ = Liquidity measured by current ratio 
ܣܫܲ = Assets-in-place 
ܯܮ = multiple listing (1 if multiple listing and 0 if otherwise); 
ܣܩܧ = Firm age 
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ܦܱܹܰ = Director ownership 
ܫܱܹܰ = Institution ownership 
ܱܹܵܰ = State ownership 
ܤܱܣܴܦܵ = Board size 
ܤܱܣܴܦܫܰܦ = Board independent 
ܨܣܯܫܮܻ = Family members 
ܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ = Role duality 
ܯܦ = Level of mandatory disclosure  
ܻܧܣܴܵ = 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
ܵݑܾ − ݏܽ݉݌݈݁ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ (݋݈݀ ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐݏ) = Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait  
Ɛ = Error term 
The regression model contains 13 continuous variables: firm size, leverage, profitability, 
liquidity, assets-in-place, firm age, director ownership, institutional ownership, state 
ownership, board size, board independence, family members and level of mandatory 
disclosure. In addition, the model contains eight dummy variables, two dummies for 
industry type (manufacturing, services or energy sectors), one dummy variable for multiple 
listing status (multiple exchange listed or not), one dummy variable for the presence of role 
duality (duality for CEO and chairman positions), three dummies to represent the years, 
and one dummy for the country group Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman (developed stock 
market). 
7.3.2 Results of voluntary disclosure models 
Since the aim of this thesis is to examine if the level of voluntary disclosure is influenced 
by corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership factors (OS), corporate governance 
factors (CGF) and the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD), fixed time effects models are 
examined (Hsiao, 2003). Similar models are used by Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Hossain and 
Hammami (2009).  
 
The dummy variable for the year 2010, which is the base case, takes the value of 1 if the 
annual report relates to 2010, and 0 otherwise. The other three dummy variables represent 
2011, 2012 and 2013. A trend towards increasing mandatory disclosure level would be 
represented by the coefficients being ordered as follows: 2010 < 2011 < 2012 < 2013 < 0. 
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In this model, ܵܫܼܧ (measured by total sales) and ܴܱܧ (return on equity) are excluded to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity between ܵܫܼܧ (measured by total assets) and ܴܱܣ 
(return on assets). Multicollinearity exists when there is a high correlation between two or 
more independent variables (predictor variables) in the regression model (Brace, Kemp and 
Snelgar, 2003). Field (2005) argues that if the collinearity is found to be high, the 
probability that a good predictor will be found to be non-significant increases. Hence, in 
this case, such a predictor is inappropriately rejected from the regression model. 
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Table 7.14. Regression results for the voluntary disclosure models 
 
Independent variables 
 
Hyp. 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Model I 
(FSC+LMD+FE) 
Model II 
(Model I+OS) 
Model III 
(Model II+CGF) 
Model IV 
(Model III+Sub-sample: 
developed stock markets) 
   coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat coefficient      t-stat 
Constant   -0.092 (-0.919) 0.082 (0.776) -0.119 (-1.127) -0.234** (-2.130) 
a) Corporate factors: 
SIZE 
 
H18 
 
+ 
 
0.051*** 
 
(8.260) 
 
0.037*** 
 
(5.570) 
 
0.018** 
 
(2.493) 
 
0.061*** 
 
(5.504) 
IND1 (Services) H19 N/A -0.015 (-1.033) -0.025* (-1.764) -0.039** (-2.768) -0.036** (-2.687) 
IND2 (Energy) H19 N/A 0.073** (2.793) 0.070** (2.651) 0.050* (1.918) 0.042* (1.657) 
LEV H20 + 0.155*** (3.735) 0.144*** (3.531) 0.190*** (4.639) 0.155*** (3.857) 
ROA H21 + 0.372*** (4.245) 0.361*** (4.115) 0.365*** (4.365) 0.338*** (4.168) 
LIQ H22 - -0.001 (-0.194) -0.001 (-0.287) 0.001 (0.150) 0.002 (0.510) 
AIP H23 + 0.047* (1.723) 0.028 (1.026) 0.052** (1.974) 0.075** (2.900) 
ML H24 + 0.109*** (3.718) 0.096*** (3.342) 0.129*** (4.477) 0.090** (3.122) 
AGE H25 + 0.001 (1.347) 0.000 (0.665)  0.000 ( 0.944)  0.001** (2.012) 
b) Ownership factors: 
DOWN 
 
H26 
 
- 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
-0.099* 
 
(-1.843) 
 
-0.013 
 
(-0.295) 
 
 0.036 
 
(0.794) 
IOWN H28 + N/A N/A -0.047 (-1.396) -0.008 (-0.249) -0.009 (-0.285) 
SOWN H29 + N/A N/A 0.122*** (3.300)  0.150*** (4.167) 0.124*** (3.532) 
c) Governance factor: 
BOARDS 
 
H30 
 
+ 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
0.018*** 
 
(5.073) 
 
0.016*** 
 
(4.856) 
BOARDIND H31 + N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.032 (-1.125) -0.036 (-1.331) 
FAMILY H32 - N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.063* (-1.739) -0.075** (-2.154) 
DUALITY H33 - N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.050** (2.999) 0.062*** (3.826) 
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Independent variables 
 
Hyp. 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Model I 
(FSC+LMD+FE) 
Model II 
(Model I+OS) 
Model III 
(Model II+CGF) 
Model IV 
(Model III+Sub-sample: 
developed stock markets) 
d) Level of mandatory 
disclosure   
(LMD) 
 
 
 
H34 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
-0.258** 
 
 
 
(-2.166) 
 
 
 
-0.290** 
 
 
 
(-2.497) 
 
 
-0.024 
 
 
(-0.190) 
 
 
0.109 
 
 
(0.888) 
f) country group 
(developed stock 
markets): Bahrain, 
Oman, Kuwait  
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
0.054*** 
 
(3.461) 
e)Years 
2011 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 0.000 
 
(0.008) 
 
0.000 
 
(0.025) 
 
0.001 
 
(0.070) 
 
0.001 
 
(0.043) 
2012 N/A N/A -0.001 (-0.032) 0.001 (0.035) 0.000 (0.019) -0.001 (-0.048) 
2013 N/A N/A  0.008 (0.470) 0.011 (0.616) 0.008 (0.500) 0.004 (0.247) 
Adjusted R2 - - 0.318 - 0.355 - 0.418 - 0.455 - 
F - - 14.712 - 14.201 - 14.742 - 16.208 - 
Prob. (F) - - <0.001 - <0.001 - <0.001 - <0.001 - 
No. of observations - - 392 - 392 - 392 - 392 - 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
** Significant at the 5% level  
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7.13 summarises the results of the model of the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), ownership structure 
factors (OSF), corporate governance factors (CGF), and the level of mandatory disclosure 
(LMD).  
 
Model I reports the results for the full sample modelled against the corporate characteristic 
factors and the level of mandatory disclosure. The results show that the model is significant 
overall (F = 14.721, p < 0.000), with an adjusted R2 of 0.318.  
 
Model II reports the results for the full sample for the voluntary index modelled against the 
corporate characteristic factors, the ownership structure factors, and level of mandatory 
disclosure. The results show that the model is significant overall (F = 14.201, p < 0.000), 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.355.  
 
Model III reports the results for the full sample model for the voluntary index modelled 
against the corporate characteristic factors, the ownership factors, the corporate governance 
factors, and level of mandatory disclosure. The results show that the model is significant 
overall (F = 14.742, p < 0.000), with an adjusted R2 of 0.418.  
 
Model IV shows the results for the full sample model for the voluntary index modelled 
against the corporate characteristic factors (CCF), the ownership structure factors (OSF), 
the corporate governance factors (CGF), the level of mandatory disclosure (LMD), the 
years, and country group (developed stock markets). The results show that the model is 
significant overall (F = 16.208, p < 0.000), with an adjusted R2 of 0.455. 
 
The overall model results show that, as expected, the level of voluntary disclosure increases 
with a firm size, leverage, profitability, assets-in-place, firm age, the percentage of state 
ownership, board size, and the presence of role duality. The results also show that the level 
of voluntary disclosure differs by industry type. Further, as expected, the level of voluntary 
disclosure decreases with the percentage of director ownership, the percentage of family 
members on the board, and the level of mandatory disclosure. The details of voluntary 
disclosure multivariate regression results are presented in Appendix H. 
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7.3.2.1 Firm size 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with firm size at the 
1%, 1%, 5% and 1% levels in models I, II, III and IV, respectively. This finding provides 
support for hypothesis H18, which states that there is a positive relationship between the 
extent of voluntary disclosure and firm size. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Cooke (1989a, 1991), Hossain et al. (1995), Haniffa and Cooke(2002), Barako et al. 
(2006), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Omar and Simon (2011), Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012), Ntim et al. (2012a), Samaha et al. (2012), and Allegrini and Greco (2013). In GCC 
countries, larger firms can be expected to have a higher level of voluntary disclosure. This 
results can be explained by agency theory as firms tend to increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure to alleviate the problem between management and the shareholders. In addition, 
large firms are more publicly visible and more politically sensitive than small firms. 
Therefore, based on political cost theory, large firms are more subjected to the interests of 
regulations and government bodies which may increase political costs. One way to alleviate 
the intervention and undesired pressure from government bodies, and and to improve the 
image of the firms is by increasing the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
7.3.2.2 Industry type 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly negatively associated with industry type 
IND1, that is, membership of the services sector category, in models II, III and IV at the 
10%, 5% and 5% levels, respectively. The level of voluntary disclosure for the services 
industry is significantly lower than that for the other industries (manufacturing and energy). 
This finding is consistent with Suwaidan (1997) who concludes that firms in the service 
sectors disclose less information than firms in the financial or manufacturing sectors. This 
is because the manufacturing sector is largely associated with pollution, contamination and 
other negative effects on the environment and society, and therefore manufacturing firms 
are expected to provide more information in order to mitigate the risks of their operations 
on the environment. In addition, the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively 
related to industry type IND2, that is, membership of the energy sector category in models 
I, II, III and IV at the 5%, 5%, 10% and 10% levels, respectively. The level of voluntary 
disclosure for the energy sector is thus significantly higher than for the other industries 
(manufacturing and services). Thus, hypothesis H19, which states that the level of 
voluntary disclosure differs by industry, is supported. This finding is consistent with 
Haniffa and Cook (2002) who find that there is a high level of voluntary disclosure in the 
351 
 
construction sector but a low level of voluntary disclosure in the consumer sector. 
Moreover, there is variation in the degree of regulation between industries, where some are 
subject to additional rules (Tsamenyi et al., 2007). For example, some firms whose 
operations have the potential to damage the environment, such as oil and gas, are obliged 
to disclose more information about their operations (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). 
7.3.2.3 Leverage 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with leverage, 
measured by the long-term debt to owners' equity ratio, in models I, II, III and l IV at the 
1% level in each case. Thus, hypothesis H20, which states that there is a positive 
relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and leverage, is supported. In other 
words, the level of voluntary disclosure increases for higher leveraged GCC firms. This 
result may be explained by the fact that on average more highly leveraged GCC firms will 
be keener to satisfy the creditors’ needs by disseminating more reliable information on the 
ability of the firms to pay its debts. This result is consistent with Hossain et al. (1995), 
Barako et al. (2006) and Omar and Simon (2011).  
7.3.2.4 Profitability (ROA) 
The level of corporate voluntary disclosure is significantly positively related to 
profitability, as measured by return on assets (ROA), in models I, II, III and IV at the 1% 
level in each case. Thus, hypothesis H21, which states that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and profitability, is supported. The result suggests 
that the level of voluntary disclosure increases for higher profitability firms. This result is 
consistent with the signalling theory which proposes that firms with better performance are 
inclined to disclose additional information in order to signal their superior performance. 
The result is consistent with Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Naser et 
al. (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Aly et al. (2010), Omar 
and Simon (2011), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), Ntim et al. (2012a), Samaha et al. (2012) 
and Nelson (2014). 
 
Model IV, in the case of voluntary disclosure, is not augmented with the addition of an 
interaction term between profitability and liquidity (ROA*LIQ), because the expected sign 
of this variable is positive and the result supports this sign. However, in the case of 
mandatory disclosure the expected sign of this variable is positive but the result shows a 
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negative sign. Therefore Model IV, in the case of mandatory disclosure, is augmented with 
the addition of an interaction term between profitability and liquidity (ROA*LIQ) to see 
whether firms with high profitability and liquidity disclose more mandatory. 
7.3.2.5 Liquidity  
The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively but not significantly associated with 
liquidity, measured by current assets/current liabilities, in models I and II and positively 
but not significantly associated with liquidity in models II and IV. Thus, hypothesis H22, 
which states that there is a negative relationship between liquidity and the level of voluntary 
disclosure, is not supported. It is argued that firms with weaker liquidity positions may 
provide more information to satisfy the demands of creditors (Aly et al., 2010). However, 
our results show that this does not seem to be the case for GCC country listed firms with 
regard to voluntary disclosure. The lack of explanatory power of the liquidity variable is 
consistent with the findings of the voluntary disclosure models of Camfferman and Cooke 
(2002) and Aly et al. (2010). 
7.3.2.6  The proportion of Assets-in-Place 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with assets-in-place 
in models I, III and IV at the 10%, 5% and 5% levels, respectively. This finding supports 
hypothesis H23, which states that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated 
with assets-in-place. This result is consistent with signalling theory, which proposes that 
firms with a high proportion of fixed assets tend to disclose more information in their 
annual reports to reflect their stability and future growth. The result also is consistent with 
the findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Hossain and Hammami (2009) who find a 
positive relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and the proportion of assets-
in-place in firms from Malaysia and Qatar, respectively.  
7.3.2.7 Multiple listing status   
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly higher in in multiple market listing firms 
in models I, II, III and IV at the 1%, 1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Thus hypothesis 
H24, which that the level of voluntary disclosure is higher in firms with a multiple market 
listing is supported. This result is consistent with the findings of the following researchers 
(Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 1992; Hossain et al, 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Hossain et al, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; El-Jazzar et 
al., 1999; Glaum and Street, 2003; Anderson and Daoud, 2005; Collet and Hasky, 2005; 
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Omar, 2007). In GCC countries, multiple market listed firms are expected to disclose more 
information voluntarily in order to meet the interests of investors and its subsidiaries. Firms 
with multiple listing status may disclose more information voluntarily because they have 
different objectives regarding the growth of capital and the development.    
7.3.2.8 Firm age 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with firm age, 
measured by the number of years since formation, in model IV at the 5% level, but not in 
the other models. Therefore hypothesis H25, which states that there is a positive association 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and firm age, is supported to some extent. This 
result is consistent with Hossain and Hammami (2009), Prencipe (2004) and White et al. 
(2007). In GCC countries, consistent with the theory of competitive advantage, young firms 
are likely to disclose less information in their annual reports, as to do otherwise could be 
harmful if sensitive information is disclosed to competitors. In contrast, older firms are 
more experienced and are therefore more likely to include more information in their annual 
reports in order to stengthen their image and reputation with the market. 
7.3.2.9 The proportion of director share ownership 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly negatively associated with the degree of 
director share ownership, measured by the proportion of shares owned by executive 
directors to the total number of shares issued, in model II at the 10% level. Thus hypothesis 
H26, which states that there is a negative association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and the proportion of director ownership, has some weak support. In other 
words, the level of voluntary disclosure in a firm is higher in firms with a low proportion 
of director share ownership. This result is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), Bauwhede 
and Willekens (2008) and Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012). As expected, directors who 
own a substantial volume of shares may not want to disclose voluntary information to the 
public because as can instead use their power to employ firm resources to fulfil their own 
interests at the expense of other shareholders. They also may wish to hide any fraud and 
incompetence. As a result, a negative relationship between the degree of director share 
ownership and disclosure may be expected. 
7.3.2.10 The proportion of institutional share ownership  
The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively though insignificantly associated with 
institutional share ownership, measured by proportion of shares owned by institutional 
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investors to total number of shares issued, in models II, III and IV. Thus, hypothesis H28, 
which states that there is a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and institutional share ownership, is not supported. Contrary to expectations, the proportion 
of institutional ownership is not related to differences in voluntary disclosure levels. While 
it is argued that the existence of institutions alleviates the conflict between management 
and shareholders as they tend to encourage firms to disclose more information to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2010), 
the results here that this does not apply for GCC country listed firms with regard to 
voluntary disclosure. However, the lack of explanatory power of the institutional share 
ownership variable is consistent with the findings of other existing studies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
7.3.2.11 The proportion of state share ownership 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively related to the degree of state 
share ownership, measured as the proportion of shares owned by the government to the 
total number of shares issued in models II, III and IV at the 1% level in each case. Thus, 
hypothesis H29, which states that firms with a high proportion state share ownership will 
have a higher level of voluntary disclosure, is supported. This result is consistent with 
existing studies that find a positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and the proportion of state share ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003; Conyon and He, 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012). Eng and Mak (2003) argue that agency 
problems are more likely to arise with significant block ownership such as government 
ownership. Therefore, the managers firms with large block shareholders may disclose more 
voluntarily information as a means to alleviate the agency conflict with the shareholders.  
7.3.2.12 Board size 
The level of voluntary disclosure is found to be positively associated with the firm’s board 
size in models III and IV at the 1% level. Thus hypothesis H30, which states that firms with 
a large board size have a high level of voluntary disclosure, is supported. This is consistent 
with Ntim et al. (2012a), who found that board size is a key determinant of voluntary 
corporate disclosure. More recently, Albassam (2014) found that board size is positively 
correlated with the level of voluntary corporate disclosure among Saudi listed firms. This 
result is consistent with agency theory which suggests that board size is a key factor in 
monitoring management behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
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In addition, large firms are more likely to have a larger number of directors in order to 
improve firm control and monitoring (Coles et al., 2008). Thus, increase managerial 
monitoring affects positively voluntary disclosure level. 
7.3.2.13 The degree of board independence 
The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively but insignificantly associated with board 
independence, measured by the ratio of board independent directors to the total number of 
directors, in models III and IV. Thus, hypothesis H31, which states that there is a positive 
relationship between the proportion of board independence and the level of voluntary 
disclosure, is not supported. It is argued that outside directors may be elected by block 
holders to represent their interests and may be able to obtain information directly, rather 
than through public disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). In addition, outside directors may act 
as a substitute for monitoring through public disclosure. Thus, a positive relation between 
proportion of outside directors and voluntary disclosure level is expected, but not observed 
for GCC firms. The lack of explanatory power of the board independence is consistent with 
the findings of a large number of existing studies (Haniffa, 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Al-Akra et al, 2010; Matocsy et 
al., 2012; Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
7.3.2.14 Family members on board   
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly negatively associated with the proportion 
of family members on board to the total number of directors in models III and IV at the 
10% and 5% levels, respectively. Therefore hypothesis H32, which states that there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of family members on the board and extent 
of voluntary disclosure, is supported. In other words, this the results of this thesis suggest 
that the level of voluntary disclosure in a firm increases with a lower proportion of family 
members on the board. As expected, the presence of family members on the board leads to 
lower disclosure as such directors have greater access to information and have less intention 
of disclosing this information to others. This result is consistent with Ho and Wong (2001), 
Chau and Gray (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002).  
7.3.2.15 Role duality 
The level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with the presence of 
role duality in models III and IV at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Thus hypothesis 
H33, which states that firms with chair/CEO role duality are expected to disclose less 
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voluntary information, is not supported. However, this result is consistent with the findings 
of Felo (2009), Abed et al. (2011) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) who find that the level of 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to role duality. For example, Felo finds that having 
the same person to fill the CEO and chairman roles leads to greater voluntary disclosure 
transparency. Role duality is very common across GCC listed firms (77% of sample firms 
have role duality) which may have an impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
7.3.2.16 The impact of mandatory disclosure level on voluntary disclosure level 
The extent of mandatory disclosure is found to be significantly negatively associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure in models I and II at the 5% level in each case, but not in 
the other models. Therefore hypothesis H34, which states that there is some support for a 
negative relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. This result is consistent with Gigler and Hemmer (1998), who find that 
increasing the rate of mandatory disclosures may eliminate the need for a manager’s 
voluntary disclosures. Generally, firms believe that the confirmatory role of mandatory 
disclosures is more important for investors as the mandatory information is verifiable and 
more reliable than the management’s private information. As a result, the management pays 
less attention to voluntary disclosures than mandatory disclosures. In addition, managers 
will choose to increase the level of voluntary disclosure when the extent of mandatory 
disclosures is low. As expected, the interaction between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure in GCC countries show that they are substitutes, and therefore a firm may choose 
to increase the level of voluntary disclosure when the extent of mandatory disclosure is 
low.  
7.3.2.17 Country group (Developed stock markets) 
The sub-sample dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a firm is registered in Bahrain, 
Oman or Kuwait, all of which have longer established stock markets, and 0 otherwise. 
Model IV, which reports the results which include this sub-sample dummy variable reveals 
that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with the stock 
market establishment dummy variable at the 1% level, indicating that the level of voluntary 
disclosure for sub-sample 2 (Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) with less established stock 
markets is significantly lower than for firms from sub-sample 1 (Bahrain, Oman and 
Kuwait) with more established stock markets.  
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7.3.2.18 Time  
There are no significant differences in the level of voluntary disclosure across the study 
years as can be seen from the time dummy variable coefficients in models I, II, III and IV. 
However, the level of voluntary disclosure monotonically increases each year until 2013, 
indicating that there is a trend towards more voluntary disclosure across GCC country listed 
firms.  
 
Overall the results show that the level of voluntary disclosure increases with a firm size 
(H18), leverage (H20), profitability (H21), assets-in-place (H23), multiple listing status 
(H24), firm age (H25), the percentage of state share ownership (H29), board size (H30), 
and the presence of role duality (H33). The results also show that the level of voluntary 
disclosure differs by industry type (H19). Further, the level of voluntary disclosure 
decreases with the percentage of director share ownership (H26), the percentage of family 
members on the board (H32), and firms with high level of mandatory disclosure (H34). 
However, liquidity (H22), the percentage of institutional share ownership (H28), and board 
independent (H31) are found not to be significant factors for explaining variations in the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Table 7.14 summarises this study’s corresponding voluntary 
disclosure hypotheses, as well as the test results for those hypotheses. 
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Table 7.15. Voluntary disclosure corresponding hypotheses and hypotheses test results 
Variables Hypotheses Results   
Corporate characteristic 
factors:  
  
Firm size H18: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and firm 
size. 
Supported (+) 
Industry type H19: The level of voluntary disclosure differs by industry. Supported (+) 
Leverage H20: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
leverage. 
Supported (+) 
Profitability H21: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
profitability. 
Supported (+) 
Liquidity H22: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
liquidity. 
Not supported 
Assets-in-place H23: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
assets-in-place. 
Supported (+) 
Multiple listing status H24: The extent of voluntary disclosure is likely to increase for multiple listing firms. Supported (+) 
Firm age H25: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and firm 
age. 
Supported (+) 
Ownership structure 
factors: 
  
Director share ownership 
 
H26: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
director share ownership. 
Supported (-) 
359 
 
Variables Hypotheses Results   
Institutional share 
ownership 
H28: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
institutional share ownership. 
Not supported 
State share ownership H29: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and state 
share ownership.  
Supported (+) 
Corporate governance 
factors: 
  
Board size H30: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
board size. 
Supported (+) 
Board independent H31: There is a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Not supported 
Family members on the 
board 
H32: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of family members on the board. 
Supported (-) 
CEO Role duality H33: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
presence of CEO/Chairman role duality. 
Not supported 
(+) 
Mandatory disclosure 
level: 
  
Level of mandatory 
disclosure 
H34: There is a negative relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and the 
level of mandatory disclosure.  
Supported (-) 
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 Summary 
This chapter presents the results for the models of the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC 
country listed firms. It reviews the relationships between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and a range of factors such as: the corporate characteristics factors (CCF), the ownership 
structures factors (OSF), the corporate governance factors (CGF), and level of mandatory 
disclosure (LMD). The chapter then goes on to present descriptive statistics for the 
dependent variable (the VD disclosure indices), which measures the level of voluntary 
disclosure of GCC listed firms. It then presents descriptive statistics for the voluntary 
disclosure level determinants and presents the results of bivariate correlations for these 
variables. The chapter also examines the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the year dummy variables, in addition to the sub-sample groups for the more and less 
established stock market countries. 
 
The first research question for this chapter is to examine the extent of voluntary disclosure 
across GCC country listed firms, while the second and third research questions attempts to 
explore which determinants cause significant variations in the voluntary disclosure levels 
of such firms and how and why the determinants differ across GCC listed firms. This 
chapter aims to address these research questions by testing the 17 hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4. A self-constructed, item-based voluntary disclosure index measures the extent 
of voluntary disclosure, focusing on 13 groups of information categories found in the 
annual reports of GCC listed firms over the period 2010 to 2013. 
 
The results of this chapter reveal that the average level of voluntary disclosure in GCC 
country firms is 31%, with a range of 9% to 68%. The highest mean level of voluntary 
disclosure is for Saudi Arabia (0.45), followed by Oman (0.38), Bahrain (0.32), Qatar 
(0.32), the UAE (0.23) and Kuwait (0.21). The average level of voluntary disclosure across 
GCC-listed firms is found to be higher than the results of Al-Shammari (2008) for Kuwait 
(15%), Ferguson et al. (2002) for Hong Kong (13%), Meek et al. (1995) for the US, UK 
and continental Europe (18%), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) for Kuwait (19%), and 
Alfaraih and Alanezi (2011) for Kuwait (22%). However, the level of voluntary disclosure 
across GCC-listed firms is found to be lower than the results of Hossain and Hammami 
(2009) for Qatar (37%), Leventis and Weetman (2004) for Greece (37%) and Al-Janadi et 
al. (2012) for the UAE and Saudi Arabia (36%).  
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The results show that the level of voluntary disclosure varies by type of information (across 
the 13 groups of information), which is consistent with existing studies. The most highly 
disclosed groups were: group 1: general information (0.66), followed by group 9: 
information about directors (0.57), group 13: foreign currency information (0.48), and 
group 5: market-based information (0.42), whereas the lowest groups were group 6: future 
prospects (0.08), group 8: Research and development (0.11), group 10: Employee 
information (0.18), and group 11: Social policy and value added information (0.26). The 
findings show that GCC listed firms disclose significantly more general information, 
directors’ information, foreign currency information and market information than future 
prospects information, research and development information and employee and social 
information. The high level of disclosure for general information can be explained by the 
low cost of processing such information. In addition, the nature of this information is not 
very sensitive, and firms would not lose their competitive advantage by disclosing such 
information (Sukthomya, 2011). The high level of disclosure for directors’ information 
could be possibly a response of companies to the corporate governance campaigns carried 
out by GCC governments in the last decade. For foreign currency information, the high 
level of disclosure can be referred to the small number of items required by mandatory 
disclosures (6 items) for such information (IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates), thus GCC listed firms pay more attention to disclosing more information 
voluntarily in this category. 
 
The results from the multivariate analyses tend to support a strong positive relationship 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and firm size, industry type (energy), leverage, 
profitability (ROA), the proportion of assets-in-place, multiple market listing status, firm 
age, the proportion of state share ownership, board size and the presence of role duality. 
The results also suggest that the voluntary disclosure is negatively influenced by service 
industry membership, the proportion of director share ownership, the proportion of family 
members on the board, and the extent of mandatory disclosure. The results show no 
significant variation in the level of voluntary disclosure between the study years. Liquidity, 
the proportion of institutional share ownership and the degree of board independence do 
not evidence a significant association with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
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In terms of the explanatory power of the models, the pooled regression for overall voluntary 
disclosure shows that the variables included in model IV are able to explain 45.5% of the 
variation in the voluntary disclosure level for GCC country listed firms. The explanatory 
power of the regression models in this study appears to be higher than that found in existing 
studies of developed capital markets such as the following: Cooke (1991), in Japan (Adj. 
R2 = 29.4%); Malone et al. (1993), in US (Adj. R2 = 29.4%); Raffoumier (1995), in 
Switzerland (Adj. R2 = 42%); Camfferman and Cooke (2002), in the U.K. and Dutch (Adj. 
R2 = 33.7%); Bhojraj et al. (2004) in the USA (Adj. R2 = 24.3%); Patelli and Prencipe 
(2007), in Italy (Adj. R2 = 24.4%); Allegrini and Greco (2013), in Italy (Adj, R2 = 40.7%); 
and Gisbert and Navallas (2013), in Spain (Adj. R2 = 42.5 %); and higher than that found 
for developing capital markets such as the following: Hossain et al. (1995), in Malaysia 
(Adj. R2 = 28.6%); Owusu-Ansah (1998) in Zimbabwe (Adj. R2 = 34.5%); Eng and Mak 
(2003), in Singapore (Adj, R2 = 20.6%); and Hossain and Taylor (2007), in Bangladesh 
(Adj. R2 = 24%).  
 
The high value of the adjusted R2 for the regression model incorporating data from different 
time periods is consistent with the findings of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009), who find a 
dramatic increase in the values of adjusted R2 after year dummy variables are included in 
the pooled regression models. The results also support the strength of disclosure theories, 
especially agency theory, in explaining the variation in voluntary disclosure across firms. 
 
In conclusion, the results strongly support the corporate characteristic factor, ownership 
structure factor, and corporate governance factor hypotheses. Consistent with the 
theoretical expectations and with existing studies, excepting role duality, the results 
indicate a significant positive relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and firm 
size, leverage, profitability (ROA), the proportion of assets-in-place, listing status, firm 
age, the proportion of state ownership, board size and role duality in GCC country listed 
firms. In addition, the findings also show significant differences in voluntary disclosure 
levels across the GCC country by industry type. In other words, a large international firm 
with high profitability and leverage is more likely to provide more voluntary disclosure in 
GCC countries. Further, the proportion of director ownership, the proportion of family 
members on board and the extent of mandatory disclosure are significantly negatively 
related to the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure across GCC listed firms.  
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There are significant differences in the level of voluntary disclosure across country groups 
(developed stock markets). However, liquidity, the proportion of institutional ownership 
and board independence were found not significantly affecting the level of voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, there are no significant differences in the level of voluntary 
disclosure across the study years. However, the level of voluntary disclosure monotonically 
increases each year until 2013, except for Kuwait and Qatar listed firms, indicating that 
there is a trend towards more voluntary disclosure across GCC country listed firms.  
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 Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
 
 Introduction 
Motivated by investigating the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the 
annual reports of GCC country listed firms, this study has three specific objectives. The 
first objective is to investigate the extent to which listed firms from GCC member states 
(Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE) disclose mandatory and 
voluntary information to their stakeholders. The second objective is to investigate the 
nature of the key determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in GCC country 
listed firms. The third objective is to explore how and why determinants of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures differ across GCC country listed firms. This chapter summarises the 
main conclusions of the study. Section 8.2 summarises the salient findings and their 
implications for key stakeholders. Section 8.3 presents the implications of the thesis results. 
Section 8.4 presents the main contributions of this study to the research field. Section 8.5 
highlights the limitations of the study, and section 8.6 provides suggestions for further 
research.   
 
 Summary of findings 
The aim of the study is to seek answers to the following three research questions:  
1. To what extent do GCC country firms listed (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and the UAE) disclose mandatory and voluntary information?  
2. What are the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in GCC country 
listed firms? 
3. How and why do the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosure differ 
across GCC country listed firms? 
To measure the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, two indexes were 
constructed. The mandatory disclosure index comprised disclosure and measurement items 
for 24 applicable IASs/IFRSs which apply to GCC countries during the sample period from 
2010 to 2013. They were IAS 1, IAS 2, IAS 7, IAS 16, IAS 17, IAS 18, IAS 21, IAS 23, 
IAS 24, IAS 27, IAS 28, IAS 31, IAS 33, IAS 36, IAS 37, IAS 38, IAS 40, and IFRS 3, 
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IFRS 5, IFRS 8, IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12 and IFRS 13. A total of 325 mandatory 
disclosure items were obtained from the 24 applicable IASs/IFRSs. The voluntary 
disclosure index consisted of 13 different information groups. The groups studied were: (1) 
general information; (2) financial overview and historical information; (3) ratios and other 
analyses; (4) projected and management information; (5) market-based information; (6) 
future prospects; (7) acquisitions and disposals; (8) research and development; (9) 
information about directors; (10) employee information; (11) social policy and value-added 
information; (12) segmental information; and (13) foreign currency information. The 
groups therefore comprise 129 items of voluntary information. The published annual 
reports of GCC listed firms for the most recent years available at the time of data collection 
were selected in order to reflect the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
information. 
 
To investigate the factors expected to influence the extent of mandatory disclosure, the 
study first examined the roles, responsibilities, and practices of the monitoring and 
enforcement bodies in each GCC country, along with the role of the auditor in promoting 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Existing studies in developed and 
developing countries were reviewed and synthesised. The result of this was a set of 17 
potential determinant variables. Nine corporate characteristic factors were selected for this 
study: firm size, industry type, profitability, liquidity, international listing status, the extent 
of international sales, whether firms had consolidated financial statements, the type of 
auditor, and firm age. Two ownership structure variables were chosen: the degree of 
institutional share ownership and government share ownership. Three corporate 
governance factors were selected: board size, the degree of board independence and the 
presence of CEO role duality. Two cultural factors (manager personal characteristics) were 
selected: the educational level of directors and the educational level of financial controllers. 
In addition, the impact of the extent of voluntary disclosure on the extent of mandatory 
disclosure is examined.  
  
To explore the factors likely to affect the extent of voluntary disclosure, existing studies 
for both developed and developing countries were also reviewed. The outcome was a set 
of 17 potential determinant variables. Nine corporate characteristic factors were selected: 
firm size, industry type, leverage, profitability, liquidity, assets in place, multiple market 
listing status, and firm age. Four ownership structures variables were also selected: the 
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degree of director share ownership, the degree of institutional share ownership, the degree 
of state share ownership, and the degree of foreign share ownership. Four corporate 
governance variables were chosen: board size, the degree of board independence, the 
degree of family membership of the board, and the presence of role duality. In addition, the 
impact of the extent of mandatory disclosure on the extent of voluntary disclosure is also 
investigated.    
 
The level of mandatory disclosure 
The extent of mandatory disclosure, averaged over all firms and across years, was 0.73. 
The extent of mandatory disclosure ranged from 0.72 in 2010 to 0.74 in 2013. This indicates 
that the level of mandatory disclosure has improved over the time in GCC country listed 
firms. This could be because by 2013 more of new applicable standards (IFRS10, IFRS11, 
IFRS12 and IFRS13) had an effect on firm financial statements which may result in greater 
mandatory disclosure. However, no firm in any year within the period of the study fully 
complied with all mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 
The level of mandatory disclosure differs across GCC country listed firms. The highest 
average mandatory disclosure level in the sample was found for the UAE (0.77). This was 
followed by Qatar (0.76), Kuwait (0.74), Oman (0.72), Bahrain (0.71) and Saudi Arabia 
(0.71). The level of mandatory disclosure increased over time for all GCC country listed 
firms, suggesting that each individual state was moving towards greater accounting 
harmonisation with mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 
The salient findings reveal that the level of mandatory disclosure was lower than the level 
of mandatory disclosure observed for developed countries. The level of mandatory 
disclosure in GCC listed firms across time was also lower than the level of mandatory 
disclosure for found firms in Australia at 0.94 (Tower et al., 1999), in Switzerland at 0.92 
(Street and Gray, 2001), in Germany at 0.81 (Glaum and Street, 2003), in New Zealand at 
0.88 (Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005), in Greece at 0.88 (Tsalavoutas et al., 2011), and in 
the UK at 0.92 (Popova et al., 2013). 
 
The results of the relatively lower level of mandatory disclosure for GCC country firms 
could be explained by the fact that the mechanisms used by enforcement bodies and the 
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activities of external auditors for monitoring compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements are inadequate in these countries. Possible reasons for this shortcoming 
include a lack of professional training and salaries which are insufficient to attract highly 
qualified accountants. There may also be a lack of commitment from the respective 
governments, at a policy level, to pursue enforcement strongly. With respect to differences 
in average mandatory disclosure levels across countries, it may in addition be explained by 
differences in the financial reporting environment across GCC countries, the role of 
independent audit in promoting compliance with IASs/IFRSs, and the enforcement process 
to check the financial statements for compliance with IASs/IFRSs, as discussed in Chapter 
2.   
 
The level of mandatory disclosure was found to vary across the different standards. A high 
level of mandatory disclosure was found for IASs 1, 2, 21, 23, 27 and IFRSs 11, 12 and 13 
(averaging more than 0.90), whereas a low level of mandatory disclosure was found for 
IASs 17, 36, 40 and IFRS 3 and 5 (averaging less than 0.65). A moderate level of mandatory 
disclosure was found for IASs 7, 16, 18, 24, 28, 31, 33, 37, 38, IFRS 8 and 10 (between 
0.65 and 0.90). The level of mandatory disclosure increased from 2010 to 2013 for all 
standards, indicating that sample countries overall progressed towards achieving greater de 
facto harmonisation with mandatory disclosure requirements.  
 
One explanation for the higher extent of mandatory disclosure for IASs 1, 2, 7, 16, 18, 21, 
23, 24, 27, 28, 31 and 38 is that it is easier to comply with these standards than it is for the 
other IASs/IFRSs which in general involve greater proprietary costs incurred and more 
complex requirements. For example, IAS 2 consists of only eight items and firms probably 
find it easy to comply with these requirements. In addition, the higher level of mandatory 
disclosure with IFRS 11, 12 and 13 may be explained as just a few firms started adopting 
these standards and it had an effect on their financial statements, but for the majority of the 
sample firms these standards had no effect on their financial statements for the annual 
period.  
 
A low level of mandatory disclosure was found for IASs 17, 36, 40 and IFRS 3 and 5, and 
this could be explained by contributing factors such as proprietary costs associated with 
such standards, difficulty in adherence, the sensitive nature of the disclosure requirement 
(more complex requirements) and inexperience of firms and auditors to meet the 
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requirements of such standards. In addition, business practice relating to those standards 
were not the common across GCC listed firms until 2005, which might contribute to a lack 
of experience in dealing with them and more complex requirements. In addition, the 
activities associated with IFRS 3 Business Combinations and IFRS 5 Non-current Assets 
Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations were not common among GCC country listed 
firms until 2005. For relatively new standards, firms may not have had adequate experience 
in order to meet the requirements of IFRS 3 and IFRS 5. In addition to the complexity of 
the requirements for those standards.  
 
A summary of the results for the mandatory disclosure models is presented in Table 8.1. It 
shows that a significant positive relationship is observed between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure and firm size, international presence (international listing and international 
sales), firms with group accounting standards or consolidated financial statements, firm 
age, the degree of state share ownership, the degree of board independence, the educational 
level of the board of directors, and that of the financial controllers. In addition, the findings 
show significant differences in mandatory disclosure levels across industry types. In 
particular, the level of mandatory disclosure for energy firms is significantly higher than 
the other industries (manufacturing and services). The extent of mandatory disclosure is 
significantly negatively related to firm profitability, the degree of institutional share 
ownership, board size, the presence of CEO role duality, and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. However, the extent of mandatory disclosure is found not to be significantly 
related to firm liquidity.    
 
In addition, there are significant differences in the extent of mandatory disclosure through 
time and across country groups (the latter grouped by the degree of high level of exports). 
The level of mandatory disclosure monotonically increased each year until 2013, with a 
clear upward trend in the extent of mandatory disclosure through time. This result is 
consistent with the introduction of new IFRSs in 2013 (IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial 
Statements, IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities, 
and IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement). The extent of mandatory disclosure for firms 
within sub-sample 1 (the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait with a high degree of exports as a 
percentage of GDP) is significantly higher than for firms within sub-sample 2 (Oman, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia which have a low level of exports as a percentage of GDP). So, firms in 
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high export countries (the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait) disclose more mandatory disclosure 
information than firms in low export countries (Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).  
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Table 8.1. Summary of the key results for drivers of mandatory disclosure 
Variables Hypotheses Measurements Expected 
relationship  
Empirical test results 
Corporate characteristics: 
 
    
Firm size H1 Total assets + Supported (+) 
Industry type H2 Dummy variable, 1 for energy firms and 0 
otherwise 
+/- Supported (+) 
Profitability H3 Return on assets (ROA) 
 
+ Not supported (-) 
Liquidity H4 Current ratio 
 
+ Not supported 
Market listing status H5 Dummy variable, 1 for internationally listed, 
and 0 otherwise 
+ Supported (+) 
Degree of internationality H6 Dummy variable, 1 for international sales and 0 
otherwise 
+ Supported (+) 
Consolidated financial 
statements firms 
H8 Dummy variable, 1 for consolidated financial 
statements, and 0 otherwise 
+ Supported (+) 
Firm age H9 Current year - year of incorporation + Supported (+) 
Ownership structure factors: 
 
    
Degree of institutional share 
ownership 
H10 Proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors to total shares issued 
 
- Supported (-) 
Degree of state share ownership H11 Proportion of shares owned by government to 
total shares 
issued 
 
- Not supported (+) 
Corporate governance 
factors: 
 
    
Board size H12 Number of directors on board + Not supported (-) 
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Variables Hypotheses Measurements Expected 
relationship  
Empirical test results 
Degree of board independence H13 Proportion of independent directors to total 
directors 
 
+ Supported (+) 
Presence of CEO role duality H14 Dummy variable, 1 when CEO serves as board 
chairman and 0 otherwise 
- Supported (-) 
Cultural factors: 
 
    
Educational level of board of 
directors 
H15 Proportion of directors qualified in business or 
accounting to total directors 
 
+ Supported (+) 
Educational level of financial 
controller 
H16 Proportion of financial controller qualified in 
business or accounting to total number of 
financial controllers 
 
+ Supported (+) 
Voluntary disclosure level: 
 
    
Level of voluntary disclosure H17 Extent of voluntary disclosure by firm - Supported (-) 
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The extent of voluntary disclosure 
The extent of voluntary disclosure for GCC firms as a whole, across the 13 information 
categories examined across all years was 0.31, that is, firms disclosed 31% of potential 
voluntary disclosure items, with a range from 9% to 68%. The mean extent of voluntary 
disclosure across all years was found to be: Saudi Arabia (0.45), Oman (0.38), Bahrain 
(0.32), Qatar (0.32), the UAE (0.23), and Kuwait (0.21). The extent of voluntary disclosure 
across GCC country listed firms was found to be higher than that found by Al-Shammari 
(2008) for firms in Kuwait (15%), Ferguson et al. (2002) for Hong Kong (13%), Meek et 
al. (1995) for the US, UK and Continental Europe (18%), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) for Kuwait (19%), Alfaraih and Alanezi (2011) for Kuwait (22%), and was similar 
to that found by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) for Malaysia (31%), but was lower than that 
found by Hossain and Hammami (2009) for Qatar (37%), Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
for Greece (37%) and Al-Janadi et al. (2012) for the UAE and Saudi Arabia (36%). The 
extent of voluntary disclosure increased by 1% over the sample period, from 0.31 in 2010 
to 0.32 in 2013, indicating that the extent of voluntary disclosure improved slightly. 
However, no firm in the sample fully disclosed the potential voluntary information items 
examined. 
   
The results also show that extent of voluntary disclosure varies by the type of information 
(13 groups of information), consistent with existing studies. The highest group scores were 
for group 1 general information (0.66), group 9 information about directors (0.57), group 
13 foreign currency information (0.48), and group 5 market-based information (0.42), 
whereas the lowest scores were for group 6 future prospect (0.08), group 8 research and 
development (0.11), group 10 employee information (0.18), and group 11 social policy and 
value added information (0.26). The findings thus show that GCC listed firms disclose 
significantly more general information, directors’ information, foreign currency 
information and market information than future prospect information, research and 
development information, employee and social information. The high level of disclosure 
for general information can be explained by the low cost of processing such information. 
In addition, the nature of this information is not very sensitive, and firms would not lose 
their competitive advantage by disclosing such information (Sukthomya, 2011).  The high 
level of disclosure for directors’ information could be possibly a response of companies to 
the corporate governance campaigns carried out by GCC governments in the last decade. 
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For foreign currency information, the high level of disclosure can be referred to the small 
number of items required by mandatory disclosures (6 items) for such information (IAS 
21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates), thus GCC listed firms pay more 
attention to disclosing more information voluntarily in this category. 
 
The summary results of the voluntary disclosure models are presented in Table 8.2. The 
results support a significant positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure 
and firm size, leverage, profitability, assets in place, market listing status, firm age, the 
proportion of state share ownership, board size, and the presence of CEO role duality. In 
addition, the findings show significant differences in voluntary disclosure levels across 
industry types. In particular, the extent of voluntary disclosure for energy firms is 
significantly higher than the other industries (manufacturing and services). The results also 
show that the extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly negatively related to service 
industry membership, the proportion of director share ownership, the proportion of family 
members on the board, and the extent of mandatory disclosure. In addition, the level of 
voluntary disclosure for firms within sub-sample 1 (Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman with 
developed stock markets) is significantly higher than for firms within sub-sample 2 (the 
UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia with less established stock markets). However, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is not significantly related to firm liquidity, the degree of institutional 
share ownership, and the degree of board independence. Further, there are no significant 
differences in the extent of voluntary disclosure through time. 
  
To summarise, the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure has increased over time 
across GCC country listed firms, but remained lower than that observed for developed 
country listed firms. More broadly, the results for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
provide strong support for the influence of corporate characteristics, ownership structure 
factors, corporate governance factors, and cultural factors. 
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Table 8.2. Summary of the key results for drivers of voluntary disclosure 
Variables Hypotheses Measurements Expected 
relationship  
Empirical test 
results 
Corporate characteristic 
factors: 
 
    
Firm size H18 Total assets + Supported (+) 
Industry type H19 Dummy variable, 1 for energy firms and 0 otherwise +/- Supported (+) 
Industry type H19 Dummy variable, 1 for service firms and 0 otherwise +/- Supported (-) 
Leverage H20 Long term debt to owners' equity ratio + Supported (+) 
Profitability H21 Return on assets (ROA) 
 
+ Supported (+) 
Liquidity H22 Current ratio 
 
- Not supported 
Proportion of assets in place H23 The ratio of the book value of fixed assets (net of depreciation) to 
the book value of total assets 
+ Supported (+) 
Multiple listing status H24 Dummy variable, 1 for those internationally listed in stock markets 
and 0 otherwise 
+ Supported (+) 
Firm age H25 Current year – incorporated year + Supported (+) 
Ownership structure 
factors: 
 
    
Degree of director share 
ownership 
H26 Percentage of shares owned by the CEO and executive directors to 
the total number of shares issued 
- Supported (-) 
Degree of institutional share 
ownership 
H28 Proportion of shares owned by institutional investors to total 
shares issued 
 
+ Not supported 
Degree of state share 
ownership 
H29 Proportion of shares owned by government to total shares 
issued 
 
+ Supported (+) 
Corporate governance 
factors: 
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Variables Hypotheses Measurements Expected 
relationship  
Empirical test 
results 
 
Board size H30 Number of directors on board + Supported (+) 
Degree of board independent H31 Proportion of independent directors to total directors 
 
+ Not supported 
Degree of family members 
on board 
H32 Proportion of family members on board to total number of 
directors 
- Supported (-) 
Presence of CEO role duality H33 Dummy variable, 1 when CEO serves as board chairman and 0 
otherwise 
+ Not supported (-) 
Mandatory disclosure 
level: 
 
    
Level of mandatory 
disclosure 
H34 Extent of mandatory disclosure disclosed by firm - Supported (-) 
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 Implications of the thesis results 
This study does not focus on the value relevance of the accounting information to market 
participants, but instead it focuses on an investigation into compliance with accounting 
standards and differences in voluntary disclosure across GCC member states. The results 
of this thesis have important implications for regulators, enforcement bodies and investors 
in the GCC countries. If they aim to ensure a greater level of mandatory disclosure, there 
is evidently ample scope for further improvement. In addition, the qualifications required 
of auditors and accountants who are responsible for applying IASs/IFRSs to promote 
compliance with the required IASs/IFRSs (including passing examinations for admission 
and professional training requirements) could be one factor for enhancing the level of 
mandatory disclosure among GCC listed firms. While penalties exist for contravening the 
disclosure’s law, the law needs to be enforced to maximise mandatory disclosure levels.  
 
The study shows that the regulators and enforcement bodies in GCC countries (i.e. the 
surveillance departments of the ministry of commerce and the external auditor’s report) are 
the most important drivers of the degree and nature of disclosure in GCC countries. The 
enforcement bodies, as governmental non-profit organizations, manage the relationship 
between investors, the stock exchange and brokers. The government in GCC countries 
should continue to support the regulators and enforcement bodies with both resources and 
experts in order to achieve its objectives. 
 
The results of the thesis have implications for the regulators of the Gulf Co-Operation 
Council Accounting and Auditing Organization (GCCAAO) in their efforts to harmonise 
accounting standards. The results provide the GCCAAO with potentially useful 
information concerning the degree of mandatory disclosure and the firm attributes that are 
associated with higher mandatory disclosure (which is what the regulators may wish to 
achieve). Greater disclosure performance may help the GCCAAO to represent the region 
more effectively in the international standards-setting arena.  
 
This study provides important lessons for those international organisations interested in the 
diffusion of financial reporting standards across and within developing countries. It 
provides evidence on the firm factors driving higher (lower) levels of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure and shows how disclosure has evolved through time. Lessons drawn 
377 
 
from the GCC country experience will be of interest to regulators interested in improving 
the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure and strengthening monitoring-and-
enforcement mechanisms in other countries, and in particular in developing countries.  
 
The thesis also shows that the most important variables influencing the level of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosures in GCC listed firms are firm size, profitability, listing status, 
industry type, firm length of establishment and the degree of state ownership. Since the 
extent of disclosures is related to firm characteristics, the regulators in GCC countries 
should focus on firms that are small, unprofitable, those not listed on multiple stock 
exchanges, firms not in the energy sector, younger firms, and firms that do not have a high 
degree of state ownership, in order to improve mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels 
in the annual reports of such firms. These firms have an incentive to improve their 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures extent in order to compete with other firms and attract 
more investors.  
 
Firm size is the most important variable which affects the variation in disclosure level for 
GCC listed firms. This result is consistent with disclosure theories (e.g. agency and political 
theories) and with existing studies for developed and developing countries (see Tables 3.3, 
3.4, 4.3 and 4.4). As regards investment decision making, large firms will provide more 
information for users than small firms. The resources and the expertise of large firms could 
make them role models for other firms in the market. GCC listed firms were found to 
disclose more profitability ratios than other types of ratio (e. g. liquidity ratios). The 
importance of profitability ratios may be the result of high performance firms attracting 
more investors to the firm. Firms which are listed on multiple stock exchanges were found 
to disclose more information than other listed firms. It is argued that the higher disclosure 
observed for multiple exchange listed firms is a response to greater interest in their shares. 
Indeed, for firms to be listed on the multiple stock exchanges, they must fulfil certain 
conditions regarding issued capital and profitability. Thus, it is expected to see large firms 
with multiple stock exchange listings to disclose more information due to the need for 
external financing. Multiple listed firms are obliged to disclose additional information 
compared to national requirements. Thus, the quality of information disclosed increases for 
multiple listing firms. 
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Energy firms disclose more information than services firms in GCC countries. The nature 
and complexity of the activities of these firms require more information to be disclosed 
than other firm types. In addition, some IASs/IFRSs (i.e. IAS 2 Inventories; IAS 38 
Intangible Assets; IFRS 3 Business Combinations and IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for 
Sale and Discontinued Operations) are more applicable to energy firms than to service 
firms. Older firms have stronger accounting systems and more experienced managers and 
staff, and are therefore more likely to include more information in their annual reports in 
order to enhance their image and reputation in the market. As suggested by agency theory, 
firms with large block shareholders (such as in the case of state ownership) should disclose 
more information in their annual reports as a means of alleviating the agency conflict with 
shareholders. Overall, the regulators in GCC countries should take into consideration the 
costs and the benefits associated with increased disclosure for firms which are smaller, less 
profitable, firms that are not listed on multiple stock exchanges, firms that are not in the 
energy sector, younger firms, and firms do not have a high percentage of state ownership. 
It is clear that firms will disclose more information if the benefits to doing so exceed the 
costs (cost-benefit theory). If any increase in disclosure for these firms causes higher costs 
and lower benefits then they will be unwilling to disclose additional information. 
 
In general, the results of the thesis have important implications for regulators, enforcement 
bodies, current and potential future investors since identifying firm-specific characteristics 
such as corporate characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors 
and cultural factors could help different categories of external users identify the differences 
that occur in mandatory and voluntary disclosures between firms. 
 
The interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure suggests that such disclosures 
are not separate elements in financial reporting. Both should be taken into consideration 
when exploring a firm’s disclosure strategy. Understanding the interaction between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure should provide regulators with useful insights into the 
pattern of disclosure observed in the market. For example, the positive relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure shows that an increase in the level of mandatory 
disclosure encourages an increase in voluntary disclosure. However, some existing studies 
did not support this view, arguing that the provision of voluntary disclosure is independent 
of mandatory disclosure. When mandatory requirements are limited or regulations are 
vague and difficult to interpret, firms have an incentive to replace missing information with 
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voluntary disclosures. This leading to a negative relationship between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure which is observed in this thesis. The interaction between voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures is examined by existing researchers (Dye, 1985; 1986; Gigler 
and Hemmer, 1998; Naser et al., 2003; Al-Razeen et al., 2004; Einhorn, 2005; Yu, 2011). 
Naser et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures, whereas Gigler and Hemmer (1998) find that increasing the 
frequency of mandated disclosures may eliminate managers’ voluntary disclosures and 
reduce the informational efficiency of prices. However, Al-Razeen et al. (2004) find no 
clear association between the two disclosure types. Thus, it may be argued that there is still 
no clear relationship between the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Firms 
have to determine what the optimal level of total disclosure is appropriate for them (Leuz 
et al., 2008). Either a firm strictly follows regulatory requirements and limits its discretion 
over voluntary disclosure, or it meets minimum mandatory requirements and extends its 
reporting by the voluntary provision of information. Moreover, users of the annual report 
(e. g. investors) should understand that there is not necessarily a positive relationship 
between the level of mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. In other words, firms 
that are more forthcoming in disclosing mandatory items are not always the same firms that 
disclose more voluntary information.  
 
 Contributions to knowledge 
This study contributes to the academic literature in the area of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure, and to the growing empirical accounting literature on the association between 
firm-specific characteristics and the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the 
following ways: 
1. This thesis contributes to the academic disclosure literature by providing new 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC country listed firms and corporate 
characteristics, ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors and 
cultural factors. To date, there is very little existing empirical evidence concerning 
the impact on the extent of mandatory and/or voluntary disclosure(s) in the annual 
reports of GCC country listed firms and corporate characteristics such as firm size, 
industry type, profitability, liquidity, auditor type, international listing status, and 
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firm age. This study is the first to focus on this range of factors. It provides a useful 
guide for understanding the underlying reasons for variations in the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of GCC country listed 
firms. Therefore, this study makes an important additional contribution to the body 
of knowledge. 
2. The disclosure indices used in this study consist of two different disclosure indices, 
the mandatory disclosure index (MDINDEX) which contains 325 mandatory 
disclosure items required by IASs/IFRSs and the voluntary disclosure index 
(VDINDEX) which comprises 129 voluntary discourse items. These indices may 
be employed by different users (e.g. investors, financial analysts, regulators) in 
order to assess the extent of corporate financial disclosures in GCC country listed 
firms. The indices may be updated by different users by adding new mandatory 
disclosure items and other voluntary items as appropriate. Therefore, the index 
could act as a benchmark for regulators as well as researchers and others users for 
the purposes of future analysis and evaluation.  
 
3. The thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing a longitudinal study 
(over a four-year period) of the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in 
the annual reports of GCC country listed firms, to determine whether disclosure 
levels have improved over time. Most existing empirical research has to date 
examined the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices for one year 
only (thus cross-sectional studies), and hence, this thesis is an important additional 
contribution to the body of knowledge by looking at the dynamics of corporate 
financial disclosure change. 
 
4. The results of this study clarify that users of GCC country listed firms’ financial 
statements might expect greater compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
from larger firms, firms with higher profitability and liquidity, firms with more 
international activities, firms with consolidated financial statements, older firms, 
firms with a higher proportion of state ownership, firms with a higher education 
level of the board directors and financial controllers.  In addition, users of GCC 
listed firms’ annual reports may expect more voluntary disclosures from larger 
firms, more highly leveraged and profitable firms, firms with a higher proportion of 
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assets in place, multiple exchange listed firms, older firms, firms with a higher 
proportion of state ownership, firms with larger boards and firms with chair/CEO 
role duality.  
 
5. Identifying the firm-specific characteristics such as corporate characteristics, 
ownership structure factors, corporate governance factors and cultural factors 
should help different categories of external users (such as investors, financial 
analysts, practitioners, academics, and policy makers) to understand the differences 
that occur in mandatory and voluntary disclosures across firms. In addition, the 
results of this study provide an opportunity for understanding international financial 
reporting differences, and in particular understanding the environment within 
developing countries. Therefore, this comparison makes an important additional 
contribution to the body of knowledge. 
6. This thesis is based on disclosure theories which predominantly originated in 
relation to developed and mature markets, and seeking to determine whether they 
apply to an emerging economy setting in explaining the influence of firm-specific 
characteristics on the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the annual 
reports of GCC country listed firms. Thus, this thesis makes an important additional 
contribution to the body of knowledge. 
7. The results of the study have provided evidence on the applicability of theories 
originated in the developed context to the GCC emerging capital markets. This 
provides a better understanding not only of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
practices in the GCC context but also of the factors that affect it. This encourages 
the use of the proposed theoretical framework in explaining disclosure practices in 
other developing contexts. 
 Limitations of the research 
While this study provides many useful insights into the behaviour of listed firms in GCC 
countries with respect to mandatory and voluntary disclosures, several limitations should 
be noted. Only the top 20 listed firms were selected for this study, as measured by the 
highest market weighted index value for a range of industries. This yielded a relatively 
modest sample size for each GCC country which made it more difficult to isolate between-
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country effects and to generalise the results. The thesis was also restricted to firms which 
are listed on the GCC stock exchanges, and does not take into account the experience of 
non-listed companies. Although the use of listed firms alone limits the generalisability of 
the results, there are clear advantages of this approach. The greater data availability and 
from an equity investment perspective the financial reporting behaviour of publicly listed 
firms is of primary interest. In addition, this study was only designed for non-financial 
institutions, so the findings of this study may not be applicable to the financial institutions. 
 
Various regression models were used to test the hypotheses in the empirical work. The 
results were somewhat mixed, in common with the findings of many empirical accounting 
studies, indicating that other non-modelled variables may have provided further 
explanatory power. However, the approach in this thesis was to include all variables that 
could be justified, whether theoretically and/or empirically, and significant attempts were 
made to identify the most appropriate of alternative proxy measures. In some cases, other 
variables might be identified but are not easily measured. For example, the proportion of 
shares owned by company management might be another useful proxy for ownership 
diffusion, but this information was not readily available for firms in the GCC countries. 
 
Although it was established that there were differences in the strength of enforcement 
across the GCC countries, no attempt was made to explore whether these differences were 
related to differences in detailed environmental factors such as differences in politics, 
economics, and culture, and this was considered beyond the scope of this thesis. Finally, 
the findings of this study, as with any empirical investigation, might not be readily 
generalizable to other economies. The extent to which each country’s environment 
influences its accounting practices in relation to, mandatory and voluntary disclosure, 
remains, to some extent, an open question. Despite these limitations, it is argued that this 
study makes a number of significant contributions to existing knowledge in the area of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices across GCC country listed firms. 
 
 Suggestions for future research 
Despite these limitations, the results are interesting enough to warrant an extension to other 
country settings. Investigating the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures and 
determining the characteristics that are associated with such disclosures in other countries 
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might help to address some of the mixed evidence and increase confidence in the salient 
study results, particular is extended to a wider range of developing countries. 
 
It is noted that the difference between mean level of mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
within GCC listed-firms is significant, 73% and 31% for mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures respectively. Since the mandatory disclosures are identified in IFRSs/IASs and 
the disclosed information is audited, firms cannot be selective in terms of what is going to 
be disclosed in the annual reports. This significantly reduces flexibility in mandatory 
disclosure. In addition, firms are not able to be influenced by other firms’ disclosures. 
However, firms are more flexible with voluntary disclosure and usually influenced by other 
firms’ disclosures. Before making the decision on what needs to be disclosed, firms are 
more likely to make observations about what has been disclosed by their competitors. This 
observation/point may be investigated in future research. 
 
Future research might address some of the limitations of this study. For example, it would 
be interesting to investigate the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure by non-listed 
firms and financial institutions, where the degree of reliance on accounting information by 
users may be quite different (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Similarly, the level of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosures might be investigated in a smaller firm (small capitalisation) 
setting. The GCC regulators and the IASB are committed to promoting a high level of 
mandatory disclosure by all types of firm, and they might benefit from this research 
extension. 
 
It is likely that the level of disclosure was different across GCC country listed firms. It 
argued that, in developing countries, firm-specific characteristics, political, economic, and 
socio-cultural factors affect the strength of enforcement and, in turn, the level of corporate 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures (Saudagaran, 2009). Further research might 
investigate the impact of such factors as they may have an impact on the diffusion of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the region. Several studies in the existing literature 
have started to explore the impact of firm-specific characteristics, political, economic and 
socio-cultural factors on financial disclosures (Hofstede, 1980; Zarzeski, 1996; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
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Corporate governance issues have been investigated in this thesis, but not in great depth. 
Various studies have provided evidence that the level of disclosure is influenced by 
corporate governance variables (Gibbins et al., 1990; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Similar 
studies could be undertaken in the context of GCC country listed firms. Two specific 
corporate governance variables relevant to GCC country listed firms setting are whether 
the firm's Chairman of the board of directors, or other board members, are also members 
of a ruling royal family. In this case, their presence might for example restrict a regulatory 
body’s ability to enforce compliance with mandatory disclosure or the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
In addition, this study also found that external auditors gave unqualified audit opinions 
when firms did not fully comply with all mandatory disclosure requirements. This raises 
questions about the factors affecting: (i) the quality and independence of auditors in GCC 
country listed firms; and (ii) the role of auditors in promoting compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements and other regulations. Both issues might be examined in future 
research. Finally, the GCC countries have recently opened up their share markets to foreign 
investors. Thus, as circumstances change over time, this study could be updated on an 
ongoing basis to understand the dynamics of such change. This approach should enrich our 
understanding of the process by which international accounting standards are gaining 
increasing currency throughout the commercial world. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: Sample Companies 
Table A1: Names of Firms, Industry and Country of Incorporation: 
Bahrain 
Aluminium Bahrain BSC Basic Resources 
Bahrain Telecommunications Co BSC Telecommunications 
Gulf Hotel Group B.S.C Travel & Leisure 
BMMI BSC Retail 
Seef Properties Real Estate 
Bahrain Cinema Co Consumer Discretionary 
Bahrain Duty Free Complex BSC Consumer Discretionary 
Bahrain Ship Repairing & Engineering Co Industrials 
Nass Corp BSC Industrials 
National Hotels Co Consumer Discretionary 
Trafco Group BSC Consumer Staples 
Bahrain Tourism Co Consumer Discretionary 
Delmon Poultry Co Consumer Staples 
Bahrain Flour Mills Co Consumer Staples 
 
Kuwait 
Kuwait Foods Americana Consumer Discretionary 
National Mobile Telecommunications Co KS Telecommunications 
Kuwait Portland Cement Co Industrials 
Combined Group Contracting Co Industrials 
Kuwait National Cinema Co Travel & Leisure 
Agility Public Warehousing Co KSC Industrials 
Kout Food Group Consumer Discretionary 
Gulf Cable & Electrical Industries Co KP Industrials 
Boubyan Petrochemicals Co KSCP Materials 
Mobile Telecommunications Co KSC Telecommunications 
National Petroleum Services Co KSCC Energy 
Al Kout Industrial Projects Co KSCC Materials 
Kuwait Packing Materials Manufacturing Materials 
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Kuwait 
Safwan Trading & Contracting Co KSCC Health Care 
Independent Petroleum Group Energy 
City Group Co KSC Industrials 
Kuwait Cement Co Materials 
HumanSoft Holding Co Consumer Discretionary 
Acico Industries Co KSCC Materials 
Eyas for Higher & Technical Education Consumer Discretionary 
 
Oman 
Oman Telecommunications Co SAOG Telecommunications 
Raysut Cement Co Construction & Materials 
Omani Qatari Telecommunications Co SAOG Telecommunications 
Renaissance Services SAOG Energy 
Oman Cement Co Construction & Materials 
Shell Oman Marketing Co SAOG Energy 
Oman Cables Industry Industrials 
Sembcorp Salalah Power & Water Co Utilities 
Al Maha Petroleum Products Marketing Co Retail 
Al Anwar Ceramic Tile Co Industrials 
Galfar Engineering & Contracting SAOG Industrials 
Oman Investment & Finance Industrials 
National Aluminium Production Materials 
 
Qatar 
Ooredoo QSC Telecommunications 
Industries Qatar QSC Industrials 
Barwa Real Estate Co Real Estate 
Gulf International Services OSC Energy 
Qatar Electricity & Water Co Utilities 
Qatar Gas Transport Co Nakilat Energy 
Qatar Navigation Industrials 
Vodafone Qatar Telecommunications 
Qatari Investors Group QSC Materials 
436 
 
Qatar 
Medicare Group Health Care 
Al Meera Consumer Goods Co Consumer Staples 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Etihad Etisalat Co Telecommunications 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp Materials 
SAVOLA Consumer Staples 
Saudi Telecom Co Telecommunications 
National Industrialization Co Industrials 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co Materials 
Jarir Marketing Co Consumer Discretionary 
Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Co Materials 
Almarai Co Consumer Staples 
Saudi Cement Materials 
Saudi Industrial Investment Group Materials 
Yanbu National Petrochemicals Co Materials 
Saudi International Petrochemical Co Materials 
Saudi Electricity Co Utilities 
Saudi Arabian Mining Co Materials 
Yamamah Saudi Cement Co Materials 
Al Tayyar Travel Group Consumer Discretionary 
Sahara Petrochemical Co Materials 
Mobile Telecommunications Co Saudi Arabi Telecommunications 
National Shipping Co of Saudi Arabia/The Energy 
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Appendix B: IAS/IFRS and Effective Dates 
Table B1: Current Status and Effective Dates of IAS/IFRS  
Standard Title Effective Date 
IFRS 1  First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards  01 January 2004 
IFRS 2  Share-Based Payment  01 January 2005 
IFRS 3  Business Combinations  31 March 2004 
IFRS 4  Insurance Contracts  01 January 2005 
IFRS 5  Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations  01 January 2005 
IFRS 6  Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources  01 January 2006 
IFRS 7  Financial Instruments: Disclosures  01 January 2007 
IFRS 8  Operating Segments  01 January 2009 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 01 January 2013 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 01 January 2013 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 01 January 2013 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 01 January 2013 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 01 January 2013 
IAS 1  Presentation of Financial Statements  01 January 2005 
IAS 2  Inventories 01 January 2005 
IAS 7  Cash-Flow Statements 01 January 1994 
IAS 8  Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors  01 January 2005 
IAS 10  Events after the Balance-Sheet Date  01 January 2005 
IAS 11  Construction Contracts  01 January 1995 
IAS 12  Income Taxes  01 January 1998 
IAS 14  Segment Reporting  01 July 1998 
IAS 16  Property, Plant, and Equipment  01 January 2005 
IAS 17  Leases  01 January 2005 
IAS 18  Revenue  01 January 1995 
IAS 19  Employee Benefits  01 January 1999 
IAS 20 
 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance  01 January 1984 
IAS 21  Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates  01 January 2005 
IAS 23  Borrowing Costs  01 January 1995 
IAS 24  Related Party Disclosures  01 January 2005 
IAS 26  Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans  01 January 1988 
IAS 27  Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements  01 January 2005 
IAS 28  Investments in Associates  01 January 2005 
IAS 29  Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies  01 January 1990 
IAS 30  
Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar 
Financial Institutions  01 January 1991 
IAS 31  Interests in Joint Ventures  01 January 2005 
IAS 32  Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation  01 January 2005 
IAS 33  Earnings Per Share  01 January 2005 
IAS 34  Interim Financial Reporting  01 January 1999 
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Standard Title Effective Date 
IAS 36  Impairment of Assets  31 March 2004 
IAS 37  Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets  01 July 1999 
IAS 38  Intangible Assets  31 March 2004 
IAS 39  Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement  01 January 2005 
IAS 40  Investment Property  01 January 2005 
IAS 41  Agriculture  01 January 2003 
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Appendix C: IAS/IFRS Included and Excluded from Disclosure 
Checklist 
Table C1: IAS/IFRS Included in this Study 
Standard Title 
IFRS 3  Business Combinations  
IFRS 5  Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations  
IFRS 8  Operating Segments  
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements 
IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 
IAS 1  Presentation of Financial Statements  
IAS 2  Inventories 
IAS 7  Cash-Flow Statements 
IAS 16  Property, Plant, and Equipment  
IAS 17  Leases  
IAS 18  Revenue  
IAS 21  Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates  
IAS 23  Borrowing Costs  
IAS 24  Related Party Disclosures  
IAS 27  Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements  
IAS 28  Investments in Associates  
IAS 31  Interests in Joint Ventures  
IAS 33  Earnings Per Share  
IAS 36  Impairment of Assets  
IAS 37  Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets  
IAS 38  Intangible Assets  
IAS 40  Investment Property  
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Table C2: IAS/IFRS Excluded from this Study 
Standard Title Justification for Exclusion 
IFRS 1 
First-time Adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
GCC-listed firms are not first-time 
IFRS adopters 
IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment Not applicable to the sample selected 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts Not applicable to the sample selected 
IFRS 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources Not applicable to the sample selected 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures Not applicable to the sample selected 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 
Effective beginning on or after 1 
January 2013 
IAS 8 
Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting 
Estimates and Errors Not applicable to the sample selected 
IAS 10 Events after the Balance-Sheet Date Not applicable to the sample selected 
IAS 11 Construction Contracts Not applicable to the sample selected 
IAS 12 Income Taxes 
GCC-listed firms are not subject to 
income tax 
IAS 14 Segment Reporting IAS 14 is superseded by IFRS  8 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits 
GCC firms are obligated to adhere to 
local law 
IAS 20 
Accounting for Government Grants and 
Disclosure of Government Assistance Not relevant to GCC-listed firms 
IAS 26 
Accounting and Reporting by Retirement 
Benefit Plans 
GCC firms are obligated to adhere to 
local law 
IAS 29 
Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary 
Economies Not applicable to the GCC economy 
IAS 30  
Disclosures in the Financial Statements of 
Banks and Similar Financial Institutions Not applicable to the sample selected 
IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation IAS 32 is superseded by IFRS 7 
IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting Irrelevant to the focus of study 
IAS 39 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement 
Does not include any presentation or 
disclosure requirements 
IAS 41 Agriculture Not applicable to the sample selected 
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Appendix D: IASs/IFRSs Disclosure Checklist 
(Mandatory Disclosure Checklist) 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 1   Presentation of Financial Statements 
 
 
Para. 10(a) 1 Financial statements should include a balance sheet  
Para. 10(b) 2 Financial statements should include an income statement  
Para. 10(c) 3 Financial statements should include a statement of change in 
equity, showing either all changes in equity 
 
Para. 10(d) 4 Financial statements should include a cash flow statement  
Para. 10(e) 5 Financial statements should include notes, comprising a 
summary of significant accounting policies and other 
explanatory notes 
 
Para. 16 6 An enterprise whose financial statements comply with IFRS 
should include an explicit and unreserved statement of 
compliance with IFRS in the notes. Financial Statements 
should not be described as complying with IFRS unless they 
comply with all the requirements of IFRSs 
 
Para. 17(c) 7 Financial statements should include additional disclosures 
when compliance with the specific requirements in IFRSs is 
insufficient to enable users to understand the impact of 
particular transactions, other events and conditions on the 
enterprise’s financial position and financial performance 
 
Para. 20(a) 8 Disclose that management has concluded that the financial 
statements present fairly the enterprise’s financial position, 
financial performance and cash flows 
 
Para. 20(b) 9 Disclose that it has complied with applicable IFRSs, except that 
it has departed from a particular requirement to achieve a fair 
presentation 
 
Para. 20(c) 10 Disclose the title of the IFRS, nature of the departure, reason 
for the departure, and the treatment adopted 
 
Para. 20(d) 11 For each period presented, disclose the financial impact of the 
departure on each item in the financial statements that would 
have been reported in complying with the requirement 
 
Para. 21 12 When the enterprise departed from a requirement of IFRS in a 
prior period, and that departure affects the amount recognized 
in the financial statements for the current period, the 
enterprise’s financial statements should include disclosures 
about the title of the IFRS, nature of the departure, reason for 
the departure, and the treatment adopted 
 
Para. 29 13 Each material class of similar items should be presented 
separately in the enterprise’s financial statements 
 
Para. 38 14 Comparative information should be disclosed in respect of the 
previous period for all amounts reported in the financial 
statements 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 1   Presentation of Financial Statements 
 
 
Para. 38 15 Comparative information should be included in narrative and 
descriptive information when it is relevant to an understanding 
of the current year’s financial statements 
 
Para. 
41(a),(b),(c) 
16 When the presentation or classification of items in the financial 
statements has been amended, comparative amounts should be 
reclassified, unless it is impracticable to do so. When 
comparative amounts have been reclassified, the enterprise 
should disclose the nature, the amount and the reason for the 
reclassification. 
 
Para.49 17 Financial statements should be identified clearly and 
distinguished from other information in the same published 
document 
 
Para.51(a) 18 Financial statements should display prominently the name of 
the enterprise 
 
Para.51(b) 19 Financial statements should disclose whether the financial 
statements cover the individual enterprise or a group of 
enterprises 
 
Para.51(c) 20 Financial statements should disclose the balance sheet date or 
the period covered by the financial statements 
 
Para.51(d) 21 Financial statements should disclose the reporting currency  
Para.51(e) 22 Financial statements should disclose the level of rounding used 
in presenting amounts in the financial statements (e.g. 
thousands or 
millions of units of the reporting currency) 
 
Para. 60 23 Financial statements should present current and non-current 
assets, and current and non-current liabilities, as separate 
classifications on the face of the balance sheet except when a 
presentation based on liquidity provides information that is 
reliable and is more relevant. When a presentation is based on 
liquidity, assets and liabilities should be presented broadly in 
order of liquidity 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(i) 
24 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose the 
number of shares authorized, either on the face of the balance 
sheet or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(ii) 
25 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose the 
number of shares issued and fully paid, and issued but not fully 
paid, either on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes to 
the financial statements 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(iii) 
26 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose the 
par value per share, or that the shares have no par value, either 
on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes to the financial 
statements 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(iv) 
27 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose a 
reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning and at the end of the period, either on the face of the 
balance sheet or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(v) 
28 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose the 
rights, preferences and restrictions attaching to that class, 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 1   Presentation of Financial Statements 
 
 
including restrictions on the distribution of dividends and the 
repayment of capital, either on the face of the balance sheet or 
in the notes to the financial statements 
Para. 79(a) 
(vi) 
29 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose 
shares in the enterprise held by the enterprise itself or by 
subsidiaries or associates, either on the face of the balance 
sheet or in the notes to the financial statements of the enterprise 
 
Para. 79(a) 
(vii) 
30 For each class of share capital, an enterprise should disclose 
shares reserved for issue under options and contracts for the 
sale of shares, including the terms and amounts, either on the 
face of the balance sheet or in the notes to the financial 
statements 
 
Para. 79(b) 31 An enterprise should disclose a description of the nature and 
purpose of each reserve within equity, either on the face of the 
balance sheet or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 87 32 An enterprise should not present any items of income and 
expense as extraordinary items, either on the face of the income 
statement or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 99 33 An enterprise should disclose an analysis of expenses using a 
classification based on either the nature of the expenses or their 
function within the enterprise, either on the face of the income 
statements or in the notes to the income statement 
 
Para. 104 34 An enterprise classifying expenses by function should disclose 
additional information on the nature of expenses, including 
depreciation and amortisation expense and employee benefit 
expense 
 
Para. 107 35 An enterprise should disclose, either on the face of the income 
statement or the statement of changes in equity, or in the notes, 
the amount of dividends recognised as distributions to equity 
holders during the period, and the related amount per share 
 
Para. 113 36 Each item on the face of the balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of changes in equity and cash flow statement should 
be cross referenced to any related information in the notes 
 
Para. 122 37 The significant accounting policies section of the notes to the 
financial statements should describe the measurement basis 
used in preparing the financial statements 
 
Para. 137(a) 38 An enterprise should disclose the amount of dividends 
proposed or declared before the financial statements were 
authorized for issue but not recognized as a distribution to 
equity holders during the period, and the related amount per 
share 
 
Para. 137(b) 39 An enterprise should disclose the amount of any cumulative 
preference dividends not recognised 
 
Para. 138(a) 40 Financial statements should include the domicile and legal 
form of the entity, its country of incorporation and the address 
of its  
registered office 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 1   Presentation of Financial Statements 
 
 
Para. 138(b) 41 Financial statements should include a description of the nature 
of the enterprise’s operations and its principal activities 
 
Para. 138(c) 42 Financial statements should include the name of the parent 
enterprise and the ultimate parent of the group 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 1 Requirements 
 
 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 2  Inventories 
 
 
Para. 36(a) 1 Financial statements should include the accounting policies 
adopted in measuring inventories, including the cost formula 
used 
 
Para. 36(b) 2 Financial statements should include the total carrying amount 
of inventories and the carrying amount in classification 
appropriate to the enterprise 
 
Para. 36(c) 3 Financial statements should include the carrying amount of 
inventories carried at fair value less costs to sell 
 
Para. 36(d) 4 Financial statements should include the amount of inventories 
recognized as an expense during the period 
 
Para. 36(e) 5 Financial statements should include the amount of any write-
down of inventories recognised as an expense in the period 
 
Para. 36(f) 6 Financial statements should include the amount of any reversal 
of any write-down that is recognised as a reduction in the 
amount of inventories recognised as expense in the period 
 
Para. 36(g) 7 Financial statements should include the circumstances or events 
that led to the reversal of a write-down of inventories 
 
Para. 36(h) 8 Financial statements should include the carrying amount of 
inventories pledged as security for liabilities 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 1 Requirements 
 
 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 7  Cash Flow Statements 
 
 
Para. 10 1 Enterprise’s cash flow statement should report cash flows 
during the period classified by operating, investing and 
financing 
 
Para. 18 
(a), (b) 
2 An enterprise should report cash flows from operating activities 
using either the direct method, whereby major classes of gross 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 7  Cash Flow Statements 
 
 
cash receipts and gross cash payments are disclosed; or the 
indirect method, whereby profit or loss is adjusted for the 
effects of transactions of a non-cash nature, any deferrals or 
accruals of past or future operating cash receipts or payments, 
and items of income or expense associated with investing or 
financing cash flows 
Para. 21 3 An enterprise should report separately major classes of gross 
cash receipts and gross cash payments arising from investing 
and financing activities 
 
Para. 28 4 An enterprise should report the effect of exchange rate changes 
on cash and cash equivalents held or due in a foreign currency 
in the cash flow statement in order to reconcile cash and cash 
equivalents at the beginning and the end of the period 
 
Para. 31 5 An enterprise should disclose separately cash flows arising 
from interest received (inflows) 
 
Para. 31 6 An enterprise should disclose separately cash flows arising 
from interest paid (outflows) 
 
Para. 31 7 An enterprise should disclose separately cash flows arising 
from dividends received (inflows) 
 
Para. 31 8 An enterprise should disclose separately cash flows arising 
from dividends paid (outflows) 
 
Para. 43 9 An enterprise should exclude from the cash flow statement 
investing and financing transactions that do not require the use 
of cash or 
cash equivalents 
 
Para.43 10 Investing and financing transactions that do not require the use 
of cash or cash equivalents should be disclosed elsewhere in the 
financial statements in a way that provides all the relevant 
information about these investing and financing activities 
 
Para.45 11 An enterprise should disclose the components of cash and cash 
equivalents 
 
Para.45 12 An enterprise should present a reconciliation of the amounts for 
cash and cash equivalents in its cash flow statement with the 
equivalent reported in the balance sheet 
 
Para.46 13 An enterprise should disclose the policy that it adopts in 
determining the composition of cash and cash equivalents 
 
Para.48 14 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant cash 
and cash equivalent balance held by the entity that are not 
available for use by the group 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 7 Requirements 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 8  Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and 
Errors 
 
 
Para. 28  When initial application of an IFRS has an effect on the current 
period or any prior or future period, enterprise financial 
statements should include the following disclosures: 
 
Para. 28 (a) 1 Disclose the title of the IFRS  
Para. 28 (b) 2 Disclose that the change in accounting policy has been made in 
accordance with its transitional provisions 
 
Para. 28 (c) 3 Disclose the nature of the change in accounting policy  
Para. 28 (d) 4 Disclose a description of the transitional provisions  
Para. 28 (e) 5 Disclose the transitional provisions that might have an effect on 
future periods 
 
Para. 28 (f) 6 Disclose the amount of the adjustment for each financial 
statement line item affected and for basic and diluted earnings 
per share. These disclosures should be presented for the current 
period and each prior period presented 
 
Para. 28 (g) 7 Disclose the amount of the adjustment relating to periods 
before those presented 
 
Para. 28 (h) 8 If retrospective application is impracticable for a particular 
period, or for period before those presented, the enterprise 
should disclose the circumstances that led to the existence of 
that condition and a description of how and from when the 
change in accounting policy has been applied 
 
Para.30 (a) 9 When an enterprise has not applied a new IFRS that has been 
issued but is not yet effective, the entity should disclose that 
fact 
 
Para.30 (b) 10 When an enterprise has not applied a new IFRS that has been 
issued but is not yet effective, the entity should present a 
reasonably estimable information relevant to assessing the 
possible impact that application of the new IFRS will have on 
the enterprise’s financial statements in the period of initial 
application 
 
Para. 39 11 An enterprise should disclose the nature and amount of a 
change in an accounting estimate that has an effect in the 
current period or which is expected to have an effect in future 
periods 
 
Para. 40 12 If the amount of the effect in future periods is not disclosed 
because estimating it is impracticable, the enterprise should 
disclose that fact 
 
  In correcting prior period errors, the enterprise should disclose 
the following: 
 
Para. 49 (a) 13 Disclose the nature of the prior period error  
Para. 49 (b) 14 For each prior period presented, disclose the amount of the 
correction for each financial statement line item affected and 
for basic and diluted earnings per share 
 
Para. 49 (c) 15 Disclose the amount of the correction at the beginning of the 
earliest prior period presented 
 
Para. 49 (d) 16 If retrospective restatement is impracticable for a particular 
period, the enterprise should disclose the circumstances that led 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 8  Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and 
Errors 
 
 
to the existence of that condition and a description of how and 
from when the error has been corrected 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 8 Requirements 
 
 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 10  Events after the Balance Sheet Date 
 
 
Para.13 1 If dividends are declared after the balance sheet date but before 
the financial statements are authorized for issue, the enterprise 
should disclose such dividends in the notes to the financial 
statements 
 
Para.17 2 An enterprise should disclose the date when the financial 
statements were authorized for issue 
 
Para.17 3 An enterprise should disclose the body who gave the 
authorization of issuing the financial statements 
 
Para.17 4 An enterprise should disclose if the shareholders or others have 
the power to amend the financial statements after issuance 
 
Para.21 (a) 5 An enterprise should disclose the nature of event when non-
adjusting event occur after the balance sheet data 
 
Para.21 (b) 6 An enterprise should disclose an estimate of its financial effect, 
or a statement that such an estimate cannot be made when non-
adjusting event occur after the balance sheet data 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 10 Requirements 
 
 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 16  Property, Plant and Equipment  
 
 
Para. 73 (a) 1 For each class of property, plant and equipment, enterprise’s 
financial statements should disclose the measurement bases 
used for determining the gross carrying amount 
 
Para. 73 (b) 2 For each class of property, plant and equipment, enterprise’s 
financial statements should disclose the depreciation methods 
used 
 
Para. 73 (c) 3 For each class of property, plant and equipment, enterprise’s 
financial statements should disclose the useful lives or the 
depreciation rates used 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 16  Property, Plant and Equipment  
 
 
Para. 73 (d) 4 For each class of property, plant and equipment, enterprise’s 
financial statements should disclose the gross carrying amount 
and the accumulated depreciation ( aggregated with 
accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the 
period 
 
Para. 73 (e) 5 For each class of property, plant and equipment, enterprise’s 
financial statements should disclose a reconciliation of the 
carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period 
showing any additions; disposals; acquisitions through business 
combinations; increases or decreases during the period resulting 
from revaluations and from impairment losses recognised or 
reversed directly in 
equity; impairment losses recognised in profit or loss; 
impairment losses reversed in profit or loss; depreciation, the 
net exchange differences arising on the translation of financial 
statements of a foreign entity; and other changes 
 
Para. 74 (a) 6 An enterprise should disclose the existence and amounts of 
restrictions on title, and property, plant and equipment pledged 
as security for liabilities 
 
Para. 74 (b) 7 An enterprise should disclose the amount of expenditures 
recognised in the carrying amount of an item of property, plant 
and equipment in the course of its construction 
 
Para. 74 (c) 8 An enterprise should disclose the amount of contractual 
commitments for the acquisition of property, plant and 
equipment 
 
Para. 76 9 An enterprise should disclose the nature and effect of any 
change in accounting estimate relating to property, plant and 
equipment that has an effect in the current period or is expected 
to have an effect in subsequent periods 
 
Para. 77(a) 10 For property, plant and equipment stated at revalued amounts, 
an enterprise should disclose the effective date of the 
revaluation 
 
Para. 77(b) 11 For property, plant and equipment stated at revalued amounts, 
an enterprise should disclose whether an independent value was 
involved 
 
Para. 77(c) 12 For property, plant and equipment stated at revalued amounts, 
an enterprise should disclose the methods and significant 
assumptions applied in estimating the items’ fair value 
 
Para. 77(d) 13 For property, plant and equipment stated at revalued amounts, 
an enterprise should disclose the extent to which the items’ fair 
values were determined directly by reference to observable 
prices in an active market or recent market transactions on 
arm’s length terms or were estimated using other valuation 
techniques 
 
Para. 77(e) 14 For each revalued class of property, plant and equipment, an 
enterprise should disclose the carrying amount that would have 
been recognised had the assets been carried under the cost 
model 
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Para. 77(f) 15 For property, plant and equipment stated at revalued amounts, 
an enterprise should disclose the revaluation surplus, indicating 
the change for the period and any restrictions on the 
distributions of the balance to shareholders 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 16  Requirements 
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IAS 17  Leases 
 
 
Para. 31 (a) 1 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the net carrying amount at the 
balance sheet date for each class of asset 
 
Para. 31 (b) 2 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose a reconciliation between the total of 
future minimum lease payments at the balance sheet date, and 
their present value 
 
Para. 31 (b) 3 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the total of future minimum lease 
payments at the balance sheet data, and their present value, for 
not later than one year period, later than one year and not later 
than five years period, and later than five years period 
 
Para. 31 (c) 4 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose contingent rents recognised as an 
expense for the period 
 
Para. 31 (d) 5 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the total of future minimum sublease 
payments expected to be received under non-cancellable 
sublease at the balance sheet date 
 
Para. 31 (e) 6 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose a general description of the lessee’s 
significant leasing arrangements including the basis on which 
contingent rent payable is determined, the existence and terms 
of renewal or purchase options and escalation clauses, and 
restrictions imposed by lease arrangements such as those 
concerning dividends, additional debt, and further leasing 
 
Para. 35 (a) 7 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the total of future minimum lease 
payments under non-cancellable operating leases for not later 
than one year period, later than one year and not later than five 
years period, and later than five years period 
 
Para. 35 (b) 8 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the total of future minimum sublease 
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payments expected to be received under non-cancellable 
subleases at the balance sheet data 
Para. 35 (c) 9 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose the lease and sublease payments 
recognised as an expense for the period, with separate amounts 
for minimum lease payments, contingent rents, and sublease 
payments 
 
Para. 35 (d) 10 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessee, the 
enterprise should disclose a general description of the lessee’s 
significant leasing arrangements including the basis on which 
contingent rent payable is determined, the existence and terms 
of renewal or purchase options and escalation clauses, and 
restrictions imposed by lease arrangements such as those 
concerning dividends, additional debt, and further leasing 
 
Para. 47(a) 11 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose a reconciliation between the gross 
investment in the lease at the balance sheet data, and the 
present value of minimum lease payments receivable at the 
balance sheet data 
 
Para. 47(a) 12 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the gross investment in the lease and 
the present value of minimum lease payments receivable at the 
balance sheet date, for not later than one year period, later than 
one year and not later than five years period, and later than five 
years period 
 
Para. 47(b) 13 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose unearned finance income 
 
Para. 47(c) 14 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the unguaranteed residual values 
accruing to the benefit of the lessor 
 
Para. 47(d) 15 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the accumulated allowance for 
uncollectible minimum lease payments receivable 
 
Para. 47(e) 16 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose contingent rents recognised as 
income in the period 
 
Para. 47(f) 17 For finance leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose a general description of the lessor’s 
material leasing arrangements 
 
Para. 56(a) 18 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the future minimum lease payments 
under non-cancellable operating leases in aggregate 
 
Para. 56(a) 19 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the future minimum lease payments 
under non-cancellable operating leases for not later than one 
year period, later than one year and not later than five years 
period, and later than five years period 
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Para. 56(b) 20 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose the total contingent rents recognised 
as income in the period 
 
Para. 56(c) 21 For operating leases in which the enterprise is the lessor, the 
enterprise should disclose a general description of the lessor’s 
leasing arrangements 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 17  Requirements 
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Para. 35(a) 1 An enterprise should disclose the accounting policies adopted 
for the recognition of revenue 
 
Para. 35 (b) 
(i) 
2 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant revenue 
recognised during the period arising from the sale of goods 
 
Para. 35 (b) 
(ii) 
3 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant revenue 
recognised during the period arising from the rendering of 
service 
 
Para. 35 (b) 
(iii) 
4 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant revenue 
recognised during the period arising from interest 
 
Para. 35 (b) 
(iv) 
5 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant revenue 
recognised during the period arising from royalties 
 
Para. 35 (b) 
(v) 
6 An enterprise should disclose the amount of significant revenue 
recognised during the period arising from dividends 
 
Para. 35 (c) 7 An enterprise should disclose the amount of revenue arising 
from exchange of goods or service included in each significant 
category of revenue 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 18 Requirements 
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IAS 21  The effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 
 
 
Para.52 (a) 1 An enterprise should disclose the amount of exchange 
differences recognised in profit or loss 
 
Para.52 (b) 2 An enterprise should disclose net exchange differences classified 
in other comprehensive income and in a separate component of 
equity, and a reconciliation of the amount of such exchange 
differences at the beginning and end of the period 
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Para. 53 3 When the presentation currency is different from the functional 
currency of the enterprise, the enterprise should disclose that 
fact, the functional currency, and the reason for using a different 
presentation currency 
 
Para. 54 4 When there is a change in the functional currency of either the 
reporting enterprise or a significant foreign operation, that fact 
and the reason for the change in functional currency should be 
disclosed 
 
Para. 55 5 When an enterprise present its financial statements in a currency 
that is different from its functional currency, it should describe 
the financial statements as complying with IFRSs only if they 
comply with all requirements of each applicable IFRS 
 
Para. 57 6 When an enterprise present its financial statements or other 
financial information in a currency that is different from either 
its functional currency or its presentation currency, and the 
requirement of Para.55 are not met, the enterprise should clearly 
identify the information as supplementary information to 
distinguish it from the information that complies with IFRSs, 
disclose the currency in which supplementary information is 
displayed, and disclose the entity’s functional currency and the 
method of translation used to determine the supplementary 
information 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 21 Requirements 
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IAS 23  Borrowing Costs 
 
 
Para. 26(a) 1 Enterprise’s financial statements should disclose the amount of 
borrowing costs capitalised during the period  
 
Para. 26(b) 2 the capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of 
borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation should be disclosed  
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 23 Requirements 
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Para. 13 1 An enterprise should disclose the name of its parent and, if 
different, its ultimate controlling party 
 
Para. 14 2 An enterprise should disclose the related party relationship when 
control exist, irrespective of whether there have been transaction 
between the related parties 
 
Para.18 3 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose the nature of the related party 
relationship 
 
Para.18 4 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose the types of transactions (for example, 
good or service sold/purchased, management service, directors’ 
remuneration and emoluments, loans and guarantees) 
 
Para.18(a) 5 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose the amount of transactions 
 
Para.18(b) 6 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose the amount of outstanding balances 
(including terms and conditions, secured or not, the nature of the 
consideration to be provided in settlement and any guarantees 
given or received) 
 
Para.18(c) 7 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose provisions for doubtful debts related 
to the amount of outstanding balances 
 
Para.18(d) 8 Where there have been transactions between related parties, the 
enterprise should disclose the expense recognised during the 
period in respect of bad or doubtful debts due from related 
parties 
 
Para.23 9 Disclosures that related party transactions were made on terms 
equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s length transactions are 
made only if such terms can be substantiated 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 24 Requirements 
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IAS 27  Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 
 
 
Para. 41 (a) 1 An enterprise should disclose the nature of the relationship 
between the parent and a subsidiary when the parent does not 
own, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half 
of the voting power 
 
Para. 41 (b) 2 For an investee of which more than half of the voting or 
potential voting power is owned, directly or indirectly through 
subsidiaries, but which, because of the absence of control, is not 
a subsidiary, an enterprise should disclose the reasons why the 
ownership does not constitute control 
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Para. 41 (c) 3 An enterprise should disclose the reporting date of the financial 
statements of a subsidiary when such financial statements are 
used to prepare consolidated financial statements and are as of a 
reporting date or for a period that is different from that of the 
parent, and the reason for using a different reporting date or 
period 
 
Para. 41 (d) 4 An enterprise should disclose the nature and extent of any 
significant restrictions (e.g. resulting from borrowing 
arrangements or regulatory requirements) on the ability of 
subsidiaries to transfer funds to the parent in the form of cash 
dividends or to repay loans or advances 
 
Para. 42 (a) 5 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose the fact that the financial statements 
are separate financial statements 
 
Para. 42 (a) 6 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose the fact that the exemption from 
consolidation has been used 
 
Para. 42 (a) 7 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose the name and country of incorporation 
or residence of the entity whose consolidated financial 
statements that comply with IFRSs have been produced for 
public and the address where these are obtainable 
 
Para. 42 (b) 8 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise 
should disclose a listing of names of significant investments in 
subsidiaries 
 
Para. 42 (b) 9 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose a listing of the country of 
incorporation or residence of significant investments in 
subsidiaries 
 
Para. 42 (b) 10 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose proportion of ownership interest and if 
different, proportion of voting power held 
 
Para. 42 (c) 11 When separate financial statements are prepared for a parent that 
elect not to prepare consolidated financial statements, the 
enterprise should disclose a description of the methods used to 
account for significant investments in subsidiaries 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 27 Requirements 
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Para. 37(a) 1 An enterprise should disclose the fair value of investments in 
associates for which there are published price quotations 
 
Para. 37(b) 2 An enterprise should disclose summarised financial information 
of associates, including the aggregated amounts of assets, 
liabilities, revenues and profit or loss 
 
Para. 37(c) 3 An enterprise should disclose the reasons why the presumption 
that an investor (the enterprise) does not have significant 
influence is overcome if the investor holds, directly or indirectly 
through subsidiaries, less than 20 per cent of the voting or 
potential voting power of the investee but concludes that it has 
significant influence 
 
Para. 37(d) 4 An enterprise should disclose the reasons why the presumption 
that an investor (the enterprise) has significant influence is 
overcome if the investor holds, directly or indirectly through 
subsidiaries, 20 per cent or more of the voting or potential voting 
power of the investee but concludes that it does not have 
significant influence 
 
Para. 37(e) 5 An enterprise should disclose the reporting date of the financial 
statements of an associate, when such financial statements are 
used in applying the equity method and are as of a reporting date 
or for a period that is different from that of the investor (the 
enterprise) , and the reason for using a different reporting date or 
different period 
 
Para. 37(f) 6 An enterprise should disclose the nature and extent of any 
significant restrictions (e.g. resulting from borrowing 
arrangements or regulatory requirements) on the ability of 
associates to transfer funds to the investor (the enterprise) in the 
form of cash dividends, or repayment of loans or advances 
 
Para. 37(g) 7 An enterprise should disclose the unrecognised share of losses of 
an associate, both for the period and cumulatively, if an investor 
(the enterprise) has discontinued recognition of its share of 
losses of an associate 
 
Para. 37(h) 8 If the investment is classified as held for sale, an enterprise 
should disclose the fact that an associate is not accounted for 
using the equity method in accordance with IFRS 5 
 
Para. 37(i) 9 An enterprise should disclose summarised financial information 
of associates, either individually or in groups, that are not 
accounted for using the equity method, including the amounts of 
total assets, total liabilities, revenues and profit or loss 
 
Para. 38 10 The enterprise’s share of the profit or loss of associates 
accounted for using the equity method should be separately 
disclosed 
 
Para. 38 11 The carrying amount of investments in associate accounted for 
using the equity method should be separately disclosed 
 
Para. 38 12 The enterprise’s share of the of any discontinued operation of 
such associate accounted for using the equity methods should be 
separately disclosed 
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Para. 39 13 The enterprise’s share of changes recognised directly in the 
associate’s equity should be disclosed in the statement of 
changes in equity 
 
Para. 40 (a) 14 The enterprise’s share of the contingent liabilities of an associate 
incurred jointly with other investors 
 
Para. 40 (b) 15 The enterprise (as investor) should disclose those contingent 
liabilities that arise because the investor is severally liable for all 
or part 
of the liabilities of the associate 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 28 Requirements 
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Para. 54(a) 1 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose separately the 
aggregate amount of any contingent liabilities that the enterprise 
has incurred in relation to its interest in joint ventures and its 
share in each of the contingent liabilities that have been incurred 
jointly with other venturers 
 
Para. 54(b) 2 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose separately the 
aggregate amount of its share of the contingent liabilities of the 
joint ventures themselves for which it is contingently liable 
 
Para. 54(c) 3 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose separately those 
contingent liabilities that arise because the venture is 
contingently liable for the liabilities of the other venturers of a 
joint venture 
 
Para. 55(a) 4 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose separately the 
aggregate amount of any capital commitments of the venturer in 
relation to its interests in joint ventures and its share in the 
capital commitments that have been incurred jointly with other 
venturers 
 
Para. 55(b) 5 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose separately the 
aggregate amount of its share of the capital commitments of the 
joint ventures themselves 
 
Para. 56 6 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose a listing and 
description of interests in significant joint ventures 
 
Para. 56 7 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose the proportion of 
ownership interest held in each of its jointly controlled entities 
 
Para. 56 8 The enterprise (as a venturer) that recognises its interest in 
jointly controlled entities using the line-by-line reporting format 
for proportionate consolidation or the equity method, should 
disclose the aggregate amounts of each of current assets, long-
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terms assets, current liabilities, long-term liabilities, income and 
expenses related to its interests in joint ventures 
Para. 57 9 The enterprise (as a venturer) should disclose the method it uses 
to recognise its interest in jointly controlled entities 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 31 Requirements 
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Para. 66 1 The enterprise should present on the face of the income 
statement basic and diluted earnings per share for profit or loss 
from continuing operations attributable to the ordinary equity 
holders of the parent entity 
 
Para. 66 2 The enterprise should present on the face of the income 
statement basic and diluted earnings per share for profit or loss 
for the period attributable to the ordinary equity holders of the 
parent entity 
 
Para. 66 3 The enterprise should present basic and diluted earnings per 
share with equal prominence for all periods presented 
 
Para. 68 4 The enterprise that report a discontinued operation should 
disclose the basic and diluted amounts per share for the 
discontinued operation either on the face of the income 
statement or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 69 5 The enterprise should present the basic and diluted earnings per 
share, even if the amounts disclosed are negative (i.e. a loss per 
share) 
 
Para. 70(a) 6 The enterprise should disclose the amounts used as the 
numerators in calculating basic and diluted earnings per share, 
and a reconciliation of those amount to profit or loss 
attributable to the parent entity for the period 
 
Para. 70(b) 7 The enterprise should disclose the weighted average number of 
ordinary shares used as the denominator in calculating basic 
and diluted earnings per share, and a reconciliation of these 
denominators to each other 
 
Para. 70(c) 8 The enterprise should disclose instruments (including 
contingently issuable shares) that could potentially dilute basic 
earnings per share in the future, but were not included in the 
calculation of diluted earnings per share because they are anti-
dilutive for the period(s) presented 
 
Para. 70(d) 9 The enterprise should disclose a description of ordinary share 
transactions or potential ordinary share transactions, other than 
as a result of capitalisation, bonus issues or share splits or 
decrease as a result of a reverse share splits, that occur after the 
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balance sheet date but before the financial statements are 
authorized for issue that would have changed significantly the 
number of ordinary shares 
or potential ordinary shares outstanding at the end of the period 
if those transactions had occurred before the end of the 
reporting period 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 33  Requirements 
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IAS 36  Impairment of Assets 
 
 
Para. 
126(a) 
1 For each class of assets, the enterprise should disclose the 
amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss during 
the period and the line item(s) of the income statement in which 
those impairment losses are included 
 
Para. 
126(b) 
2 For each class of assets, the enterprise should disclose the 
amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or 
loss during the period and the line item(s) of the income 
statement in which those impairment losses are reversed 
 
Para. 
126(c) 
3 For each class of assets, the enterprise should disclose the 
amount of impairment losses on revalued assets recognised 
directly in equity during the period 
 
Para. 
126(d) 
4 For each class of assets, the enterprise should disclose the 
amount of reversals of impairment losses on revalued assets 
recognised directly in equity during the period 
 
Para. 
129(a) 
5 An enterprise that reports segment information should disclose 
for each reportable segment based on an enterprise’s primary 
reporting format the amount of impairment losses recognised in 
profit or loss and directly in equity during the period 
 
Para. 
129(b) 
6 An enterprise that reports segment information should disclose 
for each reportable segment based on an enterprise’s primary 
reporting format the amount of reversals of impairment losses 
recognised in profit or loss and directly in equity during the 
period 
 
Para. 
130(a) 
7 For each material impairment loss recognised or reversed 
during the period for an individual asset, including goodwill, or 
cash generating unit, the enterprise should disclose the events 
and circumstances that led to the recognition or reversal of the 
impairment loss 
 
Para. 
130(b) 
8 For each material impairment loss recognised or reversed 
during the period for an individual asset, including goodwill, or 
cash generating unit, the enterprise should disclose the amount 
of the impairment loss recognised or reversed 
 
459 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IAS 36  Impairment of Assets 
 
 
Para. 
131(a) 
9 For impairment losses or reversals that are not individually 
material, the enterprise should disclose the main classes of 
assets affected by impairment losses and the main classes of 
assets affected by reversals of impairment losses 
 
Para. 
131(b) 
10 For impairment losses or reversals that are not individually 
material, the enterprise should disclose the main event and 
circumstances that led to the recognition of these impairment 
losses and reversals of impairment losses 
 
Para. 133 11 If any portion of the goodwill acquired in a business 
combination during the period has not been allocated to cash-
generating unit (group of units) at the reporting date, the 
enterprise should disclose the amount of unallocated goodwill 
together with the reasons why that amount remains unallocated 
 
Para. 
134(a) 
12 For each cash-generating unit (group of units) for which the 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant 
in comparison with the enterprise’s total carrying amount of 
goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, the 
enterprise should disclose the carrying amount of goodwill 
allocated to the unit (group of units) 
 
Para. 
134(b) 
13 For each cash-generating unit (group of units) for which the 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant 
in comparison with the enterprise’s total carrying amount of 
goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, the 
enterprise should disclose the carrying amount of intangible 
assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to the unit (group of 
units) 
 
Para. 
134(c) 
14 For each cash-generating unit (group of units) for which the 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant 
in comparison with the enterprise’s total carrying amount of 
goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, the 
enterprise should disclose the basis on which the unit’s (group 
of units’) recoverable 
amount has been determined ( i.e. value in use or fair value less 
cost to sell) 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 36  Requirements 
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Para. 84 (a) 1 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose the 
carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 84 (b) 2 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose 
additional provisions made in the period, including increases to 
existing provisions 
 
Para. 84 (c) 3 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose the 
amount used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) 
during the period 
 
Para. 84 (d) 4 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose unused 
amounts reversed during the period 
 
Para. 84 (e) 5 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose the 
increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from 
the passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount 
rate 
 
Para. 85 (a) 6 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose a brief 
description of the nature of the obligation and the expected 
timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits 
 
Para. 85 (b) 7 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose an 
indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of 
those outflows 
 
Para. 85 (c) 8 For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose the 
amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of 
any asset that has been recognised for that expected 
reimbursement 
 
Para. 86 9 Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an 
enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at 
the balance sheet date a brief description of the nature of the 
contingent liability 
 
Para. 86 (a) 
and 
Para. 91 
10 Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an 
enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at 
the balance sheet date an estimate of its financial effect. If it is 
not practicable to do so, that fact should be disclosed 
 
Para. 86 (b) 
and 
Para. 91 
11 Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an 
enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at 
the balance sheet date an indication of the uncertainties relating 
to the amount or timing of any outflow. If it is not practicable to 
do so, that fact should be disclosed 
 
Para. 86 (c) 
and 
Para. 91 
12 Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an 
enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at 
the balance sheet date the possibility of reimbursement. If it is 
not practicable to do so, that fact should be disclosed 
 
Para. 89 13 When an inflow of economic benefits is probable, an enterprise 
should disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent 
assets at the balance sheet date and an estimate of their financial 
effect at the balance sheet date. If it is not practicable to do so, 
that fact should be disclosed 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 37  Requirements 
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IAS 38  Intangible Assets 
 
 
Para. 
118(a) 
1 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose whether the useful lives are indefinite or finite 
 
Para. 
118(a) 
2 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose the useful lives or the amortisation rates used for 
intangible assets with finite useful lives 
 
Para. 
118(b) 
3 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose the amortisation methods used for intangible assets 
with finite useful lives 
 
Para. 
118(c) 
4 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose the gross carrying amount and accumulated 
amortisation (aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) 
at the beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 
118(d) 
5 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose the line item(s) of the income statement in which any 
amortisation of intangible assets is included 
 
Para. 
118(e) 
6 For each class of intangible assets, the enterprise should 
disclose a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the 
beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 121 7 The enterprise should disclose the nature and amount of any 
change in accounting estimate relating to intangible assets that 
has a material effect in the current period or that is expected to 
have a material effect in subsequent periods 
 
Para. 
122(a) 
8 For an intangible asset assessed as having an indefinite useful 
life, the enterprise should disclose the carrying amount of that 
asset 
 
Para. 
122(a) 
9 For an intangible asset assessed as having an indefinite useful 
life, the enterprise should disclose the reasons supporting the 
assessment of an indefinite useful life and a description of the 
factor(s) that played a significant role in determining that the 
asset has an indefinite useful life 
 
Para. 
122(b) 
10 For an intangible asset assessed as having an indefinite useful 
life, the enterprise should disclose a description, the carrying 
amount and remaining amortisation period of any individual 
intangible asset that is material to the financial statements of 
the enterprise 
 
Para. 
124(a) 
11 If the intangible assets are accounted for at revalued amounts, 
the enterprise should disclose, by class of intangible assets, the 
effective date of the revaluation, the carrying amount of 
revalued intangible assets, and the carrying amount that would 
have been recognised had the revalued class of intangible assets 
been measured after recognition using the cost model 
 
Para. 
124(b) 
12 If the intangible assets are accounted for at revalued amounts, 
the enterprise should disclose, in respect of the revaluation 
surplus relating to intangible assets, the amount of the surplus 
at the beginning and end of the period, the changes during the 
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IAS 38  Intangible Assets 
 
 
period, and any restrictions on the distribution of the balance to 
shareholders 
Para. 
124(c) 
13 If the intangible assets are accounted for at revalued amounts, 
the enterprise should disclose the methods and significant 
assumptions applied in estimating the assets’ fair values 
 
Para. 126 14 The enterprise should disclose the aggregate amount of 
research and development expenditure recognised as an 
expense during the period 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 38  Requirements 
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IAS 40  Investment Property  
 
 
Para. 75(a) 1 For investment property, the enterprise should disclose whether 
it applies the fair value model or the cost model 
 
Para. 75(b) 2 If the enterprise applies the fair value model, it should disclose 
whether, and in what circumstances, property interest held 
under operating leases are classified and accounted for as 
investment property 
 
Para. 75(c) 3 The enterprise should disclose the criteria it uses to distinguish 
investment property from owner-occupied property and from 
property held for sale in the ordinary course of business 
 
Para. 75(d) 4 The enterprise should disclose the methods and significant 
assumptions applied in determining the fair value of investment 
property, including a statement whether the determination of 
the fair value was supported by market evidence or was more 
heavily based on other factors (which the enterprise should 
disclose) because of the nature of the property and lack of 
comparable market data 
 
Para. 75(d) 
&(e) 
5 The enterprise should disclose the extent to which the fair value 
of investment property (as measured or disclosed in the 
financial statements) is based on a valuation by an independent 
valuer who holds a recognised and relevant professional 
qualification and has recent experience in the location and 
category of the investment property being valued. If there has 
been no valuation by an 
appropriate qualified independent values, this fact should be 
disclosed 
 
Para. 75(f) 6 The enterprise should disclose the amount recognised in profit 
or loss for rental income from investment property, direct 
operating expenses (including repairs and maintenance) arising 
from investment property that generated rental income during 
the period, and direct operating expenses (including repairs and 
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maintenance) arising from investment property that did not 
generate rental income during the period 
Para. 75(g) 7 The enterprise should disclose the existence and amounts of 
restrictions on the relisability of investment property or the 
remittance of income and proceeds of disposal 
 
Para. 75(h) 8 The enterprise should disclose contractual obligations to 
purchase, construct or develop investment property or for 
repairs, maintenance or enhancements 
 
Para. 76 9 An enterprise that applies the fair value model should disclose a 
reconciliation between the carrying amounts of investment 
property at the beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 79(a) 10 An enterprise that applies the cost model should disclose the 
depreciation method used for investment property 
 
Para. 79(b) 11 An enterprise that applies the cost model should disclose the 
useful lives or the depreciation rates for investment property 
 
Para. 79(c) 12 An enterprise that applies the cost model should disclose the 
gross carrying amount of investment property and the 
accumulated depreciation (aggregated with accumulated 
impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 79(d) 13 An enterprise that applies the cost model should disclose a 
reconciliation of the carrying amount of investment property at 
the beginning and end of the period 
 
Para. 79(e) 14 An enterprise that applies the cost model should disclose the 
fair value of investment property. If the enterprise cannot 
determine the fair value of the investment property reliably, it 
should disclose a description of the investment property, an 
explanation of why fair value cannot be determined reliably, 
and if possible, the range of estimates within which fair value is 
highly likely to lie 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IAS 40  Requirements 
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IFRS 2  Share-based Payment 
 
 
Para. 45(a) 1 The enterprise should disclose a description of each type of 
share-based payment arrangement that existed at any time 
during the period, including the general terms and conditions of 
each arrangement 
 
Para. 45(b) 2 The enterprise should disclose the number and weighted 
average exercise price of share options for each of the 
following groups options: outstanding at the beginning of the 
period, granted during the period, forfeited during the period, 
exercised during the period, expired during the period, 
 
464 
 
IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IFRS 2  Share-based Payment 
 
 
outstanding at the end of the period, and exercisable at the end 
of the period 
Para. 45(c) 3 For share options exercised during the period, the enterprise 
should disclose the weighted average share price at the date of 
exercise 
 
Para. 45(d) 4 For share options outstanding at the end of the period, the 
enterprise should disclose the range of exercise prices and 
weighted average remaining contractual life 
 
Para. 46 5 The enterprise should disclose information that enables users of 
the financial statements to understand how the fair value of the 
goods or service received, or the fair value of the equity 
instruments granted, during the period was determined 
 
Para. 47  If the enterprise has measured the fair value of goods or service 
received as consideration for equity instruments of the 
enterprise indirectly, by reference to the fair value of the equity 
instruments granted, the enterprise should disclose the 
following: 
 
Para. 47(a) 6 For share options granted during the period, the enterprise 
should disclose the weighted average fair value of those share 
options at 
the measurement date and information on how the fair value of 
the share options was measured 
 
Para. 47(b) 7 For equity instrument other than share options granted during 
the period, the enterprise should disclose the number and 
weighted average fair value of those equity instruments 
determined at the measurement date and information on how 
the fair value of the equity instruments was measured 
 
Para.48 8 If share-based payment transactions were measured directly, 
using the fair value of goods or service received during the 
period, the enterprise should disclose how the fair value of the 
goods or services received was determined (e.g. whether fair 
value was measured at a market price for those goods and 
services) 
 
Para.51 (a) 9 The enterprise should disclose the total expense recognised for 
the period arising from share-based payment transactions in 
which the goods or services received did not qualify for 
recognition as assets 
 
Para.51 (a) 10 The enterprise should disclose the portion of the total expense 
recognised for the period that arises from transactions 
accounted for as equity-settled share-based payment 
transactions 
 
Para.51 (b) 11 The enterprise should disclose the total carrying amount at the 
end of the period for liabilities arising from share-based 
payment transactions 
 
Para.51 (b) 12 The enterprise should disclose the total intrinsic value at the 
end of the period of liabilities arising from share-based 
payment transactions for which the counterparty’s right to cash 
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or other assets had vested by the end of the period (e.g. vested 
share appreciation rights). 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 2  Requirements 
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IFRS 3  Business Combinations  
 
 
Para.64(a) 1 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the names and descriptions of the combining entities or 
business 
 
Para.64(b) 2 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the acquisition date 
 
Para.64(c) 3 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the percentage of voting equity instruments acquired 
 
Para.64(m) 4 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose details of the cost of the combination, and a description 
of the components of that cost, including any costs directly 
attributable to the combination 
 
Para.64(m) 5 When equity instruments have been issued or become issuable 
as part of the cost of business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the number of equity instruments issued or issuable, 
the fair value of the equity instruments issued or issuable, and 
the basis for determining that fair value 
 
Para. 67(e) 6 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose details of any operation the enterprise has decided to 
dispose of as a result of the business combination 
 
Para. 67(f) 7 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the amount recognised at the acquisition date for each 
class of the acquiree’s assets, liabilities and contingent 
liabilities, and, unless disclosure would be impracticable, the 
carrying amounts of each of those classes, determined in 
accordance with IFRSs, immediately before the combination(if 
such disclosure would be impracticable that fact should be 
disclosed together with an explanation of the case) 
 
Para. 67(g) 8 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
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disclose the amount of any excess recognised in the profit or 
loss associated with an excess in the acquirer’s interest in the 
net fair value of the acquiree’s identifiable assets, liabilities and 
contingent liabilities, over cost, and the line item in the income 
statement in which the excess is 
recognised 
Para. 67(h) 9 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose a description of the factors that contributed to a cost 
that results in the recognition of goodwill, including a 
description of each intangible asset that was not recognised 
separately from goodwill and an explanation of why the 
intangible asset’s fair value could not 
be measured reliably 
 
Para. 67(i) 10 For each material business combination that was effected 
during the period, the enterprise (as the acquirer) should 
disclose the acquiree’s profit or loss since the acquisition date 
included in the acquirer’s profit or loss for the period, unless 
disclosures would be impracticable (if such disclosure would be 
impracticable that fact should be disclosed together with an 
explanation of the case) 
 
Para. 69 11 If the initial accounting for business combination that was 
effected during the period has been determined only 
provisionally, the enterprise should disclose that fact and an 
explanation of why this is the case 
 
Para. 70(a) 12 The enterprise should disclose the revenue of the combined 
enterprise for the period as though the acquisition date for all 
business combinations effected during the period had been the 
beginning of the period. If it is not practicable to do so, that fact 
should be disclosed together with an explanation of why this is 
the case 
 
Para. 70(b) 13 The enterprise should disclose the profit or loss of the 
combined enterprise for the period as though the acquisition 
date for all business combinations effected during the period 
had been the beginning of the period. If it is not practicable to 
do so, that fact should be disclosed together with an explanation 
of why this is the case 
 
Para. 73(a) 14 The enterprise should disclose the amount, and an explanation, 
of any gain or loss recognised in the current reporting period 
that is of such a size, nature or incidence that disclosure is 
relevant to an understanding of the combined enterprise’s 
financial performance, and that relates to the identifiable assets 
acquired or liabilities or contingent liabilities assumed in 
business combination that was effected in either the current or a 
previous period 
 
Para. 73(b) 15 If the initial accounting for a business combination that was 
effected in the immediately preceding period was determined 
only provisionally at the end of that period, the enterprise 
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should disclose the amounts, and explanations, of adjustments 
to the provisional values recognised during the current period 
Para. 73(c) 16 The enterprise should disclose information about error 
corrections for any of the acquiree’s identifiable assets, 
liabilities or contingent liabilities, or changes in values assigned 
to those items, that the acquirer recognises during the current 
period 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 3  Requirements 
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IFRS 5  Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations 
 
 
Para. 33(a) 1 The enterprise should disclose a single amount on the face of 
the income statement comprising the total of (i) the post-tax 
profit or loss of discontinued operations, and (ii) the post-tax 
gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair value less 
costs to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s) 
constituting the discontinued operation 
 
Para. 33(b) 2 The enterprise should disclose an analysis of the single amount 
disclosed in accordance with Para. 33(a), by identifying the 
revenue, expenses and pre-tax profit or loss of discontinued 
operations; the related income tax expense; and the gain or loss 
recognised on the measurement to fair value less costs to sell or 
on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s) constituting 
the discontinued operation 
 
Para. 33(c) 3 The enterprise should disclose the net cash flows attributable to 
the operating, investing and financing activities of discontinued 
operations 
 
Para. 34 4 The enterprise should re-present the disclosures required in 
Para. 33(a), (b) and (c) for prior periods presented in the 
financial statements so that the disclosure relate to all 
operations that have been discontinued by the balance sheet 
date for the latest period presented 
 
Para. 36(a) 5 If an enterprise ceases to classify a component of any enterprise 
as held for sale, the results of operations of the component 
previously presented in discontinued operations should be 
reclassified and included in income from continuing operations 
for all periods presented 
 
Para. 36(b) 6 If an enterprise ceases to classify a component of any enterprise 
as held for sale, the amounts for prior periods should be 
described as having been re-presented 
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IFRS 5  Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations 
 
 
Para. 38 7 The enterprise should present a non-current asset classified as 
held for sale and the assets of a disposal group classified as 
held for sale separately from other assets in the balance sheet 
 
Para. 38 8 The liabilities of a disposal group classified as held for sale 
should be presented separately from other liabilities in the 
balance sheet 
 
Para. 38 9 Assets and liabilities classified as held for sale should not be 
offset and presented as a single amount 
 
Para. 38 10 The major classes of assets and liabilities classified as held for 
sale should be separately disclosed either on the face of the 
balance sheet or in the notes to the financial statements 
 
Para. 38 11 Any cumulative income or expense recognised directly in 
equity relating to a non-current asset(or disposal group) 
classified as held for sale should be presented separately 
 
Para. 38 12 An enterprise should not reclassify or re-present amounts 
presented for non-current assets or for the assets and liabilities 
of disposal groups classified as held for sale in the balance 
sheets for prior periods to reflect the classification in the 
balance sheet for the latest period presented 
 
Para. 41(a) 13 An enterprise should disclose, in the notes in the period in 
which a non-current asset (or disposal group) has been either 
classified as held for sale or sold, a description of the non-
current asset (or disposal group) 
 
Para. 41(a) 14 An enterprise should disclose, in the notes in the period in 
which a non-current asset (or disposal group) has been either 
classified as held for sale or sold, a description of the facts and 
circumstances of the sale, or leading to the expected disposal, 
and the expected manner and timing of that disposal 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 5  Requirements 
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IFRS 8  Segment Reporting 
 
 
Para. 51 1 For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the 
segment revenue from sales to external customers 
 
Para. 51 2 For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the 
segment revenue from transactions with other segments 
 
Para. 52 3 For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose 
segment result from continuing operations separately from 
segment result from discontinued operations 
 
Para. 55 4 An enterprise should disclose the total carrying amount of 
segment assets for each reportable segment 
 
Para. 56 5 An enterprise should disclose segment liabilities for each 
reportable segment 
 
Para. 57 6 An enterprise should disclose the total cost incurred during the 
period to acquire segment assets that are expected to be used 
during more than one period (property, plant, equipment, and 
intangible assets) for each reportable segment 
 
Para. 58 7 An enterprise should disclose the total amount of expense 
included in segment result for depreciation and amortisation of 
segment assets for the period for each reportable segment 
 
Para. 61 8 For each reportable segment, an enterprise should disclose the 
total amount of significant non-cash expenses (other than 
depreciation and amortisation) that were included in segment 
expense 
 
Para. 67 9 An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment 
revenue and the enterprise’s revenue from external customers 
 
Para. 67 10 An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment 
result from continuing operations and a comparable measure of 
the enterprise’s operating profit or loss from continuing 
operations 
 
Para. 67 11 An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment 
result from discontinued operations and the enterprise’s profit 
or loss from discontinued operations 
 
Para. 67 12 An enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment 
assets and the enterprise’s assets 
 
Para. 67 13 enterprise should present a reconciliation between segment 
liabilities and the enterprise’s liabilities 
 
Para. 69  If the enterprise’s primary format for reporting segment 
information is business segments, the following information 
should be disclosed: 
 
Para. 69 (a) 14 Disclose segment revenue from external customers, by 
geographical area, based on geographical location of its 
customers, for each geographical segment whose revenue from 
sales to external customers is 10 per cent or more of total 
enterprise revenue from sales to all external customers 
 
Para. 69 (b) 15 Disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets, by 
geographical location of assets, for each geographical segment 
whose segment assets are 10 per cent or more of the total assets 
of all geographical segments 
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IFRS 8  Segment Reporting 
 
 
Para. 69 (C) 16 Disclose the total cost incurred during the period to acquire 
segment assets that are expected to be used during more than 
one period (property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets), 
by geographical location of assets, for each geographical 
segment whose segment assets are 10 per cent or more of the 
total assets of all geographical segments 
 
Para. 70  If the enterprise’s primary format of reporting segment 
information is geographical segments, the enterprise should 
disclose the following segment information for each business 
segment whose revenue from sales to external customers is 10 
per cent or more of total entity revenue from sales to all 
external customers whose segment assets are 10 per cent or 
more of the total assets of all 
business segments: 
 
Para. 70(a) 17 Disclose segment revenue from external customers  
Para. 70 (b) 18 Disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets  
Para. 70 (c) 19 Disclose the total cost incurred during the period to acquire 
segment assets that are expected to be used during more than 
one period (e.g. property, plant, equipment, and intangible 
assets) 
 
Para. 75 20 An enterprise should disclose the basis of pricing inter-segment 
transfers 
 
Para. 75 21 An enterprise should disclose any changes in the basis of 
pricing inter-segment transfers 
 
Para. 76 22 An enterprise should disclose changes in accounting policies 
adopted for segment reporting that have a material effect on 
segment 
information 
 
Para. 76 23 An enterprise should disclose a description of the nature of the 
change in accounting policies 
 
Para. 76 24 An enterprise should disclose the reasons for the change in 
accounting policies 
 
Para. 76 25 An enterprise should disclose the fact that comparative 
information has been restated to account for the change in 
accounting policies 
or that it is impracticable to do so 
 
Para. 81 26 An enterprise should disclose the types of products and service 
included in each reported business segment 
 
Para. 81 27 An enterprise should disclose the composition of each reported 
geographical segment 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 8 Requirements 
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IFRS 10  Consolidated Financial Statements 
 
 
Para. 19 1 A parent shall prepare consolidated financial statements: The 
financial statements of a group in which assets, liabilities, 
equity, income, expenses and cash flow of the parent and its 
subsidiaries are presented as using uniform accounting policies 
for like transactions and other events in similar circumstances. 
 
Para. 20 2 Consolidation of an investee shall begin from the date the 
investor obtains control: of the investee and cease when the 
investor loses control of the investee. 
 
Para. B86  Consolidated financial statements  
Para. B86 
(a) 
3 Combine like items of assets, liabilities, equity, income, 
expenses and cash flows of the parent: An entity that controls 
one or more entities, with those of its subsidiaries: An entity 
that is controlled by another entity. 
 
Para. B86 
(b) 
4 Offset (eliminate) the carrying amount of the parent’s 
investment in each subsidiary and the parent’s portion of equity 
of each subsidiary (IFRS 3 explains how to account for any 
related goodwill). 
 
Para. B86 
(c) 
5 eliminate in full intragroup assets and liabilities, equity, 
income, expenses and cash flows relating to transactions 
between entities of the group (profits or losses resulting from 
intragroup transactions that are recognised in assets, such as 
inventory and fixed assets, are eliminated in full). Intragroup 
losses may indicate an impairment that requires recognition in 
the consolidated financial statements. 
 
Para. 22 6 A parent shall present non-controlling interests directly or 
indirectly, to a parent. in the consolidated statement of financial 
position within equity, separately from the equity of the owners 
of the parent. 
 
Para. 23 7 Changes in a parent’s ownership interest in a subsidiary that do 
not result in the parent losing control [Definition text: of the 
subsidiary are equity transactions (ie transactions with owners 
in their capacity as owners). 
 
Para. 24  Non-controlling interests  
Para. B94 8 An entity shall attribute the profit or loss and each component 
of other comprehensive income to the owners of the parent and 
to the non-controlling interests The entity shall also attribute 
total comprehensive income to the owners of the parent and to 
the non-controlling interests even if this results in the non-
controlling interests having a deficit balance. 
 
Para. B95 9 If a subsidiary has outstanding cumulative preference shares 
that are classified as equity and are held by non-controlling 
interests the entity shall compute its share of profit or loss after 
adjusting for the dividends on such shares, whether or not such 
dividends have been declared. 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 10 Requirements 
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IFRS 11  Joint Arrangements  
Para. 20   
A joint operator shall recognise in relation to its interest in a 
joint operation: 
 
 
 
Para. 20 (a) 1 Its assets, including its share of any assets held jointly.  
Para. 20 (b) 2 Its liabilities, including its share of any liabilities incurred 
jointly. 
 
Para. 20 (c) 3 Its revenue from the sale of its share of the output arising from 
the joint operation. 
 
Para. 20 (d) 4 Its share of the revenue from the sale of the output by the joint 
operation; and 
 
Para. 20 (e) 5 Its expenses, including its share of any expenses incurred 
jointly. 
 
Para. 21 6 A joint operator shall account for the assets, liabilities, revenues 
and expenses relating to its interest in a joint operation in 
accordance with the IFRSs applicable to the particular assets, 
liabilities, revenues and expenses. 
 
Para. B34 7 When an entity enters into a transaction with a joint operation 
in which it is a joint operator such as a sale or contribution of 
assets, it is conducting the transaction with the other parties to 
the joint operation and, as such, the joint operator shall 
recognise gains and losses resulting from such a transaction 
only to the extent of the other parties’ interests in the joint 
operation. 
 
Para. B35 8 When such transactions provide evidence of a reduction in the 
net realisable value of the assets to be sold or contributed to the 
joint operation or of an impairment loss of those assets, those 
losses shall be recognised fully by the joint operator. 
 
Para. 24 
 
9 A joint venture shall recognise its interest in a joint venture as 
an investment and shall account for that investment using the 
equity method in accordance with IAS 28 Investments in 
Associates and Joint Ventures unless the entity is exempted 
from applying the equity method as specified in that standard. 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 11 Requirements 
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IFRS 12  Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities  
Para.12  An entity shall disclose for each of its subsidiaries: An entity 
that is controlled by another entity that have non-controlling 
interests: Equity in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or 
indirectly, to a parent. that are material to the reporting entity: 
 
Para.12 (a) 1 The name of the subsidiary.  
Para.12 (b) 2 The principal place of business (and country of incorporation if 
different from the principal place of business) of the subsidiary. 
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IFRS 12  Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities  
Para.12 (c) 3 The proportion of ownership interests held by non-controlling 
interests. 
 
Para.12 (d) 4 The proportion of voting rights held by non-controlling 
interests, if different from the proportion of ownership interests 
held. 
 
Para.12 (e) 5 The profit or loss allocated to non-controlling interests of the 
subsidiary during the reporting period. 
 
Para.12 (f) 6 Accumulated non-controlling interests of the subsidiary at the 
end of the reporting period. 
 
Para.12 (g) 7 Summarised financial information about the subsidiary.  
Para.21(a)  An entity shall disclose for each joint arrangement and 
associate that is material to the reporting entity: 
 
 
(i) 
8 The name of the joint arrangement or associate.  
(ii) 9 The nature of the entity’s relationship with the joint 
arrangement or associate (by, for example, describing the 
nature of the activities of the joint arrangement or associate and 
whether they are strategic to the entity’s activities). 
 
(iii) 10 The principal place of business (and country of incorporation, if 
applicable and different from the principal place of business) of 
the joint arrangement or associate. 
 
(iv) 11 The proportion of ownership interest or participating share held 
by the entity and, if different, the proportion of voting rights 
held (if applicable). 
 
Para.21(b)  An entity shall disclose for each joint venture and associate 
that is material to the reporting entity: 
 
 
(i) 
12 Whether the investment in the joint venture or associate is 
measured using the equity method or at fair value. 
 
(ii) 13 Summarised financial information about the joint venture or 
associate including: current assets, non-current assets, current 
liabilities, non-current liabilities, revenue, profit or loss from 
continuing operations, post-tax profit or loss from discontinued 
operations, other comprehensive income and total 
comprehensive income. 
 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 12 Requirements 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IFRS 13  Fair Value Measurement  
Para.93  To meet the disclosure objective, the following minimum 
disclosures are required for each class of assets and liabilities 
measured at fair value (including measurements based on fair 
value within the scope of this IFRS) in the statement of 
financial position after initial recognition: IFRS 13:93 
 
(a) 1 The fair value measurement at the end of the reporting period.  
(b) 2 For non-recurring fair value measurements, the reasons for the 
measurement. 
 
(c) 3 The level of the fair value hierarchy within which the fair value 
measurements are categorised in their entirety (Level 1, 2 or 3). 
 
(d) 4 for assets and liabilities held at the reporting date that are 
measured at fair value on a recurring basis, the amounts of any 
transfers between Level 1 and Level 2 of the fair value 
hierarchy, the reasons for those transfers and the entity's policy 
for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to 
have occurred, separately disclosing and discussing transfers 
into and out of each level. 
 
(e) 5 for fair value measurements categorised within Level 2 and 
Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, a description of the 
valuation technique(s) and the inputs used in the fair value 
measurement, any change in the valuation techniques and the 
reason(s) for making such change (with some exceptions). 
 
(f) 6 for fair value measurements categorised within Level 3 of the 
fair value hierarchy, quantitative information about the 
significant unobservable inputs used in the fair value 
measurement (with some exceptions) 
 
Para.93  for recurring fair value measurements categorised within Level 
3 of the fair value hierarchy, a reconciliation from the opening 
balances to the closing balances, disclosing separately changes 
during the period attributable to the following: 
 
(a) 7 total gains or losses for the period recognised in profit or loss, 
and the line item(s) in profit or loss in which those gains or 
losses are recognised – separately disclosing the amount 
included in profit or loss that is attributable to the change in 
unrealised gains or losses relating to those assets and liabilities 
held at the end of the reporting period, and the line item(s) in 
profit or loss in which those unrealised gains or losses are 
recognised 
 
(b) 8 total gains or losses for the period recognised in other 
comprehensive income, and the line item(s) in other 
comprehensive income in which those gains or losses are 
recognised 
 
(c) 9 purchases, sales, issues and settlements (each of those types of 
changes disclosed separately) 
 
(d) 10 the amounts of any transfers into or out of Level 3 of the fair 
value hierarchy, the reasons for those transfers and the entity's 
policy for determining when transfers between levels are 
deemed to have occurred. Transfers into Level 3 shall be 
disclosed and discussed separately from transfers out of Level 3 
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IFRS 
standard/ 
Source of 
Info. 
Item 
No. 
Disclosure Requirements Score* 
IFRS 13  Fair Value Measurement  
Para.93 11 for fair value measurements categorised within Level 3 of the 
fair value hierarchy, a description of the valuation processes 
used by the entity 
 
Para.93  for recurring fair value measurements categorised within Level 
3of the fair value hierarchy: 
 
(a) 13 a narrative description of the sensitivity of the fair value 
measurement to changes in unobservable inputs if a change in 
those inputs to a different amount might result in a significantly 
higher or lower fair value measurement. If there are 
interrelationships between those inputs and other unobservable 
inputs used in the fair value measurement, the entity also 
provides a description of those interrelationships and of how 
they might magnify or mitigate the effect of changes in the 
unobservable inputs on the fair value measurement 
 
(b) 14 For financial assets and financial liabilities, if changing one or 
more of the unobservable inputs to reflect reasonably possible 
alternative assumptions would change fair value significantly, 
an entity shall state that fact and disclose the effect of those 
changes. The entity shall disclose how the effect of a change to 
reflect a reasonably possible alternative assumption was 
calculated 
 
Total Score for Compliance with IFRS 13 Requirements 
 
 
 
*Scoring Procedure: 
1 = Requirement is complied with 
0 = Requirement is not complied with 
N/A = Requirement is not applicable 
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Appendix E: Voluntary Disclosure Checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group(1) General Information 
 
  
1 Brief history of the company Barrett, 1975; Barrett, 1976; Stanga, 1976; 
Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Adhikari and 
Tondkar, 1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; 
Depoers, 2000; Chun and Gray, 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hooks, Coy and 
Davey, 2002; Omar, B., 2007 
 
2 Description of organisational 
Structure 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
3 Statement of general objective Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
4 Statement of financial objective Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
5 Statement of marketing objective Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
6 Statement of social objective Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995;  Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
7 Statement of major type of 
products 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
8 Description of major plants, 
warehouses and projects including 
function, location and size 
Chio, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976;  
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Wallace, 1988; Adhikari and Tondkar, 
1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 
2007 
 
9 Information on major industry 
trends 
Chio, 1973;  Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; 
Firth, 1984; Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a; 
Cooke, 1989b; Adhikari and Tondkar, 
1992; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994;  
Zarzeski, 1996; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Kahanna, Palebu and 
Srinivasan, 2004; Omar, B., 2007 
 
10 General outlook of the economy  Chio, 1973; Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 
1984; Suwaidan, 1997; Robb,Single and 
Zarzeski, 2001 
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No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (2) Financial Overview 
and Historical Information 
 
  
11 Balance sheet for the last three 
years 
Cooke, 1989a;  Suwaidan, 1997; Makhija 
and Patton, 2004; Omar, B., 2007 
 
12 Income statement for the last three 
years 
Cooke, 1989a;  Suwaidan, 1997; Makhija 
and Patton, 2004; Omar, B., 2007 
 
13 Sales (revenue) for the last 3-5 
years 
Barrett, 1975; Barrett, 1976;  Suwaidan, 
1997; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Omar, 
B., 2007 
 
14 Sales (revenue) for the last 6-10 
years 
Choi, 1973; Barrett, 1975; Barrett, 1976; 
Suwaidan, 1997;  Omar, B., 2007   
 
15 Historical summary for important 
financial and operating data  
Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; 
Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Cooke, 1989a; 
Adihkari and Tondkar, 1992; Gray, Meek 
and Roberts, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Craig 
and Diga, 1998; Chun and Gray, 2001; 
Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002; Omar, B., 
2007   
 
16 Other financial data for the past 3-
5 years 
Stanga, 1976; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
17 Other financial data for the past 6-
10 years 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
18 Effects of interest rates on current 
results 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
19 Effects of interest rates on future 
results 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
20 Provisions for securities Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, B., 2007  
21 Transfers to capital reserves Cooke, 1989; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, 
B., 2007 
 
22 Market value of inventory Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Cooke, 1989b; Omar, B., 2007 
 
23 Advertising information—
qualitative and qualitative  
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995;  Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
24 Intangible assets valuation other 
than 
goodwill 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (3) Ratios and Other 
Analysis 
 
  
25 Growth rate in earnings Stanga, 1976; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Omar, B., 2007   
 
26 Number of shareholders  Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; 
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984;  
Adihkari and Tondkar, 1992; Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Craig and Diga, 1998;  Khanna, 
Palebu and Srinivasan, 2004;  Omar, B., 
2007   
 
27 Distribution of costs into fixed and 
variable  
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Omar, B., 2007   
 
28 Liquidity ratio Cooke, 1989a; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Chun and 
Gray, 2001; Omar, B., 2007   
 
29 Leverage ratio Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994;; Gray, 
Meek and Roberts, 1995; Chun and Gray, 
2001; Omar, B., 2007   
 
30 Profitability ratio Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Botosan, 
1997; Chun and Gray, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
 
 
31 Return on assets Botosan, 1997; Hooks, Coy and Davey, 
2002; Singleton and Globerman, 2002; 
Khanna, Palebu and Srinivasan, 2004;  
Omar, B., 2007   
 
32 Return on shareholders' equity  Cooke, 1989a; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994;  Al-Mulhem, 1997; Botosan, 1997; 
Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002; Singleton 
and Globerman, 2002; Khanna, Palebu and 
Srinivasan, 2004;  Omar, B., 2007   
 
33 Return on capital employed  Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b;  Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, 1994; Gray, Meek and 
Roberts, 1995; Suwaidan, 1997; Omar, B., 
2007   
 
34 Rate on return required by firm on 
its projects 
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Omar, B., 2007   
 
35 Breakdown of sales according by 
major product lines, customer 
classes or geographical areas 
Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; 
Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984;  Cooke, 1989a; 
Adihkari and Tondkar, 1992; Suwaidan, 
1997; Hail, 2002; Omar, B., 2007 
 
36 Breakdown of net income 
according by major product lines, 
customer classes or geographical 
areas 
Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; 
Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Adihkari and 
Tondkar, 1992; Suwaidan, 1997; Hail, 
2002; Omar, B., 2007 
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No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (3) Ratios and Other 
Analysis 
 
  
38 Other ratios (e.g. debt/equity, 
debt/total assets) 
Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b;  Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, 1994; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; Hooks, Coy and Davey, 
2002; Omar, B., 2007 
 
39 Measure of physical level of 
output and rate of utilization   
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Omar, B., 2007 
 
40 Growth in units sold or average 
prices of units sold 
Botosan, 1997; Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 
2001; Singleton and Globerman, 2002; 
Omar, B., 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (4) Projected and 
Management Information  
 
  
41 Description of major types of 
products 
Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; 
Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Adhikari and 
Tondkar, 1992; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000;  Robb,Single and 
Zarzeski, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Hail, 2002; Singleton and Globerman, 
2002;  Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003;  
Khanna, Palebu and Srinivasan, 2004; 
Omar, B., 2007 
 
42 New products (services) 
development 
Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 
1989b;  Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Robb,Single and 
Zarzeski, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Omar, B., 2007   
 
43 Factors affecting business future 
(i.e. political, economic, 
technology) 
Choi, 1973Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 
1984; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b; 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992;  Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, 1994; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Suwaidan, 1997;  Craig and Diga, 1998; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
44 Research and development 
activities and expenditures for the 
next year 
Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976;  
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; Al-
Issa, 1998; Cooke, 1989a;  Adhikari and 
Tondkar, 1992;  Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Raffournier, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Botosan, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Omar, B., 2007   
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No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (4) Projected and 
Management Information  
 
  
45 Planned advertisement and 
promotion expenditures 
Stanga, 1976; Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 
1989a; Cooke, 1989b; Omar, B., 2007 
 
46 Productive capacity Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b; Depoers, 
2000; Omar, B., 2007   
 
47 Raw material sources  Choi, 1973; Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a; 
Omar, B., 2007   
 
48 Labour market (i.e. wage 
settlement, turnover) 
Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 
1989b; Omar, B., 2007   
 
49 Quantitative forecasts of sales and 
profit  
  Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Gray, 
Meek and Roberts, 1995; Botosan, 1997; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; Hooks, Coy and Davey, 
2002; Singleton and Globerman, 2002; 
Omar, B., 2007   
 
50 Qualitative  forecasts of sales and 
profit 
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Gray, 
Meek and Roberts, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Depoers, 2000; Hooks, Coy and 
Davey, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
51 Cash flow forecast  Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Cooke, 1989a; Gray, Meek and Roberts, 
1995; Botosan, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; Chau and Gray, 2001; 
Singleton and Globerman, 2002; Omar, 
B., 2007   
 
52 Completed and uncompleted 
project 
Cooke, 1989a;  Hossain, Tan and Adams, 
1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 
2007   
 
53 Description of production 
methods/services techniques 
Depoers, 2000; Omar, B., 2007    
54 Capital expenditure for the next 
year 
Stanga, 1976; Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; 
Firth, 1984; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Wallace, 1988; Cooke, 1989a; 
Cooke, 1989b; Adhikari and Tondkar, 
1992;  Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Botosan, 1997; Suwaidan, 
1997; Chau and Gray, 2001; Singleton 
and Globerman, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
55 Discussion of the managements' 
future plane  
Al-Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Omar, B., 2007   
 
56 Comparison of actual business 
performance to previously and 
reasons for changes in firm's 
performance and financial position  
Choi, 1973; Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002; 
Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Omar, 
B., 2007   
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No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (5) Market Based 
Information   
 
  
57 Price range of the firm's share for 
the past few years 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Omar, 
B., 2007   
 
58 Market capitalization  Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Depoers, 
2000; Omar, B., 2007   
 
59 Distribution of marketing network 
for finished goods/services   
Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; Firth, 1984; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 
1989a; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Omar, B., 2007   
 
60 Information about geographical 
concentration in the sales base of a 
firm 
Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Omar, 
B., 2007   
 
61 Geographical distributions of 
shareholders 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
62 Size or type of shareholders Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
63 Measure of customer's satisfaction  Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Omar, 
B., 2007   
 
64 Growth or shrinkage in market 
share 
Robb,Single and Zarzeski, 2001; Omar, 
B., 2007   
 
65 Market share ratios of the firm (i.e. 
number of customers by sector, 
change in market share in major 
areas of activity) 
Depoers, 2000; Hooks, Coy and Davey, 
2002; Omar, B., 2007 
 
66 Stock exchange where shares are 
listed  
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Omar, B., 
2007 
 
67 Foreign stock market listing 
information 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (6) Future Prospect 
 
  
68 Profit forecast—qualitative  Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
69 Profit forecast—quantitative Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
70 Sales forecast—qualitative Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
71 Sales forecast—quantitative Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
72 Cash flow projections— 
qualitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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No 
 
Items 
 
Studies used this item 
 
Score* 
 Group (6) Future Prospect 
 
  
73 Cash flow projections—
quantitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
74 Forecast assumptions Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
75 Factors affecting future business— 
economic 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
76 Factors affecting future business—
political 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
77 Factors affecting future business— 
technological 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
78 Index of selling prices Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
79 Index of quantity sales Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
80 Index of raw material prices Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (7) Acquisition and 
Disposal 
 
  
81 Reasons for the acquisitions Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
82 Amount of goodwill on acquisition Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
83 Financing details of the acquisition Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
84 Reasons for the disposals Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
85 Amount of consideration realized 
from the 
disposals 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (8) Research and 
Development 
 
  
86 Firm's policy on R & D Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
87 Location of research and 
development activities 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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No Items Studies used this item Score* 
 Group (8) Research and 
Development 
 
  
88 Discussion on future R & D 
activities 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
89 Forecast of R & D expenses Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
90 New product development Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
91 Number employed in research and 
development 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (9) Information about 
Directors 
  
92 Name and age of directors Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
93 Academic qualifications of 
directors 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
94 Commercial experience of the non-
executive 
directors 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
95 Commercial experience of the 
executive 
directors 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
96 Position or office held by 
executive directors 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
97 Salary and other remunerations 
(amounts) 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (10)  Employee 
Information 
 
  
98 Geographical distribution of 
employees 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
99 Employee appreciation Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
100 Break down of employees by line 
of 
business 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
101 Categories of employees by 
function 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
102 Categories of employees by gender Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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No 
 
Items 
 
Studies used this item 
 
Score* 
 Group (10)  Employee 
Information 
 
  
103 Break down of employees by 
geographic 
area 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
104 Number of employees—full time 
and part 
time 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
105 Corporate policy on employee 
training 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
106 Amount spent in training Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
107 Number of employees trained Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
108 Discussion of employee turnover Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
109 Discussion on employee welfare Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (11)  Social Policy and 
Value Added Information 
  
110 Environmental protection 
programme— 
qualitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
111 Environmental protection 
programme— 
quantitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
112 Charitable donations (amount) Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
113 Description of community 
involvement 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
114 Value added statement Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
115 Value added ratios Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
116 General value added information Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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*Scoring Procedure: 
1 = Item is disclosed  
0 = Item is not disclosed 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (12)  Segmental 
Information 
 
  
117 Geographical profit—quantitative Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
118 Geographical capital 
expenditure—quantitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
119 Geographical production—
quantitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
120 Line-of-business production—
quantitative 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
121 Proportion of local production raw 
materials 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
122 Discussion of market share of 
products— 
general 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
123 Size, growth rate on product 
market 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
124 Discussion of competitors Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
Items 
 
 
Studies used this item 
 
 
Score* 
 Group (13)  Foreign Currency 
Information 
 
  
125 Long term debt by currency Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
126 Short term debt by currency Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
127 Discussion on impact of foreign 
currency 
fluctuations on future results 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
128 Foreign currency exposure 
management 
description 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
 
129 Major exchange rates used in 
account 
Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman 1995 
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Appendix F: T-test to check variation across firms in each country for 
Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure Indices  
Table F1: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for UAE firms 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 80 .7551 .05398 .00619 
VD 80 .2361 .13536 .01553 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 121.965 79 .000 .75513 .7428 .7675 
VD 15.203 79 .000 .23605 .2051 .2670 
 
 
Table F2: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for Bahrain firms 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 56 .6895 .04171 .00557 
VD 56 .3150 .09394 .01255 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 123.699 55 .000 .68946 .6783 .7006 
VD 25.092 55 .000 .31500 .2898 .3402 
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Table F3: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for Kuwait firms 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 80 .7208 .03514 .00393 
VD 80 .2120 .13315 .01489 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 183.450 79 .000 .72075 .7129 .7286 
VD 14.242 79 .000 .21200 .1824 .2416 
 
 
Table F4: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for Oman firms 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 52 .6765 .06390 .00922 
VD 52 .3581 .13711 .01979 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 73.346 51 .000 .67646 .6579 .6950 
VD 18.096 51 .000 .35812 .3183 .3979 
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Table F5: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for Qatar firms 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 44 .7445 .04732 .00713 
VD 44 .3173 .10702 .01613 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 104.366 43 .000 .74455 .7302 .7589 
VD 19.665 43 .000 .31727 .2847 .3498 
 
 
Table F6: T-test for mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices for Saudi Arabia firms 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
MD 80 .6930 .04683 .00524 
VD 80 .4457 .09886 .01105 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 0 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
MD 132.348 79 .000 .69300 .6826 .7034 
VD 40.327 79 .000 .44575 .4237 .4678 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
489 
 
Appendix G: Detailed Mandatory Disclosure Multivariate Regression 
Results 
Table G1: Mandatory Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model I 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .654a .428 .405 .04208 .497 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Consolidated F.S, International Listing, Profitability (ROA), 
Industry Type (Energy), Education - Board of Directors, International Sales, International Sales, 
Education - Financial Controller, Liquidity, 2011, VD Index, Industry Type (Services), 2012, Firm 
Size LOG 
b. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .488 15 .033 18.357 .000b 
Residual .652 377 .002   
Total 1.139 392    
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Consolidated F.S, International Listing, ROA, Industry Type 
(Energy), Education - Board of Directors, International Sales, International Sales, Education - 
Financial Controller, Liquidity, 2011, VD Index, Industry Type (Services), 2012, Firm Size LOG 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .336 .035  9.658 .000   
Firm Size LOG .008 .002 .173 3.521 .000 .640 1.562 
Industry Type 
(Services) 
.001 .005 .012 .285 .776 .823 1.216 
Industry Type 
(Energy) 
.038 .009 .180 4.246 .000 .860 1.162 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
-.056 .030 -.078 -1.851 .065 .881 1.135 
Liquidity .002 .001 .059 1.360 .175 .840 1.191 
International 
Listing 
.027 .010 .109 2.587 .010 .873 1.145 
International Sales .017 .005 .155 3.624 .000 .855 1.169 
Consolidated F.S .018 .005 .147 3.409 .001 .839 1.193 
International Sales .000 .000 .088 2.045 .042 .838 1.193 
Education - Board 
of Directors  
.071 .024 .126 3.000 .003 .884 1.131 
Education - 
Financial 
Controller 
.352 .031 .471 11.246 .000 .885 1.130 
VD Index -.060 .018 -.161 -3.389 .001 .686 1.457 
2011 -.001 .006 -.005 -.100 .920 .665 1.503 
2012 -.001 .006 -.007 -.146 .884 .664 1.506 
2013 .014 .006 .108 2.229 .026 .661 1.512 
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
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Table G2: Mandatory Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model II 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .670a .450 .424 .04140 .515 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Consolidated F.S, International Listing, Profitability (ROA), 
Industry Type (Energy), Education - Board of Directors , State Ownership , International Sales, 
International Sales, 2011, Liquidity, Education - Financial Controller, Industry Type (Services), 
Institutional Ownership, VD Index, 2012, Firm Size LOG 
b. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .512 17 .030 17.584 .000b 
Residual .627 375 .002   
Total 1.139 392    
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Consolidated F.S, International Listing, Profitability (ROA), 
Industry Type (Energy), Education - Board of Directors , State Ownership , International Sales, 
International Sales, 2011, Liquidity, Education - Financial Controller, Industry Type (Services), 
Institutional Ownership, VD Index, 2012, Firm Size LOG 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .363 .035  10.377 .000   
Firm Size LOG .004 .003 .090 1.701 .090 .531 1.883 
Industry Type 
(Services) 
.000 .005 -.002 -.048 .962 .769 1.300 
Industry Type 
(Energy) 
.037 .009 .179 4.271 .000 .857 1.167 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
-.065 .030 -.090 -2.161 .031 .865 1.156 
Liquidity .002 .001 .060 1.411 .159 .840 1.191 
International 
Listing 
.030 .010 .121 2.903 .004 .868 1.152 
International Sales .015 .005 .134 3.176 .002 .840 1.191 
Consolidated F.S .016 .005 .130 3.037 .003 .825 1.212 
International Sales .000 .000 .057 1.328 .185 .808 1.238 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-.030 .012 -.116 -2.463 .014 .678 1.476 
State Ownership  .029 .014 .110 2.141 .033 .575 1.739 
Education - Board 
of Directors  
.071 .024 .127 2.918 .004 .798 1.253 
Education - 
Financial 
Controller 
.384 .032 .514 11.842 .000 .798 1.253 
VD Index -.075 .018 -.201 -4.083 .000 .623 1.606 
2011 -.001 .006 -.004 -.084 .933 .665 1.503 
2012 -.001 .006 -.008 -.173 .863 .664 1.507 
2013 .014 .006 .110 2.300 .022 .661 1.513 
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
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Table G3: Mandatory Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model III 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .687a .472 .443 .04071 .522 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Role Duality, State Ownership , Profitability (ROA), Industry 
Type (Energy), International Listing, International Sales, Board Size, Liquidity, 2012, Education 
- Financial Controller, Consolidated F.S, International Sales, Education - Board of Directors , 
Industry Type (Services), Board Independence, Institutional Ownership, 2011, VD Index, Firm 
Size LOG 
b. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .538 20 .027 16.219 .000b 
Residual .602 372 .002   
Total 1.139 392    
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Role Duality, State Ownership , Profitability (ROA), Industry 
Type (Energy), International Listing, International Sales, Board Size, Liquidity, 2012, Education 
- Financial Controller, Consolidated F.S, International Sales, Education - Board of Directors , 
Industry Type (Services), Board Independence, Institutional Ownership, 2011, VD Index, Firm 
Size LOG 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .389 .035  11.030 .000   
Firm Size LOG .006 .003 .131 2.442 .015 .507 1.973 
Industry Type 
(Services) 
.003 .005 .024 .544 .587 .726 1.378 
Industry Type 
(Energy) 
.035 .009 .166 3.987 .000 .842 1.187 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
-.070 .030 -.097 -2.358 .019 .862 1.160 
Liquidity .002 .001 .069 1.640 .102 .834 1.200 
International 
Listing 
.024 .010 .096 2.318 .021 .843 1.187 
International Sales 
.013 .005 .116 2.747 .006 .816 1.226 
Consolidated F.S .013 .005 .104 2.359 .019 .742 1.348 
International Sales 
.000 .000 .115 2.558 .011 .716 1.397 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-.035 .012 -.137 -2.924 .004 .663 1.508 
State Ownership  .025 .014 .092 1.825 .069 .567 1.763 
Board Size -.003 .001 -.103 -2.307 .022 .726 1.377 
Board 
Independence 
.013 .011 .056 1.241 .215 .717 1.395 
Role Duality -.016 .006 -.120 -2.478 .014 .620 1.612 
Education - Board 
of Directors  
.041 .026 .072 1.575 .116 .690 1.450 
Education - 
Financial 
Controller 
.384 .032 .514 11.867 .000 .774 1.291 
VD Index -.056 .019 -.150 -2.997 .003 .578 1.731 
2011 -.001 .006 -.006 -.120 .905 .665 1.503 
2012 -.001 .006 -.009 -.188 .851 .663 1.509 
2013 .013 .006 .105 2.244 .025 .659 1.517 
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
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Table G4: Mandatory Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model IV 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .701a .491 .460 .04009 .538 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Group 6: UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 2013, International Listing, Education 
- Financial Controller, ROA*LIQ, Institutional Ownership, Industry Type (Energy), Board 
Independence, International Sales, 2011, Board Size, Industry Type (Services), Consolidated F.S, 
International Sales, State Ownership , 2012, Education - Board of Directors , Role Duality, VD 
Index, Liquidity, Firm Size LOG, Profitability (ROA) 
b. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .559 22 .025 15.822 .000b 
Residual .580 370 .002   
Total 1.139 392    
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Group 6: UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 2013, International Listing, Education 
- Financial Controller, ROA*LIQ, Institutional Ownership, Industry Type (Energy), Board 
Independence, International Sales, 2011, Board Size, Industry Type (Services), Consolidated F.S, 
International Sales, State Ownership , 2012, Education - Board of Directors , Role Duality, VD 
Index, Liquidity, Firm Size LOG, Profitability (ROA) 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .392 .036  10.761 .000   
Firm Size LOG .007 .003 .156 2.692 .007 .419 2.385 
Industry Type (Services) .004 .005 .033 .751 .453 .723 1.384 
Industry Type (Energy) .038 .009 .180 4.351 .000 .821 1.218 
Profitability (ROA) -.145 .045 -.201 -3.214 .001 .362 2.760 
Liquidity -.002 .002 -.063 -1.093 .275 .429 2.330 
ROA*LIQ .031 .011 .221 2.928 .004 .247 4.055 
International Listing .019 .010 .077 1.857 .064 .819 1.221 
International Sales .013 .005 .122 2.911 .004 .803 1.246 
Consolidated F.S .010 .006 .080 1.751 .081 .671 1.491 
International Sales .000 .000 .080 1.734 .084 .661 1.513 
Institutional Ownership -.037 .012 -.143 -3.087 .002 .656 1.524 
State Ownership  .024 .013 .091 1.829 .068 .567 1.763 
Board Size -.002 .001 -.086 -1.913 .057 .703 1.423 
Board Independence .020 .011 .085 1.876 .061 .687 1.456 
Role Duality -.012 .006 -.092 -1.875 .062 .585 1.710 
Education - Board of 
Directors  
.026 .026 .046 .990 .323 .661 1.514 
Education - Financial 
Controller 
.366 .032 .490 11.340 .000 .755 1.325 
VD Index -.047 .019 -.126 -2.429 .016 .524 1.908 
2011 -.001 .006 -.006 -.140 .889 .665 1.504 
2012 -.002 .006 -.012 -.258 .796 .661 1.513 
2013 .014 .006 .107 2.324 .021 .659 1.518 
Sub-sample: UAE, 
Bahrain and Kuwait (High 
Level of Exportations % 
of GDP) 
.014 .006 .132 2.250 .025 .409 2.445 
 
a. Dependent Variable: MD Index 
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Appendix H: Detailed Voluntary Disclosure Multivariate Regression 
Results 
Table H1: Voluntary Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model I 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .584a .341 .318 .12073 .337 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, International Listing, Assets-in-Place, Leverage, MD Index, 
Industry Type (Services), 2011, Profitability (ROA), Industry Type (Energy), Firm Age, Firm Size 
LOG, 2012, Liquidity 
b. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.788 13 .214 14.712 .000b 
Residual 5.393 379 .015   
Total 8.181 392    
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, International Listing, Assets-in-Place, Leverage, MD Index, 
Industry Type (Services), 2011, Profitability (ROA), Industry Type (Energy), Firm Age, Firm Size 
LOG, 2012, Liquidity 
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                                   Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.092 .100  -.919 .359   
Firm Size LOG .051 .006 .402 8.260 .000 .752 1.329 
Industry Type 
(Services) -.015 .014 -.047 -1.033 .302 .853 1.172 
Industry Type 
(Energy) .073 .026 .130 2.793 .005 .819 1.221 
Leverage .155 .042 .230 3.735 .000 .469 2.132 
Profitability 
(ROA) .372 .088 .192 4.245 .000 .871 1.148 
Liquidity -.001 .004 -.010 -.194 .846 .630 1.589 
Assets-in-Place .047 .028 .076 1.723 .086 .913 1.095 
International 
Listing .109 .029 .166 3.718 .000 .889 1.125 
Firm Age .001 .000 .064 1.347 .179 .794 1.260 
MD Index -.258 .119 -.096 -2.166 .031 .900 1.111 
2011 .000 .017 .000 -.008 .994 .665 1.504 
2012 -.001 .017 -.002 -.032 .975 .664 1.507 
2013 .008 .018 .025 .470 .638 .655 1.527 
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
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Table H2: Voluntary Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model II 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .618a .382 .355 .11734 .345 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, International Listing, Assets-in-Place, Leverage, Institutional 
Ownership , MD Index, Director Ownership, Industry Type (Services), 2011, Industry Type 
(Energy), Profitability (ROA), Firm Age, 2012, State Ownership, Liquidity, Firm Size LOG 
b. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.128 16 .196 14.201 .000b 
Residual 5.053 376 .014   
Total 8.181 392    
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, International Listing, Assets-in-Place, Leverage, Institutional 
Ownership , MD Index, Director Ownership, Industry Type (Services), 2011, Industry Type 
(Energy), Profitability (ROA), Firm Age, 2012, State Ownership, Liquidity, Firm Size LOG 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .082 .106  .776 .438   
Firm Size LOG .037 .007 .295 5.570 .000 .598 1.672 
Industry Type 
(Services) 
-.025 .014 -.081 -1.764 .079 .796 1.256 
Industry Type 
(Energy) 
.070 .026 .124 2.651 .008 .767 1.304 
Leverage .144 .041 .214 3.531 .000 .459 2.180 
Profitability (ROA) .361 .088 .186 4.115 .000 .820 1.220 
Liquidity -.001 .004 -.015 -.287 .775 .618 1.619 
Assets-in-Place .028 .027 .045 1.026 .305 .868 1.152 
International Listing .096 .029 .147 3.342 .001 .875 1.143 
Firm Age .000 .000 .031 .665 .506 .761 1.314 
Director Ownership -.099 .054 -.087 -1.843 .066 .755 1.324 
Institutional 
Ownership  
-.047 .033 -.069 -1.396 .163 .690 1.450 
State Ownership .122 .037 .172 3.300 .001 .620 1.612 
MD Index -.290 .116 -.108 -2.497 .013 .897 1.114 
2011 .000 .017 .001 .025 .980 .665 1.504 
2012 .001 .017 .002 .035 .972 .664 1.507 
2013 .011 .017 .031 .616 .538 .654 1.528 
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
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Table H3: Voluntary Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model III 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .669a .448 .418 .11152 .397 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Role Duality, Director Ownership, Assets-in-Place, Industry Type 
(Services), Profitability (ROA), Institutional Ownership, Liquidity, Board Size, 2011, 
International Listing, Industry Type (Energy), Board Independence, Firm Age, MD Index, Family 
Members, State Ownership, 2012, Firm Size LOG, Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.667 20 .183 14.742 .000b 
Residual 4.514 372 .012   
Total 8.181 392    
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2013, Role Duality, Director Ownership, Assets-in-Place, Industry Type 
(Services), Profitability (ROA), Institutional Ownership, Liquidity, Board Size, 2011, 
International Listing, Industry Type (Energy), Board Independence, Firm Age, MD Index, Family 
Members, State Ownership, 2012, Firm Size LOG, Leverage 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.119 .106  -1.127 .260   
Firm Size LOG .018 .007 .143 2.493 .013 .463 2.159 
Industry Type 
(Services) 
-.039 .014 -.124 -2.768 .006 .754 1.327 
Industry Type (Energy) .050 .026 .089 1.918 .056 .700 1.428 
Leverage .190 .041 .282 4.639 .000 .412 2.429 
Profitability (ROA) .365 .084 .188 4.365 .000 .818 1.223 
Liquidity .001 .003 .007 .150 .881 .618 1.619 
Assets-in-Place .052 .027 .084 1.974 .049 .835 1.198 
International Listing .129 .029 .197 4.477 .000 .789 1.268 
Firm Age .000 .000 .045 .944 .346 .665 1.503 
Director Ownership -.013 .046 -.014 -.295 .768 .637 1.570 
Institutional Ownership -.008 .033 -.012 -.249 .803 .667 1.500 
State Ownership .150 .036 .208 4.167 .000 .608 1.645 
Board Size .018 .004 .229 5.073 .000 .746 1.341 
Board Independence -.032 .028 -.050 -1.125 .261 .778 1.285 
Family Members -.063 .036 -.083 -1.739 .083 .674 1.483 
Role Duality .050 .017 .143 2.999 .003 .665 1.504 
MD Index -.024 .124 -.009 -.190 .849 .713 1.402 
2011 .001 .016 .003 .070 .944 .665 1.504 
2012 .000 .016 .001 .019 .985 .662 1.510 
2013 .008 .016 .024 .500 .617 .653 1.532 
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
503 
 
Table H4: Voluntary Disclosure Multivariate Regression Results Model IV 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .696a .485 .455 .10792 .440 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Group 3: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, 2013, Liquidity, Director Ownership, 
Board Independence, Industry Type (Services), Assets-in-Place, Profitability (ROA), Board Size, 
Industry Type (Energy), 2011, International Listing, Institutional Ownership, Role Duality, 
Family Members, MD Index, Firm Age, State Ownership, 2012, Leverage, Firm Size LOG 
b. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.965 21 .189 16.208 .000b 
Residual 4.216 371 .012   
Total 8.181 392    
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Group 3: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, 2013, Liquidity, Director 
Ownership, Board Independence, Industry Type (Services), Assets-in-Place, Profitability 
(ROA), Board Size, Industry Type (Energy), 2011, International Listing, Institutional 
Ownership, Role Duality, Family Members, MD Index, Firm Age, State Ownership, 2012, 
Leverage, Firm Size LOG  
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -.234 .110  -2.130 .034   
Firm Size LOG  .061 .011 .333 5.504 .000 .390 2.566 
Industry Type (Services) -.036 .014 -.117 -2.687 .008 .753 1.328 
Industry Type (Energy) .042 .025 .075 1.657 .098 .698 1.432 
Leverage .155 .040 .230 3.857 .000 .399 2.506 
Profitability (ROA) .338 .081 .174 4.168 .000 .814 1.228 
Liquidity .002 .003 .025 .510 .611 .616 1.624 
Assets-in-Place .075 .026 .121 2.900 .004 .816 1.226 
International Listing .090 .029 .138 3.122 .002 .733 1.364 
Firm Age .001 .000 .095 2.012 .045 .641 1.560 
Director Ownership .036 .045 .038 .794 .428 .606 1.650 
Institutional Ownership -.009 .032 -.013 -.285 .776 .666 1.502 
State Ownership .124 .035 .173 3.532 .000 .595 1.680 
Board Size .016 .003 .212 4.856 .000 .745 1.343 
Board Independence -.036 .027 -.057 -1.331 .184 .777 1.288 
Family Members -.075 .035 -.099 -2.154 .032 .672 1.488 
Role Duality .062 .016 .178 3.826 .000 .659 1.518 
MD Index .109 .122 .041 .888 .375 .683 1.463 
2011 .001 .016 .002 .043 .966 .665 1.504 
2012 -.001 .016 -.002 -.048 .962 .662 1.511 
2013 .004 .016 .012 .247 .805 .651 1.537 
Sub-sample: Bahrain, 
Oman, Kuwait (Old 
Stock Market) 
.054 .016 .184 3.461 .001 .504 1.984 
a. Dependent Variable: VD Index 
 
 
